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Abstract	
Part	of	a	new	cohort	of	diplomatic	actors,	sub-state	governments	represent	a	particularly	
complex	challenge	for	our	understanding	of	international	relations.	These	actors	are	both	
territorially	constituted	and	governmental;	they	look	and	sound	very	similar	to	states.	
Crucially,	however,	they	are	not	states	at	all.	When	paradiplomatic	relations	are	conducted	
on	the	part	of	sub-state	governments	with	a	strong	regional	identity,	in	particular	‘stateless	
nations’,	there	can	sometimes	be	challenge	–	implicit	or	explicit	–	to	the	authority	of	the	
state	to	speak	for,	or	represent,	its	people.	This	thesis	takes	three	such	stateless	nations:	
Wales,	Scotland	and	Bavaria,	and	analyses	their	paradiplomatic	activities.	The	unique	
political	context	in	each	of	these	case	studies	is	used	as	a	frame	within	which	to	understand	
and	interpret	both	the	motivations	and	implications	of	such	activities.		Using	a	conceptual	
toolkit	less	familiar	to	traditional	paradiplomatic	analysis,	including	sovereignty	games,	
performativity	and	mimicry,	the	study	explores	the	ways	in	which	sub-state	governments	
acquire	international	agency,	and	the	extent	to	which	this	agency	is	contested	by	other	
actors.	Despite	the	range	in	political	ambitions	in	each	of	the	stateless	nations	considered,	
the	paradiplomatic	activities	they	conducted	were	often	remarkably	similar.	What	differed,	
however,	was	the	way	that	these	activities	were	interpreted,	depending	on	the	political	
context	and	the	tenor	of	inter-governmental	relations	within	the	state.	The	paradox	of	
paradiplomacy	is	that	in	many	ways	it	remains	unremarkable	in	its	day-to-day	practices.	Yet,	
at	other	times,	sub-state	governments	use	their	international	relationships	to	make	
important	claims	about	their	status	and	position	within	their	state,	the	currency	of	
exchanges	becoming	that	rarefied	concept:	sovereignty.	Using	a	marginal	site	of	
international	relations	such	as	paradiplomacy,	this	thesis	explores	the	heterogeneity	of	the	
field	and	the	variety	of	relationships	that	exist	and	persist	within	it.	
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Introduction	
Who	does	diplomacy?	We	know	that	 it’s	no	 longer	the	monopoly	of	 impenetrable	 foreign	
offices,	ministers	with	stiff	upper	lips	and	manicured	moustaches.	A	place	remains,	surely,	for	
the	appropriately	attired	attaché,	briefcase	in	hand.	But	what	of	soft	power,	the	subtle	plays	
of	public	diplomacy?	The	Twitter-happy,	Facebook-friendly	protagonists,	not	just	promoting	
the	diplomatic	messages	of	states,	but	of	other	actors:	faith	groups,	advocates	of	minority	
rights,	breakaway	governments?	It’s	a	truism	-	and	yet	it’s	true	-	the	practices	of	diplomacy	
are	 changing,	 proliferating,	 becoming	 more	 inclusive.	 It	 is	 no	 longer	 easy	 to	 distinguish	
‘official’	diplomacy	from	this	wider	pool	of	interactions.		
	
At	the	same	time,	in	another	realm,	the	political	currency	of	regionalism,	self-determination	
and	nation-building	has	an	increased	potency.	If	one	pulls	at	this	thread,	all	sorts	of	issues	
come	 tumbling	 out.	 Regions	 and	 devolved	 governments	 in	 democratic	 states	 clamour	 for	
more	 authority,	 more	 autonomy.	 Religious	 and	 ethnic	 factions	 break	 away	 into	 new	
unrecognised	 governments	 or	 self-declared	 states.	 Indigenous	 peoples	 stake	 a	 claim	 on	
incorporated	territory,	be	that	for	a	seat	at	the	table	-	or	for	the	whole	table	itself.	From	civic	
nationalism	through	to	civil	war,	there	is	a	continuum.		However,	something	does	link	both	
ends	of	this	spectrum:	the	use	of	a	diplomatic	toolkit,	to	play	with	the	relative	roles	or	power	
positions	 that	 are	held.	 To	 secure	 specific,	 concrete	objectives	 or	 simply	 to	 challenge	 the	
status	quo.		
	
Where	traditional	diplomacy	might	face	a	‘challenge’	from	the	presence	of	de-territorialized	
actors,	NGOs,	transnational	companies	and	international	organizations,	what	is	presented	by	
the	above,	territorially-based,	category	of	actors	is	something	really	quite	different.	Here,	the	
weakened	boundaries	between	who	is,	and	who	is	not,	a	diplomat	meet	similarly	weakened	
boundaries	around	what	is,	and	what	isn’t,	a	state.	We	see	the	government	-	territory	nexus	
particularly	clearly	as	these	actors	exert	some	form	of	governmental	control	over	a	defined	
territory,	meaning	that	they	have	an	awful	 lot	more	 in	common	with	states	than	with	any	
NGO.	Of	course;	we	must	not	get	ahead	of	ourselves,	or	set	up	straw	men.	Canada	is	a	state.	
Hay	on	Wye	is	not	(despite	the	parody	performed	by	the	self-proclaimed	“King	of	Hay”).		But	
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what	of	the	status	of	quasi-sovereign	actors,	unrecognised	or	de	facto	states,	autonomous	
regions,	or	regions	actively	seeking	statehood?	What	about	Northern	Cyprus,	or	the	Tibetan	
Government	in	Exile?	What	do	we	make	of	the	remnants	of	colonialism	-	overseas	territories	
such	 as	 Guadeloupe,	 Gibraltar	 or	 Guam?	 What	 about	 regions	 such	 as	 Scotland,	 Venice,	
Catalonia,	Kurdistan	or	Quebec?	It	 is	apparent	that	many	non-state	entities	in	fact	possess	
many	state-like	qualities	and	competences.		
	
If	diplomacy	 is	 the	conduct	by	governmental	officials	of	relations	or	negotiations	between	
states,	then	there	is	a	large	mass	of	grey	area	remaining.	Where	the	loosening	of	diplomatic	
boundaries	 meets	 the	 proliferation	 of	 territorially	 based	 non-state	 -	 yet	 governmental	 -	
actors,	is	an	area	ripe	for	research.	Within	this	group	are	not	only	unrecognised	states	seeking	
formal	 recognition	 from	 the	 international	 community,	 but	 also	 a	 whole	 host	 of	 regional,	
governmental	 actors	 that	 increasingly	 employ	 the	 practices	 of	 diplomacy	 as	 part	 of	 their	
attempts	 to	 reach	 and	 represent	 themselves	 upon	 a	 more	 global	 stage.	 Not	 seeking	
statehood,	but	perhaps	acting	outside	of	the	restricted,	parochial	parameters	set	out	for	them	
-	and	often	appealing	to	national	sentiments	as	they	do	so.	
	
For	regions	 -	some	who	represent	sub-state	nations,	some	who	seek	 independence,	some	
who	do	neither	-	the	lure	of	a	diplomatic	toolkit	is	hard	to	resist.	Across	large	swathes	of	the	
world,	sub-state	governments	(most	often	where	they	are	endowed	with	a	constitutional	role	
and	 legislative	profile)	 represent	 the	 interests	of	a	 territorially	defined	people,	one	whose	
constituency	overlaps	with	that	of	a	nation-state.	Owing	to	the	necessities	of	our	globalised	
age,	there	are	a	multitude	of	pragmatic,	economic	reasons	for	such	a	sub-state	government	
to	 develop	 an	 international	 profile.	 In	 many	 cases,	 however,	 there	 are	 also	 compelling	
political	reasons	for	them	to	do	so.	This	may	be	because	their	constituents	demand	a	greater	
voice	within	 the	 state.	 It	may	be	 in	order	 to	gain	 traction	on	a	 specific	 issue	of	particular	
importance	to	that	community	-	from	fishing	rights	to	minority	rights.	It	may	also	be	to	reflect	
and	promote	the	region’s	identity	or	its	demands	for	self-government,	nationhood	or	other	
forms	of	self-determination.		
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Paradiplomacy	 -	 these	 international	 interactions,	 carried	out	by	governments	and	officials	
below	the	state	 level	 -	 is	one	 lens	with	which	 to	 look	at	what	 is,	essentially,	a	collision	of	
forces:	the	efflorescence	of	a	regionalist,	sub-state	nationalist	or	self-determinist	 ideology,	
on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 diversification	 and	 stratification	 of	 diplomatic	 practices	 on	 the	
other.	There	may	be	other	ways	in	which	to	view	this	relationship,	but	the	sheer	volume	of	
paradiplomatic	exchanges	and	the	degree	to	which	they	have	become	commonplace,	yet	at	
heart	not	fully	understood,	would	signal	that	this	is	a	good	place	to	start.	These	emergent	-	
some	might	argue,	resurgent	-	practices,	and	the	twin	forces	or	phenomena	that	they	reflect	
(a	burgeoning	regionalist	ideology	-	and	the	accompanying	institutional	framework	-	and	the	
diversification	 of	 diplomacy),	 may	 be	 on	 the	 periphery	 of	 what	 is	 considered	 ‘proper’	
international	relations.	 Indeed,	 it	may	seem	too	much	of	a	 leap	to	discuss	the	minutiae	of	
regional	exchanges	in	the	same	breath	as	the	big	hitters	of	the	IR	mainstream:	sovereignty,	
authority,	power.	But	it	is	precisely	in	this	unassuming	borderland	between	the	domestic	and	
the	international	that	these	themes	are	played	upon,	challenged	and	reasserted.	According	
to	Adler-Nissen	and	Gad	(2012:	3),	enquiry	at	the	margins	of	international	relations	has	the	
potential	to	shed	a	great	deal	of	light	into	these	forces,	allowing	the	true	heterogeneity	of	
practices	to	come	to	the	surface.	It’s	difficult	to	see	such	dynamics,	as	they	really	are,	when	
wearing	 a	 ‘Westphalian	 straightjacket’,	 one	 that	 only	 allows	 either/or	 conceptions	 of	
sovereignty	or	statehood	to	be	considered	(Buzan	and	Little,	2001:	-25;	Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	
2014:	14).	
	
Paradiplomacy	is	a	practice	pregnant	with	contradiction.	It	can	represent	a	set	of	tools	and	
mechanisms	 by	 which	 hierarchically	 subordinate	 non-state	 actors	 attempt	 to	 reposition	
themselves	in	relation	to	their	state	counterparts.	They	are	able	to	speak	for	a	given	‘people’	
in	a	sense	that	overlaps	a	constituency	both	levels	of	government	claim	to	represent	and,	in	
doing	so,	challenge	the	core	functions	of	state-level	actors	and	institutions.	Yet,	at	the	same	
time,	 its	main	 composite	 activities	 -	 the	Memoranda	 of	 Understanding	 between	 regional	
governments,	 cultural	 exchanges	 and	 regional-twinning	 projects	 -	 are	 ordinary	 in	 the	
extreme.	Or	at	least,	they	may	appear	to	be	so,	given	the	assumptions	we	tend	to	make	about	
this	 tier	of	 government.	 Likewise,	 in	 the	 self-perceptions	 and	understandings	of	 sub-state	
diplomats,	 their	 international	 role	 is	 both	 something	 minor	 and	 even	 expendable	 (‘low-
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hanging	fruit’,	 in	the	words	of	one	 interviewee),	and	 it	 is	also	an	 important	component	of	
their	 nation-building	 projects,	 both	 implicit	 and	 explicit	 -	 some	 of	 which	 seek	 eventual	
secession	from	the	state	or	a	fundamental	recasting	of	state	-	sub-state	powers.		A	form	of	
political	doublespeak	abounds	in	this	territory.	Paradiplomacy	is	argued	to	be	‘all	about	the	
economy’,	grounded	in	the	legitimate	and	unavoidably	international	concerns	of	rightful	sub-
state	governance.	 It	can	also,	however,	be	about	 identity,	political	power,	nationhood	and	
even	 sovereignty.	 As	 this	 thesis	 will	 go	 on	 to	 explore,	 the	 broader	 implications	 of	
paradiplomatic	activity	-	at	least	in	its	most	advanced	forms	-	are	similarly	bound	up	in	such	
an	oscillatory	dynamic.		Judging	whether	or	not	a	paradiplomatic	activity	is	‘advanced’	or	not	
is,	of	course,	a	subjective	process.	However,	there	are	some	useful	parameters	that	we	might	
look	 to:	 does	 the	 activity	 stray	 outside	 of	 clearly	 or	 predominately	 functional,	 inward-
investment-seeking	 territory?	 Does	 the	 activity	 contradict,	 challenge	 or	 contest	 the	
diplomacy	of	the	state	which	the	region	sits	within?	Is	there	a	clear	constitutional	basis	for	
the	activity?	Does	the	activity	generate	debate	or	controversy,	within	the	region,	the	state,	
or	more	widely?	The	responses	to	these	questions	can	help	to	guide	us	towards	a	cluster	of	
activities	which	may	reflect	a	more	complex	set	of	underpinning	forces.	
	
Despite	 its	 recent	 resurgence	 as	 an	 area	 of	 academic	 interest,	 the	 extant	 paradiplomacy	
literature	 has	 failed	 to	 adequately	 take	 account	 of	 this	 core	 feature	 of	 the	 practice	 -	 its	
paradoxical,	contradictory	nature	-	or	to	explore	the	full	value	that	an	international	role	may	
have	for	sub-state	actors	from	an	agency-orientated	perspective.	Driven	by	more	traditional	
comparative	politics	perspectives,	the	view	has	-	for	the	most	part	-	been	that	paradiplomatic	
actions	can	be	explained	away	by	the	driving	forces	of	European	integration	and	globalisation,	
new	 international	opportunity	structures	necessitating	an	 international	profile	 for	 regions,	
whose	 role	 is	 seen	 as	 largely	 reactive.	 In	 short,	 ‘it’s	 the	 economy,	 stupid’.	 Yet,	 sub-state	
governments	display	a	tremendous	range	in	their	international	engagements,	as	well	as	in	the	
priorities	 they	 pursue	 on	 the	 international	 stage,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	 present	
themselves	to	the	outside	world.	They	are	doing	more	than	simply	responding	to	external	
forces:	 they	 are	 cultivating	 international	 personalities	 of	 different	 tenors,	 consciously	
developing	agency	in	a	domain	where	their	status	is,	to	a	large	degree,	what	they	make	of	it.		
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As	part	of	these	top-down,	consequentialist	approaches	to	the	study	of	sub-state	diplomacy,	
analyses	have	leant	towards	the	descriptive	rather	than	the	explanatory	(McConnell	et	al.,	
2012:	806).	Consequently,	such	studies	have	ignored	the	wider,	more	probing,	questions	that	
paradiplomatic	 practices	 can	 raise.	 For	 McConnell	 et	 al.	 (2012:	 806)	 these	 surround	 the	
legitimising	functions	that	diplomatic	activity	may	accomplish,	and	the	performative	aspects	
of	paradiplomatic	practice.	Meanwhile,	though	relatedly,	there	has	been	a	lack	of	willingness	
from	within	the	discipline	of	International	Relations	(IR)	to	engage	with	this	topic,	outside	of	
the	narrower	frame	of	globalisation.	Nor	have	contributions	from	the	Comparative	Politics	
tradition	tended	to	draw	upon	and	utilise	insights	from	other	fields,	notably	that	of	IR,	in	their	
paradiplomatic	investigations.	Such	an	approach	-	drawing	on	the	theoretical	frameworks	and	
vocabularies	of	both	international	relations	and	comparative	politics	-	would,	however,	seem	
the	most	logical	and	appropriate	one	for	a	field	of	study	that	is	located	precisely	on	the	border	
between	 the	 international	 and	 the	 domestic;	 nested	within	 the	 structure	 of	 a	 sovereign,	
hierarchical	state	yet	concerned	with	the	establishment	of	direct	relationships	and	exchanges	
with	external	actors	beyond	that	state,	both	sovereign	and	otherwise.	Such	activities	have	a	
genesis,	 and	 indeed	have	 implications,	 that	 relate	 to	both	 the	 international	 and	domestic	
spheres.	Indeed,	this	borderland	is	the	area	that	Adler-Nissen	and	Gad	identify	as	being	most	
noticeably	subject	to	the	‘blindness’	of	academics	to	the	full	view	of	what	actually	occurs	in	
politics,	 constrained	 by	 ‘either/or’	 conceptions	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 rigid	 classifications	 of	
political	relations	(2014:	14).	
	
This	 study	 seeks	 to	 redress	 these	 imbalances.	 The	 approach	 adopted	 here	 is	 to	 place	
paradiplomatic	activity	in	the	‘bigger	picture’,	looking	analytically	at	precisely	what	it	is	that	
sub-state	 governments	 are	 doing	 internationally,	 the	 ways	 that	 they	 establish	 their	
international	agencies,	the	motivations	they	may	have	for	pursuing	an	external	role	and	the	
implications	of	their	doing	so.	The	aim	is	to	uncover	the	nuances	and	contradictory	‘push-pull’	
dynamics	evident	in	the	roles	that	sub-state	governments	play	on	the	international	stage.	At	
the	same	time,	an	attempt	is	made	to	place	paradiplomacy	in	a	context	which	allows	us	to	
see	 the	 value	 that	 diplomacy	 and	 international	 actorness	may	have	 for	 actors	 other	 than	
sovereign	states.		
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This	thesis	progresses	in	two	main	stages.	The	first	stage	(Chapters	One	and	Two)	looks	to	
reposition	 paradiplomacy	 in	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 which	 better	 takes	 account	 of	 the	
broader	significance	of	the	practice.		Chapter	One	surveys	the	existing	literature,	highlighting	
the	 dominance	 of	 top-down,	 structural	 and	 descriptive	 accounts	 of	 the	 practice,	 and	 the	
absence	 of	 international	 relations	 narratives.	 In	 Chapter	 Two,	 a	 new	 perspective	 on	
paradiplomatic	 activity	 is	 offered.	 This	 includes	 a	 deliberate	 attempt	 to	 distinguish	
paradiplomatic	 endeavours	 -	 as	 autonomous,	 diplomatic	 activities	 -	 from	 a	wider	 pool	 of	
interactions	 that	 include	 aspects	 of	 multi-level	 governance.	 The	 argument	 is	 made	 that	
considering	the	nuanced	differences	between	the	concepts	of	paradiplomacy	and	multi-level	
allows	for	a	more	direct	light	to	be	shone	on	the	ways	in	which	paradiplomacy	touches	upon	
core	areas	of	state	competence,	and	the	challenges	that	these	incursions	present.		It	is	posited	
that	multi-level	governance	and	paradiplomacy	can	represent	meaningfully	different	types	of	
activity,	conducted	in	different	ways,	and	with	different	aims.	Instead,	an	alternative	range	of	
theoretical	 constructs	 are	 introduced	which	 relate	more	 closely	 to	 the	 crucial	 element	 of	
political	 contestation	 implicit	 in	 much	 paradiplomatic	 activity.	 At	 heart,	 it	 is	 an	 agency-
oriented	 framework.	 It	 allows	 for	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 ways	 that	 diplomatic	 tools	 are	
appropriated	by	sub-state	actors,	the	roles	they	go	on	to	play	on	an	international	stage	and	
the	meanings	 that	 these	 newly	 formed	 international	 identities	 have	 for	 such	 actors,	 and	
indeed	their	state-level	counterparts.	Specifically,	the	key	theoretical	constructs	introduced	
in	 part	 one	of	 this	 thesis	 include:	 sovereignty	 games	 (Adler-Nissen	 and	Gad,	 2012;	Adler-
Nissen	 and	Gad,	 2014),	mimicry	 (McConnell,	 2016;	 Duran,	 2015;	McConnell	 et	 al.,	 2012),	
performativity	(Neumann,	2003)	and	-	more	familiar	to	traditional	paradiplomatic	analyses	-		
nation-building	(Lecours,	2002).	The	final	part	of	Chapter	Two	outlines	the	empirical	research	
project	that	follows,	utilising	the	alternative	theoretical	framework	established.	It	introduces	
the	reader	to	our	three	case	studies	-	Wales,	Scotland	and	Bavaria	-	and	the	ways	in	which	
these	 cases	will	 be	 examined,	 via	 a	 tripartite	 analysis:	 institutional,	 discourse	 and	 praxis,	
drawing	on	a	range	of	sources	including	semi-structured	elite	interviews,	statutes	and	official	
documentation,	parliamentary	records	and	media	reports.		
	
Part	two	of	the	thesis	(Chapters	Three,	Four,	Five	and	Six)	addresses	a	set	of	-	sequential	-	
research	questions,	drawing	on	empirical	data	from	three	case	studies,	all	of	which	sit	at	the	
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more	 ‘developed’	 end	 of	 the	 paradiplomatic	 spectrum.	 Here,	 the	 sorts	 of	 paradiplomatic	
activities	that	the	sub-state	government	engages	in	go	beyond	purely	functional,	region-to-
region	exchanges.	They	can	include	‘official’	diplomatic	relationships	with	full	nation	states.	
They	can	include	lobbying	for	support	on	independence	or	secession.	They	may	challenge	or	
contest	a	theme	or	decision	made	by	the	government	of	a	state	that	the	region	sits	within,	
looking	 to	 an	 international	 audience	 to	 support	 their	 cause.	 Or	 a	 region	 may	 use	 an	
international	 cause	 -	 the	 environment,	 for	 example	 -	 or	 a	 particular	 event	 or	 disaster	 to	
highlight	division	or	political	difference	within	the	state.	The	decision	to	look	specifically	at	
this	set	of	relatively	advanced	paradiplomatic	activities	rests	on	the	fact	that	it	is	here	that	
the	chaffing	of	the	boundaries	of	state	authority	is	most	evident.	The	focus	of	this	study	is	
indeed	this	very	point	of	friction,	assessing	the	ways	in	which	diplomatic	tools	can	be	utilised	
by	non-state	actors	for	a	range	of	political	ends;	the	choice	of	three	stateless	nations	thereby	
allows	us	 to	 explore	 those	 actions	 less	 readily	 understood	with	 reference	 to	economic	or	
functional	 imperatives.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 study,	 a	 nation	 is	 understood	 to	 reflect	
Anderson’s	 “imagined	 community”	 (Anderson,	 2006),	 and	 stateless	 nations	 –	 a	 nation	
incongruent	with	 its	state	 -	are	considered	a	particular	 type	of	political	community	 that	 is	
growing	in	significance,	“able	to	capture	and	promote	sentiments	of	 loyalty,	solidarity	and	
community	among	individuals	who	have	developed	a	growing	need	for	identity”	(Guibernau,	
2004:	1255).	
	
Methodologically	speaking,	the	approach	adopted	is	somewhat	‘messy’,	drawing	as	it	does	
on	 concepts	 both	 from	 comparative	 politics	 and	 IR.	 The	 particular	 value	 of	 such	
methodological	eclecticism	in	a	problem	(rather	than	method)	driven	area	of	study	has	been	
previously	 established	 (Krook	 and	 Squires,	 2006),	 and	 this	 rationale	 is	 explored	 in	 the	
methodology	section	of	the	thesis.	A	pulling	together	of	different	intellectual	toolkits	seems	
only	logical	when	trying	to	understand	activities	that	take	place	within	a	nested	structure,	and	
that	have	a	Janus-faced	nature.	To	understand	paradiplomacy,	we	-	of	course	-	must	get	a	
handle	on	the	town-twinning,	memoranda	signing,	day-to-day	mundanity	of	the	practice.	But	
at	 the	same	time,	we	have	 to	at	 least	 try	and	understand	why	 the	act	of	 ‘representation’	
abroad	is	so	contested	by	state	and	sub-state	governments.	We	need	to	interpret	the	political	
calculations	involved	in	a	sub-state	government	dissenting	from	a	state-level	diplomatic	‘line’.	
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Certainly,	we	should	attempt	to	locate	the	precise	boundaries	between	state	and	sub-state	
authority	when	it	comes	to	external	affairs.	In	short:	the	task	is	inherently	broad	and	varied,	
so	must	be	the	tools.	A	focus	on	a	site	of	international	activity	such	as	paradiplomacy,	one	
that	takes	place	at	the	very	boundary	between	the	domestic	and	the	 international,	would	
seem	to	necessitate	an	approach	that	brings	both	 international	 relations	and	comparative	
politics	into	the	same	fold.		
	
Chapter	three	addresses	the	first	in	the	sequence	of	empirical	research	questions	and	asks,	in	
an	institutional	capacity,	what	exactly	it	is	that	sub-state	governments	are	able	-	and	willing	-	
to	do	in	terms	of	their	diplomacy.	As	a	proxy	for	a	‘gold	standard’	of	traditional	diplomatic	
activity,	 the	 Vienna	 Convention	 on	 Diplomatic	 Relations	 (VCDR)	 is	 utilised	 as	 a	 frame	 of	
reference,	against	which	to	assess	the	scope	of	paradiplomacy	and	the	status	of	sub-state	
governments	in	terms	of	international	and	diplomatic	law.	This	is	particularly	important	owing	
to	the	fine	line	that	sub-state	governments	must	tread	in	terms	of	whether	their	diplomacy	is	
‘official’	or	‘unofficial’,	whether	it	draws	on	the	legal	authority	of	their	state	governments	or	
whether	 it	 is	 executed	 independently	 from	 it.	As	 the	 chapter	explores,	 there	 is	 a	political	
choice	at	the	heart	of	this	distinction,	particularly	for	Wales	and	Scotland	who	maintain	the	
unusual	ability	to	‘opt	in’	to	the	VCDR	via	co-location	with	UK	overseas	missions,	should	they	
choose	to.	The	chapter	briefly	explores	the	ongoing	relevance	of	the	Treaty,	and	in	particular	
the	host	of	challenges	currently	posed	to	its	centrality	in	diplomatic	law	-	many	of	which	also	
relate	 to	 the	emergence	of	non-state	diplomatic	actors.	 It	 then	moves	on	 to	examine	 the	
formal	 status	of	paradiplomacy	 in	 the	UK	and	 in	Germany,	and	provide	an	account	of	 the	
various	ways	that	Wales,	Scotland	and	Bavaria	have	chosen	to	enact	their	diplomacy,	which	
at	times	visibly	pushes	at	the	legal	boundaries	that	they	operate	within.	Particular	attention	
is	paid	to	the	types	of	overseas	representations	that	our	case	studies	have	established,	and	
to	the	relative	distance	or	proximity	that	such	representations	maintain	to	the	‘host’-state,	to	
use	Cornago’s	terminology	(Cornago,	2010).		
	
On	 establishing	 the	 varied	 statuses	 that	 the	 three	 case	 studies	 exhibit	 in	 terms	 of	 their	
paradiplomacies	in	Chapter	Three	-	in	other	words,	‘what’	forms	of	diplomacy	they	choose,	
or	are	enabled,	to	pursue	-	the	subsequent	chapter	moves	on	to	consider	the	political	logics	
	 9	
underpinning	the	development	of	such	disparate	strategies	and	international	profiles.	Simply,	
why	sub-state	governments	conduct	the	paradiplomatic	activities	that	they	do.		This	Chapter	
(Four)	 looks	 beyond	 the	 economic	 rationales	 most	 commonly	 used	 to	 account	 for	
paradiplomacy	 and	 instead	 reframes	 the	 issue	 as	 a	 type	 of	 sovereignty	 game;	 a	 way	 of	
conceptualising	 the	 back-and-forth	 between	 sovereign	 and	 ‘other’	 actors	 that	 revolves	
around	the	rightful	sites	of	power	and	political	authority	(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2012;	Adler-
Nissen	and	Gad,	2014).	Owing	to	the	fact	that	international	relations	and	diplomacy	are	policy	
areas	so	closely	allied	with	the	very	notion	of	sovereignty	itself,	the	practice	of	paradiplomacy	
necessarily	plays	on	and	challenges	the	traditional	hierarchical	roles	of	state	and	sub-state	
government.	The	chapter	explores	the	utility	of	paradiplomacy	to	the	political	ambitions	of	
each	of	our	governing	parties,	and	the	ways	in	which	they	draw	on	and	‘mimic’	the	behaviours	
and	discourses	of	stateness:	helping	to	anchor	the	region	or	stateless	nation	in	an	accepted	
and	 familiar	discourse	 that	 strengthens	and	normalizes	national	 sentiments	 in	 a	domestic	
setting.	This	is	enabled	by	taking	on	(mimicking)	the	outward	appearance	of	a	state:	a	defining	
characteristic	of	which	being	the	ability	to	conduct	diplomatic	relations.		
	
In	chapter	five,	the	processes	of	international	agency	creation	are	explored	in	greater	detail	-	
probing	 the	 question	 of	 how	 sub-state	 governments	 go	 about	 securing	 international	
legitimacy.	 In	 particular,	 it	 employs	 the	 framework	 of	 performativity;	 going	 beyond	 fixed	
classifications	of	actors	and	capabilities	and	instead	looking	at	the	actual	interactions	taking	
place.	The	chapter	investigates	a	separate	‘performance’,	or	set	of	performances,	from	each	
of	our	case-studies	that	tell	both	external	actors	and	domestic	audiences	how	the	sub-state	
government	sees	itself,	its	region	or	stateless	nation,	and	the	place	that	it	aspires	to	on	the	
world	stage.	These	include:	the	establishment	of	Bavaria’s	‘grand’	European	representation;	
the	Welsh	Government’s	performances	at	the	Copenhagen	Climate	change	Summit	and	those	
surrounding	 the	 launch	 of	 its	 ‘Wales	 for	 Africa’	 development	 assistance	 programme;	 and	
Scottish	diplomacy	surrounding	the	arrival	of	two	Chinese	Pandas	in	Edinburgh’s	zoo.	These	
process-tracing	exercises	provide	a	detailed	account	both	of	 the	attempts	at	 international	
agency	 creation,	 and	 the	ways	 that	 such	 attempts	 are	 contested	or	 conditioned	by	other	
actors,	in	particular	host-state	governments.	Such	a	perspective	attempts	to	overcome	the	
challenge	of	analysing	paradiplomatic	activities	 in	a	way	that	 takes	 into	account	 the	often	
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conflictual	messages	sent	by	its	component	actors:	sub-state	politicians	and	officials	as	well	
as	diplomats	at	the	national	level	and	those	from	‘receiving’	states	and	regions.	As	in	chapter	
four,	the	language	of	mimicry	is	employed	throughout	the	analysis	in	chapter	five.	Essentially,	
this	allows	us	to	consider	the	various	ways	in	which	the	symbols	and	discourses	of	state-level	
diplomacy	are	used	or	‘mimicked’	by	sub-state	actors.	However,	rather	than	investigating	the	
reasons	why	a	mimetic	strategy	may	help	to	establish	and	reinforce	a	sense	of	nationhood	or	
political	distinctiveness	at	a	domestic	level,	it	is	instead	used	as	a	way	to	understand	how	sub-
state	governments	bring	legitimacy	and	credibility	to	their	external	roles,	as	perceived	by	the	
international	community.	Mimicry,	in	this	context,	is	used	to	account	for	the	ways	in	which	
sub-state	actors	learn	to	‘walk	the	walk’	and	‘talk	the	talk’	of	an	international	agent,	rather	
than	a	domestically	bound	actor.	
	
Chapter	 Six	 builds	 on	 the	 explorations	 of	 ‘what’,	 ‘why’	 and	 ‘how’	 in	 the	 previous	 three	
chapters	 to	 address	 the	broader	 significance	of	 paradiplomatic	 activity,	 and	 ascribe	 some	
characteristics	to	the	nature	of	sub-state	governments	as	international	agents.	The	first	part	
of	 the	 chapter	 explores	 the	 hybridity	 of	 sub-state	 governments	 as	 international	 actors,	
arguing	that	their	‘sovereignty	bound,	sovereignty	free’	status	(Hocking,	1997)	has	important	
consequences.	They	can	both	claim	to	legitimately	represent	a	given	‘people’,	marking	them	
apart	from	many	other	non-state	actors,	and	yet	maintain	a	large	degree	of	selectivity	in	their	
international	endeavours.	In	our	three	case	studies,	neither	Wales	nor	Scotland	nor	Bavaria	
carry	 the	burden	of	 constitutional	 responsibility	 for	 international	 affairs,	 and	 indeed	 their	
paradiplomatic	activities	often	take	place	with	very	little	scrutiny	from	either	parliamentary	
or	media	sources	as	to	the	substance	of	their	interactions.	When	combined	with	the	ability	to	
draw	on	state-level	resources	and	reputations	(as	well	as	those	of	the	sub-state	government	
itself),	these	features	amount	to	a	particular	type	of	international	operational	space,	with	a	
distinct	range	of	qualities.	Sub-state	governments	are	able	to	occupy	this	space	to	differing	
ends:	allowing	them	to	conduct	international	relations	on	a	largely	‘a	la	carte’	basis,	yet	from	
a	restricted	menu.	The	ultimate	constraints	that	sub-state	governments	operate	within,	and	
employ	 such	 selectivity	 within,	 are	 hard,	 unyielding	 ones:	 part	 of	 the	 paradox	 that	 is	
paradiplomacy.	The	second	part	of	Chapter	Six	thus	moves	on	to	consider	the	range	of	ways	
in	which	this	-	potentially	quite	privileged	-	space	can	be	utilised	by	sub-state	actors.	Ranging	
	 11	
from	the	 ‘paradiplomacy	of	good	 intentions’,	 through	 to	paradiplomacy	 ‘on	 the	 fringes	of	
‘high	politics’,	this	section	identifies	six	separate	categories	of	paradiplomatic	activity	based	
on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 challenge	 -	 or	 otherwise	 -	 that	 such	 activities	 represent	 for	 other	
members	of	the	international	community,	in	particular	host-state	governments.	This	chapter	
presents	 an	 account	 of	 paradiplomacy	 grounded	 in	 both	 International	 Relations	 and	
Diplomatic	theory.	
	
A	 concluding	 chapter	 explores	what	 is	 perhaps	 the	 central	 finding	 of	 this	 thesis:	 that	 the	
contradictory	nature	of	paradiplomatic	activity	results	in	both	system-reinforcing	and	system-
disruptive	 effects	 (McConnell	 et	 al.,	 2012:	 811-812).	 Such	 oscillation	 is	 perhaps	 why	 the	
significance	of	the	phenomenon	has	been	subject	to	such	scant	academic	consideration;	it	is	
many	 things	 at	 once,	 a	 result	 of	 the	 ‘push-pull’	 dynamics	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 practice.	
Paradiplomacy	reinforces	the	status	of	‘official’,	state-to-state	diplomacy,	through	its	mimicry	
of	 this	 genre.	 Furthermore,	 absolute	 conceptions	 of	 hierarchical	 state-sovereignty	 are	
reinforced	through	the	use	of	paradiplomacy	as	a	state-building	tool,	evident	in	some	of	the	
most	 advanced	 cases,	 and	 arguably	 seen	 in	 the	 most	 recent	 manifestations	 of	 Scottish	
paradiplomacy,	 particularly	 following	 on	 from	2016’s	UK	 referendum	on	 EU	membership.	
However,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 paradiplomacy	 dilutes	 the	 monopoly	 that	 states	 hold	 on	 a	
rarefied	form	of	diplomacy,	simply	by	introducing	new	actors	into	the	game	(McConnell	et	al.,	
2012:	811-812);	crucially,	these	are	territorially	based,	governmental	actors.	These	actors	look	
and	sound	so	much	like	states	themselves	-	yet,	of	course,	are	not	states	at	all.		So	the	saying	
goes:	if	it	walks	like	a	duck,	swims	like	a	duck	and	quacks	like	a	duck,	we	are	inclined	to	believe	
it	is	-	in	fact	-	a	duck.	A	more	qualified	conception	of	sovereignty	is	therefore	promoted,	by	
virtue	of	sub-state	governments	having	wrested	some	element	of	control	 -	or	at	 least	 the	
perception	of	an	element	of	control	-	in	an	area	of	policy,	international	relations,	that	is	“so	
closely	 articulated	 to	 sovereignty	 that	 it	 is	 considered	 the	 prerogative	 of	 the	 sovereign”	
(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2014:	16).		
	
All	of	this	imbues	paradiplomatic	activities	with	a	particular	significance,	and	perhaps	serves	
as	 indication	 as	 to	 how	 far	 such	 sub-state	 authority	 or	 legitimacy	 can	 stretch	 in	 different	
contexts.	The	practice	of	paradiplomacy,	therefore,	may	be	best	understood	as	one	extended	
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sovereignty	game:	a	game	that	plays	on	and	challenges	the	language	of	sovereignty	and	its	
associated	concepts	-	authority,	representation,	legitimacy.	Crucially,	the	game	appears	to	be	
played	in	order	to	secure	the	status	of	sub-state	governments	as	rightful	participants	in	the	
game	 itself,	 something	 seemingly	 common	 to	 each	 of	 our	 case	 studies,	 rather	 than	 any	
particular	set	of	constitutional	concessions	(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2014).	Where	this	thesis	
departs	from	previous	explorations	of	paradiplomacy	in	relation	to	sub-state	nationalism	or	
nation	building	is	in	qualifying	the	link	between	the	phenomena.	Paradiplomacy	as	it	relates	
to	sub-state	nation	building	does	not	have	to	mean	a	concrete	end	goal.	We	do	not	have	to	
prove	an	imminent	will	to	secede,	recast	devolution	dispensations	or	federal	arrangements	
to	 know	 that	by	 conducting	 certain	 types	of	 paradiplomatic	 activity,	 and	by	 framing	 their	
interactions	in	certain	ways,	sub-state	governments	are	asserting	their	rightful	participation	
in	a	sovereignty	game.	We’ve	had	the	duck	test,	now	for	the	elephant	test:	something	that	is	
hard	 to	 describe,	 but	 instantly	 recognisable	 when	 you	 see	 it.	 This	 is	 paradiplomacy	 as	 a	
sovereignty	game.	Rarely	is	an	explicit	claim	to	sovereignty	made,	but	in	a	multitude	of	ways,	
this	 right	 to	 participate	 -	 or	 seat	 at	 the	 table	 -	 is	 exactly	 the	 currency	 of	 many	 of	 the	
paradiplomatic	endeavours	described	in	the	empirical	analyses	to	follow.	
	
The	value	of	this	particular	study	thus	lies	both	in	the	subject	matter	considered,	and	the	way	
that	it	is	explored.	Regional	identities	are	becoming	increasingly	salient	at	precisely	the	time	
when	 traditional	 diplomatic	 boundaries	 are	 being	 watered	 down,	 creating	 numerous	
opportunities	for	sub-state	governments	to	recast	their	previously	domestically-bound	roles	
and	reposition	themselves	vis	a	vis	their	host	states.	Yet,	previous	studies	have	failed	to	utilise	
the	 full	 range	 of	 available	 tools	 and	 frameworks,	 particularly	 those	 stemming	 from	 the	
disciplines	of	International	Relations	and	Diplomatic	Theory,	to	understand	the	ways	in	which	
a	distinct	category	of	actor	has	been	able	to	carry	out	this	recasting	work,	and	indeed	the	full	
spectrum	of	motivations	they	may	have	for	doing	so.	The	alternative	theoretical	framework	
established	in	part	one	of	this	thesis,	when	combined	with	the	empirical	work	that	follows,	
aims	to	do	just	this:	looking	beyond	the	superficial	explanations	for	sub-state	diplomacy	and	
instead	accounting	for	the	unquestionably	political	dynamics	that	underpin	it.	
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Each	of	our	three	cases	has	a	unique	approach	to	their	paradiplomatic	endeavours,	though	
they	maintain	much	 in	 common.	 They	 are	 cases	 that	 we	 all	 think	 we	 know,	 correctly	 or	
otherwise.	A	boastful,	wilful	Scotland	eager	to	shout	down	their	‘English’	counterparts	at	any	
opportunity.	And	for	Wales,	‘see	Scotland…	to	a	lesser	degree’:	bumbling	along	with	a	relative	
lack	of	ambition,	preoccupied	with	concerns	about	its	crumbling	valleys	and	precarious	hill	
farmers	 -	 and	 the	 rugby.	 	 Benign	Bavaria,	 too	 busy	 counting	 its	 coffers	 too	 challenge	 the	
Federal	Government	in	any	meaningful	way;	happy	with	the	pivotal	role	that	the	Federal	party	
system	 allows	 it	 to	 occupy	 at	 a	 state	 level,	 getting	 on	with	 the	 job	 of	 governing	 a	major	
economy	 without	 the	 navel-gazing	 that	 stateless	 nationalism	 implies.	 In	 important	 ways,	
however,	 the	 empirical	 findings	 of	 this	 thesis	 turn	 many	 of	 these	 -	 admittedly	 glib	 -	
assumptions	on	their	heads.	The	Scottish	Government	prioritises	‘official’	diplomacy,	tying	it	
into	UK-wide	representations	overseas,	often	at	the	cost	of	a	distinctive	Scottish	voice;	maybe	
the	 traditional	 diplomacy	 of	 yore	 isn’t	 so	 outmoded	 after	 all.	Wales,	meanwhile,	 actively	
utilises	the	way	in	which	it	can	operate	‘under	the	radar’	to	build	exclusive	relationships	in	
parts	of	the	world	where	headline	diplomacy	can	inhibit	state-level	interactions.	It	has	also	
proved	 particularly	 adept	 at	 mimicking	 prevailing	 international	 discourses	 -	 of	 gender	
equality,	e-democracy	and	environmentalism	-	crafting	an	international	image	that	aligns	very	
neatly	with	dominant	norms.	In	Bavaria,	‘cooperative	federalism’	is	taking	a	back-seat	in	the	
heat	of	a	refugee	crisis	that	has	dragged	its	Government,	perhaps	unwillingly,	into	core	areas	
of	 Federal	 foreign	 policy.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Bavaria’s	 nationhood	 is	 never	 far	 from	 the	
forefront	of	its	paradiplomacy,	something	which	is	highly	unusual	in	a	German	context.	
	
Just	as	the	investigations	into	each	of	these	three	cases	have	proved	rich,	when	taken	as	a	
group	they	have	also	 illuminated	several	features,	or	qualities,	that	seem	to	belong	to	the	
operational	 space	 that	 sub-state	 governments	 occupy	 at	 an	 international	 level.	 As	
governmental,	 yet	 non-sovereign,	 actors,	 sub-state	 governments	 are	 able,	 but	 rarely	
compelled,	to	act	internationally.	They	benefit	from	governmental	resources	-	a	civil	service,	
a	 budget,	 the	 symbols	 and	 trappings	 of	 the	 office	 -	 and	 often	 operate	 with	 Federal	
arrangements	or	devolution	dispensations	 that	have	permeable	boundaries	between	 sub-
state	and	national	competences.	These	boundaries	get	further	stretched	by	precedent	and	
de	 facto	 compromises.	 Bavaria	 insists	 on	 using	 the	 term	 ‘Vertung’	 (representation)	 to	
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describe	 its	 Brussels	 office,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 explicitly	 forbidden	 from	enacting	 a	
diplomatic	 role.	 In	 response,	 the	 Federal	 Government	 simply	 calls	 it	 something	 different.	
Wales	and	Scotland	both	operate	international	aid	and	development	policies	on	the	pretext	
of	a	devolved	responsibility	for	sustainable	development.	A	compromise,	of	sorts.		
	
This	fluid	status	and	ability	to	‘pick	and	choose’	international	relations	results	in	what	might	
be	perceived	as	an	enviable	position:	to	opt	in,	or	opt	out,	of	foreign	policy	and	international	
affairs,	 though	 with	 some	 important	 caveats.	 While	 newspapers	 and	 parliamentary	
committees	 focus	 on	 scrutinising	 the	 national	 government,	 the	 activities	 of	 sub-state	
governments	often	slip	through	the	net.	No	one	 is	 looking,	at	 least	up	until	 the	point	that	
something	out	of	the	ordinary	thrusts	national	attention	upon	them	-	such	as	the	Scottish	
Government’s	2009	release	of	Abdelbaset	al	Megrahi.	Even	then,	poor	understandings	of	sub-
state	 authority	 and	 institutional	 competences	 often	 means	 that	 even	 if	 attention	 briefly	
focuses	 at	 the	 sub-state	 level,	 once	 again	 -	 no	 one	 is	 really	 sure	where	 responsibility	 lies	
(Kenealy,	2012a:	555).	By	ascribing	characteristics	to	the	international	practices	of	sub-state	
governments,	we	inch	closer	to	understanding	the	nature	of	the	challenge	that	it	may	pose	
to	more	traditional	concepts	of	international	relations.	For	McConnell	et	al.,	these	types	of	
activity	 raise	 profound	 questions.	 In	 their	 consideration	 of	 other	 non-state	 actors	
(micropatias,	international	religious	communities	and	unrecognised	states)	and	their	mimicry	
of	diplomacy,	they	argue	that:	
Such	cases	fundamentally	transgress	the	inside/outside	binary	of	international	
politics	and	shine	a	spotlight	on	the	role	of	contingency	in	the	untidy	discursive	
production	 of	 international	 recognition,	 sovereignty	 and	 legitimacy	
(McConnell	et	al.,	2012:	811).	
	
In	the	time	that	has	elapsed	since	work	on	thesis	was	begun,	several	broad	shifts	in	both	the	
paradiplomatic	and	broader	geopolitical	planes	have,	arguably,	taken	place.	First,	there	was	
the	2014	referendum	on	Scottish	independence	-	during	which	time	Scottish	officials	were	
extremely	 reluctant	 to	 discuss	 paradiplomacy,	 deeming	 it	 too	 politically	 sensitive.	 An	
argument	perhaps	 that	 this	 isn’t	 ‘all	about	 the	economy’,	after	all.	Then	we	had	the	2016	
Brexit	referendum	and	the	resulting	intra-UK	fall-out,	supreme-court	battles	and	calls	for	a	
second	Scottish	vote	on	independence.	And,	of	course,	2017	saw	the	inauguration	of	Donald	
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Trump	as	America’s	45th	President	-	a	development	which	will	surely	catalyse	paradiplomats	
across	the	globe,	particularly	those	from	America’s	more	liberal	states.	All	in	all,	if	there	was	
ever	a	time	to	see	the	implications	of	a	multiplication	of	international	agents,	the	contestation	
and	dilution	of	national	diplomacy	and	the	definition	of	the	boundaries	between	different	
tiers	of	Government,	this	must	be	it.		
	
	
	
Part	1:	The	Paradox	of	Paradiplomacy	
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Chapter	One:	Literature	Review	
	
Paradiplomacy	-	the	external	relations	of	sub-state	or	regional	governments	-	is	not	an	entirely	
new	 practice;	 its	 precedents	 stretch	 back	 well	 into	 the	 19th	 century,	 at	 a	 conservative	
estimation	(Paquin	and	Lachapelle,	2005:	:71).	However,	the	late	20th	and	early	21st	centuries	
have	 witnessed	 the	 ‘normalisation’	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 (Cornago,	 2010),	 becoming	
increasingly	well	established	as	a	competence	of	sub-state	government,	and	a	consequential	
feature	of	international	society.		This	normalization	reflects	competing	forces:	the	increasing	
willingness	of	sub-state	actors	themselves	to	develop	an	international	personality,	and	the	
mechanisms	they	develop	for	doing	so,	alongside	the	responses	of	central	governments	 in	
attempting	to	manage	this	development.	This	has	typically	taken	the	form	of	novel	legal	or	
political	instruments	and	arrangements	defining	the	contours	of	‘acceptable’	behaviour	in	this	
regard	(Cornago,	2010:	11).	Cornago	goes	on	to	argue	that,	whilst	conventional	approaches	-	
specifically	from	within	the	realm	of	diplomatic	studies	-	often	under-emphasise	or	even	deny	
the	 importance	 of	 paradiplomacy,	 this	 ‘normalization’	 is	 indeed	 a	 “politically	 relevant	
process”	(2010:	14).	
	
A	full	consideration	of	paradiplomacy	entails	three	distinct,	if	rather	broad,	levels	of	analysis:	
structures	and	opportunities,	motivations	and	agency,	and	 implications	or	 significance.	To	
date,	paradiplomatic	literature	has	devoted	the	vast	majority	of	its	attention	to	the	first	of	
these	aspects,	less	to	the	second,	and	comparatively	little	to	the	third.	In	addition,	there	have	
been	 few	 attempts	 to	 link	 these	 three	 aspects	 together	 in	 an	 overarching	 theoretical	
framework	 (Lecours,	 2002:	 92).	 In	 practice,	 this	 has	 meant	 that	 structural	 accounts	 of	
paradiplomacy	have	dominated	the	literature,	even	though	(as	will	be	explored	in	this	review)	
the	variation	in	paradiplomatic	activity	suggests	a	much	greater	role	for	the	agency	of	sub-
state	actors	than	is	allowed	for	under	these	accounts.	Furthermore,	the	failure	to	adequately	
consider	the	implications	of	paradiplomacy	-	within	both	domestic	and	international	contexts	
-	 has	 meant	 that	 an	 incomplete	 picture	 of	 the	 practice	 has	 emerged,	 and,	 crucially,	 the	
meaning	of	the	phenomenon,	as	a	political	action,	is	not	yet	clear.	Indeed,	the	criticism	has	
been	 levied	 that	 the	 current	 literature	 fails	 to	 take	 account	 of	 the	 novelty	 of	 sub-state	
international	engagement	as	a	widely	identifiable	feature	of	contemporary	politics	(Aldecoa,	
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1999:	83).	Alongside	the	three	levels	of	analysis	outlined	above,	there	is	a	further	tripartite	
distinction	 to	 consider.	 The	 opportunities,	 motives	 and	 ramifications	 of	 the	 practice	
materialise	 and	 transpire	 at	 the	 regional,	 state	 and	 international	 levels.	 This	 implicates	
numerous	schools	of	thought	and	areas	of	research	in	the	study	of	this	phenomenon,	and	
necessitates	an	analytical	framework	drawing	on	the	toolkits	of	both	comparative	politics	and	
international	relations.	This	is	an	endeavour	that	has	generated	only	limited,	and	sporadic,	
enthusiasm;	reflected	in	the	literature’s	imbalance.		
	
If	the	first	defining	characteristic	of	the	paradiplomacy	literature	is	this	imbalance,	the	second	
is	the	compartmentalised	nature	of	its	development.	Criekemans	(2011b:	3),	identifies	three	
distinct	phases	of	paradiplomatic	research.	The	first	of	these	was	a	wholly	empirical	exercise,	
which	examined	the	distribution	of	competences	between	regional	and	central	governments,	
focussing	on	the	(domestic)	legal	and	constitutional	dimensions	of	the	practice	(dominated	
by	 constitutional	 law	 experts).	 The	 second	 phase	 was	 also	 largely	 empirical,	 comprising	
comparative	studies	of	sub-state	governments	and	examinations	of	territorial	mobilization	
that	were	dominated	by	the	fields	of	federalism	and	regionalism.	The	third,	a	more	recent	
trend,	which	largely	consists	of	the	work	of	Criekemans	himself,	along	with	colleagues	at	the	
University	of	Antwerp	and	the	Clingendael	Institute	(and	thus	is	dominated	by	diplomacy	and	
foreign	policy	analysis	scholars)	seeks	to	situate	paradiplomacy	in	an	international	milieu.	It	
is	 argued	 that	 considering	 sub-national	 diplomacy	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 a	 new	 territorial	
configuration	of	international	politics	might	overcome	some	of	the	conceptual	and	analytical	
lacunas	 that	 have	 been	 identified,	 such	 as	 the	 lack	 of	 analytical	 frameworks	 or	 adequate	
explanations	for	the	development	(Criekemans	and	Duran,	2011).	The	distinction	between	
these	phases	is	not	absolute,	nor	is	their	progression	strictly	linear.	For	example,	both	Lecours	
(2002)	and	Cornago	(1999)	were	tentatively	exploring	some	of	the	international	aspects	of	
the	phenomenon	right	in	the	midst	of	the	literature’s	more	comparative	phase.	However,	this	
phased	conception	does	highlight	the	general	course	of	the	literature’s	development,	and	the	
ways	in	which	individual	fields	of	study	have	approached	the	phenomenon:	largely	in	isolation	
from	one	another.		
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Lecours	and	Moreno	(2001:	2)	assess	the	literature	from	a	different	perspective,	arguing	that	
there	 are	 two	 distinct	 ‘angles’	 from	 which	 to	 view	 the	 external	 relations	 of	 sub-state	
governments.	The	first	is	as	a	consequence	of	various	other	phenomena	(such	as	globalisation	
and	supranational	integration),	whereby	paradiplomacy	is	appropriated	as	evidence	of	a	new	
form	 of	 contemporary	 territorial	 politics.	 This,	 the	 authors	 argue,	 has	 been	 the	 “most	
popular”	 angle	 of	 analysis.	 The	 second,	 “less	 visible	 and	 less	 discussed”	 angle	 considers	
paradiplomacy	 as	 a	 discrete	 phenomenon,	 whereby	 the	 action	 of	 sub-state	 governments	
“projecting	 themselves	 onto	 the	 international	 scene	 and,	 consequently,	 becoming	
international	actors”	is	investigated	in	and	of	itself,	and	where	territorial	politics	is	thus	seen	
as	“an	explanatory	variable	for	one	particular	international	process,	namely	the	international	
relations	of	regions”	(Lecours	and	Moreno,	2001:	2).		
	
There	 is	 an	 apparent	 contradiction	 between	 the	 ‘natural’	 competences	 of	 a	 sub-state	
government	 (assumed	 to	be	 firmly	 domestically	 located,	 concerned	with	 regional	 or	 local	
issues	 that	 are	 understood	 to	 be	 better	managed	 by	 an	 authority	 ‘closer’	 to	 the	 specific	
environment)	and	 the	practice	of	diplomacy	or	 international	 relations	on	 the	part	of	 such	
actors.	It	would	therefore	seem	clear	that	the	second	of	the	approaches	mentioned	above,	
considering	paradiplomacy	as	a	discrete	phenomenon,	is	inherently	more	appropriate	for	its	
study	than	is	the	first,	currently	more	popular,	angle	of	analysis.	This	seems	particularly	true	
when	we	remember	that,	in	many	instances,	the	appropriation	of	international	remits	by	sub-
state	actors	is	often	-	though	not	always	-	a	source	of	domestic	political	tension,	and	therefore	
political	capital	is	likely	to	be	expended	in	gaining	these	competences.	It	is	not	often	the	case	
that	international	actorness	falls	into	the	laps	of	unsuspecting	regional	governments.	
	
To	 assess	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 literature	 has	 thus	 far	 examined	 the	 practice	 of	
paradiplomacy,	 this	 chapter	will	 consider	 the	distinct	 factors	 that	 have	been	 identified	 as	
relevant	to	three	key	questions	regarding	the	phenomenon:	how	it	has	emerged,	why	it	takes	
place,	and	why	it	matters.	The	theoretical	development	of	the	field	will	be	considered	in	the	
context	of	 this	 final	question,	 looking	at	 the	barriers	 to,	evidence	of	and	potential	 for	 the	
establishment	of	overarching	analytical	frameworks.	In	short,	this	introductory	chapter	lays	
out	 the	 approaches	 traditionally	 taken	 to	 paradiplomatic	 study;	 highlighting	 their	
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shortcomings	and	signalling	the	need	for	a	new,	more	comprehensive	framework,	which	is	to	
be	introduced	in	the	subsequent	chapter.		
	
	
Paradiplomacy:	Structures	and	Opportunities	
I. Globalisation		
According	 to	Hocking	 (1999:	18),	 the	co-occurrence	of	globalisation	and	 localisation	 is	not	
coincidental,	but	rather	the	phenomena	represent	two	sides	of	the	same	coin;	reflecting	“the	
competing	 pressures	 and	 tensions	 created	 by	 a	 broader	 and	 more	 integrated	 global	
economy”.	There	has	emerged	a	“symbiotic	relationship	between	cohering	and	fragmenting	
forces”,	whereby	“the	local	is	not	the	antithesis	of	the	global”	(Hocking,	1999:	9).	Criekemans	
and	Duran	(2011)	meanwhile,	highlight	the	weakening	of	the	barriers	previously	segregating	
‘high’	and	‘low’	politics,	arguing	that	this	has	important	effects	for	sub-state	governments	as	
national	foreign	policy	agendas	become	less	hierarchical,	and	thus	permeable	to	the	interests	
and	concerns	of	local	or	regional	actors	(such	as	the	environment,	trade,	culture	and	minority	
rights).	In	a	similar	vein,	Cornago	(2010:	18-19)	emphasises	the	establishment	of	regions	as	
globally	 competitive	 units,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 “a	 new	 economic	 geography,	 institutional	
restructuring,	new	technological	facilities,	cross-national	migration	and	new	environmental	
concerns”,	 arguing	 that	 these	 ‘global	 dynamics’	 can	 account	 for	 the	 proliferation	 of	
paradiplomatic	activities.		
	
Expanding	on	this	central	idea,	Paquin	and	Lachapelle	(2005:	78)	argue	that	globalization	(and	
the	related	‘nation	state	crisis’)	in	fact	holds	the	greatest	explanatory	power	when	it	comes	
to	 understanding	 paradiplomacy.	 	 So,	 the	 argument	 goes:	 the	 economic	 imperatives	 of	 a	
globalized	world	have	led	smaller	(regional)	units	to	compete	with	one	another	for	relative	
shares	of	the	‘world	market’.	The	authors	argue	that	this	form	of	economic	competition	has	
come	 to	 replace	 alternative	 forms,	 in	 particular	 that	 “between	 sovereign	 powers	 for	 the	
acquisition	of	new	territories”.	The	international	engagement	of	regions,	therefore,	is	seen	as	
a	functional	requirement	of	this	particular	global	order	(Paquin	and	Lachapelle,	2005:	78).		
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The	danger	of	the	‘glocalisation’	argument,	however,	is	that	it	tends	to	present	an	a-historical	
narrative,	subsuming	the	practice	of	paradiplomacy	 into	broader	processes	all	 too	readily,	
rather	than	examining	the	phenomenon	as	a	discrete	endeavour	with	its	own	evolutionary	
history.		For	example,	in	exploring	the	role	of	consular	representation	in	an	emerging	state	-	
Norway	-		Leira	and	Neumann	(2008)	place	the	practice	of	paradiplomacy	in	the	context	of	
the	 country’s	 state-building	 process,	which	 substantially	 pre-dates	 the	 ‘post-modern’	 era.	
Likewise,	while	Paquin	and	Lachapelle	 (2005:	71)	are	keen	to	emphasise	 the	 link	between	
globalisation	and	paradiplomacy	in	their	book,	they	also	identify	Quebec’s	paradiplomacy,	or	
at	 the	 least	 strong	precedents	 for	 it,	as	manifest	 from	as	early	as	 the	nineteenth	century.	
‘Globalisation’	can	therefore	be	seen	to	engender	attractive	opportunity	structures	for	sub-
state	governments,	which	may	indeed	be	a	key	explanation	of	the	proliferation	of	sub-state	
international	 activities.	 But	 it	 fails	 to	 adequately	 explain	 the	 motivations	 behind	
paradiplomatic	action;	a	practice	that	predates	the	globalized	era.	It	is	particularly	ill	equipped	
to	explain	those	actions	that	are	not	clearly	functional	or	primarily	economic	in	nature.		
	
II. The	European	Union	and	Regionalism	
The	 twin	 processes	 of	 European	 integration	 and	 internal	 regionalisation	 (or	 micro-
macro/inter-intra	regionalism)	have	provided	particularly	pronounced	opportunities	for	sub-
state	mobilization.	The	two	processes	are	said	to	have	not	only	“coincided”	(Aldecoa,	1999:	
86),	 but,	 more	 specifically,	 the	 argument	 has	 been	 made	 that	 within	 the	 sui	 generis	
environment	of	the	EU,	the	‘new	regionalism’	has	emerged	in	response	to	increasing	levels	of	
interdependence	(Sodupe,	1999:	58).	Sodupe	goes	on	to	argue	that	the	relationship	between	
integration	and	regionalisation	is	a	multi-faceted,	reciprocal	one,	whereby	“just	as	integration	
gives	a	new	dimension	to	regionalism,	regionalism	in	turn	stimulates	integration,	since	the	
former	contributes	to	reinforce	interdependence”,	and	that	one	of	the	key	dynamics	in	this	
process,	indeed	one	of	its	most	“striking	aspects”	is	inter-regional	co-operation	(1999:	58).	
Cornago,	 meanwhile	 (2010:	 20)	 argues	 that,	 whilst	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 EU	 initially	
“undermined	 important	 sub-national	 competences”,	 it	 gradually	 came	 to	 provide	 a	
“favourable”	environment	 for	 the	mobilization	of	 sub-state	governments,	 via	 its	effect	on	
“administrative	cultures”	amongst	the	member	states	of	the	EU.	Concurrently,	the	European	
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integration	 process	 enabled:	 “the	 spread	 of	 a	 shared	 perception	 concerning	 the	 need	 to	
provide	 institutional	 venues	 for	 mobilizing	 sub-state	 governments	 across	 the	 European	
region”	(Cornago,	2010:	20).		
	
For	 Paquin	 and	 Lachapelle	 (2005),	 European	 integration	 is	 a	 particularly	 clear	 example	 of	
wider	 ‘internationalization	 processes’,	 whereby	 the	 proliferation	 of	 ‘new’	 issues	 on	 the	
international	political	agenda,	such	as	the	environment,	public	health,	transportation	and	so	
on,	increasingly	implicate	sub-state	governments	in	the	international	domain.	Here,	relations	
between	sub-state	and	central	state	governments	are	key:		
Civil	servants	and	politicians	from	sub-state	entities	worry	about	the	fact	that	
international	issues	affect	their	fields	of	jurisdiction.	Sub-national	entities	will	
thus	set	up	international	positions	for	themselves	because	their	failure	to	act	
would	have	given	central	governments	a	 free	hand	 (Paquin	and	Lachapelle,	
2005:	86).	
Paquin	and	Lachapelle	argue	that	in	order	to	defend	their	competences	from	EU-wide	policy	
decisions,	which	may	redistribute	elements	of	their	authority,	sub-state	governments	“will	
pressure	 their	 ‘national’	 government	 and	 European	 institutions	 into	 allowing	 regions	 of	
Europe	to	play	a	greater	role”	(Paquin	and	Lachapelle,	2005:	87).	
	
Looking	 in	 some	 detail	 at	 the	 distinct	 effects	 of	 European	 integration	 on	 territorial	
mobilization	 and	paradiplomacy,	Hepburn	 and	McLoughlin	 (2011:	 385)	 point	 to	 three	 key	
facets.	Firstly,	the	fact	that	many	EU	policies	and	areas	of	competence	overlap	with,	and	have	
significant	 impact	 upon,	 commonly	 devolved	 areas	 of	 activity	 means	 that	 sub-state	
governments	have	significant	vested	interest	in	the	EU	policy	making	process.	Thus,	they	are	
encouraged	 to	 engage,	with	 a	 presumed	 legitimacy	 often	 lacking	 in	 other	 paradiplomatic	
activities,	in	this	arena.	Secondly,	the	trend	towards	regionalisation	within	Europe	has	opened	
up	the	possibility	of	new	forms	of	autonomy:	something	less	than	sovereign	statehood	but	
greater	 than	 devolved	 authority.	 	 Regional	 parties	 within	 EU	 member	 states	 have	 new	
institutions	and	new	political	arenas	in	which	to	establish	themselves	as	relevant	actors,	and	
defend	their	interests:	
While	 territorial	 political	 strategies	 were	 once	 focused	 exclusively	 on	 state	
structures,	regional	actors	now	lobby	at	transnational	levels	to	advance	their	
goals,	and	European	umbrella	organisations	have	been	formed	to	represent	
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regional	 party	 interests	 in	 European	 institutions	 (Hepburn	 and	McLoughlin,	
2011:	385).	
In	 particular,	 the	 Committee	 of	 the	 Regions	 (though	 disappointing	 some	 of	 the	 more	
enthusiastic	hopes	of	a	‘Europe	of	the	Regions’	(Scully	and	Wyn	Jones,	2010:	5))	has	proved	
fertile	ground	for	sub-state	governments	looking	to	“acquire	an	additional	state-like	quality,	
one	that	could	build	its	internal	coherence	and	stimulate	its	process	of	identity	construction”	
(Lecours,	 2002:	 100).	 	 Thirdly	 for	 Hepburn	 and	McLoughlin,	 the	 ideological	 nature	 of	 the	
European	integration	project	has	“encouraged”	sub-state	nationalist	parties,	such	as	the	SNP,	
to	 adopt	 a	 ‘civic	 nationalism’,	 based	 on	 inclusive	 criteria	 and	 advocating	 “principles	 and	
themes	common	to	those	of	the	EU	-	such	as	support	for	free	trade	and	diversity”	(2011:	385).	
	
The	EU	 is	not	 representative	of	 the	degree	of	 integration	witnessed	 in	 regional	 structures	
globally,	but	as	the	most	advanced	institutional	manifestation	of	a	more	global,	and	gradual,	
trend,	 it	 does	 allow	 the	 dynamics	 of	 regionalisation,	 and	 their	 relationship	 to	 the	
development	 of	 paradiplomacy,	 to	 be	 seen	 particularly	 clearly,	 and	 is	 therefore	 worth	
considering	in	this	greater	depth.		
	
III. Devolution	and	Decentralisation	
Part	 of	 the	 ‘new	 regionalism’,	 identified	 in	 broader	 processes	 of	 governance,	 particularly	
within	 the	 EU,	 relates	 to	 the	 dispersal	 of	 power	 (political,	 administrative	 or	 legislative)	
‘downwards’	towards	the	regions,	as	well	as	to	the	supranational	level.	This	is	both	as	a	result	
of	pressure	 from	 individual	 regions	 themselves	 (such	as	Catalonia),	and	a	part	of	broader,	
state-wide	reform	process	(as	in	France)	(Scully	and	Wyn	Jones,	2010:	5).	The	two	processes	
of	 devolution	 and	 decentralisation	 represent	 alternative	 institutional	 embodiments	 of	 a	
shared	 logic;	 that	 of	 building	 regional	 capacity	 (Cole	 and	 Baudewyns,	 2004:	 74-75).	 This	
creation	 of	 “regional	 agents”,	 via	 devolution	 or	 decentralisation,	 is	 a	 logical,	 perhaps	
necessary,	precursor	to	such	agents	then	developing	an	 international	perspective	(Lecours	
and	Moreno,	2001:	6).	 Indeed,	 the	advancement	of	 legislative	autonomy	within	 regions	 is	
seen	 by	 Criekemans	 (2010c:	 38)	 to	 be	 reflected	 in	 the	 increasing	 sophistication	 of	
	 23	
paradiplomatic	activities	throughout	the	second	and	third	‘waves’	that	he	identifies	as	taking	
place	in	the	1990s-2000s.	
	
As	 in	 most	 federal	 systems,	 the	 ‘regional	 agents’	 created	 through	 devolution	 or	
decentralisation	are	almost	exclusively	devoid	of	‘foreign	policy’	prerogatives	(with	a	notable	
exception	 being	 the	 Belgian	 regions),	 meaning	 that	 paradiplomacy	 falls	 into	 a	 “legal	 and	
constitutional	grey	 zone”	 (Lecours,	2008:	6).	 	Having	said	 this,	however,	 there	are	various	
ways	in	which	the	external	role	of	regional	agents	has	a	legal	or	constitutional	basis	of	one	
sort	or	another,	 though	their	role	may	be	-	and	most	often	 is	 -	heavily	circumscribed.	The	
more	interesting	question,	then,	is	perhaps	centred	around	what	such	regions	choose	to	do	
with	their	limited	set	of	competences,	and	the	various	ways	in	which	the	boundaries	of	their	
international	remit	are	chafed	by	the	paradiplomatic	practices	that	they	undertake.	The	lack	
of	 formal	 responsibility	 and	 accountability	 that	 regions	 typically	 have	 for	 ‘foreign	 affairs’	
makes	the	decision	of	sub-state	or	regional	actors	to	consciously	expand	their	remit	in	this	
area	particularly	 interesting.	The	distinct	qualities	 that	 this	engenders	 -	 the	non-statutory,	
loosely	institutionalised	space	that	sub-state	governments	operate	within,	the	lack	of	scrutiny	
arising	from	the	sheer	incongruence	of	many	of	these	activity,	the	ability	-	yet	often	not	the	
obligation	-	to	act,	all	feeds	in	to	how	paradiplomatic	practice	manifests	on	the	ground,	and	
thus	the	potential	significance	that	 it	has.	These	themes	are	central	to	this	thesis,	and	are	
explored	in	much	greater	detail	in	part	two.	
	
This	‘new	regionalism’,	specifically	the	processes	of	devolution	and	decentralisation	that	have	
taken	place,	particularly	within	Europe,	offers	enhanced	opportunities	for	paradiplomacy	to	
emerge,	owing	to	 its	 institutionalisation	or	enhancement	of	a	regional	tier	of	government.	
However,	 it	 does	 not	 necessarily	 follow	 that	 those	 regions	 with	 the	 greatest	 legislative	
autonomy	are	the	most	advanced	when	it	comes	to	their	paradiplomatic	activities,	and	vice	
versa.	For	example,	Criekeman	and	Duran	(2011)	consider	the	paradiplomatic	action	of	the	
French	 Provence-Alpes-Cote	 d’Azur	 (PACA),	 a	 region	 that	 is	 “devoid	 of	 strong	 legislative	
powers	or	a	distinct	national(ist)	identity”,	that,	nonetheless	(when	compared	to	other	sub-
state	governments	with	stronger	legislative	powers),	“is	pursuing	a	comparable	foreign	policy,	
making	use	of	comparable	diplomatic	instruments”.	Here,	despite	the	fact	that	the	“French	
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foreign	 ministry	 still	 firmly	 holds	 the	 reins	 of	 France’s	 diplomacy”,	 French	 regions	 are	
increasingly	utilising	the	(comparatively	limited)	remit	they	hold	in	areas	of	‘low’	politics	as	a	
means	to	actively	develop	their	own	diplomatic	identity,	even	international	actorness	(Duran,	
2011:	340	&	346).		
IV. Lecours	2002:	Opportunity	Structures		
The	preceding	sections	have	sought	to	explore	the	various	opportunity	structures,	enabled	
by	 the	 processes	 of	 globalisation,	 European	 integration	 and	 decentralisation,	 which	 are	
identified	within	the	paradiplomacy	literature	as	promoting	or	facilitating	the	phenomenon	
that	is	paradiplomacy.	Before	moving	on	to	consider	the,	perhaps	more	intriguing,	question	
of	why	sub-state	governments	themselves	choose	to	utilise	these	opportunity	structures	and	
engage	 in	 paradiplomacy,	 it	 is	worth	 firstly	 considering	 a	 tentative	 theoretical	 framework	
identified	by	Lecours	(2002),	which	draws	attention	to	the	multi-locational	nature	of	these	
structures.	 What	 is	 required	 -	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 practice	 of	 paradiplomacy	 -	
according	 to	 Lecours,	 is	 a	 “multi-analytical	 framework	 where	 regional	 political	 systems,	
national	 structures,	 continental	 regimes	 and	 the	 global	 system	 each	 contain	 opportunity	
structures	that	condition	the	international	agency	of	regional	governments”	(2002:	101).		This	
work	 represents	 perhaps	 the	 most	 advanced	 such	 framework	 iterated	 within	 the	
paradiplomacy	literature,	and	is	thus	worth	investigating	in	some	detail.		
	
Looking	firstly	at	the	regional	level,	two	institutional	variables	are	given	explanatory	weight:	
the	party	system	(particularly	the	existence	of	nationalist	or	regional	parties)	and	the	formal	
institutional	powers,	or	course	of	development,	of	the	region.	It	comes	as	no	surprise,	argues	
Lecours,	that	the	most	prominent	actors	in	paradiplomacy	tend	to	be	located	within	federal	
regions	(2002:	101).	 Inevitably,	as	many	questions	are	raised	by	the	identification	of	these	
two	 primary	 regional	 variables	 as	 are	 answered.	 For	 example,	 though	 the	 existence	 of	 a	
nationalist	or	regionalist	party	may	certainly	predispose	the	region	towards	paradiplomatic	
action,	their	exact	role	in	doing	so	may	be	greatly	differentiated.	A	‘weak’	nationalist	party	
with	limited	electoral	support	may	still	catalyse	a	region’s	paradiplomatic	activity	indirectly,	
via	their	effect	on	party	competition,	incentivising	third	or	governing	parties	towards	a	more	
prominent	 external	 role	 (Royles,	 2010:	 162-163).	 Furthermore,	 the	 link	 between	
	 25	
paradiplomacy	and	federalism,	and	therefore	the	weight	that	federalism	itself	has	previously	
been	 given	 as	 an	 explanatory	 variable	 in	 much	 paradiplomatic	 research,	 is	 increasingly	
questionable.	The	processes	of	devolution	and	decentralisation	that	have	been	particularly	
pronounced	within	Europe	in	the	last	few	decades	raise	numerous	questions	as	to	whether	
their	 open-ended	 dynamics	 produce	 different	 incentives	 or	 opportunities	 to	 engage	with	
external	actors	than	does	federalism,	where	the	constitutional	situation	may	be	taken	to	be	
more	static	(the	obvious	exception	here	is	Quebec	and	its	relations	with	Canada).			
	
The	second	 level	at	which	Lecours	 identifies	a	set	of	variables	 is	 the	national	 (state-level).	
Here,	it	is	the	constitutional	framework,	the	nature	of	intergovernmental	relations	(which,	in	
turn,	are	partially	based	on	party	congruence	across	different	levels	of	government	(Royles	
and	Wyn	Jones,	2010)),	the	mechanisms	for	regional	representation	in	central	 institutions,	
and	the	state’s	foreign	policy	agenda	-	specifically	whether	it	 is	more	or	less	permeable	to	
sub-state	 interests	 -	 that	 are	 seen	 as	 key.	 As	 referenced	 previously,	 Lecours	 and	Moreno	
(2001:	7)	point	to	the	breakdown	in	the	conceptual	categories	of	‘high’	and	‘low’	politics	in	
the	post-Cold	War	era	as	a	key	factor	conditioning	the	(re)emergence	of	paradiplomacy.		
	
Again,	 the	 relationship	between	 this	variable	and	paradiplomatic	action	 is	not	absolute.	 It	
would	seem	that	in	a	‘globalized’	age,	states	have	little	choice	but	to	engage	with	issues	which	
are	 particularly	 permeable	 to	 sub-state	 interests:	 the	 environment,	 for	 example.	 The	
additional	presence	of	 ‘high	politics’	on	a	national	foreign	policy	agenda	wouldn’t	seem	to	
preclude	paradiplomatic	opportunities	for	such	actors,	though	there	may	be	an	argument	as	
to	 the	 status-reducing	 effects	 of	 foreign	 policy	 reporting	 being	 focussed	 on	 attention-
grabbing	 ‘high	politics’,	where	sub-state	actors	have	-	or	are	thought	to	have	-	 little	or	no	
presence.	
	
The	third	set	of	variables	identified	by	Lecours	occur	at	the	continental	level;	situated	with	
the	economic	and	political	regimes	in	a	specific	geographical	setting,	at	an	intergovernmental	
or	supranational	level,	the	EU	being	the	most	obvious	example	here.	The	existence	of	such	
regimes,	according	to	Lecours,	legitimises	political	action	that	bypasses	central	government,	
weakening	 its	 monopoly	 on	 policy	making	 or	 international	 relations,	 on	 account	 of	 their	
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“transformation	 of	 state	 sovereignty”.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 the	 degree	 of	 cooperation	 or	 the	
advancement	of	institutional	mechanisms	that	represents	the	pertinent	variable	conditioning	
paradiplomacy	at	this	level	(Lecours,	2002:	103).		
	
The	fourth	and	final	level	of	analysis	for	Lecours	is	the	global	environment,	with	variables	here	
comprising:	 the	 international	 organisations	within	which	 regions	 can	 be	 represented,	 the	
number	of	states	willing	to	engage	in	diplomatic	relations	with	regions,	and	the	level	of	inter-
regional	 cooperation	 which	 takes	 place.	 Furthermore,	 the	 global	 economy	 provides	 an	
attractive	opportunity	structure	through	its	constitution	of	the	region	as	an	economic	unit	in	
its	own	right,	alongside	that	of	the	state	(Lecours,	2002:	103-104).	The	third	variable,	inter-
regional	cooperation,	is	seen	as	particularly	important	by	Lecours,	due	to	its	self-reproducing	
nature:	
Indeed,	much	like	state	interactions	have	built	and	sustained	a	state	system	
which	in	turn	has	legitimised	states	as	the	central	actors	of	world	politics,	the	
development	of	a	web	of	inter-regional	relations	could	lead	to	an	international	
regional	 system	 that	 would	 build	 up	 the	 international	 agency	 of	 regional	
governments.		
Lecours’	 approach	 places	 a	 strong	 emphasis	 on	 structural	 variants,	 or	 the	 ‘how’	 of	
paradiplomacy,	and,	in	doing	so,	produces	a	convincing	theoretical	framework	that	addresses	
this	question.	However,	in	order	to	fully	understand	the	phenomenon	of	paradiplomacy,	and	
to	work	towards	a	genuinely	overarching	conceptual	framework,	much	closer	attention	needs	
to	be	paid	both	to	the	‘why?’	and	the	‘so	what?’	pieces	of	this	particular	puzzle.		
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The	Agency	of	Sub-state	governments	
Structural	opportunities	alone	cannot	fully	explain	paradiplomatic	activity.	In	particular,	they	
fail	to	adequately	account	for	one	of	the	key	characteristics	of	the	practice:	its	diversity.	US	
states,	for	example,	have	ample	structural	opportunities	to	engage	internationally,	but	the	
often-limited	way	that	they	have	chosen	to	do	so	stands	in	stark	contrast	to	other	regions:	
All	 the	 US	 states	 and	 all	 large	 cities	 possess	 considerable	 governmental	
capacity	 to	 exercise	 international	 competencies,	 and	 all	 have	 used	 such	
capacity	to	engage	the	international	arena,	but	neither	state	governments	nor	
local	governments	have	plunged	deeply	into	international	affairs.	Instead,	they	
skim	the	surface	of	international	affairs	in	search	of	specific	benefits	for	their	
jurisdiction	(Kincaid,	1999:	121).	
	At	 best,	 therefore,	 structural	 opportunities	 are	 a	 necessary,	 but	 ultimately	 insufficient	
condition	in	explaining	the	practice	of	paradiplomacy.	The	role	of	agency,	of	the	motivations	
prompting	sub-state	governments	themselves	to	develop	an	international	personality,	must	
also	 be	 examined	 to	 fully	 understand	 the	 phenomenon.	 Sub-state	 governments	 have	
different	legal,	constitutional	and	political	powers	and	remits	from	central	states.	This	means	
that	many	 of	 the	motivations	 assumed	 to	 lie	 behind	 traditional	 international	 relations	 or	
diplomatic	 endeavours	 may	 not	 apply	 to	 the	 regional	 setting,	 and,	 therefore,	 that	 a	 full	
investigation	into	the	purposes	of	paradiplomatic	action	is	necessary.	“Regions	rarely	look	to	
influence	the	behaviour	and	policies	of	other	international	actors;	rather,	they	tend	to	have	
the	more	modest	objective	of	developing	an	international	personality”	(Lecours,	2002:	96	&	
104).1		Exactly	why	regions	might	wish	to	develop	this	international	personality	is	a	central	
question	for	paradiplomatic	research.		
	
A	useful	overarching	framework	is	developed	by	Keating	(1999),	who	identifies	three	‘sets’	of	
motivations	 lying	 behind	 paradiplomatic	 activity:	 economic,	 cultural	 and	 political.	 Looking	
firstly	at	economic	motivations,	Keating	identifies	both	the	desire	(or,	perhaps	increasingly,	
need)	for	sub-state	governments	to	seek	inward	investment,	which	compels	them	to	establish	
themselves	as	attractive	economic	 locations	 internationally,	and	a	“more	altruistic	style	of	
																																																						
1	 Though	 there	 are	 indeed	 some	 similarities	 in	 the	 strategies,	 even	 aims,	 of	 sub-state	
diplomacy	and	small	state	diplomacy	Criekemans	D.	(2011b)	Regional	Sub-State	Diplomacy	
Today.	Devolution	in	a	Globalized	World.	Chatham	House,	London.	
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external	 activity”	 in	 the	 programmes	of	 international	 development	 assistance	 undertaken	
most	notably	by	European	regions	(1999:	4).2	Cultural	motivations,	meanwhile,	are	often	tied	
most	closely	with	language	promotion	(Keating	cites	French	support	for	Quebec’s	linguistic	
programmes	here,	though	Wales’	promotion	of	the	Welsh	language	in	Patagonia	would	be	a	
different,	inter-regional	example).		
	
More	 controversial	 are	 the	 political	motivations	 identified	 by	 Keating:	 nationalist	 regions	
“seek	recognition	and	legitimacy	as	something	more	than	regions”,	while	“external	projection	
may	also	serve	by	a	reverse	effect	to	help	nation-building	at	home,	by	showing	local	leaders	
in	 international	 contexts”.	 According	 to	 Keating,	 “even	 in	 regions	 without	 nationalist	
movements,	the	international	arena	can	be	used	as	a	platform	for	internal	region-building,	as	
well	as	for	the	projection	of	the	regional	politicians	themselves”	(Keating,	1999:	5).		The	need	
for	 ‘recognition’	 by	 external	 actors,	 inherently	 realised	 in	 the	 conduct	 of	 ‘international	
relations’	is	also	highlighted	by	Paquin	and	Lachapelle,	who	posit	that	this	activity,	alongside	
the	role	of	paradiplomacy	in	the	power-struggle	that	the	authors	identify	between	sub-state	
nations	and	central	state	governments,	means	that	paradiplomacy	often	constitutes	a	key	
component	 of	 the	 quest	 for	 legitimacy	 on	 the	 part	 of	 ‘stateless	 nations’	 (Paquin	 and	
Lachapelle,	2005:	82-85).	 Indeed,	 stateless	nationalism	 is	an	 important	variable	 in	 its	own	
right	and	is	addressed	in	some	detail	below.	
I. Stateless	Nations	
A	 key	 component	 in	 many	 explanations	 of	 the	 less	 clearly	 ‘functional’	 international	
engagements	of	regions	are	‘stateless	nations’.	As	Aldecoa	and	Keating	argue	(1999b:	v),	aside	
from	the	strong	functional	logics	deriving	from	international	competition,	and	the	spill-over	
effects	 of	 meeting	 such	 requirements	 in	 international	 trade,	 political	 explanations	 are	
required	 to	 account	 for	 the	 development	 of	 paradiplomacy,	 “derived	 from	 the	 goals	 and	
strategies	of	sub-state	elites,	building	and	promoting	the	nation	or,	in	some	cases,	preparing	
																																																						
2	These	more	‘altruistic’	economic	activities	may	perhaps	be	more	appropriately	classed	as	
political	 in	nature,	or	 at	 the	 least	 ‘cooperative’,	 given	 that	 the	 region	doesn’t	 receive	any	
specific	economic	advantages	from	such	action,	rather	they	are	generally	seen	to	form	part	
of	nation-building	endeavours.	
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the	way	for	national	independence”.	Keating	(1997)	explores	this	concept	in	detail,	arguing	
that	 a	 new	 type	 of	 civic	 (as	 opposed	 to	 ethnic)	 nationalist	 project	 has	 emerged	 in	many	
locales:	
	Civic	nationalism	 is	a	 collective	enterprise	based	upon	common	values	and	
institutions,	and	patterns	of	social	interaction.	The	bearers	of	national	identity	
are	 institutions,	 customs,	 historical	 memories	 and	 rational/secular	 values.	
Anyone	can	join	the	nation	irrespective	of	birth	or	ethnic	origins,	though	the	
cost	of	adaptation	varies.	Civic	nationalism	is	based	upon	a	territorially	defined	
community,	 not	 upon	 a	 social	 boundary	 among	 groups	 within	 a	 territory	
(Keating,	1997:	691).	
What	 these	entities	desire,	according	 to	Keating,	 is	 self-determination.	But,	he	goes	on	to	
argue;	 “the	 end	 of	 self-determination	 is	 not	 necessarily	 a	 nation-state,	 since	 that	 is	 a	
historically	 contingent	 form”	 (1997:	 693).	 Paradiplomacy	 legitimises	 this	 form	 of	 nation	
building	by	“placing	the	minority	nation	in	the	wider	family	of	nation-states”.	This	argument,	
paradiplomacy-as-stateless-nation	building,	is	also	made	by	Lecours	and	Moreno	(2001:	1),	
who	 contend	 that	 the	 “processes	 of	 nationalism…logically	 lead	 to	 regional	 governments	
seeking	the	development	of	an	international	personality”.	Royles	(2010:	142	&	161),	makes	a	
similar	case	with	reference	to	Welsh	paradiplomacy,	whereby	the	actions	of	Welsh	Labour,	
with	“broad	agreement”	across	the	political	spectrum,	are	interpreted	as	part	of	a	conscious	
nation-building	 exercise,	 with	 international	 activities	 “bolstering	 identity,	 enhancing	
legitimacy	 and	 national	 recognition”.	 	 Indeed,	 Lecours	 and	 Moreno	 argue	 that	
‘multinationalism’,	 rather	 than	 federalism,	 is	 the	 key	 variable	 conditioning	 a	 region’s	
development	of	paradiplomatic	activity,	and	that	therefore,	“paradiplomacy,	at	 least	 in	 its	
most	developed	form,	needs	to	be	re-conceptualized	through	a	theoretical	linkage	with	sub-
state	or	stateless	nationalism”	(2001:	1-3).	
	
Lecours	and	Moreno	go	on	to	unpack	this	link	between	nation	building	and	paradiplomacy,	
and,	 in	doing	 so,	discern	 three	distinct	aims	or	benefits	 that	 sub-state	nationalist	 factions	
identify	 in	 external	 engagements.	 The	 work	 of	 these	 two	 authors	 represents	 the	 fullest	
consideration	of	such	links	in	the	literature,	and	is	thus	worth	addressing	in	detail.	The	first	of	
the	aims	or	benefits	accruing	from	paradiplomacy	with	regards	to	nation	building	is	identity	
construction;	“nationalism	is	a	form	of	identity	politics”	and	such	identities	are	discursively	
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constructed;	“creating	and	shaping	national	identities	necessitates	‘speaking	the	nation’,	that	
is,	promoting	the	idea	of	a	national	community”	(Lecours	and	Moreno,	2001:	3).	
	
There	are	two	elements	to	the	role	of	paradiplomacy	in	identity	construction.	The	first	is	to	
do	with	the	discourse	of	international	relations,	specifically	the	fact	that	this	discourse	is	one	
of	nations,	 and	 that,	 therefore,	 “the	 very	 definition	 of	 international	 agents,	 at	 least	with	
respect	to	territorial-institutional	units,	entails	nationhood”.	The	authors	argue	that,	when	
looked	at	from	this	perspective:	“the	development	of	an	international	agency	on	the	part	of	
a	regional	government	is	full	of	symbolic	meaning,	and	therefore	an	attractive	strategic	option	
for	nationalist	leaders”(Lecours	and	Moreno,	2001:	3-4).	The	second	element	relates	to	the	
domestic	audience:	
Highly	visible	paradiplomatic	activities	give	nationalist	leaders	the	opportunity	
to	 play	 to	 their	 domestic	 audience.	 They	 provide	 a	 scene	 from	 which	
nationhood	 can	 be	 proclaimed	 most	 forcefully…in	 short,	 through	
paradiplomacy,	regions	can	both	behave	as	nations	and	present	themselves	as	
such	(Lecours	and	Moreno,	2001:	4).	
The	second	dimension	of	paradiplomacy-as-stateless-nation-building	 rests	on	 the	 fact	 that	
paradiplomatic	 activity	 offers	 an	 attractive	 space	 for	 the	 “definition	 and	 articulation	 of	
regional/group	 interests”,	 which,	 in	 turn,	 contributes	 to	 the	 further	 development	 of	 the	
nation’s	collective	 identity.	Such	 interests,	entailing	a	“specific	conception	of	 the	common	
good”,	are	both	cultural	and	ideological	in	nature.	In	terms	of	culture,	nationalist	movements	
“emphasize	 and	 politicize	 cultural	 distinctiveness;	 consequently,	 they	 tend	 to	 define	 the	
‘national	 interest’	 primarily	 in	 terms	 of	 cultural	 protection/preservation”.	Meanwhile,	 the	
authors	 continue,	 emergent	 nationalist	 movements	 tend	 to	 develop	 an	 “ideological	
personality”,	which	is	then	refined	with	reference	to,	and	projected	onto,	the	international	
stage.	 Lecours	 and	Moreno	 cite	Quebec	 nationalists’	 strong	 links	with	 trade	unions	 as	 an	
example	 here,	 but	 the	 international	 and	 sustainable	 development	 activities	 of	 many	
European	regions,	Scotland	and	Wales	 included,	would	also	appear	 to	be	evidence	of	 this	
ideological	 personality.	 Interest	 definition	 is	 seen	 by	 Lecours	 and	 Moreno	 as	 “the	 most	
straightforward	and	visible”	component	of	paradiplomacy,	due	to	the	fact	that	such	activities	
are	 seen	 to	 ‘mimic’	more	 traditional	 foreign	 policy	 discourses,	 which	 are	 “fundamentally	
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about	 the	 definition,	 defence	 and	 promotion	 of	 a	 (state)	 national	 interest”	 (Lecours	 and	
Moreno,	2001:	4).	
	
The	third	and	final	link	between	nation	building	and	paradiplomacy	as	identified	by	Lecours	
and	Moreno	is	that	of	political-territorial	mobilization.	Here,	the	often-conflictual	nature	of	
paradiplomacy	in	relation	to	the	‘host’	state	presents	“nationalist	leaders	with	opportunities	
to	stimulate	political-territorial	mobilization	because	it	pits	the	region	against	the	centre,	and	
sometimes	regional	nationalist	forces	against	non-nationalist	ones”.	Given	the	sensitivity	of	
‘foreign	policy’,	paradiplomacy	represents	a	particularly	useful	tool	in	such	mobilization:	quite	
simply,	it	is	a	“statement	about	power”	(Lecours	and	Moreno,	2001:	5).	
	
While	 the	category	of	 stateless	nation,	and	certainly	 the	paradiplomacy-as-nation-building	
argument,	remain	crucial	to	understanding	the	political	motivations	behind	paradiplomatic	
action,	many	of	the	distinctions	inherent	in	such	arguments,	such	as	that	between	nationalist	
and	non-nationalist	regions,	as	identified	by	Keating	(1999:	4-5),	or	indeed	ethnic	and	civic	
nationalisms,	 are	 perhaps	 overly	 simplistic.	 Amongst	 the	 ‘nationalist’	 regions	 commonly	
classed	as	 ‘stateless	nations’,	there	are	those,	such	as	Scotland,	whose	ruling	party	has	an	
explicit	 independence	 platform,	 whilst	 there	 are	many	 others	 whose	 ‘nationalism’	 is	 not	
necessarily	 tied	 to	 an	 independence	 or	 secessionist	 agenda,	 or	 indeed	 (exclusively)	 to	 a	
‘nationalist’	party.	The	exact	motivations,	therefore,	behind	these	regions’	paradiplomacies,	
and	nation	building	projects	more	broadly,	would	seem	to	be	significantly	different,	as	would	
the	significance	or	implications	of	such	activities.	More	generally	speaking,	there	also	exist	
‘nation	building’	projects	which	are	employed	in	a	purposefully	cooperative	way	with	regards	
to	an	existing	state	identity,	Bavaria	having	traditionally	been	an	apt	example	here	(Hepburn,	
2008a:	186).	The	will	of	differentiation,	in	cases	such	as	these,	may	manifest	in	a	much	more	
conciliatory	style	of	paradiplomacy-as-nation-building	activity	than	seen	in	those	cases	where	
antagonistic	relations	exist	between	central	and	regional	governments.		
	
Therefore,	 whilst	 there	 is	 certainly	 a	 significant	 link	 between	 nation	 building	 and	
paradiplomacy,	the	exact	nature	of	this	 link	appears	to	be	more	complex	than	 is	currently	
accounted	for	in	the	literature.	Some	elements	of	paradiplomatic	activity	can	be	interpreted	
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as	attempts	 to	 ‘pave	 the	way’	 for	 independence,	 such	as	 in	Quebec	or	Scotland,	whereas	
others	remain	preoccupied	with	identity	construction	within	the	domestic	constituency.	The	
challenges	 such	 paradiplomacies	 may	 pose	 to	 state	 sovereignty,	 and	 the	 related	 inter-
governmental	tensions	within	the	extant	state,	may	also	differ	substantially.		
	
Though	many	 authors	 have	 acknowledged	 the	 variety	 of	 potential	 ‘end	 points’	 to	 nation	
building	 exercises,	 there	 is	 currently	 no	 systematic	 analysis	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
paradiplomacy	 is	 utilised	 along	 this	 continuum.	 	 The	 relationship	 between	 those	 discrete	
goals	 that	 are	 commonly	 attributed	 to	 ‘nation-building’,	 and	 the	 precise	 nature	 of	
paradiplomatic	activity	would	appear	to	be	an	overdue	item	on	the	paradiplomacy	research	
agenda.		
	
II. The	‘Self’	and	the	‘Other’	
Duran	(2011:	342)	argues	that	the	current	body	of	literature	addressing	the	question	of	why	
sub-state	governments	engage	in	paradiplomacy	represents	a	dichotomous	approach	to	the	
phenomenon:	”it	is	either	conflicting	with	or	cooperative	to	the	diplomatic	activities	of	the	
state	 the	 region	 is	 a	 constitutive	 part	 of”.	 The	 empirical	 data,	Duran	 continues,	 “seem	 to	
justify	this	dichotomy”,	due	to	the	prevalence	of	paradigmatic	case	studies,	focussing	on	the	
‘usual	suspects’	whose	paradiplomacy	is	easily	identified	as	either	cooperative	or	conflictual,	
and	 is	notable	 for	 that	 reason	 (Duran,	2011:	339	&	342).	 	As	a	consequence,	 the	study	of	
paradiplomacy	often	ignores	the	potential	of	more	conciliatory	approaches,	such	as	Hocking’s	
(1999)	multi-layered	diplomacy	model,	and,	the	implication	follows,	mischaracterises	much	
of	 the	 practice.	 	 Duran	 argues	 that,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 one	 of	 the	 lesser-studied	 entities	with	
regards	to	paradiplomacy	(alongside	the	Italian,	Argentinean,	Brazilian,	Chilean	and	Chinese	
regions,	inter	alia),	the	French	region	of	PACA,	diplomatic	practices:	
Surpass	 the	 often-cited	 conflictual	 logic	 according	 to	 which	 sub-national	
entities	win	what	the	national	diplomatic	level	loses….	diplomacy	is	first	and	
foremost	a	means	of	mediating	between	the	Self	and	the	Other.	Seen	in	that	
light,	 paradiplomacy	 can	 be	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 a	 diplomacy	 aimed	 at	
emphasizing	 the	 commonalities	 instead	 of	 the	 differences	 or	 separateness	
between	polities	(Duran,	2011:	340).	
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In	the	case	of	PACA,	Duran	argues	that	paradiplomacy	is	related	to	two	distinct	processes:	
that	of	decentralisation	within	the	French	state,	and	of	identity	construction	within	the	region	
itself.	This	paradiplomatic	action	can	be,	and	is,	both	cooperative	and	conflictual	with	that	of	
the	 central	 state,	 but,	 Duran	 stresses,	 the	 key	 is	 that	 such	 actions	 “are	 primarily	 about	
managing	 relations	 with	 ‘others’”	 (Duran,	 2011:	 356).	 In	 this	 case,	 PACA	 has	 developed	
significant	links	with	the	wider	Mediterranean	region	as	a	key	part	of	its	paradiplomacy:	
By	treating	the	French	state	and	other	French	territorial	collectives	not	only	as	
part	of	the	diplomatic	Self,	but	also	as	diplomatic	Others,	and	by	considering	
the	Mediterranean	 space	 as	 domestic,	 by	 advocating	 a	multiple	 diplomatic	
identity-	Provencal,	French	and	Mediterranean	-	the	region	is	filling	the	relative	
vacuum	the	French	state	left	in	the	Mediterranean	region…Thus	the	region	is	
affirming	 the	 diplomatic	 Self	 (PACA),	 recognising	 diplomatic	 Others	 (other	
French	 regions,	 France,	 foreign	 interlocutors)	 but	 also	 the	 diplomatic	
Sameness	(the	Mediterranean	space)	(Duran,	2011:	357).	
The	practice	of	paradiplomacy,	therefore,	embodies	process	of	differentiation	and	alignment,	
something	that	refers	not	just	to	relationships	formed	with	other	regions	or	states,	but	also	
between	the	region	and	their	host	state,	and	other	regions	within	that	state.		Though	not	the	
intention	of	Duran,	given	his	attempt	 to	move	away	 from	conflictual	 logics,	 it	would	even	
seem	that	this	conceptualisation	could	be	used	to	understand	the	ways	 in	which	stateless	
nations	use	paradiplomacy	as	part	of	their	nation	building	endeavours:	both	to	differentiate	
themselves	from	certain	actors	(the	central	state,	other	regions	within	the	state,	particularly	
in	cases	of	asymmetrical	demands	for	autonomy)	and	align	themselves	with	others;	whether	
they	are	other	‘stateless	nations’	(as	the	Bavarian	government	has	overtly	attempted	“Bavaria	
is	very	similar	to	Scotland.	We	see	ourselves	as	a	nation”	(Eberhard	Sinner,	Bavarian	Minister,	
in	Hepburn,	2008a:	184))	or	other	states	(such	as	Quebec’s	relations	with	France).	This	broad	
conceptualisation	(paradiplomacy	as	a	process	of	differentiation	and	alignment)	is	potentially	
a	useful	one	in	explaining	the	motivations	of	sub-state	governments	as	a	general	‘category’	
of	actor	in	developing	external	relations,	with	the	precise	contours	of	these	relations	being	
dependent,	essentially,	on	the	relationship	that	the	region	has	with	its	various	‘others’	(be	
that	conflictual	or	cooperative).	
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III. Paradiplomacy,	or	Multi-Level	Governance?	
A	consequence	of	the	scant	attention	given	to	agency-orientated	aspects	of	paradiplomacy	is	
that	the	concept	has	perhaps	too	often	been	equated	with	Multi-Level	Governance.	Here,	the	
focus	of	analysis	has	traditionally	been	related	to	governance	of	the	European	Union,	and	the	
various	opportunity	structures	that	this	creates	for	sub-state	governments	and	other	actors	
‘below’	 the	 state.	More	broadly	 it	 represents	a	useful	 concept	 to	explain	decision	making	
dynamics	within	the	European	sphere,	not	focussing	just	on	the	state	as	the	unit	of	analysis	
but	rather	a	nexus	of	actors	and	the	ways	in	which	these	actors	interact	with	one	another	
(Marks	 et	 al.,	 1996).	 Marks	 and	 Hooghe	 use	 multi-level	 governance	 to	 account	 for	 the	
‘unravelling	of	the	central	state’,	and	to	theoreise	new	patterns	of	political	interaction	that	
were	no	longer	necessarily	hierarchical	in	their	nature;	a	set	of	relationships	that	bypassed	
the	central	state,	yet	without	rendering	it	irrelevant	(Marks	and	Hooghe,	2003).	These	themes	
remain	 hugely	 relevant	 for	 paradiplomatic	 analysis.	 However,	 the	 conflation	 of	 the	 two	
phenomena	–	paradiplomacy	and	multi-level	governance	–	may	prove	problematic.	Such	a	
conflation	is	partly	down	to	the	shared	subject	matter	and	operational	spaces	that	they	jointly	
inhabit,	but	it	is	also	encouraged	by	the	sheer	variety	of	activities	and	practices	comprising	
paradiplomacy,	many	of	which	equate	to	multi-level-governance	and	can	indeed	be	useful	
explored	under	this	overarching	concept.		
	
Paradiplomacy	 manifests	 in	 numerous	 guises:	 at	 times	 utterly	 mundane,	 at	 times	 highly	
contentious.	 The	 scope	 of	 these	 activities	 should	 come	 as	 no	 surprise	 to	 students	 of	
regionalism.	Regions	and	sub-state	governments	are	themselves	an	“extraordinarily	diverse	
group”,	possessing	 varying	degrees	of	 autonomy	 (Scully	 and	Wyn	 Jones,	 2010:	 3)	 .	Unlike	
sovereign	 states,	 there	 is	 no	minimum	 legal	 or	 conceptual	 personality	 that	 regions	 share.	
Logically,	 therefore,	 the	 motivations	 behind	 the	 international	 activities	 that	 these	 actors	
undertake	also	span	a	spectrum	of	political	distinctiveness,	particularly	with	regards	to	the	
‘host’	 state.	 In	 its	more	 ubiquitous	modes,	 sub-state	 internationalism	might	 relate	 to	 the	
functional	requirements	of	European	governance,	or	the	need	to	attract	inward	investment.	
In	its	most	developed	forms,	however,	paradiplomatic	activities	can	speak	to	the	ambitions	
of	 sub-state	 nationalism	 (Lecours	 and	Moreno,	 2001:	 3).	 These	more	 developed	 forms	 of	
paradiplomacy	typically	take	the	sub-state	government	into	more	contentious	areas:	whether	
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that	is	thematically	(recognition,	international	aid,	core	areas	of	the	state’s	foreign	policy),	in	
terms	of	the	nature	of	the	activity	(relations	with	third	states	or	departure	from	a	state-held	
position).		
	
When	considered	in	these	terms,	the	potential	implications	of	paradiplomatic	activities	take	
on	a	political	charge.	For	international	relations	theory,	these	could	be	particularly	profound.	
Unlike	 the	myriad	of	other	non-state	actors	operating	at	 the	 international	 level,	 sub-state	
governments	 are	 territorially	 constituted,	 and	 this	 territory	 overlaps	 with	 that	 of	 nation-
states.	 Indeed,	 for	 Duran,	 not	 only	 is	 paradiplomacy	 a	 territorially-driven	 political	
phenomenon,	meaning	that	substate	diplomats	“represent,	communicate	and	negotiate	in	
the	name	of	territorial	communities”,	they	are	also	“political	expressions	of	the	dynamics	of	
de-	and	reterritorialization	that	characterize	our	current	international	environment”	(Duran,	
2015:	63).	For	the	minority	of	sub-state	governments	that	represent	a	distinct	‘nation’,	the	
potential	 becomes	 that	 of	 undermining	 a	 core	 function	 of	 the	 nation-state	 itself	 in	
international	 relations:	 to	 speak	 for	 ‘the	 people’	 of	 a	 given	 territory.	 Currently,	 the	
international	relations	literature	has	no	place	to	‘put’	actors	that	are	not	readily	categorised	
according	to	the	“traditional	dichotomy”	of	state	and	non-state	(Shadian,	2010:	486).	Indeed,	
a	reified	conception	of	the	nation-state	“leads	to	an	impoverished	conception	of	what	the	
‘non-state’	entails”	(Bulkeley	and	Schroeder,	2011:	745).	 Increasingly,	the	activities	of	sub-
state	actors,	particularly	those	representing	distinct	nations,	on	the	international	stage	are	
making	this	an	untenable	situation.		
	
Taken	as	a	whole,	the	literature	on	sub-state	international	mobilization	has	failed	to	develop	
a	theoretical	framework	able	to	fully	explore	these	more	developed	paradiplomatic	activities,	
many	 of	 which	 correspond	 to	 the	 logics	 of	 sub-state	 nationalism.	 The	 ‘fuzzy’	 boundaries	
between	 frameworks	 addressing	 autonomous,	 diplomatic	 activities	 (paradiplomacy)	 and	
more	functional	engagement	in	multi-level	policy-making	processes	(multi-level	governance)	
have	meant	 that	 these	more	 distinctive	 activities	 have	 become	diluted	 in	 analyses	 of	 the	
broader	phenomenon.		
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Both	paradiplomacy	and	multi-level	governance	are	concerned	with	the	un-bounding	of	sub-
state	units	from	their	domestic	territorial	settings.	These	units	engage	to	different	degrees	
and	 in	 various	 modes	 with	 external	 actors,	 comprising	 other	 regions,	 third	 states,	
international	 networks	 and	 supranational	 organisations.	 As	 explored	 in	 the	 preceding	
sections,	this	mobilization	is	thought	to	be	partially	fuelled	by	functional	imperatives,	such	as	
attracting	 inward	 investment,	or	 shaping	EU	policy	 (Hocking,	1999;	Cornago,	2010:	18-19;	
Tatham,	 2010).	 However,	 at	 the	 opposite	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum,	 other,	 less	 tangible,	
motivations	 may	 also	 be	 also	 manifest.	 These	 include	 status-,	 capacity-	 or	 even	 nation-
building	(Lecours	and	Moreno,	2001;	Kincaid,	1990;	Wigell,	2013;	Cole	and	Palmer,	2011;	Wyn	
Jones	and	Royles,	2012;	Royles,	2010;	Aldecoa	and	Keating,	1999a;	Duran,	2011).	In	their	most	
developed	forms,	these	activities	can	entail	the	representation	of	a	sub-state	unit	as	a	distinct	
nation	on	 the	 international	 stage,	promoting	 the	 interests	or	 values	of	an	equally	distinct	
‘people’.	 However,	 in	 much	 of	 the	 literature,	 regional	 mobilization,	 manifest	 in	 both	
paradiplomacy	 and	 multi-level	 governance,	 is	 closely	 allied	 to	 the	 broader	 processes	 of	
globalisation	 (Hocking,	 1999;	 Paquin	 and	 Lachapelle,	 2005),	 and	 European	 integration	
(Aldecoa,	 1999;	 Sodupe,	 1999;	Hepburn	 and	McLoughlin,	 2011).	 This	 literature	 also	 often	
implies	a	causal	relationship	between	these	wider	phenomena	and	sub-state	mobilisation	in	
the	international	domain	(Hocking,	1999:	9;	Cohn	and	Smith,	1996:	25;	Paquin	and	Lachapelle,	
2005:	78;	Sodupe,	1999:	58).		
	
Not	only	does	this	focus	on	the	logics	of	globalisation	and	European	integration	mean	that	
the	agency	of	regional	actors	themselves	has	at	times	been	neglected,	but	it	also	leads	to	a	
confusion	 between	 different	 categories	 of	 international	 activity	 undertaken	 by	 sub-state	
governments.	Given	the	broad	scope	that	the	phenomenon	of	sub-state	internationalisation	
encompasses,	in	terms	of	the	types	of	actor,	of	arenas	and	of	activities,	the	lack	of	coherence	
within	the	two	main	literatures	accounting	for	these	practices	is	far	from	surprising.	Imprecise	
boundaries	have	led,	however,	to	a	situation	where	parts	of	the	ostensibly	‘paradiplomacy’	
literature	deal	with	activities	 that	may	be	better	considered	under	multi-level	governance	
frameworks	(for	example:	Tatham,	2008;	2010;	2013;	Hocking,	1999:	25).	A	further	difficulty	
arises	from	the	fact	that	multi-level	governance	itself	is	a	“multi-level	concept’:	
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Because	 it	moves	across	and	connects	different	analytical	planes	and	raises	
different	normative	questions.	MLG	is	at	the	same	time	a	theory	of	of	political	
mobilisation,	of	policy-making	and	of	polity	structuring,	hence	any	theorisation	
about	MLG	may	be	couched	alternatively	or	simultaneously	in	politics,	policy,	
or	polity	terms	(Piattoni,	2009:	172).	
	
Thus,	when	the	amorphous	concept	of	multi-level	governance	itself	becomes	conflated	with	
the	 narrower	 frame	 of	 paradiplomacy,	 it	 may	 generate	 an	 analytical	 problem:	
mischaracterising	and	obscuring	the	significance	of	paradiplomacy.	Sub-state	governments’	
role	 in	multi-level	governance	–	at	 least	 in	recent	years	-	 is	 typically	thought	to	be	a	fairly	
conciliatory	 practice	 (where	 sub-state	 governments	 act	 with	 a	 degree	 of	 presumed	
legitimacy),	concerning	activities	with	a	clear	functional	 impetus.	Too	close	an	equation	of	
this	 concept	with	 paradiplomacy	may	 therefore	 direct	 attention	 away	 from	a	 category	 of	
activities,	much	fewer	in	number	though	they	may	be,	where	less	tangible	motivations	are	at	
play,	and	the	tone	of	interactions	may	be	more	competitive.	In	conducting	paradiplomatic,	as	
opposed	to	multi-level	governance	activities,	regions	often	emulate	state-like	qualities	and,	
in	some	cases,	use	international	domains	to	build	the	‘nation’	domestically.	This	category	of	
activities	may	speak	to	a	greater	degree	of	political	contestation	than	is	typically	provided	for	
under	multi-level	governance	frameworks.	
	
The	 requirement	 for	 such	 a	 distinction	 has	 been	 recognised	 within	 both	 literatures,	 and	
tentative	steps	have	been	taken	towards	delineating	the	different	categories	of	international	
activities.	For	example,	Kincaid	(2010)	argues	that	there	is	a	choice	facing	paradiplomacy	(or,	
using	his	preferred	term,	constituent	diplomacy)	actors:	whether	or	not	to	separate	EU	and	
world	affairs	in	their	international	remits.	This	is	because,	he	argues;	“the	EU	is	increasingly	
taking	on	the	characteristic	of	a	 federal	polity	and	thereby	acquiring	the	characteristics	of	
domestic	rather	than	international	politics	and	governance”	(Kincaid	2010:23).	Meanwhile,	in	
a	 study	 of	 the	 various	 cross-border	 institutions	 utilised	 by	 regions,	 Blatter	 (2001:181)	
contends	 that	 distinguishing	 between	 “instrumental”	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 “symbolic	 or	
identity-providing	institutions”	on	the	other,	is	a	crucial	element	of	their	proper	analysis.		
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More	deliberately,	both	Palmer	(2008)	and	Kaiser	(2005)	have	attempted	to	make	an	explicit	
distinction	 between	 the	 two	 concepts.	 Palmer	 (2008:	 14)	 considers	 paradiplomacy	 as	 a	
potential	complement	to	multi-level	governance,	alongside	the	model	of	‘European	domestic	
policy’,	 in	 order	 to	 “enhance	 the	 explanatory	 potential	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 multi-level	
governance	 for	 understanding	 the	 dynamics	 of	 sub-state	mobilisation	 in	 the	 EU”.	 	 Kaiser	
(2005:	92),	meanwhile	distinguishes	paradiplomacy	“autonomous	sub-national	action	in	the	
international	sphere”,	from	multi-level	governance,	which,	looks	to	investigate		“coordinated	
policy	making	 across	 different	 territorial	 levels”.	 Kaiser	 argues	 that,	 while	 paradiplomacy	
applies	primarily	to	the	American	context,	and	multi-level	governance	to	the	European,	both	
practices	can	indeed	be	evidenced	in	each	domain.	From	these	tentative	steps	to	differentiate	
the	 two	 concepts,	 Chapter	 2	 of	 this	 thesis	 draws	 deliberate	 boundaries	 around	 them;	
suggesting	a	range	of	ways	in	which	they	may	interact	with	one	another,	and	incorporating	
such	a	distinction	into	the	new	theoretical	framework	that	is	advocated	here.	
	
The	Significance	of	Paradiplomacy:	Conceptualising	Sub-state	Actorness	
The	implications	of	paradiplomacy,	particularly	as	they	manifest	on	the	international	stage,	
have	 rarely	been	considered	as	part	of	paradiplomatic	 studies.	As	a	 result,	 they	are	often	
either	overlooked	entirely	or	relegated	to	functional	or	second-order	fields	of	study,	such	as	
public	or	network	diplomacy.	More	significantly,	sub-state	governments	are	frequently,	and	
hastily,	amalgamated	with	what	Hocking	terms	the	“grab	all	category”	of	‘non-state	actors’	
(1999:	 21).	 This	 category	 error	 -	 or	 the	 lack	 of	 specificity	 implied	 -	 elides	 the	 key	 and	
internationally	pertinent	difference	that	sub-state	governments	represent	distinct	territories	
which	 overlap,	 often	 in	 highly	 sensitive	 and	 politically	 salient	 ways,	 with	 nation	 states,	
meaning	that	the	significance	of	paradiplomacy	is	fundamentally	different	from	that	of	de-
territorialised,	purposefully	‘global’	actors	such	as	NGOs	or	MNCs.	
	
	It	 is	 not	 just	 at	 the	 international	 level	 that	 the	 implications	 of	 sub-state	 governments’	
international	action	is	underexplored;	Wright	(2003:	98)	argues	that	both	the	paradiplomacy	
and	multi-level	governance	concepts	fail	to	adequately	examine	the	consequences	of	such	
phenomena	for	state	-	sub-state	relations.	This	lacuna	can	partially	be	explained	by	the	fact	
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that	such	consequences	vary	dramatically,	depending	on	the	type	of	paradiplomatic	activity	
in	question;	specifically,	whether	it	occurs	in	conflict	with,	parallel	to,	or	indeed	in	concert	
with	the	diplomacy	of	central	state	governments	(Criekemans,	2010c:	38-39).			
	
By	virtue	of	the	fact	that	much	paradiplomatic	action	occurs	parallel	to	the	central	state,	and	
is	often	fairly	‘(Aldecoa	and	Keating,	1999a)’	(Aldecoa	and	Keating,	1999b:	14),	there	has	been	
a	 tendency	 to	 de-emphasise	 its	 significance.	 As	 highlighted	 above,	 a	 similar	 impulse	 to	
categorise	as	‘paradiplomacy’	activities	that	may	better	be	understood	with	reference	to	the	
concept	of	multi-level	governance	compounds	this	problem	of	under-	or	miss-reporting	(for	
example,	Tatham,	2008;	2010;	Blatter	et	al.,	2008).	The	paradiplomacy	literature,	therefore,	
has	failed	to	take	appropriate	account	of	the	implications	of	their	field,	whilst	international	
relations	scholars	often	overlook	the	practice	altogether,	perhaps	due	to	the	‘methodological	
nationalism’	of	mainstream	political	science	(Hepburn,	2009:	478;	Jeffery,	2008:	545).	
I. The	International	Arena	
Important	 questions	 related	 to	 the	 implications	 of	 paradiplomacy	 for	 traditional	
understandings	 of	 international	 relations	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 nation	 state	 were	 raised,	
somewhat	rhetorically,	early	on	in	paradiplomatic	research	(Aldecoa	and	Keating,	1999a:	vi;	
Lecours,	2002:	109;	Keating,	1999:	14).	However,	after	this	initial	flurry	of	enthusiasm,	and	
despite	an	 increasing	 focus	on	some	of	 the	 ‘international	 relations’	aspects	of	 the	activity	
(such	as	public	diplomacy,	see	Huijgh	(2010)),	these	fundamental	questions	have	yet	to	be	
answered,	or	even	considered	in	any	systematic	way.	Thus	far,	it	 is	scholars	of	regionalism	
and	comparative	politics	that	have	been	at	the	forefront	of	paradiplomatic	research,	leading	
to	an	imbalance	in	the	literature.		
	
In	part,	this	imbalance	may	be	explained	by	the	fact	that,	depending	on	the	particular	frame	
of	reference	or	level	of	analysis	that	one	chooses,	the	‘international’	effects	or	implications	
of	 paradiplomacy	 can	 be	 interpreted	 within	 a	 multitude	 of	 different	 frameworks.	 For	
example,	paradiplomacy	may	be	 seen	as	an	alternative	way	 to	conceptualise	 some	of	 the	
processes	more	 commonly	 analysed	 under	 the	 framework	 of	multi-level	 governance;	 the	
increasing	 involvement	 of	 sub-state	 actors	 on	 the	 international	 stage,	 and	 the	
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internationalization	of	sub-state	politics	(Kaiser,	2005:	90).	At	the	same	time,	if	we	consider	
paradiplomacy	 within	 the	 broadest	 possible	 frame	 of	 reference,	 paradiplomacy	 may	 be	
interpreted	as	one	component	(amongst	many)	of	‘transnationalism’,	or	even	evidence	of	a	
neo-medievalist	configuration	of	international	relations	(Magone,	2006).			
	
This	 aforementioned	 imbalance	 within	 the	 paradiplomacy	 literature	 has	 meant	 that	 the	
aspects	 of	 the	 practice	which	 invite	 an	 international	 relations	 perspective	 have	 not	 been	
adequately	 explored,	 with	 fundamental	 questions	 regarding	 the	 significance	 of	 the	
phenomenon,	 and	 its	 implications	 for	 key	 units	 and	 concepts	 in	 IR	 theory,	 such	 as	 state	
sovereignty,	left	unanswered.	This	is	a	significant	void	in	the	field	of	research:	as	the	strategies	
of	sub-state	governments	become	more	complex,	and	the	legitimacy	of	their	 international	
action	 develops,	 the	 practice	 becomes	 increasingly	 important	 for	 international	 relations	
theory.		
II. The	Domestic	Arena	
The	implications	of	paradiplomacy	for	the	central	state,	for	the	region	itself,	and	for	 inter-
governmental	 relations	within	 the	 state,	 differ	 greatly	 depending	 on	 the	 type	 of	 external	
relations	being	conducted	by	the	sub-state	government.		Criekemans	(2010c:	38-39)	makes	
this	distinction	on	the	basis	of	whether	paradiplomacy	is	conducted	in	concert,	or	in	conflict,	
with	 that	 of	 the	 central	 state.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 Tatham	 (2008;	 2010)	 contrasts	 EU	
paradiplomacy	which	is	conducted	through	the	member	state	with	that	which	bypasses	 it,	
opting	instead	for	direct	interest	representation	or	interaction.	Another	classification	relates	
to	whether	the	external	relations	of	sub-state	governments	take	the	form	of	paradiplomacy	
or	‘protodiplomacy’,	a	more	advanced,	often	antagonistic	form	of	external	relations	aligned	
to	sub-state	governments	pursuing	an	independence	agenda,	or	who	are	in	the	process	of	
seceding	from	the	wider	state	(Duchacek	1988,	cited	in	Cornago,	2010:	31-32).	
	
Thus	 far,	 however,	 much	 of	 the	 paradiplomacy	 literature	 has	 fairly	 modest	 expectations	
regarding	the	domestic	impact	of	paradiplomacy	(for	example:	Cornago,	2010:	31-32;	Wolff,	
2007).		In	particular,	Cornago	(2010:	31-32)	argues	that	‘protodiplomacy’	is	exceptionally	rare,	
even	amongst	those	sub-state	governments	where	“a	clear	will	of	differentiation	with	regard	
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to	the	hosting	state	exists”.	 	However,	despite	the	comparative	rarity	of	 ‘protodiplomacy’,	
there	is	no	doubt	that	this	more	conflictual	practice	is	indeed	in	evidence	as	a	part	of	certain	
sub-state	 strategies.	 For	 example,	 Scotland’s	 diplomatic	 endeavours	 do	 indeed	 seem	 to	
resemble	“those	 initiatives	and	activities	of	a	non-central	government	abroad	 that	graft	a	
more	 or	 less	 separatist	message	 on	 to	 its	 economic,	 social	 and	 cultural	 link	 with	 foreign	
nations”	 (Duchacek	1988:240,	 cited	 in	Cornago	2010:31).	Overt	 Scottish	attempts	 to	align	
themselves	with	a	Scandinavian	‘arc	of	prosperity’,	public	departures	from	the	UK’s	EU	policy	
and	 the	 appropriation	 of	 a	 pair	 of	 Chinese	 Pandas	 as	 evidence	 of	 formal	 diplomatic	 links	
between	the	region	and	the	Chinese	state,	all	seem	to	come	very	close	to	this	definition	of	
protodiplomacy.	 If	this	 is	the	case,	then	Scotland’s	paradiplomacy	suddenly	seems	to	have	
much	more	dramatic	implications	for	their	relations	with	the	UK	government	than	is	allowed	
for	under	the	typology	of	both	Wolff	(2007:	150)	and	Cornago	(2010:	31-32).		
	
In	 part,	 this	 limited	 conception	 of	 the	 challenge	 posed	 for	 central	 state	 governments	 by	
paradiplomacy	 relates	 to,	 once	 again,	 to	 the	 tendency	 to	 equate	 paradiplomacy	with	 the	
‘bigger’	 concept	 of	 multi-level	 governance.	 Here,	 sub-state	 interactions	 tend	 to	 be	 less	
controversial,	 and	 their	 presence	 carries	 greater	 legitimacy	 (for	 example:	 Tatham,	 2008;	
Blatter	et	al.,	2008;	Tatham,	2010).	There	is	certainly	a	good	deal	of	overlap	between	the	two	
concepts,	both	considering	the	international	actions	of	sub-state	governments,	but	this	range	
of	activities	encompasses	some	quite	radically	different	types	of	engagement,	ranging	from	
interest	 representation	 in	 EU	 policy	 formation	 to	 forging	 bilateral	 partnerships	with	 third	
states,	 or	 initiating	 international	 development	 programmes.	 Assuming	 that	 each	 of	 these	
activities	have	broadly	equal	implications	for	the	relations	between	the	sub-state	government	
and	 the	central	 state	seems	 to	be	potentially	misguided,	yet	 this	distinction	has	not	been	
examined	in	detail	within	the	extant	literature.		
	Theoretical	Frameworks	
As	the	previous	sections	have	sought	to	demonstrate,	the	implications	of	paradiplomacy,	both	
on	the	international	and	domestic	stages,	have	been	all	but	ignored	within	the	literature.	Two	
further,	and	widespread,	critiques	have	also	been	made,	regarding	the	failure	to	develop	the	
general	 theoretical	 perspectives	 or	 analytical	 frameworks	 necessary	 to	 understand	 the	
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phenomenon	(Lecours,	2002),	and	to	arrive	at	adequate	explanations	for	the	development	
(Bursens	and	Deforche,	2010).	In	part,	these	shortcomings	can	be	accounted	for	by	the	fact	
that	 paradiplomacy	 falls	 into	 something	 of	 an	 academic	 ‘no	 man’s	 land’,	 between	
international	relations	theory	and	comparative	politics.			
At	the	broadest	level,	paradiplomacy	raises	the	‘big	questions’	that	are	central	
to	 both	 comparative	 politics	 and	 international	 relations.	 Theorizing	
paradiplomacy…necessarily	 involves	 penetrating	 the	 structure-agency	
debate…more	 specifically,	 paradiplomacy	 is	 a	 Janus-faced	 phenomenon	
whose	very	nature	defies	its	categorization	as	internal-domestic	or	external-
international,	and	whose	explanation	involves	considering	both	internal	and	
external	variables	(Lecours,	2002:	109-110)	
Both	the	potential	for	a	more	‘joined	up’	approach	between	the	disciplines	of	comparative	
politics	and	international	relations	and	the	specific	role	of	 international	relations	theory	in	
conceptualising	the	paradiplomacy	will	be	considered	in	the	following	two	sections.		
	
I. Traditional	Comparative	Politics	and	IR	Theory:	A	Bridgeable	Divide?	
International	 Relations	 research,	 according	 to	 Caporaso	 (1997:	 564),	 remains	 narrowly	
focussed	 on	 two	 conceptual	 categories:	 the	 state	 and	 the	 international	 system.	 This	
specialisation,	as	a	consequence,	largely	ignores	domestic	politics,	resulting	in	a	“pronounced	
gap	within	the	discipline	as	a	whole	between	domestic	politics	and	international	relations”.	
Given	 the	 existence	 of	 phenomena,	 such	 as	 paradiplomacy,	 whose	 explanations	 and	
implications	 lie	 concurrently	 in	 the	 domestic	 and	 international	 spheres,	 there	 seems	 an	
intuitive	need	to	bridge	this	divide	in	future	research.		Two	different	schools	of	thought	exist,	
however,	 regarding	 whether	 or	 not	 this	 academic	 divide	 is,	 in	 fact,	 bridgeable;	 the	 cure	
remains	dependent	on	the	cause,	and	here	there	are	divergent	hypotheses.	
	
The	 first	 is	 simply	 that	 the	 chasm	 is	 a	 result	 of	 academic	 specialisation	 and	 the	 logic	 of	
divisions	of	 labour,	encouraging	political	scientists,	for	the	sake	of	expediency,	to	focus	on	
relatively	narrow	frames	of	reference.	Under	this	hypothesis,	the	gaps	that	currently	exist	in	
the	two	fields’	research	are	surmountable,	requiring	a	restructuring	of	working	practices	and	
new	research	agendas.	The	second,	however,	assumes	that	 the	 ‘problem’	 is	systemic,	and	
that	“both	fields	are	intellectually	autonomous,	stand	on	their	own	foundations,	and	cannot	
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be	reduced	to	one	another”.	Here,	an	explanation	is	offered	on	the	basis	that	the	discipline	
of	 international	 relations	 is	 concerned	with	state	 survival,	bargaining	and	power,	whereas	
domestic	 politics	 is	 rule	 based,	 preoccupied	with	 governance	 and	 institutions.	 Under	 this	
assumption,	 integrating	 the	 research	 agendas	 of	 these	 separate	 disciplines	 is	 both	
unnecessary	and	ill-advised	(Caporaso,	1997:	564).	
	
Attempts	to	incorporate	domestic	and	international	approaches	to	phenomena	which	span	
this	conceptual	divide,	and	‘de-compartmentalise’	political	science	(Lecours,	2002:	109-110),	
can,	 indeed,	be	identified.	Caporaso	(1997)	highlights	two	of	such	that	may	be	particularly	
relevant	to	the	study	of	paradiplomacy:	1)	Robert	Putnam’s	two-level	games,	and	2)	research	
concerning	the	domestification	of	international	systems	(with	the	EU	as	the	key	exemplar).	
	
Caporaso	cites	 two	works	as	key	 to	 the	 ‘two-level	game’	approach:	Putnam’s	1988	article	
‘Diplomacy	and	Domestic	 Politics:	 The	 Logic	of	 Two-Level	Games’	 and	a	 subsequent	1993	
edited	volume	by	Evans	et	al.,	entitled	“Doubled-Edged	Diplomacy”.	 	The	basic	premise	of	
these	 works	 is	 that	 the	 unitary	 actor	 assumption	 of	 the	 state	 in	 traditional	 IR	 theory	 is	
misleading,	 resulting	 in	 incomplete	 understandings	 of	 ‘international’	 phenomena	 and,	
instead,	 a	 recognition	 of	 the	 “Janus-faced”	 nature	 of	 the	 state,	 “facing	 simultaneously	
outward	 to	 the	 international	 system	and	 inward	 toward	 various	domestic	 constituencies”	
should	 form	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 more	 sophisticated	 approach	 (Caporaso,	 1997:	 566-567).	 The	
edited	book,	which	Caporaso	highlights,	focuses	particularly	on	this	process	of	international	
bargaining,	 disseminating	 the	 domestic	 and	 international	 explanations	 for	 particular	
configurations	of	power	or	negotiating	positions.	According	to	Moravcsik	(1993:	6),	the	divide	
between	international	relations	and	comparative	politics	is	less	absolute	in	practice	than	it	is	
in	theory:	“pure	international	theories,	while	attractive	in	principle,	tend	to	degenerate	under	
the	collective	weight	of	empirical	anomalies	and	theoretical	limitations	into	explanations	that	
include	 domestic	 factors”.	 The	 argument	 logically	 follows,	 therefore,	 that	 incorporating	
domestic	 factors	 into	 the	 theory-building	 stage	 would	 allow	 for	 more	 accurate	
conceptualisations	of	processes	such	as	international	bargaining;	“all	sophisticated	theories	
of	international	relations,	domestic	and	international,	tend	to	concede	that	domestic	actors	
are	active	participants	in	foreign	policy	making”.	The	contentious	issue,	as	Moravcsik	sees	it,	
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is	which	theoretical	frameworks	can	best	account	for	“observed	behaviour”	(Moravcsik,	1993:	
7).	
	
The	second	attempt	at	rapprochement	between	the	two	disciplines	identified	by	Caporaso	is	
that	which	he	terms	the	domestification	of	international	politics	(Caporaso,	1997:	579).	Unlike	
the	two-level	game	approach,	this	endeavour	can’t	be	traced	to	a	single	work	or	group	of	
scholars,	 rather	 it	 is	 most	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 wealth	 of	 research	 into	 the	 emergence,	
integration	and	operation	of	the	EU,	as	a	key	example	of	the	way	in	which	distinct	spheres	in	
the	international	realm	have	become	less	anarchic,	more	“governmentalized”	and	rule	based.	
Rather	than	advocating	a	two-level	approach	(where	the	two	levels	of	international	system	
and	domestic	politics	are	 indeed	fundamentally	different,	but	must	both	be	considered	to	
impact	 upon	 the	 process	 of	 ‘international	 relations’),	 as	 Putnam	 and	 Evans	 et	 al.,	 this	
approach	asks:	
	To	what	extent	domestic	 and	 international	politics	differ,	 in	 terms	of	deep	
organising	principles,	then	interprets	these	differences	as	ones	of	degree	(not	
kind),	and	proceeds	to	investigate	the	ways	in	which	the	international	system	
may	 acquire	 the	 characteristics	 of	 domestic	 policy’	 (Caporaso,	 1997:	 579-
580:579-80)	
Paradiplomacy	 is	 a	 prime	 example	 of	 a	 phenomenon	 that	 requires	 a	 multi-locational	
theoretical	perspective	to	adequately	account	for	its	development	and	its	implications.	The	
two-level	game	approach	taken	to	explore	international	bargaining	would	seem	a	particularly	
useful	starting	point	in	addressing	the	international	and	domestic	variables	relevant	to	the	
practice	of	paradiplomacy,	and	is	an	approach	seemingly	mirrored,	if	implicitly,	in	the	work	of	
Lecours	(2002),	cited	in	previous	sections.	
II. The	absence	of	IR		
As	 also	 intimated	 above,	 paradiplomacy	 has	 gained	 surprisingly	 little	 attention	 from	
international	 relations	 scholars;	 in	 fact	 none	 of	 the	 numerous	 ‘schools’	 in	 IR	 theory	 have	
examined	the	phenomenon,	offered	explanations	for	 its	development	or	accounted	for	 its	
impact	on	the	field	(the	exceptions	which	prove	this	rule	are	Bursens	and	Deforche’s	historical	
institutionalist,	explanatory,	account	of	the	development	of	paradiplomacy	(2010),	built	on	by	
Royles	(Royles,	2016)).	However,	the	literature	is	inching	closer	to	incorporating	the	type	of	
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dynamic	exhibited	by	paradiplomacy	into	 its	theorising;	for	example,	recent	studies	of	city	
diplomacy	(Curtis,	2011)	and	global	diasporas	(Adamson	and	Demetriou,	2007)	have	looked	
closely	at	the	reconceptualisation	of	units	in	international	relations	and	the	challenges	for	a	
priori	assumptions	of	 the	nature	and	 importance	of	sovereign	statehood	(particularly	as	 it	
relates	 to	 nationhood).	 Clearly,	 these	 are	 questions	which	 relate	 in	 equal,	 if	 not	 greater,	
measure	to	the	international	activities	of	sub-state	regional	governments,	particularly	those	
which	can	be	classed	as	‘stateless	nations’.		
	
Though	these	two	works	have	an	unambiguous	IR	focus,	they	draw	on	the	broader,	multi-
disciplinary	 framework	of	 ‘transnationalism’,	whereby	new	actors	 (such	as	 interest	groups	
and	global	corporations)	and	loci	of	political	power	(including	supranational	institutions	and	
global	networks)	increasingly	form	‘webs’	which	trap	within	them	nation	states,	constraining	
their	freedom	of	manoeuvre	and	weakening	the	respective	power	of	their	domestic	policy	
apparatus	(Cerny,	2010:	4-5).	Sub-state	governments	are	a	particularly	interesting	case	in	this	
regard;	the	fact	that	they	are	territorially	constituted	(as	opposed	to	issue	networks	or	global	
diasporas)	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 but	 that	 they	 are	 often	 politically,	 as	 opposed	 to	 solely	
economically	motivated	(in	contrast	to	most	city	diplomacy),	and	that	they	may	represent	
competing	expressions	of	nationalism	with	regards	to	their	host	‘nation	state’,	on	the	other,	
mean	that	their	effect	upon	traditional	roles	and	conceptions	of	the	state	within	international	
relations	is	potentially	of	greater	significance	than	either	of	the	two	phenomena	cited	above.		
	
This	potential	makes	the	absence	of	IR	research	exploring	the	practice	of	paradiplomacy	all	
the	more	surprising.	In	fact,	the	transnationalism	literature	itself	seems	to	largely	ignore	the	
phenomenon,	with	examinations	of	regionalism	concentrating	only	on	the	inter-,	not	intra-
state	mode	 (particularly	with	 regards	 to	 the	EU).	Meanwhile,	 though	 the	 two	works	 cited	
above	 represent	 interesting	 steps	 towards	exploring	 these	new	dynamics	 in	 IR	 theorising,	
both	authors	point	to	the	overall	paucity	of	research	or	interest	on	the	part	of	international	
relations	scholars	in	these	areas.	Specifically,	Adamson	and	Demetriou	(2007:	495)	argue	that	
what	 little	 IR	 theorising	 does	 engage	 with	 such	 issues,	 in	 particular	 diasporas	 and	
transnational	identities:	
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Has	 been	written	 largely	 from	a	 postmodernist	 perspective,	with	 a	 view	 to	
drawing	 attention	 to	 marginalised	 identities	 or	 practices	 as	 a	 means	 of	
critiquing	 hegemonic	 conceptions	 of	 the	 state…A	 conceptual	 focus	 on	 non-
state	 identities	 is	therefore	often	paired	to	a	political	project	 located	within	
the	field	of	IR,	rather	than	an	IR	project	that	seeks	to	understand	the	real	world	
of	international	politics.	
In	 attempting	 to	 explain	 what	 he	 determines	 as	 a	 fundamental	 flaw	 in	 the	 way	 that	 IR	
theorising	 has	 developed,	 Neumann	 (2002:	 630-638)	 argues	 that	 an	 unquestioning,	 over-
reliance	on	the	“systemic	point	of	departure”	in	IR,	the	Westphalian	state	system,	has	meant	
that;	“we	have	no	way	of	discussing	empirically	to	what	extent	the	system	of	states	in	fact	
remains	central	to	global	politics.	The	system	appears	as	ontic,	as	an	exogenised	given	of	the	
analysis”.	
	
In	other	words,	if	the	system	of	states	is	seen	as	a	given,	this	limits	the	extent	of	empirical	
investigations	into	other	explanations,	and	IR	theorists	“bracket	out	other	possible	ways	of	
framing	global	politics,	and	so	effectively	hamper	other	ways	from	emerging	more	clearly”.	
What	is	required,	according	to	Neumann,	is	an	abandonment	of	the	structural-functionalism	
inherent	 in	 this	 approach;	 IR	 theory	 should	 “follow	 the	 general	 turn	of	 anthropology	 and	
sociology	away	from	an	analysis	based	on	beliefs,	ideas,	norms	and	so	on,	in	favour	of	more	
concrete	analysis”.	Using	the	example	of	diplomacy	to	illustrate	his	point,	Neumann	argues	
that,	here,	it	is	particularly	important	that	the	degree	to	which	state	actors	are	required	to	
“grapple”	with	other	types	of	actors,	and	the	effect	of	these	changes,	are	properly	accounted	
for	 in	 IR	 theory,	 given	 that	 the	 practice	 of	 diplomacy	 “has	 traditionally	 been	 seen	 as	 a	
mainstay	 of	 the	 states	 system,	 and	 so	 this	 should	 be	 a	 case	 where	 potentially	 systems-
transforming	innovation	should	be	less	expected”	(Neumann,	2002:	693).	Chapter	Two	makes	
a	deliberate	attempt	to	incorporate	a	more	qualified	conception	of	sovereignty	and	statehood	
into	our	framework	for	analysis,	allowing	for	the	concrete	consideration	of	the	ways	in	which	
sub-state	governments	challenge,	subvert	or	reinforce	the	messages	of	state-level	diplomacy:		
in	 other	 words,	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 states	 are	 forced	 to	 grapple	 with	 their	 sub-state	
counterparts.		
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Conclusion:	The	state	of	the	Literature	
The	 practice	 of	 paradiplomacy	 remains	 hugely	 differentiated.	 At	 one	 level	 of	 distinction,	
paradiplomacy	can	be	both	a	highly	politicised,	almost	antagonistic,	undertaking,	generally	
by	 those	 regions	 engaged	 in	 an	 explicit	 nation-building	 project.	 Or	 it	 can	 be	 functionally	
driven,	to	the	point	of	mundane	(Keating,	1999:	13).	Within	this	first	category,	similar	means	
may	actually	reflect	very	different	idealised	ends,	from	independence,	to	greater	autonomy	
within	the	state	or	simply	enhanced	leverage	over	a	particular	issue.	This	differentiation	of	
both	practices	and	purposes	certainly	compounds	the	complexity	of	the	phenomenon	and	
can	 partly	 explain	 the	 limited	 development	 of	 the	 overarching	 theoretical	 frameworks	 or	
explanatory	approaches,	as	called	for	by	Lecours	(2002)	and	Bursens	and	Deforche	(2010).	
	
	The	paradiplomacy	literature	has	developed	in	a	sporadic,	yet	compartmentalised,	fashion,	
with	contributions	from	the	fields	of	regionalism	and	federalism	completely	eclipsing	those	
from	 the	 IR	 traditions.	Given	 the	 ‘Janus	 faced’	 nature	 of	 paradiplomatic	 activity	 (Lecours,	
2002:	110),	and	thus	the	relevance	of	both	internal	and	external	causes	and	consequences	of	
the	phenomenon,	this	is	a	significant	shortcoming.	Perhaps	as	a	result	of	this	imbalance	within	
the	 literature,	structural	determinants,	 such	as	 legislative	autonomy	or	globalisation,	have	
been	given	particularly	prominent	weightings	in	accounts	of	the	phenomenon’s	growth	over	
the	preceding	decades.	Whilst	 the	 role	of	 agency	has	 steadily	 gained	 increasing	academic	
attention	(Lecours,	2002;	Paquin	and	Lachapelle,	2005;	Lecours	and	Moreno,	2001;	Duran,	
2011;	 Keating,	 1999),	 the	 few	 works	 that	 look	 specifically	 at	 the	 motivations	 behind	
paradiplomacy	have	failed	to	adequately	explore	the	relationship	between	the	most-oft	cited	
variables,	 sub-state	nationalism	and	nation	building,	and	paradiplomatic	activity.	Thus	 far,	
this	 small	 literature	 lacks	 the	 systematic,	 comparative	 analysis	 required	 to	 uncover	 the	
nuances	of	these	motivations,	and	the	ways	 in	which	sub-state	actors	perceive	the	tool	of	
paradiplomacy.	 Instead,	 the	 paradiplomatic	 literature	 has	 focussed	 on	 exploring	 the	
opportunity	 structures	 allowing	 for	 the	 mobilization	 of	 sub-state	 actors	 beyond	 their	
territorial	 borders.	 Undoubtedly,	 this	 leaves	 a	 sizeable	 and	 obstructive	 gap	 in	 our	
understanding	of	the	phenomenon,	and	its	‘normalization’	(Cornago,	2010)	over	the	past	two	
decades.	
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Meanwhile,	and	relatedly,	the	implications	of	paradiplomacy,	both	for	the	region	and	state	
(in	terms	of	intergovernmental	relations	and	constitutional	development)	and	for	the	conduct	
and	conceptualisation	of	international	relations,	remain	underexplored.	Overall,	there	does	
appear	 to	be	 an	unwillingness	 to	 speculate	on	 the	broader	 significance	of	 paradiplomatic	
activity.	Given	that	“few	hopes	have	been	more	regularly	disappointed	than	those	focussing	
on	the	withering	away	of	the	state”	(Scully	and	Wyn	Jones,	2010:	5),	this	caution	is	perhaps	
unsurprising.	However,	the	‘hybridity’	of	sub-state	governments	on	the	international	stage	is	
significant.	The	fact	that	they	have	a	claim	to	governmental	control	-	and	often	appeal	to	(sub-
state)national	sentiments	-	over	a	defined	territory	which	overlaps	that	of	a	state,	alongside	
their	‘sovereignty	bound	yet	sovereignty	free’	status	(Hocking,	1999)	renders	it	such.	When	
combined	 with	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 analytical	 category	 in	 which	 to	 understand	 their	
international	actorness,	the	above	suggests	that	the	phenomenon	is	long	overdue	a	place	in	
the	IR	research	agenda.	Systemic	change	is	evidenced	in	the	diplomatic	system	(Neumann,	
2002:	613),	and	the	normalisation	of	paradiplomacy	is	a	key	part	of	this	change.	Given	the	
primacy	of	the	diplomatic	system	within	the	international	system	as	a	whole,	the	emergence	
of	new	actors	and	practices	in	this	arena	is	imbued	with	significance	for	international	relations	
theory.			
	
Perhaps	the	key	concept	that	the	extant	literature	on	paradiplomacy	has	failed	to	adequately	
examine	 is	one	 that	 finds	 itself	 at	 the	 core	of	both	 comparative	politics	 and	 international	
relations:	 sovereignty.	 The	 ways	 in	 which	 both	 regions	 or	 ‘stateless	 nations’	 and	 central	
governments	 view	 the	 boundaries	 of	 sovereign	 authority	 is	 inextricably	 linked	 to	
paradiplomacy:	to	the	motivations	sub-state	governments	have	in	establishing	international	
actorness,	 to	 the	 responses	 of	 central	 state	 governments	 to	 paradiplomatic	 action	within	
their	 national	 borders	 and	 to	 the	 role	 of	 quasi-autonomous,	 territorial	 actors	 in	 the	
international	 system.	 It	 is	 this,	 surprising,	 shortcoming	 that	 the	 current	 project	 aims	 to	
address,	as	laid	out	in	the	following	section.	
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Chapter	Two:	A	new	theoretical	Framework.		
Introduction	
Posited	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 is	 a	 central	 failure	 -	 both	 of	 distinctly	 paradiplomatic	
literatures,	and	those	of	International	Relations	more	broadly	-	to	‘join	up’	the	practices	of	
paradiplomacy	with	wider	concepts	and	phenomena	in	international	politics	and	diplomacy.	
For	McConnell	et	al.	(2012:	806),	paradiplomatic	studies	have	tended	towards	the	descriptive,	
meaning	 that	 such	 accounts	 “rarely	 question	 the	 legitimating	 work	 that	 diplomacy	
accomplishes	or	attend	to	the	performative	aspects	of	diplomatic	practices”.	Conspicuous	by	
their	 absence	 within	 the	 paradiplomatic	 literature,	 according	 to	 Criekemans,	 are	 “those	
studies	 that	 employ	 both	 traditional	 comparative	 politics	 and	 an	 international	 relations	
perspective”	(2010a:	4).	
	
A	consequence	of	this	oversight	is	that	much	of	the	analytical	significance	of	paradiplomacy	
is,	 in	 fact,	 missed.	 In	 multiple	 ways,	 the	 practices	 of	 paradiplomacy	 touch	 on	 the	 ‘big	
questions’	of	International	Relations	(Lecours,	2002:	119).	Who	counts	as	a	diplomatic	actor?	
From	 where	 does	 international	 legitimacy	 derive?	 How	 is	 the	 narrative	 of	 sovereignty	
challenged,	 subverted	 or	 appropriated	 by	 non-state	 actors?	 This	 thesis	 looks	 to	 re-site	
paradiplomatic	 study	 within	 the	 discipline	 of	 international	 relations	 and	 explore	 the	
implications	that	paradiplomatic	practices	have	for	the	bigger	questions	of	IR	and	diplomatic	
theory.	The	fundamental	disconnect	between,	on	the	one	hand,	a	set	of	day-to-day	sub-state	
international	 activities	 -	 activities	 that	 can	 sometimes	 tend	 towards	 the	humdrum,	but	 at	
other	times	can	represent	a	real	challenge	to	the	diplomatic	status-quo	-	and	some	of	the	
more	pressing,	and	enduringly	relevant,	dilemmas	of	international	politics	and	diplomacy	is	
very	much	 the	 area	 that	 this	 thesis	 aims	 to	 shed	 light	 upon.	 	 Indeed,	 as	we	will	 explore	
throughout	this	thesis,	at	times	the	very	same	activities	can	be	interpreted	at	various	points	
along	the	above	spectrum,	dependent	on	the	actors	involved	and	the	poltical	context	within	
which	 the	 paradiplomacy	 is	 conducted.	 A	 set	 of	 general	 premises	 underpin	 the	 approach	
adopted	here.	These	are	threefold.		
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Firstly,	 regional	 or	 sub-state	 identities	 are	 becoming	 increasingly	 salient,	 a	 phenomenon	
which	is	simultaneously	-	though	to	vastly	differing	degrees	-	driving	the	devolution	of	central	
government	authority	and	legitimacy	in	many	areas,	including	international	affairs.	Foreign	
policy	has	 traditionally	been	 the	preserve	of	national	 governments	alone,	 and	 is	 “an	area	
traditionally	so	closely	articulated	so	sovereignty	that	it	is	considered	the	prerogative	of	the	
sovereign”	 (Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	 2014:	 16).	 This	 imbues	paradiplomatic	 activities	with	 a	
particular	significance,	and	perhaps	serves	as	indication	as	to	how	far	such	sub-state	authority	
or	legitimacy	can	stretch	in	different	contexts.		
	
Secondly,	 diplomatic	 practice	 is	 diversifying;	 both	with	 regards	 to	 the	 type	 of	 actors	 now	
engaged	in	diplomacy,	of	one	sort	or	another,	and	in	terms	of	the	toolkits	now	employed	by	
diplomatic	actors.	Such	diversification	means	that	relationships	and	practices	that	may	have	
traditionally	 been	 excluded	 from	 the	 analytical	 frames	of	 reference	utilised	by	 diplomatic	
theorists	must	now	be	considered	as	part	of	the	messier	picture	of	modern	diplomacy.		
	
Thirdly,	enquiry	at	the	margins	of	international	relations	is	a	crucial	part	of	accounting	for	the	
multitude	of	activities,	actors	and	practices	that	self-evidently	exist	in	this	field.	According	to	
Adler-Nissen	 and	 Gad	 (2012:	 3),	 by	 “focussing	 on	 what	 appear	 to	 be	 marginal	 sites	 of	
international	relations,	we	are	able	to	see	much	more	heterogeneity	than	IR	theory	usually	
allows	us	a	glimpse	of”.		The	value	of	this	type	of	enquiry,	therefore,	lies	not	only	in	the	specific	
lessons	 learned	about	discrete	practices	 -	such	as	paradiplomacy	-	but	also	 in	 its	ability	to	
speak	to	a	broader	picture	of	international	relationships,	adding	nuance	and,	in	some	cases,	
important	ripostes	to	the	claims	of	grand	theory.	
	
Drawing	from	both	international	relations	and	comparative	politics	perspectives,	several	key	
concepts	will	be	employed	during	the	course	of	this	analysis.		Their	selection	and	applicability	
to	the	specific	research	questions	to	be	addressed	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	sections.	
Each,	in	their	own	way,	contributes	to	building	a	picture	of	paradiplomatic	activity	that	takes	
into	consideration	its	multiple	facets.	What	actually	is	it	that	sub-state	governments	are	doing	
on	 the	 international	 stage?	 How	 do	 they	manage	 to	 position	 themselves	 as	 credible	 and	
legitimate	international	agents?	Why	might	such	governments	covet	an	international	profile?	
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Do	such	activities	hold	any	significance	beyond	that	perceived	by	those	directly	involved	in	
paradiplomatic	 exchanges?	 In	 short,	 these	 concepts	 -	 which	 include	 hybridity,	 mimicry,	
performativity	 and	 sovereignty	 games	 -	 provide	 the	 vocabulary	with	which	 to	 discuss	 the	
meaning	and	the	potential	significance	of	paradiplomatic	activity.	
	
What	follows	in	this	chapter	is	an	attempt	to	bring	together	the	various,	diverse,	aspects	of	
paradiplomatic	activity	in	a	more	cohesive	theoretical	framework.	The	first	part	of	this	task	is	
separating	 out	 autonomous,	 diplomatic	 activities	 from	 the	 wider	 pool	 of	 sub-state	
international	activity	-	including	multi-level	governance	-	that	it	sits	within,	and	to	sketch	out	
the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 new	 approach	 advocated	 here.	 The	 focus	 is	 squarely	 on	 ‘affective’	
regions,	 in	Scully	&	Wyn	 	 Jones’	 terms	(2010:	7-8),	 those	regions	or	stateless	nations	with	
strong	sub-state	identities.	However,	the	analysis	employed	throughout	the	thesis	will	take	
full	account	of	the	contours	of	the	relationship	between	regional	identity	and	paradiplomacy;	
mapping	 them	 in	 a	precise	way	 rather	 than	assuming	any	uniformity	 to	 the	 link	between	
them.	Crucial	to	the	approach	adopted	here	is	understanding	and	accounting	for	the	hybridity	
of	the	operational	space	that	sub-state	governments	find	themselves	within:	nested	within	
state	 structures	 but	 carving	 their	 own	 diplomatic	 identities	 out	 with	 the	 state.	 In	 their	
‘sovereignty	 bound’	 yet	 ‘sovereignty	 free’	 status	 (Hocking,	 1999)	 we	 find	 particular	
opportunities,	and	constraints,	on	the	international	stage.	These	lend	a	distinct	flavour	to	the	
contributions	that	such	actors	can	make.	New	attention	is	given	to	the	ways	in	which	these	
hybrid	actors	attempt	to	carve	out	a	legitimate	international	presence,	and	specifically	their	
attempts	 to	 either	 mimic	 or	 subvert	 more	 traditional	 state-discourses.	 Ultimately,	 the	
contention	 is	 made	 that	 the	 autonomous	 diplomatic	 activities	 of	 certain	 sub-state	
governments	 (namely	 statless	 nations)	 can	 be	 perceived	 as	moves	 in	 a	 variant	 of	 Addler	
Nissen	 &	 Gad’s	 ‘sovereignty	 games’	 (Adler-Nissen	 and	 Gad,	 2012;	 Adler-Nissen	 and	 Gad,	
2014;	Adler-Nissen	and	Gammeltoft-Hansen,	2008).	These	actors	are	asserting	their	right	to	
be	 a	 participant	 in	 such	 games	 -	 through	 their	 paradiplomatic	 interventions	 -	 rather	 than	
seeking	any	specific	end,	in	and	of	itself.	Subsequent	sections	in	this	chapter	introduce	the	
specific	research	questions,	the	methodology	and	the	case	studies	that	will	inform	and	direct	
this	study.	
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A	new	framework	for	the	study	of	paradiplomacy	in	stateless	nations		
	
Far	 from	 being	 an	 anomalous	 aspect	 of	 the	 broader	 phenomenon	 of	 sub-state	
internationalism,	the	more	‘developed’	paradiplomacies	of	regions	or	stateless	nations	with	
strong	sub-state	 identities	 (‘affective’	 regions	 in	Scully	and	Wyn	Jones’	 terms	 (2010:	 :7-8))	
represent	one	of	its	most	significant	features.	It	is	these	ambitious	activities	that	present	the	
more	profound	challenge	to	dominant	concepts	and	assumptions	in	both	comparative	politics	
and	 international	 relations	 theory.	 Necessary	 for	 a	 full	 understanding	 of	 these	 types	 of	
challenging	activities	is	an	adequate	theoretical	framework	within	which	to	interpret	them,	
one	which	acknowledges	the	need	for	different	conceptual	tools	at	either	end	of	this	broad	
spectrum.			
	
Reconceptualising	paradiplomacy	to	take	account	of	 its	proper	scope	entails	a	rebalancing	
from	solely	top-down,	towards	the	inclusion	of	more	bottom-up	explanans,	and	from	purely	
structural	 to	more	 agency-oriented	 accounts.	 It	 involves	 distinguishing	 between	 different	
types	 of	 international	 activity;	 being	 able	 to	 identify	 those	 initiatives	 that	 go	 beyond	
functional	 requirements	 of	 regional	 governance	 in	 a	 globalized	 era.	 These	 forms	 of	
paradiplomacy	sit	at	odds	with	much	of	the	literature;	a	literature	whose	focus	has	often	been	
on	what	might	be	better	characterised	as	multi-level	governance.		
	
However,	 those	 activities	 that	 chafe	 more	 profoundly	 at	 the	 boundaries	 of	 sub-state	
authority,	 those	 that	 compete	 or	 conflict	with	 central	 state	 narratives,	 or	 indeed	 seek	 to	
reposition	the	sub-state	government	in	relation	to	their	central	state	counterparts,	and	those	
that	 in	 other	ways	 challenge	our	 understanding	of	 a	 ‘proper’	 role	 for	 sub-state	 units,	 are	
highly	useful	insights	into	the	nature	of	the	phenomenon	and	the	potential	significance	that	
it	 holds.	 The	 following	 sections	 I.	 -	 I.V.	 set	 out	 four	 ‘stalls’	 which	 shape	 the	 theoretical	
approach	adopted	 in	 this	 thesis:	 I.	 delineating	autonomous,	diplomatic	activities	 from	 the	
wider	 pool	 of	 sub-state	 internationalism,	 II.	 conceptualising	 the	 hybridity	 of	 sub-state	
governments	 and	 bringing	 IR	 theory	 firmly	 into	 the	 fold,	 III.	 accounting	 for	 the	 role	 and	
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importance	of	international	legitimacy	-	and	particularly	the	utility	of	mimicry	as	a	legitimising	
strategy,	and,	IV.	introducing	the	concept	of	sovereignty	games	as	a	way	to	understand	the	
back-and-forth	between	state	and	sub-state	governments,	and	the	contradictory,	paradoxical	
nature	of	the	effects	paradiplomacy	may	have	on	the	system	of	states.		
	
I. Delineating	autonomous,	diplomatic	activities	
An	 initial	 step	 towards	 seeing	 such	 activities	 in	 clearer	 focus	 is	 distinguishing	 between	
paradiplomacy	 and	multi-level	 governance.	 This	 task	 is	 both	 a	 necessary	 and	 challenging	
exercise	owing	to	the	overlap	of	their	subject	matter,	and	the	inter-relationship	between	the	
two	 practices	 (Kaiser,	 2005:	 90-92).	 The	 conception	 of	 multi-level	 governance	 as	 being	
concerned	with	policy	making,	and	paradiplomacy	as	focused	on	quite	separate,	autonomous	
action	 in	 the	 wider	 international	 setting,	 is	 a	 useful	 starting	 point	 in	 drawing	 distinct	
conceptual	boundaries	around	the	two	approaches.	The	nature	of	the	activities	that	multi-
level	governance,	on	the	one	hand,	and	paradiplomacy,	on	the	other,	look	to	understand	can	
be	divided	into	the	broad	categories	of	‘governance’	and	‘diplomacy’.	A	brief	consideration	
of	 sub-state	 representation	 in	Brussels	 should	demonstrate	 this	 range	quite	 clearly.	Here,	
there	has	emerged	a	de	facto	distinction	between	what	have	been	termed	the	‘classic	Brussels	
offices’,	and	something	‘else’,	which	is	very	much	a	diplomatic	presence	(Cole	and	Palmer,	
2011:	:386).	The	examples	discussed	by	Cole	and	Palmer	are	those	of	the	Wales	European	
Centre,	 pre-devolution,	 whose	 role	 was	 primarily	 providing	 information	 on	 funding	
opportunities	for	clients	(who	typically	included	local	governments	and	universities),	and	the	
Wales	 Brussels	 Office	 post-devolution,	 where	 the	 Welsh	 Government	 exercise	 strategic	
leadership	 over	 the	 representation,	 and	 the	 unit	 is	 deliberately	 differentiated	 from	 local	
government	and	public	agencies	in	the	process.		
	
Moore,	 meanwhile	 (2008b:	 525-527)	 makes	 a	 more	 general	 argument,	 whereby	
constitutional	 regions	 in	Brussels	 (who	have	“a	delegated	set	of	 legislative	competences”)	
maintain	a	“strong	political	dimension	to	their	work”,	one	that	is	absent	in	the	delegations	of	
both	‘administrative’	regions,	and	the	regions	of	new	member	states,	who	purposefully	do	
not	represent		“historic	or	linguistic	regions,	as	national	governments	sought	consciously	to	
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cross-cut	 inter-ethnic,	 religious	and	 linguistic	cleavages	within	 their	 state”	 (Moore,	2008b:	
:524).	This	political	dimension	to	the	presence	of	such	constitutional	regions	is	not,	however,	
uncontested.	For	example,	 the	German	 federal	government	have	continued	 to	 stress	 that	
Länder	 representations	 in	 Brussels	 must	 not	 action	 a	 diplomatic	 role,	 with	 the	 term	
‘Vertreung’	(representation)	proving	particularly	contentious	(Moore,	2006:	:200-202).	The	
degree	of	sensitivity	over	this	issue	would	suggest	that,	in	actuality,	the	German	Länder	are	
indeed	straying	into	‘diplomatic’	waters,	a	development	that	can	be	seen	particularly	clearly	
in	 the	 Bavarian	 government’s	 2006	move	 to	 “lavish	 and	 opulent”	 offices	 in	 a	 high-profile	
Brussels’	location	(Moore,	2006:	:192).	
	
The	real	significance	of	this	distinction,	between	governance	and	diplomacy,	relates	to	the	
fact	 that	 sub-state	 governments	 appear	 to	 be	 increasingly	 acting	 outside	 what	 has	 been	
understood	 as	 their	 legitimate	 (limited)	 external	 remit.	 Rather	 than	 simply	 fulfilling	 the	
accepted	 functions	 of	 sub-state	 governance	 in	 those	 domains	 now	 implicated	 in	 their	
activities	(whether	this	is	to	gain	resources	for	economic	development,	or	to	articulate	policy	
preferences),	some	regions	are	also	conducting	a	range	of	activities	that	speak	to	different,	
perhaps	more	complex,	underlying	motivations.	These	diplomatic	endeavours	may	relate	to	
a	desire	on	the	part	of	the	region	to	enhance	their	status,	both	as	it	regards	their	‘host’	state,	
and	other	actors.	Depending	on	the	nature	of	the	region	itself,	this	exercise	might	be	geared	
towards	 building	 the	 nation	 domestically	 (external	 identity	 construction)	 or	 be	 centred	
around	demonstrating	state-like	capacity.	Likewise,	they	may	be	conducted	with	the	specific	
aim	of	‘paving	the	way’	for	independence,	or	perhaps	gaining	traction	within	the	state	over	a	
specific	issue	-	or	indeed	as	part	of	a	more	symbolic	sovereignty	game	(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	
2012;	Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2014;	Adler-Nissen	and	Gammeltoft-Hansen,	2008).	
	
It	is	the	contention	of	this	thesis,	and	was	suggested	above,	that	making	these	distinctions	
(between	governance	and	diplomacy)	 is	necessary	 for	 the	advancement	of	paradiplomatic	
studies.	Without	the	refocussing	of	the	paradiplomacy	framework,	to	take	better	account	of	
the	conceptual	tools	required	at	either	end	of	a	broad	spectrum	of	activity,	there	is	a	danger	
that	a	 lack	of	clarity	may	 lead	to	the	particular	significance	of	paradiplomacy	as	a	political	
action	being	under-reported,	and	its	novelty	as	a	feature	of	the	modern	international	system	
	 55	
being	 obscured.	 As	 Criekemans	 argues	 (2010a:	 6),	 “regions	 and	 their	 external	 activities	
come…in	 many	 different	 colours,	 shapes	 and	 intensity	 when	 placed	 in	 a	 comparative	
perspective”;	in	order	to	take	full	account	of	this	variety,	one	must	be	fully	conscious	of	the	
implications	that	different	frameworks	may	entail.		
	
It	is	posited	here	that	paradiplomacy	and	multi-level	governance,	typically,	consider	different	
practices	 (diplomacy	 or	 governance),	 in	 different	modes	 (transnationality	 or	 institutional	
engagement).	 Whilst	 there	 are	 certainly	 exceptions	 to	 this	 very	 general	 rule,	 this	 broad	
distinction	means	that	a	conflation	of	these	two	concepts	is	unhelpful	and	risks	both	practices	
being	 either	 over	 or	 under-reported.	 The	 differences	 outlined	 above	may	 imply	 different	
explanations;	the	range	activities	results	in	a	similar	a	range	of	implications	for	the	disciplines	
of	both	comparative	politics	and	international	relations.	Having	said	this,	it	is	also	apparent	
from	 the	 discussion	 above	 that	 the	 two	 concepts	 often	 share	 subject	 matter,	 with	 the	
activities	of	sub-state	governments	overlapping	into	both	frameworks,	and	therefore	able	to	
be	usefully	 explored	with	 reference	 to	both	paradiplomacy	and	multi-level	 governance.	A	
prime	example	here	would	again	be	the	Brussels	offices	of	European	regions.	There	are	also	
important	conceptual	and	theoretical	markers	of	the	multi-level	governance	approach	that	
would	seem	excellent	candidates	for	a	fuller	encorporation	into	the	paradiplomacy	literature.	
Firstly,	 multi-level	 governance	 places	 an	 emphasis	 on	 individual	 actors	 within	 a	 political	
system.	It	‘”demands	that	the	social	analyst	examine	the	political	activities	of	the	the	relevant	
indidiuals	and	groups	of	 individuals	as	 the	causal	 link	between	macro	processes…	and	the	
rules	that	structure	political	regimes”	(Marks,	1996:	23).	In	a	similar	vein,	Marks	argue	sthat	
this	 actor-centred	 approach	 may	 engender	 an	 integration	 of	 comparative	 politics	 and	
international	relations,	in	order	to	gain	a	“coherent”	understanding	of	decision	making.	Ther	
eis	a	deliberate	attempt	within	this	work	to	avoid	“reifying	the	state	as	an	actor	with	interests	
or	preferences”	(Marks,	1996:	24,	34).	Given	the	above,	at	this	point	it	is	worthwhile	outlining	
three	ways	in	which	the	two	concepts	can	relate	to	one	another.		
	
Firstly,	paradiplomacy	and	multi-level	governance	can	constitute	alternative	explanations	for	
the	 same	 activities.	 For	 example,	 the	 conduct	 of	 ‘border	 diplomacy’	 between	 European	
regions,	or	participation	in	inter-regional	networks,	may	be	explained	by	paradiplomacy	as	an	
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aspect	of	external	 identity	construction	or	status	enhancement	 (for	example	Duran,	2011:	
:356-7),	but	authors	from	a	multi-level	governance	perspective	may	argue	that	such	activities	
are	a	result	of	regions	needing	to	build	policy-coalitions	in	order	to	present	a	stronger	voice	
at	the	EU	level	(for	example	Sodupe,	1999:	 :62).	The	relevance	of	various	variables	–	both	
structure	and	agency	related,	those	relating	to	sub-state,	state	or	supranational	tiers	-	may	
vary,	 depending	 on	 whether	 the	 explanation	 for	 a	 particular	 activity	 stems	 from	 a	
paradiplomacy	or	multi-level	governance	framework.	
	
Secondly,	they	can	represent	parallel	concepts,	considering	different	activities	within	a	shared	
domain	of	sub-state	 internationalism.	 It	would	seem	that	this	 is	 the	most	common	way	 in	
which	the	relationship	manifests	itself,	despite	the	fact	that	the	terms	have	been	used	inter-
changeably	 in	 parts	 of	 the	 extant	 literature.	 For	 example,	 paradiplomacy	 can	 be	 used	 to	
explore	 the	 conduct	 of	 normative	 international	 activities,	 such	 as	 international	 aid	
programmes	(Wyn	Jones	and	Royles,	2012),	while	multi-level	governance	accounts	 for	the	
activities	of	the	Committee	for	the	Regions	(Carroll,	2011),	in	parallel	to	one	another,	with	
very	little	interaction	taking	place	between	the	two	approaches.	
	
Thirdly,	the	two	can	represent	complementary	approaches,	allowing	for	the	full	exploration	
of	 motivations	 and	 opportunity	 structures	 behind	 sub-state	 international	 activities	 that	
overlap	the	conceptual	boundaries	between	the	two	frameworks.	Brussels	offices	can	again	
be	used	as	 an	example	here:	 there	are	both	 functional,	 ‘governance’	 requirements	which	
mean	 that	 the	 establishment	 of	 such	 offices	 is	 an	 important	 activity	 for	 sub-state	
governments,	 and	 they	 may,	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	 determine	 the	 size	 and	 nature	 of	 such	
representations.	But	there	is	also	a	whole	range	of	less	tangible	factors	behind	the	degree	of	
importance	that	a	sub-state	government	attaches	to	Brussels	representation,	and	indeed	a	
variety	of	types	of	(diplomatic)	activity	that	take	place	under	the	aegis	of	such	offices.	For	
example,	the	Bavarian	government	maintains	a	particularly	large	and	well-resourced	Brussels	
office,	to	the	extent	that	this	representation	is	much	more	visible	-	in	a	literal,	aesthetic	sense	
-	 than	some	of	 the	member	state	representations.	 Its	 location	means	that	“everyone	who	
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comes	 to	 the	 European	 Parliament	 has	 to	 pass	 it”.3	 Quite	 why	 Bavaria	 places	 so	 much	
emphasis	on	this	form	of	international	engagement	is	a	question	that	arguably	requires	both	
multi-level	governance	and	paradiplomacy	approaches	 to	 fully	account	 for.	 	Overall,	 there	
exist	 “multiple	 dimensions	 of	 regional	 representative	 activity”	 in	 Brussels	 (Moore,	 2008b:	
:525),	and	thus	the	application	of	these	two	concepts	would	seem	necessary	for	their	full	and	
robust	analyses.	
	
Despite	the	degree	of	overlap	between	the	subject	matter	that	paradiplomacy	and	multi-level	
governance	 share,	 they	also	attempt	 to	 account	 for	different	 types	of	 activity,	 or	politics,	
often	with	equally	different	rationales.	They	also	may	relate	to	one	another	in	the	sense	of	
interpreting	 the	 same	 or	 similar	 activities	 in	 different	 lights.	 Therefore	 the	 relationship	
between	them	also	differs	substantially,	depending	on	the	exact	activity	studied;	they	may	
represent	alternative	explanations,	parallel	concepts,	or	complementary	approaches.	Much	
greater	clarity	 is	 therefore	 required	 in	 the	 two	 literatures,	both	 in	 terms	of	 specifying	 the	
nature	of	activities	considered,	and	being	explicit	as	regards	the	choice	of	framework.	This	
should	not	be	a	particularly	arduous	or	complicated	task:	the	distinctions	outlined	above,	such	
as	between	governance	and	diplomacy,	are	made	as	a	matter	of	course	in	state-level	analysis.	
For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	a	focus	on	those	autonomous,	diplomatic	activities	conducted	
by	our	three	case	studies	is	a	deliberate	attempt	to	rebalance	the	paradiplomatic	literature	
towards	these	more	advanced	paradiplomatic	dynamics,	with	a	corresponding	emphasis	on	
the	political	rationales	to	which	such	activities	relate.	Attention	is	paid,	specifically,	to	the	role	
that	diplomacy	-	and	being	recognised	as	a	legitimate	actor	in	international	domains	-	plays	
in	 the	political	 calculations	and	 the	 self-perceptions	of	 sub-state	governments.	 In	 short,	 it	
focuses	on	why	diplomacy	matters	to	these	types	of	actors,	rather	than	on	what	functional	
imperatives	exist	in	this	domain.	
	
II. Hybrid	actors,	hybrid	spaces:	bringing	IR	theory	into	the	paradiplomatic	fold	
	
																																																						
3	Interview	with	author,	senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	Official	2013	
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International	 relations	 theory	 is	 a	 crucial	 ‘missing	 link’	 in	 the	 paradiplomatic	 literature.	
Similarly,	 the	practice	of	paradiplomacy	has	 failed	to	make	 it	onto	the	 IR	research	agenda	
itself.	This	is	problematic:	the	activities	comprising	paradiplomacy	necessarily	implicate	the	
frameworks	of	both	comparative	politics	and	international	relations.	Admittedly,	the	majority	
of	activities	that	sub-state	governments	undertake	in	the	international	domain	may	be	less	
than	remarkable;4	at	least	within	the	European	environment,	multi-level	governance	is	the	
dominant	dynamic.	However,	the	separate	category	of	autonomous,	diplomatic	activities	that	
some	 sub-state	 governments	 undertake	 does	 pose	 important	 questions	 for	 international	
relations	theory.	Even	more	so	when	these	sub-state	units	represent	stateless	nations	and	
the	 tone	 of	 interactions	may	 be	more	 ambitious,	 even	 provocative.	 Indeed,	 the	 external	
activities	 of	 such	 actors	 pose	 questions	 at	 a	 series	 of	 intersections	 at	which	 ambitious	 IR	
theorizing	already	takes	place:	between	‘identities,	borders	and	orders’	(Albert	et	al.,	2001).	
Such	dynamics	also	feed	into	more	profound	questions	regarding	the	relationship	between	
nationhood,	 statehood	 and	 the	 function	 of	 international	 relations.	 The	 post-Cold	 War	
international	system	has	welcomed	a	number	of	new	states	which	have	been	created	along	
the	lines	of	national	populations,	relying	on	the	“‘imagined	community’	of	the	nation	for	its	
legitimacy”.		
	
Yet,	 state	 centric	 theories	 of	 IR	 have	 failed	 to	 adequately	 explain	 these	 developments,	
relegating	many	of	the	key	issues	relevant	to	their	analysis	“to	the	status	of	epiphenomena”	
(Hall,	1999:	:4).	There	is	certainly	scope	for	paradiplomatic	activities	based	on	the	‘imagined	
communities’	of	strong	regions,	stateless	nations,	indigenous	populations	and	Diasporas	to	
shed	 some	all-important	 light	on	 these	 relationships.	 Though	 the	 focus	 in	 this	 study	 is	on	
stateless	nations,	the	relevance	of	other	forms	of	paradiplomatic	and	multi-level	governance	
to	international	relations	is	of	course	acknowledged.	Certainly,	economic	paradiplomacy	has	
distinct	implications	for	IR	sub-fields	such	as	international	political	economy:	the	role	of	global	
cities	representing	a	key	transformative	dynamic	in	the	international	domain	(Curtis,	2011).	
																																																						
4	 Of	 course,	 this	 same	 claim	 could	 be	 made	 of	 much	 of	 the	 state-level	 interaction	 that	
comprises	day-to-day	international	relations.	
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However,	the	more	developed	forms	of	paradiplomatic	activity	perhaps	better	illustrate	the	
current	disjuncture	between	international	relations	theory	and	emergent	practices.			
	
Sub-state	governments	are	conceptually	distinct	from	the	broader	category	of	non-state	actor	
due	to	a	key	line	of	demarcation:	they	are	territorially	constituted.	For	‘stateless	nations’,	this	
distinction	goes	even	further;	they	represent	a	single	nation,	and	thus	can	claim	(with	varying	
levels	 of	 success)	 to	 speak	 for	 a	 given	 ‘people’.	 Sub-state	 governments	 are	 thus	 ‘hybrid’	
international	actors	 (Hocking,	1986;	1999);	 their	 claims	 to	political	authority	are	expressly	
territorial,	yet	they	are	not	(legally)	sovereign.	As	such,	these	actors	are	sovereignty	bound,	
yet	sovereignty	free	(Hocking,	1999).	In	other	words,	they	are	bound	by	the	sovereignty	of	
their	‘host’	state	(i.e.,	they	are	not	‘transnational’	actors	in	the	traditional	sense),	yet	they	are	
also	free	from	the	requirements	and	responsibilities	of	full	membership	of	the	international	
system.	This	enables	them	to	carve	out	distinct	and	niche	roles,	corresponding	to	the	specific	
ambitions	of	their	governments.		
	
To	what	extent,	then,	does	the	(re)emergence	of	this	category	of	actor	on	the	international	
stage	 challenge	 extant	 conceptions	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 IR	 and	 IR	 theory?	 Arguably,	 the	
normalization	of	paradiplomacy	is	evidence	of	the	weakening	of	nation-state	sovereignty	as	
traditionally	defined.		From	one	perspective,	it	is	emblematic	of	a	relocation	of	authority	that	
has	 resulted	 from	 the	 processes	 of	 globalisation,	 increasing	 interdependence	 and	
intermesticity	 (Rosenau,	1992;	Hocking,	1999;	Fossum	and	Roussel,	2011;	La	Porte,	2012).	
The	phenomenon,	therefore,	can	be	interpreted	as	an	element	of	transnationalism,	whereby	
new	actors	and	loci	of	political	power	form	‘webs’,	trapping	within	them	nation-states	and	
constraining	their	freedom	of	manoeuvre	(Cerny,	2010:	:4-5).		
	
From	a	different	perspective,	the	practice	of	paradiplomacy	could	be	seen	as	the	partial	re-
emergence	of	a	form	of	global	politics	that	pre-dates	the	modern	nation-state	system.		Here,	
the	 prediction	 of	 Bull	 (1977)	 becomes	 an	 interesting	 marker.	 Bull	 contends	 that,	 should	
modern	states	come	to	share	“authority	over	their	citizens”	and	“ability	to	command	their	
loyalties”	with	regional/global	and	sub-state	authorities	to	such	an	extent	that	“the	concept	
of	 sovereignty	 ceased	 to	 be	 applicable”,	 we	 could	 then	 say	 that	 a	 neo-medieval	 form	 of	
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political	order	had	emerged.	Indeed,	Criekemans	(2011a:	:715)	contends	that	“to	a	certain	
extent,	 today’s	 diplomatic	 practices	 resemble	 a	 pre-Westphalian	world	 in	which	 different	
policy	 levels	 (macroregional,	 national,	 crossborder,	 substate,	 regions	 and	 cities)	 each	
generate	specific	types	of	diplomatic	activities	reflecting	specific	needs	felt	at	their	respective	
territorial	levels”.		
	
Freidrichs	 (2001)	examines	the	concept	of	neo-medievalism	 in	some	detail,	and	concludes	
that	there	exist	multiple	spheres	of	authority	and	competing	organizing	principles	that	can	
currently	be	identified	in	the	global	order.	Challenges	to	the	monopoly	of	the	nation-state	are	
based	on	two	processes,	according	to	this	view:	the	transnational	market	economy	(which	
challenges	the	state’s	traditional	monopoly	on	legitimate	political	action	in	the	international	
sphere),	and	the	fact	that	the	“sphere	of	symbolic	reproduction”	is	de-coupling	from	the	state,	
with	 individual	 allegiances	 being	 directed	 elsewhere	 (Friedrichs,	 2001).	 The	 spectrum	 of	
activities	 undertaken	 by	 sub-state	 actors	 on	 the	 international	 stage	 can	 been	 seen	 to	
contribute	 to	both	of	 these	eroding	processes,	distinguishing	 them	from	many	other	non-
state	actors.		
	
More	broadly,	the	phenomenon	of	paradiplomacy	must	form	part	of	ongoing	debates	within	
the	discipline	of	IR,	as	to	its	own	(in)ability	to	account	for	change	in	the	international	system.	
According	 to	 Buzan	 and	 Little	 (2001:	 :24-25),	 the	 discipline	 of	 IR	 operates	 within	 a	
‘Westphalian	Straitjacket’,	or	“the	strong	tendency	to	assume	that	the	model	established	in	
seventeenth	century	Europe	should	define	what	the	international	system	is	for	all	times	and	
all	places”.	In	a	similar	vein,	Agnew	(1999:	:503;	2005)	points	to	the	fact	that	conventional	
understandings	 of	 the	 geography	 of	 political	 power	 are	 underpinned	 by	 a	 series	 of	
assumptions	that	conceive	of	statehood	as	the	“unique	source	and	arena	of	political	power	
in	the	modern	world…together	they	serve	to	put	the	modern	territorial	state	beyond	history”.	
For	Neumann	 (2002:	 :630-638),	meanwhile,	 “we	have	no	way	of	 discussing	 empirically	 to	
what	extent	the	system	of	states	in	fact	remains	central	to	global	politics.	The	system	appears	
as	ontic,	as	an	exogenised	given	of	the	analysis”.	Self-evidently,	“we	are	not	very	good	as	a	
discipline	 at	 studying	 the	 possibility	 of	 fundamental	 discontinuity	 in	 the	 international	
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system...we	 lack	 even	 an	 adequate	 vocabulary;	 and	what	we	 cannot	 describe,	we	 cannot	
explain”	(Ruggie,	1993:	:144).		
	
Clearly,	sovereignty	is	a	key	starting	point	for	identifying	the	effects	that	paradiplomacy	has,	
and	 may	 come	 to	 have,	 on	 the	 field	 of	 international	 relations;	 partially	 through	 its	
multiplication	of	the	number	of	effective	international	agents	whose	authority	stems	from	a	
form	of	geographical	representation.	According	to	Mingus	(2006),	sub-state	governments,	as	
part	of	broader	networks	and	structures,	are	‘perforating’	the	sovereignty	of	nation-states,	in	
certain	policy	domains.	This	view	is	also	reflected	in	the	work	of	Sending	et	al.	(2011:	:782-
791),	who	point	to	the	“complex	tapestry	of	actors	and	concerns”	across	the	Arctic	region,	
necessitating	an	“inclusive	actor	perspective”	in	the	analysis	of	the	diplomatic	practices	taking	
place.	Taking	these	debates	a	step	further,	Agnew	(1999:	:506-7)	posits	that	political	power	
may	 be	moving	 from	 a	 ‘field	 of	 forces’	model	 of	 territorial	 sovereignty,	 to	 a	 hierarchical	
network	model	whereby	 “cores,	 peripheries,	 and	 semi-peripheries	 are	 linked	 together	 by	
flows	of	goods,	people	and	investment”.		
	
Whatever	implications	paradiplomacy	has	for	IR	theory	are,	however,	bound	to	be	nuanced.	
The	 activities	 of	 sub-state	 actors	 represent	 a	 crucial	 aspect	 of	 all	 of	 the	 process	 outlined	
above,	but	they	appear	to	embody	somehow	contradictory	forces.	On	the	one	hand,	a	trend	
towards	separatism	within	extant	states	“portends	a	 fragmentation	that	can	reinforce	 the	
field	 of	 forces	 model	 as	 new	 states	 emerge”	 (Agnew,	 1999:	 :506-7).	 The	 utility	 of	
paradiplomacy	in	‘paving	the	way	for	independence’	would	therefore	seem	to	re-assert	the	
dominance	of	state-sovereignty.	On	the	other	hand,	the	role	of	regional	units	that	remain	
within	nation-states	in	perforating	the	sovereignty	of	said	states	would	seem	to	work	in	the	
contrary	direction.	This	push-pull	dynamic	is	a	recurring	theme	in	paradiplomacy:	it	relates	to	
the	 simultaneously	 bolstering	 and	 eroding	 effect	 of	 the	 mimicry	 of	 state-diplomatic	
discourses	(McConnell,	2016;	McConnell	et	al.,	2012),	as	explored	in	the	subsequent	section.	
	
The	international	activities	of	sub-state	governments	can	also	be	interpreted	as	a	means	to	
consciously	expand	their	territorial	‘reach’.	If	the	“domain”	of	a	distinct	polity	“includes	those	
who	identify	with	it,	the	space	they	occupy,	and	the	issues	over	which	the	polity	exercises	
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influence”,	then	paradiplomacy	must	be	seen	as	an	expansion	of	this	domain	on	the	part	of	
sub-state	actors	 (Ferguson	and	Mansbach,	1996:	 :262-3).	 	Where	these	actors	represent	a	
nation,	 incongruent	with	 the	 state,	 this	would	 seem	to	 represent	a	particularly	 significant	
dynamic;	 most	 notably	 for	 state-level	 actors.	 While	 it	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 case	 that	
expanding	the	domain	of	sub-state	polities	creates	an	equal	and	opposite	retraction	of	the	
state’s	 legitimate	 domain,	 there	 is	 certainly	 the	 potential	 for	 a	 conflict	 of	 interests	 that	
manifests	at	the	international,	rather	than	the	domestic,	level.		
	
In	extrapolating	the	practice	of	paradiplomacy	beyond	the	sometimes-parochial	confines	of	
federal	or	 comparative	politics,	we	are	 faced	with	a	different	 type	of	narrative.	Here,	 the	
establishment	 of	 sub-state	 governments	 as	 international	 agents,	 albeit	 with	 limited	
‘actorness’	on	account	of	 their	opaque	 legal	 status,	 can	be	 interpreted	as	part	of	a	wider	
phenomenon	 that	 gradually	 blurs	 the	 boundaries	 between	 sovereign	 states	 and	 ‘new’,	
potentially	 contesting,	 forms	 of	 representation.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 there	 currently	 exist	 a	
sizeable	number	of	‘unrecognised	states’,	which	manage	to	“survive,	and	even	develop”	in	
the	international	system,	despite	lacking	the	external	sovereignty	otherwise	granted	by	the	
act	 of	 international	 recognition	 (Caspersen,	 2012:	 :1-2).	 These	 entities	 are	 able	 to	 govern	
(more	or	less	effectively),	provide	basic	public	services	and	enjoy	popular	legitimacy,	yet	their	
unrecognised	 status	 results	 from	 “the	 restrictive	 interpretation	 on	 the	 right	 to	 self-
determination	and	the	overriding	principle	of	territorial	integrity”	(Caspersen,	2012:	:27).	On	
the	other	hand,	non-state	actors	who	are	not	territorially	bound,	yet	nonetheless	can	claim	
to	represent	a	distinct	‘people’	are	also	delving	further	into	international	affairs:	Diasporas	
and	indigenous	peoples	are	two	clear	examples	of	this	practice.	Shadian	(2010)	examines	the	
case	of	 the	 Inuit	Circumpolar	Council,	 ICC,	 in	 its	global	 interactions;	 representing	“an	 Inuit	
polity	seeking	to	gain	a	degree	of	sovereignty	as	a	political	collective”.	The	form	of	sovereignty	
pursued	revolves	around	the	right	to	participate	in	political	decision	making,	rather	than	being	
based	on	territorial	integrity,	a	theme	to	which	we	return	when	discussing	the	conception	of	
sovereignty	games	(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2012;	Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2014;	Adler-Nissen	
and	Gammeltoft-Hansen,	2008):	
	The	ICC	serves	as	an	example	of	a	contemporary	collective	polity	-	neither	left	
outside	 the	 state	 system	 nor	 possessing	 a	 state	 of	 their	 own.	 Rather	 the	
sovereignty	of	the	ICC	depends	on	its	ability	to	maintain	the	legitimacy	of	its	
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myth,	 which	 over	 time	 has	 evolved,	 adapted	 and	 changed	 (Shadian,	 2010:	
:504).	
	
Both	 of	 these	 categories,	 unrecognised	 states	 and	 non-territorial	 ‘national’	 or	 collective	
political	 actors	 relate	 to	 a	 central	 question	 raised	 by	 paradiplomacy:	 that	 of	 sovereignty.		
Barkin	and	Cronin	(1994:	:108)	problematize	this	historical	construct	(sovereignty)	 in	some	
detail.	 The	 authors	 argue	 that	 there	 has	 long	 been	 a	 tension	 between	 state	 sovereignty,	
“which	stresses	the	link	between	sovereign	authority	and	a	defined	territory”,	and	national	
sovereignty	“which	emphasises	a	link	between	sovereign	authority	and	a	defined	population”.	
These	two	types	of	sovereignty	differ	fundamentally	in	terms	of	their	source	of	legitimation:	
state	 sovereignty	 rests	 on	 clearly	 demarcated	 boundaries	 and	 effective	 institutional	
authority,	national	sovereignty	rests	on	the	representation	of	“communities	of	sentiment”,	
forming	“the	political	basis	on	which	state	authority	rests”	(Barkin	and	Cronin,	1994:	:110-
111).	The	authors	go	on	to	argue	that	there	are	distinct	periods	in	which	international	norms	
legitimise	one	or	other	of	these	forms	of	sovereignty,	but	that	these	legitimising	principles	
are	 subsequently	 queried	 during	 “major	 systemic	 crises”,	 reverting	 to	 a	 privileging	 of	 the	
alternative	claims.		
	
The	practice	of	paradiplomacy	by	stateless	nations	arguably	makes	a	claim	for	the	legitimacy	
of	a	 form	 of	national	 sovereignty:	how	states	 respond	 to	 this	 claim	 represents	an	equally	
interesting	 marker	 as	 to	 the	 dominance	 of	 such	 international	 norms.	 At	 the	 very	 least,	
stateless	 nations,	 autonomous	 regions	 and	 unrecognised	 states	 (though	 in	 very	 different	
ways)	all	 “question	 the	direct	 link	between	 internal	and	external	 sovereignty”	 (Caspersen,	
2012:	:11).	As	Caspersen	indicates,	sovereignty	is	neither	static	nor	indivisible;	nor	must	it	be	
absolute.	 Krasner	 (1999:	 :4-5)	 carefully	 dissects	 the	 construct,	 delineating	 between	
international	 legal	 sovereignty,	 Westphalian	 sovereignty,	 domestic	 sovereignty	 and	
interdependence	sovereignty,	all	of	which	imply	different	rules	and	logics	of	appropriateness.	
It	is	possible,	Krasner	argues,	for	an	entity	to	have	one	of	these	variants	but	not	the	others,	
potentially	allowing	for	the	hybrid-nature	of	stateless	nations	as	 international	actors	to	be	
meaningfully	conceptualised.	
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III. Mimicry,	performativity,	and	learning	to	‘talk	the	international	talk’	
	
At	heart,	paradiplomacy	is	an	exercise	in	transposing	domestic	authority	to	the	international	
stage,	crafting	a	perceived	legitimacy	to	participation	in	affairs	located	outside	of	a	region’s	
geographical	 borders,	 and	 -	 essentially	 -	 claiming,	 or	 performing	 into	 being,	 a	 diplomatic	
agency	 that	was	 dormant	 during	most	 of	 the	 20th	 century.	 The	 processes	 involved	 in	 the	
creation	of	sub-state	diplomatic	agency	therefore	share	much	in	common	both	with	other	
non-state	actors,	and	indeed	with	states	themselves.	As	such,	paradiplomacy	offers	one	lens	
through	which	 to	examine	not	 just	 the	particularities	of	 sub-state	diplomacy,	but	broader	
diplomatic	processes,	performances	and	structures.	
	
Legitimacy	 is	 central	 to	 paradiplomatic	 activity:	 either	 being	 asserted	 by	 the	 sub-state	
government,	or	indeed	denied	or	challenged	by	other	actors.	Sub-state	governments	draw	on	
multiple,	 overlapping	 and	 occasionally	 contradictory	 sources	 of	 legitimacy	 in	 their	
international	engagements.	The	most	compelling	of	 these	are	often	their	 representational	
qualities:	as	elected	representatives	of	a	clearly	defined	community	or	locale.	In	some	cases,	
and	certainly	in	those	of	stateless	nations,	the	claims	of	sub-state	governments	can	go	a	step	
further:	to	represent	a	distinct	‘people’.	Clearly,	these	claims	overlap	with	those	made	by	a	
sovereign	state:	representing	the	larger	community	or	territory	within	which	the	smaller	unit	
resides.			
	
The	 particularity	 of	 a	 sub-state	 government’s	 claim	 to	 legitimacy	 is	 therefore	 premised	
precisely	on	their	difference	to	the	‘host’	state.	Whether	in	terms	of	economic	prowess,	or	
high-tech	industries	-	as	in	the	paradiplomatic	activities	of	California,	Beijing	and	Bavaria;	their	
normative	 credentials	 -	 as	 in	 the	 international	 and	 sustainable	 development	 activities	 of	
Wales	and	Scotland;	or	 indeed	their	 relative	deprivation	or	political	or	ethnic	subjugation.	
Sub-state	 governments	 appeal	 both	 to	 principles	 of	 national	 sovereignty	 and	 self-
determination	-	the	attributes	or	interests	of	a	‘people’	of	a	region	or	stateless	nation	-	and	
to	 functional	 discourses	of	 geo-strategic	 position,	 territory	or	 productivity.	 Such	 claims	 to	
legitimacy	on	the	basis	of	difference	or	particularity	can	be	identified	in	singular	instances,	for	
example	when	a	region	stands	to	be	disproportionally	affected	by	an	environmental	issue,	or	
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indeed	 if	 its	 position	 leaves	 it	 particularly	 vulnerable	 to	 conflict	 or	 international	 crime.	
Domestic	political	considerations	can	also	temporarily	mobilise	these	claims.	Moreover,	the	
discourse	 of	 particularity	 may	 be	 a	 near	 constant	 theme	 running	 through	 a	 sub-state	
government’s	 international	agency,	and	 the	claims	 it	makes	 to	a	 legitimate	presence.	The	
Quebec	Government,	 for	 example,	 has	been	able	 to	 secure	observer	 status	 in	 the	United	
Nations	on	the	basis	of	their	cultural,	linguistic	and	historical	particularity	within	the	Canadian	
context	(Balthazar,	1999)	
	
The	legitimacy	-	or	otherwise	-	of	sub-state	external	relations	poses	several	questions.	How	
can	 we	 accurately	 conceive	 of	 ‘mini-diplomacies’	 and	 tentative	 international	 relations	
emanating	from	actors	that	are	not	sovereign,	yet	often	claim	to	represent	a	distinct	people	
on	 the	 international	 stage?	 When	 these	 representations	 conflict	 with	 positions	 held	 at	
sovereign	state	level,	which	most	accurately	speaks	for	the	population	concerned	-	in	other	
words,	whose	 legitimacy	 trumps	whose?	 This	 conundrum	 currently	 plays	 out	 on	 the	UK’s	
diplomatic	horizon.	In	the	context	of	a	UK-wide	referendum	on	continued	EU	membership,	
Scotland’s	vote	stood	in	contrast	to	that	of	England	and	Wales.	Multiple	voices	from	within	
the	UK	are	therefore	speaking	to	the	wider	world	on	a	core	element	of	the	UK’s	foreign	policy,	
whistling	a	very	different	tune,	yet	in	unmistakably	diplomatic	tones.	
	
A	sub-state	government’s	international	legitimacy	may	be	(notionally)	premised	on	qualities	
that	it	possesses	-	be	they	representation,	democracy,	function	or	capacity	-	however,	in	order	
for	 this	 to	 be	 translated	 into	 an	 accepted	 presence	 on	 the	 international	 stage,	 specific	
strategies	are	required.	In	short,	how	do	sub-state	governments	ensure	that	they	are	listened	
to,	 taken	seriously,	acknowledged	by	other	actors?	A	key	way	 in	which	this	 legitimation	 is	
achieved	 is	 that	 of	mimicry:	 essentially,	 learning	 to	 ‘talk	 the	 talk’	 and	 ‘walk	 the	 walk’	 of	
diplomacy.	 	As	such	this	thesis	employs	the	vocabulary	both	of	mimicry	(McConnell,	2016;	
McConnell	et	al.,	2012)	and	performativity	to	understand	the	ways	in	which	such	legitimating	
work	 is	 accomplished	 (McConnell	 et	 al.,	 2012:	 806).	 The	 idea	of	 ‘mimicry’	 in	 a	diplomatic	
setting	has	 clear	 and	 compelling	 links	 to	much	paradiplomatic	 activity,	whereby	 sub-state	
governments	often	go	to	extreme	lengths	to	appear	‘state-like’.		
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In	the	fullest	examination	of	mimicry	in	a	diplomatic	setting	to	date,	McConnell	et	al	(2012:	
804)	explore	the	ways	in	which	“non-state	diplomacies	draw	on,	mimic	and	intervene	in	the	
realm	of	formal	political	action	in	ways	which	both	promote	‘official’	state	diplomacy	as	an	
ideal	 and	 dilute	 its	 distinction	 from	 other,	 ‘unofficial’	 diplomacies”.	 Diplomatic	
representations,	from	a	mimetic	perspective,	are	therefore	not	solely		“strategic	hegemonic	
tools	employed	by	constituted	powers	to	exclude,	but	can	also	be	tactically	performed	by	
entities	that	challenge	the	composition	and	status	of	the	interstate	system”	(McConnell	et	al.,	
2012:	811).	Not	only	does	a	mimetic	perspective	allow	us	to	look	empirically	at	the	ways	in	
which	 sub-state	 governments	 may	 craft	 their	 international	 messages	 and	 diplomatic	
representations	in	a	way	which	either	mirrors	or	diverges	from	state	practice,	it	also	acts	as	
another	analytical	lens	with	which	to	examine	the	relationship	between	the	sub-	and	central-	
state	tiers	of	diplomacy,	and	the	ways	that	they	interact	with,	and	potentially	challenge,	one	
another.	
	
Meanwhile	-	and	relatedly	-	a	performative	perspective	allows	us	to	take	a	close	look	at	the	
ways	in	which	a	sub-state	government	communicates	its	message	on	the	international	stage	
that	increasingly	lies	within	its	grasp.	That	much	diplomacy	is	now	‘public	diplomacy’	directed	
at	mass	audiences	rather	than	limited	to	exchanges	between	the	diplomatic	elites	of	formally	
equal	sovereigns,	is	widely	understood	(Huijgh,	2010;	Huijgh,	2012).		A	consequence	of	this	
shift	in	practice	has	been	that	the	performative	aspects	of	diplomacy	are	now	more	visible;	
the	‘performance’	takes	in	new	and	diverse	audiences.	However,	even	when	enacted	in	its	
most	traditional	variants,	diplomacy	has	always	relied	heavily	on	performance;	on	symbolism,	
mutually	 understood	 and	 reciprocated	 signs	 and	 shorthand	 (McConnell	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 The	
framework	of	‘Performativity’	is	primarily	concerned	with	the	processes	of	agency	creation.	
It	is,	fairly	loosely,	associated	with	the	English	School	of	International	Relations,	sharing	an	
interest	 specifically	 in	 the	 practices	 of	 diplomacy	 (Neumann,	 2003:	 1).	 It	 draws	 on	 a	 rich	
history	 in	 social	 theory	 -	 from	 John	 Austin	 to	 Judith	 Butler	 -	 as	 well	 as	 on	 constructivist	
understandings	of	international	politics,	but	perhaps	a	more	significant	‘marker’	in	the	way	
that	it	is	utilised	in	an	international	relations	setting	is	in	fact	the	breadth	of	its	intellectual	
underpinnings.	 A	 key	 premise	 is	 -	 essentially	 -	 that	 international	 agents	 are	 made,	 or	
performed	 into	 being,	 rather	 than	 simply	 born	 (Neumann,	 2002;	 Neumann,	 2003).	 The	
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framework	allows	a	focus	on	the	various	practices,	processes	or	events	that	constitute	the	
making	 of	 such	 international	 agents,	 in	 our	 case	 sub-state	 diplomats.	 Indeed,	 for	
paradiplomacy,	the	phrase	‘I	speak,	therefore	I	am’	seems	to	be	particularly	prophetic.	
	
	
	
IV. Paradiplomacy	as	a	Sovereignty	Game	
	
Abstracting	 the	practice	of	paradiplomacy	beyond	 its	parochial	 confines,	 as	 the	preceding	
sections	have	sought,	therefore	leaves	us	with	questions	of	real	and	pressing	significance	to	
contemporary	 IR	 theory.	Are	 sub-state	 governments,	 in	 their	 role	 as	 international	 agents:	
perforating	 or	 weakening	 state	 sovereignty;	 re-asserting	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 national	
sovereignty;	expanding	and	reconstituting	the	domain	of	sub-state	polities,	further	eroding	
the	 distinction	 between	 the	 international	 and	 the	 domestic;	 or	 un-bundling	 and	
disaggregating	 Caporaso’s	 (2000)	 conceptual	 triangle	 of	 ‘territory,	 sovereignty	 and	
authority’?	Beyond	these	questions,	the	activities	comprising	paradiplomacy	also	have	some	
utility	 in	 highlighting	 the	 limits	 of	 extant	 IR	 theory.	 Indeed,	 multi-national	 states,	
unrecognised	 states	 and	 non-state	 actors	 capable	 of	 conveying	 the	 loyalties	 of	 distinct	
national	or	ethnic	groups	on	the	world	stage	do	not	exist	in	the	abstract:	they	are	very	much	
a	real,	empirical	phenomenon.	As	an	increasingly	significant	dynamic	in	all	its	various	guises,	
paradiplomacy	 deserves	 a	 place	 on	 the	 IR	 research	 agenda,	 contributing	 most	 clearly	 to	
embryonic	debates	surrounding	the	developing	roles	of	‘hybrid’	international	actors.		
	
The	concept	of	nation	building	is	used	in	various	ways	and	in	hugely	differing	contexts	within	
the	field	of	paradiplomacy.	For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	however,	what	is	of	interest	are	
the	 political	 projects	 that	 draw	 on	 a	 strong	 regional	 identity,	 undertaken	 by	 sub-state	
governments	with	differing	constitutional	preferences.	Whether	 this	manifests	 in	 the	self-
referential	term	of	‘nation’	or	not	is	of	lesser	importance	than	the	fact	these	governments	
recognise	 a	 political	 or	 cultural	 distinctiveness	 in	 their	 polity.	 The	 basic	 assumption	 that	
underpins	 the	 utility	 of	 this	 framework	 in	 exploring	 paradiplomatic	 activity	 is	 that,	 for	
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stateless	nations,	 the	ability	 to	 ‘speak	 the	nation’	 internationally,	and	 to	use	 international	
settings	to	perform	an	agency	that	outstrips,	or	even	simply	augments,	that	crafted	within	
domestic	contexts,	is	particularly	valuable.	When	the	‘stakes’	are	raised	in	this	way,	we	not	
only	stand	a	better	chance	of	encountering	and	understanding	the	tensions	between	sub-	and	
central-	state	diplomacies	and	statuses,	but	also	the	ways	in	which	international	agency	feeds	
back	into	the	self-understanding	and	domestic	political	agendas	of	the	sub-state	governments	
themselves;	and	inevitably,	those	of	the	central	state,	also.	
	
	In	short,	when	we	consider	the	paradiplomatic	practices	of	stateless	nations,	the	underlying	
currency	is	often	that	most	rarefied	beast:	sovereignty.		Sub-state	governments	assert	a	form	
of	 sovereignty	 in	 their	 pretensions	 to	 an	 international	 role,	 speaking	 for	 their	 people	 and	
interacting	with	other	actors	-	often	third,	sovereign	states,	on	the	world	stage.	Likewise,	for	
the	central	state,	when	seeking	to	monitor	or	control	the	international	activities	of	their	sub-
state	 counterparts,	 their	 rationales	 often	 retreat	 into	 absolute	 sovereignty:	 the	 ability	 to	
speak	with	a	single,	unqualified	voice	on	the	international	stage	being	central	to	the	role	of	
national	 foreign	 offices	 and	 governments.	 However,	 when	 we	 consider	 the	 practices	 of	
paradiplomacy	in	their	real-life,	day-to-day	manifestations	we	see	that	the	picture	is	much	
more	nuanced	and,	 in	 fact,	much	 less	absolute.	This	 leads	us	 to	a	different	 conception	 to	
sovereignty	per	se,	that	of	a	sovereignty	game.	
	
The	notion	of	sovereignty	games	is	one	set	out	in	great	detail	by	Adler	Nissen	and	Gad,	and	
explored	 both	 in	 their	 edited	 volume	 entitled	 ‘European	 Integration	 and	 Postcolonial	
Sovereignty	Games:	the	EU	Overseas	Countries	and	Territories’,	and	with	specific	reference	
to	the	Nordic	region	in	a	special	issue	of	the	journal	Cooperation	and	Conflict	(Adler-Nissen	
and	Gad,	2012;	Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2014).		In	the	context	of	the	Nordic	region,	the	authors	
point	to	twin	processes:	European	integration	and	increasing	demands	by	polities,	such	as	
Greenland,	the	Faroe	Islands	and	Åland,	for	independence	-	in	one	form	or	another.	At	the	
heart	of	their	explanation	of	these	twin	and	seemingly	contradictory	processes	is	the	notion	
that	 sovereignty	 is	 not	 absolute,	 and	 should	 not	 be	 treated	 as	 such;	 instead	 it	 must	 be	
regarded	as	a	qualified	concept.	The	idea	of	sovereignty	games,	therefore,	 is	all	about	the	
negotiation	of	sovereignty.	The	games:	“involve	strategies	may	be	played	out	with	reference	
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to	sovereignty	as	either/or,	and	they	may	involve	alternative	types	of	polities	in	addition	to	
sovereign	states”	(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2014:	14).		
	
The	 fact	 that	 the	 meaning	 of	 sovereignty	 has	 -	 mistakenly,	 the	 authors	 contend	 -	 been	
understood	as	fixed	has	resulted	in	the	scenario	whereby	the	dominant	modes	of	considering	
world	politics	classify	relations:	
In	terms	of	either	hierarchical	subordination	or	external	equality.	For	political	
practitioners,	this	leads	to	blindness	to	other	forms	of	political	organization.	
For	 academics,	 it	 leads	 to	 blindness	 to	 what	 (also)	 goes	 on	 in	 politics	 -	 in	
international	politics,	in	domestic	politics	and	particularly	in	the	politics	on	the	
border	between	 the	 international	 and	 the	domestic	 (Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	
2014:	14).		
Such	 a	 border	 is	 precisely	 where	 paradiplomatic	 activities	 take	 place;	 territorially	 basted	
actors,	nested	within	the	structure	of	a	sovereign,	hierarchical	state,	yet	establishing	direct	
relationships	 and	 exchanges	with	 external	 actors,	 both	 sovereign	 and	 non-sovereign.	 The	
polities	 discussed	 by	 Adler-Nissen	 and	Gad	 share	with	 certain	 sub-state	 governments	 the	
inability	to	fit	neatly	into	categories	offered	by	conventional	theories	of	international	politics.	
Greenland	 or	 the	 Faroe	 islands	 are	 “neither	 formally	 sovereign	 nor	 simply	 hierarchically	
subordinated	to	their	metropole”	(2014:	16).	While	most	sub-state	governments	are	in	fact	
hierarchically	subordinate	to	the	central	state,	for	many	there	is	a	conscious	challenging	of	
this	status,	one	often	expressed	through	paradiplomatic	endeavours.	This	does	not	always	
translate	to	a	quest	for	formal	independence	-	though	it	can	do.	Instead,	it	may	be	manifest	
in	 the	 extent	 of	 competences	 transferred	 to	 the	 sub-state	 authority	 or	 in	 the	nature	 and	
quality	of	relationships	between	central	and	sub-state	levels.	Certainly,	for	those	sub-state	
governments	 identifying	 in	 one	 way	 or	 another	 with	 the	 term	 nation,	 there	 is	 a	 self-
perception	that	shares	much	in	common	with	the	Nordic	examples	cited	above.		
	
For	Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	a	sovereignty	game:	
Involves	two	or	more	players	who,	in	their	interaction,	make	strategic	claims	
about	authority	and	responsibility	with	reference	to	a	 traditional	 ‘either/or’	
concept	 of	 sovereignty.	 Contemporary	 sovereign	 states	 and	 polities,	 which	
qualify	 as	 potential	 states,	 manoeuvre	 between	 dependence	 and	 self-
determination	 -	 and	 sovereignty	 is	 a	 card	 that	 can	 be	 played	 in	 these	
manoeuvrings	-	or	played	on	-	in	different	ways.	Notably	the	articulation	of	the	
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either/or	 concept	of	 sovereignty	need	neither	 be	 explicit	 nor	 affirmative	 in	
order	for	it	to	be	vital	for	the	game	(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2014:	19).	
In	 drawing	 on	 the	 discourse	 of	 sovereignty,	 the	 ‘games’	 themselves	 therefore	 have	 both	
system-reinforcing	 and	 potentially	 disruptive	 effects.	 Similar	 effects,	 in	 fact,	 to	mimicry	 -	
whereby	non-state	actors’	adoption	of	a	form	of	state-like	diplomacy	is	seen	to	bolster	the	
authority	of	the	latter,	at	the	same	time	as	it	dilutes	the	very	distinction	that	exists	between	
the	 official	 and	 the	 unofficial	 (McConnell,	 2016;	 McConnell	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 For	 sub-state	
governments,	and	 indeed	other	polities,	the	value	of	sovereignty	games	 is	related	to	their	
ability	 to	 position	 them	 as	 legitimate	 player	 in	 the	 game	 itself.	 Post-colonial	 sovereignty	
games,	in	the	words	of	Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	“pertain	not	(only)	to	some	particular	instance	
of	distribution	of	authority	or	responsibility,	but	to	the	distribution	of	the	very	possibility	of	
articulating	 authority	 and	 responsibility”	 (Adler-Nissen	 and	 Gad,	 2014:	 20).	 Sub-state	
governments,	therefore,	are	able	to	declare	themselves	as	counted	among	the	‘players’	or	
meaningful	 units	 in	 a	 national	 scene,	 using	 the	 international	 scene	 to	 bring	 about	 this	
domestic	power-shift.		
	
In	sum,	a	new	approach	to	paradiplomacy	-	the	approach	utilised	and	advocated	in	this	thesis	
-	should	focus,	unapologetically,	at	the	more	developed	end	of	the	paradiplomatic	spectrum,	
consciously	 assessing	 the	nature	of	 the	 challenge	presented	 to	 state	governments,	or	 the	
diplomatic	status	quo	more	broadly.	In	stateless	nations	we	see	a	non-state	actor	speaking	
loudly	and	clearly	 for	 the	 interests	of,	or	at	 least	 in	the	name	of,	a	people	 -	sometimes	 in	
conflict	 with	 a	 central	 state	 authority.	 We	 see	 a	 traditionally	 territorially	 bound	 actor	
construct	 their	place	on	 the	world	 stage,	 seek	 legitimacy	 for	 their	 international	presence,	
mimicking	dominant	diplomatic	discourses	that	both	subvert	and	reaffirm	the	monopoly	that	
states	hold	on	such	domains	(McConnell	et	al.,	2012).	We	learn	about	the	boundaries	of	sub-
state	authority	and	territorial	reach,	the	processes	of	international	agency	creation	and	the	
methods	that	central	state	governments	have	to	constrain	or	deny	agency.	We	can	probe	the	
meaning	of	official	diplomacy;	assess	 the	categories	and	divisions	we	have	been	 routinely	
employing	 in	 the	 description	 and	 analysis	 of	 diplomatic	 practice.	We	 can	 learn	 about	 the	
meaning	 of	 sovereignty,	 unpicking	 the	 associations	 between	 this	 central	 concepts	 and	 its	
various	offshoots:	authority,	territory,	power.		
	 71	
	
Research	Questions	&	Design	
The	research	questions	laid	out	in	this	section	reflect	the	new	focus	and	framework	that	has	
been	discussed	above.	They	 reflect	 the	 fact	 that	paradiplomacy	has	 recently	undergone	a	
process	of	‘normalization’	(Cornago,	2010),	being	undertaken	by	a	hugely	varied	assortment	
of	regional	and	other	sub-state	actors,	in	a	multitude	of	different	guises;	at	times	mundane,	
at	times	highly	contentious.	Despite	the	absence	of	clear	constitutional	authority,	and	often	
without	a	demonstrable	functional	impetus,	the	reality	is	that	sub-state	actors	are	projecting	
themselves	onto	the	international	stage,	developing	an	‘actorness’	that	muddies	the	(already	
murky)	 waters	 of	 the	 diplomatic	 system.	 	 Where	 a	 good	 proportion	 of	 these	 discrete	
paradiplomatic	endeavours	are	reasonably	easily	understood	and	accounted	for	with	relation	
to	 economic	 incentives	 (specifically	 attracting	 inward	 investment),	 or	 engagement	 with	
European	policy-making,	other	actions	are	more	 intriguing.	The	proliferation	of	normative	
activities,	 such	 as	 support	 for	 international	 development	 or	 climate	 change	 initiatives,	
alongside	 increasingly	normal,	 or	 ‘state-like’	diplomatic	 relationships	or	encounters	 (often	
whereby	a	region	establishes	formal/longer	term	relations	with	a	sovereign	state)	seems	to	
speak	to	different,	more	complex	and	perhaps	more	significant	underlying	motivations.		
	
Of	 the	 relatively	 small	 amount	 of	 research	 that	 has	 previously	 been	 conducted	 into	 the	
motivations	behind	paradiplomacy,	the	concept	of	stateless	nationalism,	and	its	counterpart,	
nation	 building,	 have	 been	widely	 identified	 as	 at	 least	 highly	 significant,	 if	 not	 the	most	
relevant,	 variables	 (Lecours	 and	Moreno,	 2001;	 Royles,	 2010;	 Keating,	 1997;	 Paquin	 and	
Lachapelle,	 2005).	 It	 would	 seem	 that	 these	 concepts	 are	 particularly	 consequential	 with	
relation	to	the	less	clearly	functional	external	activities	mentioned	above.	However,	the	link	
between	nation	building	and	paradiplomacy	is	undoubtedly	more	complex	than	is	currently	
accounted	for	in	the	literature,	not	least	because	‘nation	building’	is	a	somewhat	amorphous	
concept	itself.	What	is	the	intended	end	product	of	such	exercises?	A	sovereign	state?	Greater	
devolved	authority?	Some	form	of	confederation?	Self-determination	is	clearly	a	concept	that	
is	 in	 a	 period	 of	 flux,	 with	 the	 interrelated	 processes	 of	 devolution/decentralisation,	
supranational	 regional	 integration	 and	 globalization	 providing	 a	 particularly	 colourful	
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backdrop.		An	alternative	way	of	thinking	about	this	dynamic,	which	seems	to	revolve	around	
the	relative	power	and	status	of	the	state	and	sub-state	government,	is	what	Addler-Nissen	
and	Gameltoft-Hansen	term	a	 ‘sovereignty	game’	 (2008).	 In	 this	view,	expanded	by	Adler-
Nissen	and	Gad	in	relation	to	the	Nordic	region	(2014),	sub-state	involvement	in	international	
affairs	may	represent	a	type	of	sovereignty	game	that	is	not	really	about	an	end	goal	of	a	new	
sovereign	state,	but	rather	an	assertion	of	the	polity’s	right	to	play	such	a	game	at	all.	
	
This	lack	of	clarity	regarding	the	process	of	nation	building	obscures	not	only	the	motivations	
for	sub-state	governments	in	conducting	paradiplomacy;	it	also	means	that	the	implications	
of	 paradiplomacy,	 in	 the	 domestic	 and	 international	 arenas,	 are	 ill	 accounted	 for.	 	 For	
example,	while	both	Scotland	and	Wales	might	be	said	to	be	involved	in	a	process	of	nation	
building	 (constructing	 and	 promulgating	 national	 identities,	 carving	 out	 areas	 of	 policy	
differentiation	with	regards	to	central	government,	‘speaking	the	nation’)	and	both	undertake	
many	similar	paradiplomatic	activities,	it	is	not	necessarily	the	case	(given	the	quite	radically	
different	 medium-term	 objectives	 of	 the	 governing	 parties	 in	 each	 case)	 that	 their	
paradiplomacies	 are	 conducted	 for	 the	 same	purpose,	 nor	 that	 their	meaning,	 or	 specific	
implications,	 can	 be	 fused	 together.	 Whilst	 there	 is	 clearly	 a	 strong	 and	 convincing	 link	
between	paradiplomacy	and	nation	building,	the	multiple	forms	that	both	of	these	concepts	
can,	and	do,	take	necessitates	a	much	closer	examination	of	these	links,	something	reflected	
in	the	specific	research	questions	addressed	here.	Indeed,	for	the	purposes	of	this	study,	a	
broader	formulation	than	nation	building	or	stateless	nations	is	employed,	focussing	on	the	
political	projects	of	stateless	nations	that	draw	upon	a	strong	sub-state	national	identity.	
	
Given	 this	 lack	of	 conceptual	 clarity,	 and	 the	widely	acknowledged	paucity	of	explanatory	
approaches	 to	 the	 study	 of	 paradiplomacy,	 this	 project	 will	 focus	 on	 a	 set	 of	 sequential	
research	 questions	 that,	 taken	 as	 a	 whole,	 are	 intended	 to	 help	 place	 the	 practices	 in	 a	
broader	theoretical	context.	The	initial	three	questions	are	largely	empirical	 in	nature.	The	
first	asks:	what	sort	of	 international	roles	are	sub-state	governments	able	to	play	on	the	
international	 stage?	 The	 second	 relates	 to	 the	 ‘why’	 of	 paradiplomatic	 action,	 and	 asks:	
beyond	economic	or	functional	imperatives,	what	drives	sub-state	governments	to	develop	
international	 actorness?	 Thirdly,	 the	 study	 will	 address	 the	 question:	 how	 do	 sub-state	
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governments	establish	credibility	and	legitimacy	in	their	international	roles?		Latterly,	the	
study	will	move	on	 to	ask:	 to	what	extent	does	 the	practice	of	paradiplomacy	 challenge	
dominant	understandings	of	international	relations?	The	answer	to	this	question	is	closely	
related	 to	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 initial	 empirical	 analysis:	 the	 motivations	 that	 sub-state	
governments	have	in	developing	international	actorness	affects	the	nature	of	the	challenge	
such	 actions	 pose	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 central	 concepts	 of	 IR	 theory,	 such	 as	 state	
sovereignty.	This	secondary	 investigation	will	constitute	a	more	theoretical	account	of	 the	
nature	 of	 sub-state	 governments	 as	 international	 actors,	 their	 position	 in	 international	
society,	and	the	implications	for	other	units	of	analysis	in	the	traditional	study	of	IR.	
	
As	a	general	rule,	empirical	studies	of	sub-state	governments’	paradiplomacies	have	largely	
focussed	 on	 paradigmatic	 cases,	 such	 as	 Quebec	 or	 Catalonia,	 where	 such	 activities	 are	
particularly	pronounced	(Duran,	2011:	:339).	At	the	same	time,	an	almost	exclusive	focus	on	
the	EU-related	activities	of	sub-state	governments	(Royles,	2010:	:143)	has	meant	that	much	
of	 the	 paradiplomatic	 literature	 examines	 activities	 that	 could	 perhaps	 be	 better	 located	
within	 the	 framework	 of	 multi-level	 governance.	 There	 would	 seem	 to	 be	 pertinent	
differences	 in,	 for	 example,	 a	 council	 or	 local	 authority	 in	 an	 English	 region	 lobbying	 EU	
institutions	for	support	to	a	particular	industry	in	an	economic	reform	package,	and	those	of	
the	directly	elected	government	of	a	‘stateless	nation’,	such	as	Scotland,	forming	long-term,	
bilateral	partnerships	with	the	states	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	Likewise,	there	would	
seem	to	be	a	further	relevant	difference	in	the	establishment	of	predominantly	functional,	
economic,	 international	 linkages	on	 the	part	of	 sub-state	governments	 in	order	 to	attract	
inward	investment,	and	those	same	governments	undertaking	overtly	normative	activities,	
such	 as	 involving	 themselves	 in	 climate	 change	 mitigation	 networks	 or	 developing	
international	aid	programmes.		
	
Admittedly,	 some	 of	 these	 distinctions	 are,	 in	 practice,	 subtle.	 However,	 the	 difficulty	 of	
separating	out	and	categorising	these	different	types	of	international	activity	does	not	negate	
the	 need	 to	 do	 so:	 in	 fact,	 when	 we	 consider	 the,	 largely	 unanswered,	 pleas	 within	 the	
literature	 for	 a	 re-conceptualisation	 of	 paradiplomacy	 through	 a	 linkage	 with	 sub-state	
nationalism	(Lecours	and	Moreno,	2001:	:1-3),	and	the	much	more	widely	cited	requirement	
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for	 the	 development	 of	 theoretical	 frameworks	 and	 explanatory	 accounts	 of	 the	 practice	
(Bursens	and	Deforche,	2010;	Lecours,	2002),	this	process	would	seem	much	overdue.		
	
Sub-state	 governments	 engaging	 in	 diplomatic	 relations	 have,	 according	 to	 the	 literature,	
fundamentally	different	aims	than	those	of	states.	Lecours	argues	 that,	 for	 the	most	part,	
these	aims	are	more	 ‘modest’,	 related	to	 the	development	of	an	 international	personality	
(Lecours,	2002:	:104).	Getting	to	the	bottom	of	exactly	what	this	means	in	practice:	the	variety	
of	 aims	 sub-state	 governments	 have,	 their	 expectations	 of	 the	 influence	 they	 are	 able	 to	
wield,	and	on	what	type	of	actors,	necessarily	entails	a	much	closer	analysis	of	the	types	of	
diplomacy	or	external	relations	that	sub-state	governments	are	developing.	Indeed,	the	very	
notion	 that	 sub-state	 governments	have	 international	 ambitions	 that	differ	 from	 those	of	
central-states	is	one	that	should	be	subject	to	challenge.	
	
Thus	far,	the	key	categories	that	have	been	used	to	analyse	paradiplomatic	actions	relate	to	
whether	they	are	in	carried	out	in	concert	with,	parallel	to,	or	are	conflictual	with	the	external	
relations	of	the	central	state	(Criekemans,	2010c).	Though	this	distinction	is	indeed	important,	
it	alone	is	incapable	of	telling	us	much	about	what	the	sub-state	actor	is	trying	to	achieve.	It	
may	be	that	a	regional	and	central	government	disagree	over	agricultural	policy,	a	domestic	
debate	 that	 can	 easily	 be	 extrapolated	 to	 the	 EU,	 or	 even	 international,	 level.	 The	
paradiplomatic	action	surrounding	this	dispute	may	well	be	in	conflict	with	that	of	the	central	
government,	 but	 the	 sub-state	 government’s	 aims	may	 in	 fact	 be	 domestically	 located,	 a	
preferential	 policy	outcome	 for	 their	 constituents,	 rather	 than	an	attempt	 to	establish	an	
international	personality.		In	contrast,	the	high	profile	of	the	Bavarian	government’s	Brussels	
office,	their	decision	to	invest	such	resources	in	direct	EU	representation,	may	tell	us	a	lot	
about	the	way	in	which	that	this	historic	‘nation’	sees	itself,	and	the	nature	of	its	interests	and	
influence,	despite	the	fact	that	in	terms	of	direct	lobbying	or	policy	positions,	they	may	be	
acting	parallel	to,	or	even	in	concert	with,	the	Federal	Government.		
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Methodology	
The	starting	point,	in	terms	of	a	methodological	and	theoretical	framework	to	apply	to	this	
study,	is	that	there	does	not	appear	to	be	one	that	could	be	adopted	in	any	uniform	sense;	a	
result	of	the	various	lacunas	in	the	development	of	paradiplomatic	theory	as	outlined	above.	
Instead,	there	are	a	range	of	potentially	useful	concepts	and	frameworks	that	exist	across	
many	overlapping	and	related	disciplines	and	subject	areas.	Though	undoubtedly	messy,	as	
starting	 points	 go,	 it	 is	 only	 in	 testing	 and	 applying	 these	 different	 tools	 or	 analytical	
perspectives	 that	we	 can	 start	 to	 ‘join	 up	 the	 dots’	 between	what	 is	 taking	 place	 on	 the	
paradiplomatic	 landscape	 and	 the	 broader	 international	 and	 diplomatic	 environments.	
Purposefully,	conceptual	 tidiness	and	methodological	clarity	have	 in	some	 important	ways	
been	compromised	for	the	function	of	seeking	new	insight	into	an	area	of	diplomacy	that	has	
traditionally	only	been	studied	in	a	compartmentalised,	and	thus	fundamentally	limited,	way.		
	
Indeed,	 in	their	article	examining	approaches	and	methods	 in	feminist	research	within	the	
UK,	Krook	and	Squires	(2006:	45)	explicitly	call	for	the	prioritisation	of	methodological	and	
theoretical	 eclecticism.	 Their	 study	demonstrated	 “a	distinctive	willingness	 on	 the	part	 of	
feminists	to	employ	various	theoretical	frames	and	to	explore	possibilities	for	synthesizing	or	
juxtaposing	methods	in	innovative	ways”.	The	authors	go	on	to	argue	that	“problem-driven	
research	should	be	cultivated	at	the	expense	of	method-driven	work”.	 	Extrapolating	from	
this	argument,	though	paradiplomatic	practices	represent	a	different	set	of	‘problems’	from	
those	dominating	 feminist	 research	agendas,	 they	do	touch	meaningfully	on	core	areas	of	
political	life:	authority,	nationhood,	legitimacy,	sovereignty.	In	other	words,	the	issues	that	
arise	from	the	practice	of	paradiplomacy	are	worthy	of	investigation	–	perhaps	particularly	so	
given	that	they	do	not	fit	neatly	into	an	established	methodology,	and	such	enquiry	requires	
the	juxtaposition	of	multiple	theoretical	frameworks.	Rather	than	aiming	for	a	robust	model	
for	predicting	future	paradiplomatic	behaviour,	or	modelling	paradiplomacy	in	unchartered	
scenarios,	 the	objectives	 of	 this	 thesis	 are	more	 limited.	 They	 revolve	 around	building	 an	
accurate	 picture,	 and	 a	 more	 kaleidoscopic	 understanding,	 of	 current	 practices	 and	 the	
meanings	 that	 these	 relatively	new	 roles	and	 relationships	hold	 for	 the	actors	 involved	 in	
cultivating	them.		
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Broadly,	 this	 thesis	 employs	 a	 constructivist	 methodology,	 seeking	 to	 “capture	 and	
understand	 the	meanings	 of	 a	 social	 action	 [paradiplomacy]	 for	 the	 agent	 performing	 it’,	
recognising	that	the	account	of	the	scholar	studying	such	action	is	not	free	from	the	“biases	
that	 surround	 us”	 	 (Moses	 and	 Knutsen,	 2012:	 11).	 The	 approach	 draws	 from	 Rosenau’s	
conceptualisation	of	 international	 theory	 (1996:	309-310),	premised	on	the	understanding	
that	 “it	 is	 sheer	 craziness	 to	 dare	 to	 understand	 world	 affairs…yet	 dare,	 we	 must”.	 In	
addressing	this	task,	Rosenau	calls	for	“a	sense	of	humility	and	puzzlement”,	remaining	‘in	
awe	of	the	complexities	and	changes	at	work	in	the	world,	ever	ready	to	concede	confusion	
and	always	 reminding	ourselves	 that	our	conclusions	must	perforce	be	 tentative”.	Yet,	he	
continues,	there	is	a	role	for	theorising	in	this	task	of	understanding	world	affairs:	using	it	to	
“tease	 meaningful	 patterns	 out	 of	 the	 endless	 details	 and	 inordinate	 complexities	 that	
pervade	world	politics’	mechanisms	for	doing	so	(Rosenau,	1996:	310).	
	
Methods	
For	this	comparative	study,		there	are	three	main	foci	of	analysis:	institutional,	discourse	and	
praxis.	 Within	 these	 three	 areas	 a	 variety	 of	 materials	 will	 be	 considered,	 ranging	 from	
constitutions	and	memoranda	of	understanding	through	to	in-depth	interviews.	Qualitative	
software,	Nvivo,	will	be	used	in	order	to	aid	the	coding	and	analysis	of	this	volume	of	material.	
This	 range	 of	 analytical	 foci	 and	 sources	 is	 explored	 in	 the	 table	 below,	 adapted	 from	 a	
framework	enumerated	by	Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	whose	distinctions	between	institutional,	
discourse	and	praxis	analysis	proved	invaluable	in	focussing	the	analysis	undertaken	(Adler-
Nissen	and	Gad,	2014:	22).	
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Table	1:	Analytical	Framework.	Adapted	from	Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2014:22	
Method	 Institutional	
Analysis	
Discourse	Analysis	 Praxis	Analysis	
Site	 Formal	scope	of	
diplomatic	powers.	
Devolution	
dispensations	or	
Federal	vs.	regional	
delegations	of	
powers.	
Negotiation	of	
meaning	and	identity	
vis	a	vis	the	
international	
actorness	and	
legitimacy	of	SSGs.	
Diplomatic	praxis:	the	
actual	scope	of	sub-
state	international	
engagement	‘on	the	
ground’	
Type	of	
material	
Constitutions,	
Memoranda	of	
Understanding,	
Concordats	and	
formalized	working	
and	inter-
governmental	
arrangements	
Parliamentary	records,	
media	debate,	party	
position	papers,	
government	policy	
documents,	official	
statements,	
official/governmental	
social	media	profiles.	
Qualitative,	in-depth	
interviews	-	where	
possible.	
Qualitative,	in-depth	
interviews	-	where	
possible.	Participant	
observation.	Policy	
documents,	party	
position	papers,	
official	statements,	
official/governmental	
social	media	profiles,		
Analytical	
strategy	
Understanding	the	
institutionalization	
of	sub-state	
diplomatic	
authority	and	both	
the	limits	and	
opportunities	
allowed	by	
governing	or	
constitutional	
arrangements	
Mapping	competing	
visions	of	the	external	
identity	of	the	SSG	and	
the	proper	scope	of	
their	international	
action	-	as	conceived	
by	both	sub	and	
central	state	actors	
Looking	at	the	self-
understandings,	
negotiation	processes	
and	strategies	
developed	in	
positioning	SSGs	as	
diplomatic	actors.	
Focusing	on	
diplomatic	practices	
	
	
There	were	two	ways	in	which	the	time	period	for	analyses	was	narrowed	down	in	each	of	
our	three	cases.	Firstly,	due	to	the	rapidly	evolving	nature	of	paradiplomacy,	there	was	a	clear	
focus	 on	 the	 current	 activities	 of	 Wales,	 Scotland	 and	 Bavaria.	 This	 meant	 that	 the	
programmes,	 interactions	 and	 institutional	 arrangements	 considered	were	 –	 for	 the	most	
part	-	those	that	existed	whilst	this	research	took	place.	This	data	collecting	phase	began	in	
2013	and	concluded	in	2016.	However,	owing	to	the	potential	significance	of	party	political	
control	and	the	political	dynamics	underpinning	paradiplomacy,	there	was	a	broader	time-
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frame	 that	 guided	 this	 research	 and	 provided	 the	 historical	 context	 within	 which	
paradiplomacy	 took	place	which	differed	 in	 each	of	 the	 case	 studies.	 Each	of	 these	 time-
frames	reflected	a	critical	juncture	in	the	political	context	of	our	cases	and	was	selected	with	
some	direction	from	the	initial	interviews	that	were	conducted.	For	Wales,	the	time	frame	
within	which	the	analysis	is	grounded	begins	in	1999,	with	the	establishment	of	the	National	
Assembly	for	Wales.	In	Scotland,	the	relevant	critical	juncture	was	instead	identified	as	the	
formation	of	 the	 first	SNP	minority	government	 in	Holyrood	 in	2007.	 In	Bavaria,	 the	 long-
standing	dominance	of	the	CSU	and	its	close	relationship	at	various	points	with	a	governing	
CDU	 at	 the	 Federal	 Level	 meant	 that	 the	 critical	 juncture	 that	 best	 reflects	 the	 distinct	
paradiplomacy	 that	 is	 currently	 conducted	 is,	 for	 our	 purposes,	 the	 premiership	 of	 Franz	
Joseph	Strauss,	beginning	in	1978.	Franz	Joseph	Strauss	was	renowned	for	developing	what	
has	been	termed		‘Nebenaußenpolitik’	or	‘foreign	policy	on	the	side’	(Panara,	2010),	using	his	
status	as	a	former	Federal	politician	to	do	“to	do	things	that	no	other	Minister	President	had	
done	before”.5	Data	has	not	been	collected	for	this	entire	near-40	year	period,	rather	 it	 is	
within	this	frame	of	reference	that	Bavaria’s	distinctive	paradiplomacy	will	be	interpreted,	as	
in	Scotland	and	Wales.		
	
Limitations	
There	were	a	number	of	limitations	to	the	approach	adopted	in	this	research,	owing	to	the	
particular	set	of	circumstances	surrounding	this	study	and	the	cases	to	be	analysed.	Perhaps	
the	most	significant	of	these	limitations	is	the	imbalance	in	the	data	collected	for	each	of	the	
case	studies,	specifically	the	lack	of	interview-data	in	the	Scottish	case.		The	political	context	
in	 Scotland	 during	 the	 course	 of	 this	 research	 meant	 that	 officials	 were	 reluctant	 to	
participate	 in	the	project;	though	unfortunate,	this	 level	of	political	sensitivity	did	 indicate	
interesting	dynamics	which	are	explored	in	subsequent	chapters.	In	the	absence	of	Scottish	
interview	 data,	 the	 thesis	 instead	 made	 use	 of	 another	 set	 of	 sources	 which	 served	 to	
illustrate	the	intentions	and	self-perceptions	of	the	Scottish	Government	in	its	international	
endeavours:	 the	 policy-papers,	 debates	 and	 exchanges	 centred	 around	 the	 Scottish	
																																																						
5	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
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independence	referendum	in	2014.	In	addition,	the	contributions	from	Scottish	Government	
officials	as	part	of	a	6-part	seminar	series	on	Security	in	Scotland	gave	further	insight	into	the	
priorities	and	positions	of	Scotland	in	an	international	context.	The	sessions	took	place	under	
‘Chatham	House’	rules	and	an	expectation	of	anonymity.	A	second	important	limitation	was	
the	lack	of	German	(or	Welsh)	language	skills	on	the	part	of	the	researcher.	This	meant	that	
all	 interviews	were	 conducted	 in	English;	however,	 reflecting	 the	 issue	area	 in	question	–	
international	 affairs	 –	 all	 the	 relevant	 interviewees	 spoke	 fluent	 English,	 and	 for	 similar	
reasons	the	Bavarian	Government	published	substantive	information	on	these	in	an	English	
language	format.	Issues	related	to	the	choice	of	case	studies	and	comparisons	between	them	
are	discussed	in	the	following	section.	
	
The	 initial	 strategy	 of	 relying	 heavily	 on	 elite-level	 interview	 data	 was	 a	 risky	 one,	 and	
ultimately	 it	 did	 not	 reap	 the	 intended	 rewards	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 numbers	 or	 balance	 of	
participants.	 Where	 the	 initial	 aim	 was	 to	 secure	 interviews	 with	 three	 to	 four	 key	
government	officials	or	advisors	 in	each	of	 the	cases,	 in	none	of	 the	cases	was	 this	 target	
reached.	 In	the	Welsh	case,	 interviews	were	conducted	with	five	officials,	spread	between	
the	Welsh	 Government	 and	 the	 National	 Assembly	 for	Wales	 (which,	 in	 this	 case	 study,	
provided	a	useful	insight	into	the	‘split’	between	paradiplomatic	objectives	in	the	executive	
and	legislative	branches),	in	Bavaria	they	were	conducted	with	two	officials	–	one	each	from	
the	executive	and	parliamentary	branches	–	and	in	Scotland,	as	explained	above,	there	was	
an	unwillingness	to	participate	in	the	project	owing	to	the	political	sensitivities	at	the	time.	
Two	 broad	 factors	 worked	 to	 mitigate	 these	 set-backs	 in	 the	 original	 strategy	 for	 data	
collection.	 The	 first	 was	 that,	 in	 the	 Welsh	 and	 Bavarian	 cases,	 while	 the	 number	 of	
interviewees	did	not	reach	the	intended	figure,	the	most	relevant	and	appropriate	individuals	
did	participate.	The	quality	of	the	interviews	was	therefore	very	high,	and	the	aim	of	probing	
the	ways	in	which	paradiplomacy	feeds	into	the	priorities	of	a	specific	sub-state	government	
and	 their	 broader	 political	 aims	 and	 strategies	 was	 met.	 The	 other	 was	 that	 alternative	
primary	sources	of	 information	were	readily	available,	and	in	the	Scottish	case	these	were	
particularly	abundant	(as	outlined	above),	mitigating	to	a	degree	the	imbalance	of	interview	
data.	The	research	strategy	underpinning	this	project	therefore	pivoted	at	a	relatively	early	
stage;	 incorporating	 a	wider	 variety	 of	 sources	 of	 evidence	 and	 information	 and	using	 an	
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analytical	strategy	brought	together	three	separate	modes:	institutional	analysis,	discourse	
analysis	and	praxis	analysis.		
	
Case	Studies	
The	case	studies	-	Wales,	Scotland	and	Bavaria	-	have	been	chosen	primarily	on	the	basis	of	
their	 representing	 a	 group	 of	 stateless	 nations,	 amongst	 whom	 the	 political	 context	 is	
substantively	different.	In	other	words,	whilst	all	three	‘qualify’	as	stateless	nations,	each	are	
governed	by	parties	with	different	political	and	constitutional	priorities.	The	strength	of	sub-
state	national	identification	also	differs	across	the	cases,	which	will	allow	for	a	consideration	
of	the	role	that	this	variable	may	play	in	the	construction	of	sub-state	governments’	external	
identities,	and	degrees	of	inter-governmental	congruence	or	incongruence	to	be	considered.	
The	cases	further	exhibit	a	‘sliding	scale’	in	terms	of	other	relevant	variables	identified	by	the	
paradiplomatic	literature:	the	extent	of	legislative	autonomy	and	the	nature	of	the	state/sub-
state	relationship	(in	particular	the	contrast	between	devolved	and	federal	regional	units),	
the	 economic	 position	of	 the	 region	 relative	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 the	 strength	of	
regional/national(ist)	parties.		
	
The	variable	of	party	political	 control	within	 the	 sub-state	government	has	not	been	 fully	
explored	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 sub-state	 diplomacy,	 though	 the	 related	 concept	 of	 political	
congruence	or	incongruence	has	been	better	studied	(for	example,	see	Wyn	Jones	and	Royles,	
2012;	 Cantir,	 2015;	 Tatham,	 2013;	 Tatham,	 2014).	 Given	 the	 agency-driven	 nature	 of	
paradiplomatic	activity	(often	lacking	any	robust	statutory	underpinning),	and	in	light	of	the	
variations	observed	in	the	type	of	activities	engaged	in	by	different	sub-state	governments,	
this	variable	seems	highly	relevant.	By	comparing	across	three	sub-state	governments	with	
qualitatively	 different	 political	 contexts,	 this	 project	 seeks	 to	 uncover	 the	precise	ways	 in	
which	governmental	actors	seek	to	develop	international	agency	and	the	ways	in	which	the	
international	sphere	can	be	utilised	for	the	realization	of	political	ambitions.	The	approach	of	
this	study	is	to	distinguish	between	external	acts	or	relations	that	are	primarily	governance-
based,	 from	 those	 whose	 emphasis	 is	 more	 diplomatic.	 Whilst	 recognising	 that	 this	
delineation	is	not	straightforward,	nor	constructive	in	some	instances,	the	argument	is	made	
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that	a	particular	focus	on	those	activities	that	are,	more	or	less,	autonomous	i.e.,	not	only	
related	to	the	functional	requirements	of	European	governance,	may	shed	significant	light	on	
an	aspect	of	sub-state	activity	that	has	 largely	been	neglected	 in	the	extant	 literature.	For	
similar	 reasons,	 this	 project	 looks	 to	 investigate	 the	 nature	 and	 scope	 of	 international	
activities	both	within	and	beyond	the	European	neighbourhood.		
	
The	 cases	 were	 selected	 from	 an	 already	 narrowed	 pool:	 stateless	 nations	 within	 the	
European	context.	The	latter	part	of	this	criteria	stems	from	the	fact	that	the	availability	of	
broadly	 similar	 international	 and	 regional	 opportunity	 structures	 for	 sub-state	
internationalism	was	deemed	an	important	base-line,	allowing	the	peculiarities	of	each	case	
(in	terms	of	their	unique	relations	with	the	central	government	and	the	priorities	pursued	by	
political	actors	at	the	sub-state	level)	to	come	to	light.	Other	factors	influenced	this	choice	of	
cases.	This	research	was	conducted	from	Cardiff,	meaning	that	a	high	degree	of	access	to	the	
Welsh	Government	and	the	broader	Welsh	policy	making	context	was	able	to	be	facilitated.	
This	proved	 important	 in	 terms	of	data	 collection	as	 access	was	 restricted	 in	other	 cases,	
owing	both	to	geography	and	to	the	political	sensitivities	in	the	Scottish	political	landscape	at	
the	time	of	research.	The	potential	comparison	between	Wales	and	Scotland	was	deemed	to	
be	important	owing	to	the	divergent	political	trajectories	of	their	governments	following	the	
SNPs	success	in	recent	years,	and	the	resulting	variation	in	degrees	of	incongruence	between	
the	UK	Government	and	Scotland	and	Wales.	Thus,	despite	sharing	a	central	government,	
other	 factors	 –	 both	 in	 terms	of	 the	 constitutional	 framework	 and	differing	delegation	of	
powers	mediating	the	roles	of	the	two	devolved	governments,	and	in	terms	of	the	influence	
of	 governing	 parties	 at	 the	 sub-state	 level	 –	may	 be	 seen	 to	 influence	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
paradiplomacy	 that	 they	 conducted,	 and	 this	 was	 deemed	 to	 offer	 important	 potential	
insight.	In	Bavaria,	the	opportunity	to	study	a	stateless	nation	that	was	an	outlier	in	its	own	
state	–	in	terms	of	the	strength	of	attachment	to	the	‘heimat’	and	the	way	in	which	this	was	
represented	in	its	external	relations	–	provided	an	important	contrast	to	the	two	cases	from	
inside	 the	 UK,	 as	 did	 the	 settled	 and	 written	 constitutional	 structure	 of	 the	 German	
federation,	and	the	relationship	of	the	Lander	to	it.	Other	potential	cases	–	such	as	some	of	
Spain’s	 autonomous	 regions	 –	 were	 considered	 but	 ultimately	 rejected	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
representing	 paradigmatic	 cases	 (e.g.	 Catalonia	 and	 Wallonia)	 or	 lacking	 sufficient	
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differentiation	in	terms	of	the	constitutional	structure	and	symmetry/asymmetry	of	sub-state	
competence	(related	to	the	UK).	
	
The	 selection	 of	 three	 sub-state	 governments	 that	 represent	 a	 stateless	 nation	 was	 a	
deliberate	one.	It	is	acknowledged	that,	as	a	result	of	the	politics	of	regional	and	sub-state	
national	identity,	the	paradiplomatic	activities	of	Wales,	Bavaria	and	Scotland	may	not	reflect	
similar	 motivations	 or	 strategies	 in	 regions	 whose	 identity	 is	 less	 salient	 or	 who	 do	 not	
represent	stateless	nations.	It	may	be	that	the	general	emphasis	on	external	engagement	is	
greater	in	stateless	nations,	or	that	the	type	of	paradiplomacy	undertaken	is	different	from	
that	 in	other	 regions.	Having	said	 this,	 the	 three	cases	chosen	are	not	generally	 (with	 the	
muted	exception	of	Scotland)	among	the	‘usual	suspects’	that	feature	in	paradiplomatic	case	
studies,	suggesting	that	their	international	endeavours	are	not	particularly	a-typical.		
	
The	notion	of	‘stateless	nations’,	simply	nations	without	their	own,	corresponding	state,	is	an	
essentially	contested	concept.	This	 is	unsurprising,	given	the	fact	that	the	nation	 itself	has	
long	 resided	 in	 this	 category	 (Hepburn,	 2008a:	 :185).	 The	 particular	 problematique	 of	
stateless	nations	for	political	science,	however,	rests	on	their	apparent	incompatibility	with	
core	units	(in	fact,	the	core	unit)	of	analysis	 in	both	comparative	politics	and	 international	
relations:	 the	 nation	 state.	 	 In	 a	 related	 vein,	 Shain	 and	 Sherman	 (1998:	 :321)	 point	 to	
phenomena	such	as	diasporas	and	separatist	movements	as	‘counter	theoretical	concepts’	
that	are	“inconsistent	with	the	structural	rationale	of	the	global	system”.	It	would	appear	that	
this	 argument	 applies	 equally	well	 to	what	 have,	 latterly,	 come	 to	 be	 known	 as	 stateless	
nations;	whether	such	entities	contain	strong	separatist	movements	or	whether	demands	for	
self-determination	 manifest	 in	 a	 different	 way,	 being	 largely	 content	 with	 a	 degree	 of	
autonomy	inside	the	overarching	state.		
	
The	meaning	of	the	state	can	be	distinguished	from	that	of	the	nation,	and	indeed	nationalism	
(Guibernau,	 2004:	 :1252).	 However,	 the	 concepts	 have	 become	 fused	 together	 and	 their	
distinctiveness	obfuscated,	 in	part	to	allow	for	a	construct	to	more	readily	understand	the	
modern	states	system.	The	nation	itself	is	perhaps	“one	of	the	most	contested	concepts	of	
our	 times”	 (Guibernau,	 2004:	 :1251);	 its	 significance	 being	 amplified	 by	 this	 symbolically	
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loaded	term.	When	we	come	to	investigate	the	discrete	practice	of	paradiplomacy,	itself	an	
action	very	much	concerned	with	status	and	symbolic	capital	(Wyn	Jones	and	Royles,	2012:	
:252),	the	stateless	nation	becomes	a	particularly	relevant	analytic	category.	Guibernau	goes	
on	to	argue	that:	
To	 be	 or	 not	 to	 be	 recognized	 as	 a	 nation	 entails	 different	 rights	 for	 the	
community	which	claims	to	be	one,	since	being	a	nation	usually	 implies	the	
attachment	 to	 a	 particular	 territory,	 a	 shared	 culture	 and	 history,	 and	 the	
vindication	of	the	right	to	self-determination.	To	define	a	specific	community	
as	a	nation	involves	the	more	or	less	explicit	acceptance	of	the	legitimacy	of	
the	state	which	claims	to	represent	it,	or,	if	the	nation	does	not	posses	a	state	
of	its	own,	then	implicitly	acknowledges	the	nation’s	right	to	self-government	
involving	some	degree	of	political	autonomy	(Guibernau,	2004:	:1251).	
However,	 alongside	 the	 inherent	 symbolism	and	 sensitivity	 of	 the	 term	nation,	 stemming	
from	the	special	rights	that	 it	confers,	 there	are	additional	complexities	 in	certain	political	
contexts	which	may	mean	that	the	term	is	deliberately	not	employed	(Wyn	Jones	and	Scully,	
2009:	:7-8)	.	The	key	example	here	is	that	of	Bavaria/Germany,	where	nation	and	nationalism	
belong	 to	a	 category	of	 ‘sullied	 concepts’,	 associated	with	national	 socialism,	 that	 remain	
politically	 inappropriate	 (Hepburn,	 2008a:	 :184).	 In	 the	 Bavarian	 case,	 an	 alternative	
conception,	the	Heimat,	is	used	to	denote	a	very	similar	phenomenon:	a	sub-state	unit	which	
represents	an	historic	nation	with	its	own	cultures	and	traditions,	that	is	seen	to	legitimately	
claim	a	‘special’	degree	of	self-rule,	or	political	autonomy,	on	account	of	this	distinctiveness	
(both	from	the	federal	state	as	a	whole	and	from	other	Lander	who	represent	mere	‘regions’).	
This	 example	 brings	 into	 focus	 the	 ongoing	 debates	 regarding	what	 exactly	 constitutes	 a	
nation;	whether	that	be	objective	criteria	 (such	as	 language,	ethnicity	or	culture,	a	shared	
history)	or	more	subjective	features,	where	a	body	of	people	feel,	and	articulate	themselves	
as	being,	a	nation	(Hepburn,	2008a:	:186).		
	
Regardless	of	the	exact	term	used	to	describe	the	phenomenon,	the	significance	of	stateless	
nations	is	argued	by	Guibernau	(2004:	:1254)	to	stem	from	their	position	as	“potential	new	
political	actors	able	to	capture	and	promote	sentiments	of	loyalty,	solidarity	and	community	
among	individuals	who	seem	to	have	developed	a	growing	need	for	identity”.		Relatedly,	it	
should	follow	that	the	‘rise’,	or,	perhaps	more	accurately,	renewed	political	mobilization,	of	
stateless	nations	has	the	potential	to	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	states	within	whose	
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borders	such	entities	reside.	In	part,	the	nature	of	this	impact	depends	upon	the	approach	
taken	by	central	states	to	the	accommodation	of	sub-state	nations,	and	indeed	the	strategies	
of	the	stateless	nations	themselves	
	
Given	the	shortcomings	in	the	extant	paradiplomatic	literature,	it	would	seem	that	a	focus	on	
those	paradiplomatic	activities	that	correspond	a	stateless	nation	would	be	of	greatest	value.	
They	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 have	 some	 form	 of	 political	 (alongside	 economic	 or	 functional)	
motivation,	their	international	actions	express	a	national	identity	that	is	distinct	from	that	of	
the	central	state,	and	thus,	the	implications	of	such	activities	for	international	relations	theory	
are,	 potentially,	 particularly	 pronounced.	 Paradiplomacy	 pushes	 at	 the	 boundaries	 of	
sovereign	authority,	 blurring	 the	distinction	between	 state	and	non-state	actor;	 the	exact	
nature	of	this	challenge	will	be	seen	especially	clearly	with	a	focus	on	those	regions	with	a	
salient	national	identity	of	their	own.	Exploring	the	more	‘developed’	end	of	a	spectrum	of	
activity	 is	clearly	 fraught	with	 its	own	dangers.	What	 is	 true	 for	one	category	of	sub-state	
actors,	is	by	no	means	applicable	to	all.	Additionally,	while	sub-state	nations	do	indeed	engage	
in	 autonomous,	 paradiplomatic	 actions	 that	 may	 correspond	 to	 the	 logics	 of	 stateless	
nationalism,	it	 is	also	the	case	that	they	carry	out	purely	functional	international	relations,	
corresponding	 to	 the	 logics	 of	 multi-level	 governance.	 Likewise,	 regions	 that	 do	 not	
necessarily	 represent	 ‘stateless	 nations’	 can	 also	 engage	 in	 highly	 ‘developed’	 forms	 of	
activity.	Though	Criekemans	(2010a:	:6)	correctly	identifies	the	dangers	of	misinterpretation	
lurking	in	any	consideration	of	the	‘nationalism’	variable	(“what	some	understand	as	being	
nationalist	 (or	worse,	 separatist)	might	 rather	 be	 evaluated	 by	 others	 a	 form	 of	 ‘identity	
politics’”),	a	careful	consideration	of	this	relationship	is	nonetheless	vital	for	the	advancement	
of	paradiplomatic	studies.			
	
From	the	perspective	of	paradiplomacy,	 the	strategies	of	stateless	nations	are	particularly	
interesting.	This	is	due,	in	part,	to	the	fact	that	there	would	appear	to	be	some	activities	that	
are	intrinsic	to	this	category	per	se	(such	as	attaining	recognition	of	their	distinctiveness	or	
their	‘nationhood’,	both	from	the	‘host’	state	and	from	other	actors),	and	others	which	would	
appear	 to	 depend	 very	 much	 on	 whether	 the	 strategy	 of	 the	 region	 was	 to	 pursue	
independence,	to	seek	maximum	autonomy	within	the	existing	state	or	to	focus	on	particular	
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areas	of	competence.	The	utility	of	paradiplomacy,	and	its	modalities,	would	seem	to	differ	
depending	on	the	exact	strategy	that	the	region	wished	to	pursue,	allowing	for	a	close	analysis	
of	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 practice	 for	 the	 actors	 themselves,	 and	 of	 their	 motivations	 for	
employing	its	different	tools.	Given	the	fact	that	the	possible	range	of	motivations	is,	logically,	
broadest	for	the	actors	with	the	grandest	ambitions,	 it	also	allows	for	the	full	spectrum	of	
paradiplomatic	endeavours	to	be	considered.		
	
Aside	 from	the	specific	agendas	of	 stateless	nations	 in	 seeking	 independence	or	domestic	
autonomy,	the	fact	that	they	represent	alternative,	sometimes	conflictual,	identities	to	those	
associated	with	a	central	state,	means	that	paradiplomacy	has	a	particularly	useful	application	
for	such	entities:	in	allowing	them	to	‘speak	the	nation’.	The	use	of	paradiplomacy	as	a	nation-	
building	tool	has	been	widely	identified	within	the	literature	(see	for	example	Keating,	1997;	
Royles,	2010;	Lecours	and	Moreno,	2001),	and	would	seem	to	be	particularly	important	with	
regards	to	the	sort	of	identity-construction	that	appears	to	be	evident	in	certain	normative	
paradiplomatic	activities,	such	as	international	aid	or	sustainable	development	programmes.	
Likewise,	the	nation-building	and	identity-constructing	logics	of	paradiplomacy	may	well	be	
evident	 in	 attempts	made	by	 stateless	 nations,	 or	 at	 least	 certain	 parties	within	 stateless	
nations,	 to	 self-consciously	 place	 themselves	 within	 this	 category,	 bringing	 with	 it	 the	
legitimate	 claims	 to	 special	 treatment	 as	 associated	with	 the	 term	 ‘nation’,	 as	 argued	 by	
Guibernau	(2004:	:1251).	The	example	of	Bavaria	will	be	explored	below,	but	the	question	of	
inter-sub-national	 networking,	 and	 the	 effects	 of	 policy	 learning	 and	 exchange	 between	
stateless	nations	in	the	context	of	paradiplomacy	is	one	that	is	ripe	for	research.		
	
Bavaria	 is	 a	 German	 Lander	 with	 strong	 sub-state	 competence,	 able	 to	 exert	 a	 unique	
influence	on	the	Federal	level,	owing	to	the	relationship	between	its	governing	CSU	party	–	
which	has	a	long-standing	dominance	in	the	Lander	-	and	one	of	the	main	Federal	parties,	the	
CDU.	It	has	perhaps	the	most	complex	identity	of	all	of	the	three	cases	to	be	considered	in	
this	project.	It	defies	categorisation,	not	being	easily	translated	into	the	concept	of	stateless	
nationalism	 as	 we	 understand	 it	 from	 archetypal	 cases,	 such	 as	 Scotland	 or	 Catalonia	
(Hepburn,	2007:	109).	However,	as	we	shall	explore	below,	the	strategies	of	the	dominant	
CSU	party	 are	 in	 fact	 very	 similar	 to	 those	 employed	by	more	prominent	 ‘nation-building	
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parties’	within	such	stateless	nations.	Indeed,	the	CSU	appear	to	be	self-consciously	placing	
Bavaria	within	this	exact	category:	
Bavaria	is	one	of	the	oldest	states	in	Europe…	we	are	very	different	from	the	
rest	of	Germany,	we	like	to	be	independent.	We	fight	for	more	competences	
and	 powers	 for	 the	 regions…Bavaria	 is	 very	 similar	 to	 Scotland.	 We	 see	
ourselves	as	a	nation’	 (Eberhard	Sinner,	Bavarian	Minister	of	European	and	
Federal	Affairs,	quoted	in	Hepburn,	2008a:	184).	
Data	from	a	comparative	study	of	European	regions	(CANS)	 illuminates	this	opaque	status	
quite	clearly.	Bavaria	appears	within	a	group	of	seven	regions		(out	of	14	surveyed)	whose	
attachment	to	the	region	is	greater	than	to	the	state,	but	does	not	appear	in	the	sub-group	
of	regions	within	this	category	(numbering	five	of	those	seven)	who	have	“what	would	appear	
to	be	a	 strong	 sense	of	national	 identity”	 (as	opposed	 to	a	 regional	one)	 (Wyn	 Jones	and	
Scully,	2009:	3-4).	In	considering	this	data,	the	authors	hint	at	a	key	factor	which	may	explain	
the	 apparent	 disjuncture	 between	 the	 strength	 of	 sub-national	 identity	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
‘national’	attachment:	Germany’s	unique	political	context.	
The	case	of	Bavaria	is	fascinating…with	Bavarian	identity	apparently	exhibiting	
many	 of	 those	 features	 classically	 associated	 with	 nationality	 and	 national	
identity:	 the	 type	of	 identity	 that	might	have	developed	 into	a	 fully	 formed	
sense	of	national	identity	in	different	historical	circumstances	(Wyn	Jones	and	
Scully,	2009:	4).	
As	 mentioned	 previously,	 the	 term	 ‘nation’	 is	 rarely	 used	 in	 the	 German	 context,	 its	
connotations	being	almost	entirely	negative.	In	Bavaria,	the	term	Heimat	is	instead	used	to	
denote	a	similar	concept.	However,	according	to	one	author,	“whether	one	chooses	to	term	
Bavaria	Nation	or	Heimat,	the	underlying	ideology	follows	nationalist	principles”	(Sutherland,	
2001:	26).		The	extent	of	CSU	dominance	in	Bavaria	means	that	they	inevitably	shape,	and	
even	 “determine”	 constitutional	 debates,	 compelling	 other	 parties	 to	 respond	 (Hepburn,	
2007:	142);	political	parties	are	key	actors	in	the	establishment	of	national	identities,	and	the	
CSU	 has	 proved	 particularly	 effective	 in	 this	 regard	 (Hepburn,	 2008a:	 186).	 According	 to	
Sutherland	(2001:	27-28):	
Not	only	does	 the	CSU	want	 to	come	across	as	 the	best	party	 to	 represent	
Bavarian	interests	in	Germany	and	Europe,	it	wants	to	style	itself	as	the	only	
true	Bavarian	party…it	has	 largely	succeeded	 in	creating	an	elision	between	
party	and	nation.	
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Part	 of	 the	 complexity	 to	 the	 Bavarian	 identity,	 as	mentioned	 above,	 relates	 to	 its	multi-
layered	 aspect,	 where	 affiliation	with	 the	 central	 state	 is	 seemingly	 undiminished	 by	 the	
strength	of	feeling	at	a	regional/Land	level.		There	exists	a	clear	hierarchy,	or	at	least	conscious	
differentiation	of	allegiances,	commonly	expressed	as:	‘Bavaria	is	our	Heimat,	Germany	is	our	
Vaterland	and	Europe	is	our	future’	(Sutherland,	2001:	22).	The	related	policy	of	the	CSU	is	
similarly	complex,	being	at	once	highly	supportive	of	federalism	and	steadfast	that	Bavaria	
requires	maximum	autonomy	within	this	structure,	leading	to	differing	interpretations	of	the	
party’s	 stance:	 as	 both	 nationalist	 and	 federalist	 (Hepburn,	 2007:	 109).	 According	 to	 the	
former;	“only	the	substitution	of	the	term	Heimat	for	Nation	distinguishes	the	strategy	of	the	
CSU	from	archetypal	nation-building”	(Sutherland,	2001:	30)	.	However,	and	informed	by	the	
other	 side	 of	 this	 peculiar	 Bavarian	 coin,	 the	 party’s	 support	 for	 federalism,	 and	 the	
contentedly	co-existing	identities	corresponding	to	the	Bavarian,	German	and	EU	levels	do	
distinguish	the	nature	of	this	nation-building	project	from	those	seen	in	both	Scotland	and	
Wales.		
	
Both	Wales	 and	 Scotland	 exhibit	 a	 much	more	 convincing	 ‘national’	 attachment	 to	 their	
respective	regions.	The	CANS	study	referenced	above	demonstrated	that	both	cases	have	a	
degree	of	attachment	to	the	region	that	is	“genuinely	striking,	standing	out	from	the	rest	both	
in	 terms	of	 the	strength	of	 feeling	 for	 the	people	of	 the	respective	regions,	as	well	as	 the	
weakness	of	such	sentiments	at	the	level	of	the	state”	(Wyn	Jones	and	Scully,	2009:	5).		In	
addition,	and	to	a	far	greater	extent	than	any	of	the	other	regions	surveyed,	both	Scotland	
and	Wales	preferred	the	term	‘nation’	to	describe	themselves	(as	opposed	to	region)	standing	
at	83%	and	70%	respectively	(ibid:	8).	The	nation	building	projects	of	both	Scotland	and	Wales	
are	 similarly	 well	 established,	 though	 with	 different	 accents.	 Indeed,	 the	 UK	 stands	 out	
internationally	 for	 the	 “extent	 to	which	 it	 has	 given	 recognition	 both	 to	 the	 plurinational	
character	of	the	state	and	the	right	of	nations	within	it	to	self-determination”	(McEwan,	2017:	
70-71).		Both	Scotland	and	Wales	have	made	use	of	the	opportunity	structures	provided	by	
asymmetric	devolution	in	1999,	which	created	a	Scottish	Parliament	and	a	National	Assembly	
for	Wales	–	the	latter	of	which	has	been	subject	to	several	constitutional	revisions	(Wyn	Jones	
and	Scully,	2012).	Since	the	2011	elections	to	the	Scottish	Parliament,	an	SNP	government	
has	 been	 pursuing	 an	 explicit	 independence	 agenda,	 with	 an	 (ultimately	 unsuccessful)	
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referendum	taking	place	in	2014,	and	a	stated	intention	to	return	to	the	question	once	the	
UK	has	exited	 the	EU.	The	current	Welsh	Labour	government,	meanwhile,	has	been	more	
concerned	with	‘building	the	nation’	domestically,	and	‘speaking’	it	more	forcefully	within	the	
UK,	arguably	with	an	aim	to	redress	some	of	the	asymmetries	of	UK-wide	devolution;	with	
some	success,	in	the	context	of	the	two	new	Government	of	Wales	Acts	that	have	been	added	
to	the	UK	Statute	books	since	this	research	began.		
	
This	selection	of	cases,	as	well	as	providing	the	aforementioned	‘sliding	scale’	in	terms	of	the	
strength	of	sub-state	national	identity	and	autonomy,	and	the	contrasting	range	of	political	
contexts,	allows	for	further	interesting	contrasts.	The	first	of	these	regards	the	constitutional	
structures	of	Germany	and	the	UK,	potentially	allowing	for	the	paradiplomacy-related	effects	
of	a	static,	federal	system,	in	contrast	to	an	asymmetrical	system	of	devolution,	subject	to	
seemingly	constant	calls	for	revision	or	redress	from	both	Scotland	and	Wales,	to	come	to	
light.	This	relationship	will	be	explored	throughout	the	thesis,	but	there	does	appear	to	be	an	
indication	of	it	manifesting	in	perhaps	a	counter-intuitive	way;	in	particular	that	federalism	
may	 constrain	 a	 sub-state	 government	 more	 than	 devolution.	 	 Secondly,	 the	 disparate	
economic	resources	of	the	three	sub-state	governments	under	consideration,	with	Bavaria’s	
position	as	one	of	 the	wealthiest	 regions	globally	and	 indeed	relative	 to	 its	 state,	and	the	
success	 of	 its	 specific	 approach	 to	 economic	 development,	 presented	 by	 the	 CSU	 as	 ‘the	
Bavarian	way’	 (Hepburn,	2008a:	189)	providing	a	particularly	 interesting	 case,	 should	also	
help	to	illuminate	the	full	range	of	motivations	behind	paradiplomatic	action.	Within	the	UK,	
a	further	economic	contrast	can	be	found	in	terms	of	the	relative	positions	of	Scotland	-	one	
of	the	state’s	wealthiest	regions	-	and	Wales,	one	of	its	poorest.		
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Chapter	Three:	Skirting	Officialdom	
	
Introduction	
Where	do	the	 international	activities	of	sub-state	governments	 ‘fit’	 in	the	global	 legal	and	
diplomatic	order?	Though	typically	loosely	institutionalised	and	frequently	non-statutory,	the	
paradiplomatic	practices	of	Wales,	Scotland	and	Bavaria	do	all	have	some	sort	of	formal	basis,	
varied	 though	 they	 may	 be.	 One	 perspective	 with	 which	 to	 compare	 and	 assess	 these	
foundational	elements	of	their	paradiplomacies	is	 in	relation	to	The	Vienna	Convention	on	
International	 Relations,	 a	 central	 document	 in	 international	 law	 which	 demarcates	 who	
‘counts’	as	an	official	diplomat	and	the	ways	in	which	diplomacy	between	sovereign	states	
must	be	carried	out.	It	represents	a	‘high-water	mark’	in	diplomatic	practice.	50	years	on	from	
its	 incarnation,	 questions	 have	 been	 raised	 about	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	 treaty	 reflects	
current	diplomay	(Behrens,	2017).	Reciprocally,	the	paradiplomacy	of	sub-state	governments	
offers	 a	unique	vantage	point	 from	which	 to	address	 such	questions.	How	 this	diplomacy	
manifests,	how	it	differs	from	sovereign-states,	and	the	interaction	between	diplomats	and	
paradiplomats	may	yet	tell	us	something	about	the	status	and	relevance	of	the	VCDR	as	it	
enters	its	6th	decade.		Can	sub-state	diplomats	carry	out	a	similar	range	of	activities	to	their	
state-level	contemporaries?	Does	being	part	of	an	official,	diplomatically	accredited	mission	
alter	the	substance	of	sub-state	‘diplomacy’?	In	what	sense	is	paradiplomacy	supplementary	
to,	or	in	competition	with,	state	diplomacy?	These	are	all	questions	addressed	in	this	chapter,	
where	the	international	representations	and	diplomatic	personalities	of	Scotland,	Wales	and	
Bavaria	 are	 considered.	 As	 such,	 the	 chapter	 both	 utilises	 the	 ‘gold	 standard’	 of	 official	
diplomacy	 to	chart	 the	 relative	positions	of	our	 three	 sub-state	governments,	and	 further	
draws	upon	these	paradiplomatic	activities	to	reflect	on	the	current	status	and	‘fitness	for	
purpose’	of	the	Treaty	itself.			
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When	 trying	 to	 place	 paradiplomatic	 activities	 in	 the	 context	 of	 other	 pressures	 on	 the	
traditional	 diplomatic	 landscape,	 as	 described	 and	 accounted	 for	 by	 the	 VCDR,	 the	most	
obvious	match	 for	 its	distinct	 challenges	are	 those	also	posed	by	 the	 increasingly	assured	
diplomatic	identity	of	the	European	Union.	Much	of	what	Wouters	and	Duquet,	in	their	2012	
article	on	the	EU	and	international	diplomatic	law,	point	to	in	terms	of	the	quasi,	state-like	
but	 non-state	 features	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 an	 international	 actor	 could	 also	 apply	 to	 sub-state	
authorities	(Wouters	and	Duquet,	2012).	Both	the	EU	and	various	sub-state	authorities	try	
and	influence	foreign	governments	(at	local	and	national	levels),	have	formal	arrangements	
with	 such	 foreign	 governments	 (and	 occasionally	 with	 international	 organisations),	 and	
maintain	a	network	of	overseas	representations	that	often	have	a	similar	functional	remit	as	
traditional	 nation-state	 Embassies	 (Wouters	 and	 Duquet,	 2012).	 However,	 the	 two	 cases	
diverge	most	substantially	 in	two	key	areas.	Firstly,	some	sub-state	governments	-	notably	
Wales	and	Scotland	as	devolved	regions	of	the	UK	-	are	able	to	formally	‘opt-in’	to	the	VCDR	
through	operating	out	of	 the	official	diplomatic	missions	of	 their	 ‘host’	 state.	This	unique,	
chameleon-like	ability	to	choose	the	status	and	character	of	 its	diplomatic	representations	
makes	the	international	activities	of	these	sub-state	governments	a	potentially	illuminating	
case	study	in	international	law,	and	in	particular	the	ways	in	which	the	VCDR	relates	to	non-
state	diplomacy.	Secondly,	for	other	sub-state	governments	that	do	not	have	the	ability	to	
‘opt-in’	 to	 the	VCDR,	 such	 as	Bavaria,	 the	 absence	of	 any	 formalised	diplomatic	 presence	
means	that	they	must	‘skirt	officialdom’.	The	status	of	their	paradiplomatic	activities	-	or	their	
diplomacy	-	is	ambiguous,	and	thus	its	interactions	with	subjects	of	the	VCDR,	and	indeed	the	
ways	 in	which	 their	own	and	other	 governments	 attempt	 to	 characterise	 their	diplomatic	
relations,	sheds	further	light	on	the	significance	of	a	rarefied	form	of	state-state	diplomacy	
that	the	VCDR	embodies.	
	
Paradiplomacy	and	Diplomatic	Law	
	
For	those	studying	paradiplomatic	practices,	there	is	a	central	paradox:	how	do	we	reconcile	
the	 international	 presence	 of	 sub-state	 governments	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 are	 not	
recognised	as	possessing	any	degree	of	sovereignty.	As	non-sovereigns,	paradiplomats	have	
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no	independent	standing	under	the	treaty,	yet	-	undoubtedly	-	their	diplomacy	often	looks	
and	 sounds	 very	 similar	 to	 that	 carried	out	by	 states.	 Sub-state	 identity	 is	 an	 increasingly	
salient	one	and	sub-state	governments,	as	diplomatic	agents,	possess	both	representational	
qualities	 and	 official	 resources	 -	 highly	 prized	 diplomatic	 commodities.	 Therefore	 the	
diplomacy	 that	 they	 undertake	 stands	 apart	 from	 that	 of	 other	 non-state	 actors;	 NGOs,	
Diasporas,	multi-national	companies,	precisely	because	of	 its	similarity	to	state	diplomacy.	
Their	relationship	to	the	central	treaty	in	diplomatic	law	is	thus	both	complex	and	potentially	
illuminating.		
	
Sub-state	governments	represent	an	important	example	of	the	ability	that	new	actors	have	
to	enter	into	international	politics	and	become	diplomats.	In	this	case,	a	key	feature	of	the	
new	diplomacy	in	question	is	its	hybrid	status,	possessing	governmental	qualities	yet	without	
an	overarching	responsibility	for	foreign	affairs	(Hocking,	1997).	Away	from	the	institutional	
checks	and	balances	that	come	with	such	a	responsibility,	along	with	public	attentions	and	
expectations,	sub-state	governments	 face	a	 less	rigid	operational	context	 than	their	state-
level	contemporaries.	How	this	impacts	on	the	composition,	and	quality,	of	their	diplomatic	
endeavours	is	a	wider	question	that	will	be	addressed	both	in	this	and	subsequent	chapters.	
In	respect	to	the	VCDR,	the	most	pertinent	question	would	seem	to	be	whether	the	legal	and	
political	differences	that	the	treaty	identifies	between	sub-	and	state-level	diplomacy	actually	
result	in	a	meaningful	divergence	in	their	diplomatic	practices.		
	
The	UK’s	devolved	regions	and	the	VCDR		
	
In	this	section	we	will	be	considering	the	UK’s	constitutional	provisions	in	relation	to	sub-state	
diplomacy,	 and	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 Welsh	 and	 Scottish	 devolved	 governments	 in	 an	
international	sphere.	There	are	many	other	states	-	unitary	and	federal	 -	that	permit	their	
sub-state	 territories	 to	 carry	out	paradiplomatic	 activities,	 to	 various	 extents.	 The	Belgian	
regions	have	the	largest	degree	of	international	autonomy;	representatives	of	Flanders	and	
Wallonia	 have	 Belgian	 diplomatic	 status	 and	 are	 permitted	 to	 sign	 official	 international	
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treaties,	in-fact	they	are	often	solely	responsible	for	doing	so.	Other	regions,	meanwhile,	do	
not	always	benefit	from	diplomatic	status	for	their	officials.	Catalonia,	for	example	has	tried	
and	failed	to	secure	 it	 (Keating,	2010b).	Some	 large	European	regions,	on	the	other	hand,	
maintain	a	significant	amount	of	domestic	autonomy	but	are	generally	content	with	state-
level	diplomatic	representation.	Bavaria,	as	will	be	discussed	in	a	subsequent	section	of	this	
chapter,	has	multiple	overseas	trade	and	investment	offices	reflective	of	its	size	and	GDP,	yet	
only	 two	Government	 representations	besides	 its	Brussels	office	 -	 	Quebec	and	 the	Czech	
Republic,	both	of	which	build	on	historical	ties.6		
	
The	UK’s	arrangements	are	relatively	permissive,	falling	roughly	at	a	mid-point	in	terms	of	the	
international	 activities	 that	 sub-state	 governments	 are	 able	 to	 engage	 in.	 International	
relations	(including	relations	with	the	European	Union)	remain	firmly	the	responsibility	of	the	
UK	Government	and	Parliament.	There	is,	however,	a	clear	recognition	in	the	Memorandum	
of	Understanding	between	the	UK	and	its	devolved	regions	of	such	devolved	regions’	interest	
in	international	affairs	‘where	they	touch	on	devolved	responsibility’	(UK	Goverment,	2010:	
B4).		Specific	concordats,	supplementary	to	the	MOU,	set	out	in	greater	detail	arrangements	
for	 international	and	European	affairs	 in	 the	context	of	devolution.	Three	passages	are	of	
particular	relevance	to	the	devolved	regions’	diplomatic	status,	and	are	worth	citing	in	detail.	
	
As	 regards	 representation	 in	 the	European	Union,	 the	concordat	sets	out	an	arrangement	
whereby	devolved	regions	can	maintain	direct	representation	so	long	as	it	forms	part	of	the	
wider	UK	representation	in	Brussels.	The	passage	below	is	subject	to	the	preceding	paragraph	
B4.26	stating	that	“the	status	and	functions	of	the	UK	Permanent	Representation	in	Brussels	
as	the	institution	representing	the	United	Kingdom	within	the	European	Union	will	continue	
unchanged”:	
	
B4.27	The	devolved	administrations	are	able	 to	 take	part	 in	 the	 less	 formal	
discussions	with	the	institutions	of	the	EU	and	interests	within	other	Member	
states.	 Subject	 to	paragraph	B4.26	above,	 the	devolved	administrations	are	
able,	 and	 have	 chosen	 to	 establish	 an	 office	 in	 Brussels,	 to	 assist	 direct	
relationships,	 including	 with	 other	 regional	 governments	 and	 with	 the	
																																																						
6	Interview	data,	senior	official	of	the	Bavarian	State	Government	2013	
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institutions	of	the	European	Union,	so	far	as	this	serves	the	exercise	of	their	
powers	and	the	performance	of	their	functions	as	laid	down	in	the	devolution	
legislation	 and	 so	 far	 as	 it	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 UK	
Government	for	relations	with	the	EU.	The	Devolved	Administration	EU	offices	
(DA	EUOs)	are	part	of	UKRep	organisational	structure	and	their	UK-based	staff	
are	permanent	UK	civil	servants	 issued	with	British	diplomatic	passports.	As	
part	 of	 the	 diplomatic	 representation	 of	 the	 UK	 they	 are	 subject	 to	 the	
authority	of	 the	Permanent	Representative	 in	 respect	of	 the	usual	 issues	of	
personal	conduct.	On	this	basis,	the	devolved	administrations’	EU	offices,	have	
diplomatic	status,	and	are	notified	to	the	Belgian	authorities	by	the	Permanent	
Representation	accordingly.	Both	UKRep	and	the	DA	EU	offices	will	develop	
working	procedures	which	reflect	the	need	to	balance	the	interests	of	all	parts	
of	the	UK	(UK	Goverment,	2010).	
	
According	 to	 these	arrangements	 the	status	of	 the	devolved	administrations	 in	Brussels	 is	
reasonably	 clear:	 they	 have	 diplomatic	 status	 because	 they	 form	 part	 of	 an	 official	 UK	
representation.	Under	the	VCDR	they	are	diplomatic	agents	of	a	sovereign	state	-	the	UK.	So	
far,	so	straightforward.	The	key	institutions	of	the	European	Union	are	restricted	to	Member	
States,	naturally	limiting	the	role	of	sub-state	governments	and	creating	a	fairly	‘neat’	division	
between	official	and	unofficial	practices	in	Brussels.		When	we	turn	to	the	international	role	
sub-state	governments	can	play	in	a	global	setting,	the	picture	becomes	more	complex.	Under	
the	heading	‘Representation	Overseas’	in	the	concordat	on	International	Relations,	Common	
Annex	(D4),	we	find	the	following	passage:	
D4.15	The	devolved	administrations	may	establish	offices	overseas	within	the	
framework	 of	 their	 responsibility	 for	 devolved	 matters	 (including	 for	 the	
provision	 of	 information	 on	 devolved	 matters	 to	 the	 public,	 regional	
governments	 and	 institutions,	 and	 promotion	 of	 trade	 and	 inward	
investment).	They	will	do	so	in	consultation	with	the	FCO.	Where	appropriate,	
such	representation	might	form	part	of	a	UK	Diplomatic	or	Consular	Mission.	
The	representatives	of	 the	devolved	administration	could	 then	make	use	of	
the	diplomatic	bag,	the	FCO	telegram	and	other	communications	systems,	and	
be	 accorded	 diplomatic	 status	 in	 accordance	 with	 local	 customs	 and	
operational	 requirements.	 The	 FCO	 will	 recover	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 services	
provided	in	 line	with	 its	practice	for	charging	UK	Government	Departments.	
UK	Embassies,	High	Commissions	and	other	Missions	overseas	will	continue	to	
serve	the	interests	of	the	UK	as	a	whole	and	to	co-ordinate	all	official	activity	
(UK	Goverment,	2010).	
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Here,	we	see	that	sub-state	governments	are	presented	with	a	clear	choice	in	their	overseas	
representation:	be	part	of	 an	official	UK	mission	and	 receive	 the	 resources	 and	privileges	
associated,	 or	 ‘go	 it	 alone’.	 The	 choice	 is	 also	 therefore	whether	 to	 ‘opt	 in’	 to	 the	 VCDR	
through	 operating	 as	 a	 subsidiary	 of	 the	 UK	 Diplomatic	 or	 Consular	 mission,	 or	 operate	
outside	it	as	representatives	without	diplomatic	status.	The	passage	further	makes	reference	
to	a	distinction	between	official	and	unofficial	activities,	something	that	will	be	explored	in	
further	 detail	 as	 part	 of	 this	 chapter.	 Lastly,	 the	 following	 paragraph	 on	 diplomatic	 and	
consular	relations	makes	clear	the	UK’s	retention	of	overall	authority	and	responsibility	under	
the	VCDR:	
D4.23	The	FCO	will	 continue	 to	be	 responsible	 for	policy	on	diplomatic	and	
consular	 relations	 with	 other	 countries	 and	 on	 all	 matters	 concerning	
international	organisations	represented	in	the	UK.	The	FCO	will	continue	to	be	
the	channels	for	all	official	communications	on	matters	relating	to	Foreign	and	
Commonwealth	consulates	and	international	organisations	and	their	staff	 in	
Northern	 Ireland,	 Scotland	 and	 Wales.	 The	 FCO	 will	 inform	 the	 devolved	
administrations	 of	 all	 career	 consular	 appointments	 in	 Northern	 Ireland,	
Scotland	and	Wales.	The	FCO	will	consult	the	devolved	administrations	about	
the	 establishment	 of	 new	 consular	 offices,	 new	 honorary	 consular	
appointments,	and	other	new	offices	where	personnel	will	have	privileges	and	
immunities	(e.g.	certain	cultural	centres	and	trade	offices)	in	Northern	Ireland,	
Scotland	and	Wales.	The	devolved	administrations	will	immediately	pass	on	to	
the	 FCO	 any	 representations	 made	 by	 diplomatic/consular	 missions	 and	
international	organisations.	The	devolved	administrations	will	also	promptly	
notify	the	FCO	of	any	alleged	breaches	within	their	devolved	competence.	The	
FCO	will	 then	take	the	appropriate	action	under	the	Vienna	Conventions	on	
Diplomatic	and	Consular	Relations	or	any	applicable	Consular	Convention	or	
Headquarters	Agreement	(UK	Goverment,	2010).	
On	the	basis	of	these	three	extracts,	and	taking	the	documents	in	their	entirety,	we	can	make	
a	series	of	suppositions	as	to	the	diplomatic	status	of	the	UK’s	devolved	governments.	The	
first	of	these	is	that	they	can,	indeed,	be	represented	internationally	by	their	own	diplomatic	
agents.	The	limits	to	this	representation	are	that,	in	order	to	conduct	‘official’	diplomacy,	sub-
state	diplomats	must	‘opt-in’	to	the	VCDR	and	operate	out	of	the	UK’s	overseas	Embassies	
and	 Consulates,	 being	 under	 their	 auspices	 and	 ultimately	 accountable	 to	 the	 FCO.	 The	
second,	however,	is	that	representatives	of	Wales,	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland	do	not	have	
to	operate	out	of	such	UK-wide	missions.	Instead,	they	can	-	in	‘consultation’	with	the	UKFCO	
-	establish	independent	offices	overseas,	but	such	offices	do	not	benefit	from	the	status	of	an	
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official	 diplomatic	mission.	 The	 outstanding	 question	 is	 therefore,	with	 official	 diplomatic	
status	within	the	grasps	of	the	UK’s	sub-state	governments	why	would	they	choose	to	operate	
without	it?	What	is	the	value	of	the	diplomatic	commodities	listed	in	the	second	extract	above	
-	the	diplomatic	bag	and	official	communications	systems	-	for	Wales,	Scotland	and	indeed	
Northern	 Ireland?	 What	 types	 of	 unofficial	 diplomacy	 can	 they	 conduct	 outside	 of	 this	
system?	
	
Wales’	Overseas	Offices	
A	consequence	of	devolution	in	1999	was	the	new	ability	for	Wales	to	“autonomously	engage	
with	the	world	outside”.	This,	according	to	the	same	senior	Welsh	Government	advisor,	stood	
in	 contradistinction	 to	 the	 international	 strands	 of	 the	 previous	Wales	 Office’s	 activities,	
where	engagement	was	“very	much	as	a	sub-set	of	the	UK”.	Such	an	autonomous	platform	
has	resulted	in	two	streams	of	external	engagement,	one	driven	by	trade	and	investment	and	
one	driven	by	policy	-	“the	ability	to	influence	policy	or	to	take	part	in	policy	formation”.7	It	is	
within	 this	 context	 that	 the	 status	 and	 activities	 of	 Wales’	 overseas	 offices	 must	 be	
considered.	
	
The	 Welsh	 Government	 has	 an	 overseas	 network	 consisting	 of	 14	 offices	 (including	 its	
representation	in	Brussels)	and	around	32	staff,	alongside	20-25	officials	working	on	external	
relations	and	related	 issues	within	the	Welsh	Government’s	Offices	at	home	 in	Wales.89	A	
separate,	relatively	new,	office	in	London	has	been	established	to	promote	Wales	to	overseas	
investors	and	visiting	VIPs.	There	is	also	a	separate	team	of	three	staff	based	in	Cardiff	looking	
after	the	Wales	for	Africa	programme	and	leading	on	fair	trade	issues.	Within	Wales	itself	the	
First	Minister	 takes	 responsibility	 for	 international	 issues	 -	 he	 is	 officially	 the	Minister	 for	
Europe,	 Wales	 for	 Africa	 and	 International	 and	 External	 Relations.	 Other	 departments	 -	
																																																						
7	Interview	data,	senior	Welsh	Government	advisor	2013	
8	Wales’	overseas	representation	was	once	much	more	extensive	-	with	representations	in	
Australia	and	many	European	countries,	but	-	like	many	other	sub-state	governments	-	was	
scaled	back	rather	drastically	in	what	was	widely	reported	to	be	a	cost-cutting	exercise	
9	These	figures	are	accurate	for	2016,	as	are	the	equivalents	for	Scotland	and	Bavaria	
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economy,	 science	 and	 transport,	 education	 and	 culture	 -	 also	 have	 a	 role	 in	 specific	
international	policy	areas.	Wales	is	also	a	member	of	several	multilateral	fora	-	the	network	
of	regional	governments	for	sustainable	development	(nrg4SD),	the	conference	of	European	
regions	with	 legislative	power	 (REGLEG),	 the	conference	of	peripheral	maritime	regions	of	
Europe	(CPMR).		
	
Reflected	in	these	examples,	the	European	policy	context	is	really	where	Wales’	international	
activities	are	most	closely	focussed.	Partly,	this	is	because	of	the	institutional	access	points	
provided	to	regions	within	European	structures	and	policy	making	processes,	partly	it	is	due	
to	 the	direct	 impact	of	 European	policy	on	Wales	 itself.	 Indeed,	 a	 key	Welsh	government	
advisor	made	clear	that	outside	of	this	European	context,	the	ability	of	sub-state	governments	
to	 contribute	 is	 greatly	 weakened;	 “different	 parts	 of	 the	 world	 have	 different	 resource	
positions,	 they	 have	 different	 political	 traditions…and	 it	 becomes	 correspondingly	 more	
difficult	to	operate	at	a	global	level	at	the	sub-state	level,	and	much	less	meaningful	I	think”.10		
	
The	 Welsh	 Government	 published	 their	 first	 written	 international	 strategy	 in	 July	 2015,	
detailing	a	number	of	objectives:	strengthening	the	Welsh	economy,	enhancing	the	profile	
and	 reputation	 of	Wales,	 developing	 effective	 bilateral	 and	multilateral	 relationships;	 co-
operating	in	the	sharing	of	 information	and	best	practice;	 increasing	Wales’	 influence	with	
‘appropriate’	 multilateral	 and	 international	 organisations	 and	 contributing	 to	 sustainable	
development	 and	 ‘responsible	 global	 citizenship’.	 The	 strategy	 stresses	 the	 “ultra-
competitive”	global	environment	facing	Wales,	and	the	need	to	seek	out	opportunities	in	key	
locations,	nurturing	links	and	relationships	built	over	time	(Welsh	Government,	2015d).	
	
At	a	country-level,	Wales	has	representation	in	Belgium,	China,	the	UAE,	India,	Ireland,	Japan	
and	the	USA.	These	overseas	offices	work	closely	with	Welsh	Government	Ministers,	who,	
according	 to	 the	 international	 strategy	 “have	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 supporting	 business	 and	
diplomatic	relationships	at	the	highest	levels”	(Welsh	Government,	2015d).	But	what	type	of		
‘diplomacy’	do	the	Ministers	and	overseas	offices	carry	out?	Of	Wales’	14	international	offices	
																																																						
10	Interview	data,	senior	Welsh	Government	advisor	2013	
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outside	of	the	UK,	all	three	Chinese	offices	alongside	representations	in	Mumbai	and	Japan	
are	housed	outside	of	British	Embassies	or	Consulates.	In	Shanghai,	the	Welsh	Government	
representative	has	recently	relocated	to	‘British	house’,	which	-	while	outside	the	Consulate	
-	 houses	 the	 British	 Council	 and	 the	 China	 Britain	 Business	 Council.	 In	 Dubai,	 Bangalore,	
Ireland,	in	all	five	USA	offices	and	in	Brussels,	Welsh	Government	representations	form	part	
of	 British	 Embassies,	 British	 Consulates,	 British	 High	 Commissions	 or,	 in	 Brussels,	 UKREP.	
Numerically,	 this	 means	 that	 5	 out	 of	 14	 offices	 operate	 outside	 of	 the	 VCDR,	 its	
representations	are	part	of	an	‘unofficial’	pool	of	diplomacy	that	takes	largely	on	a	region-
region	 basis.	 As	 such	 there	 seem	 to	 be	 some	 identifiable	 benefits	 to	 such	 independent	
representation	 that	 make	 forgoing	 co-location	 with	 the	 UKFCO	 -	 and	 the	 associated	
diplomatic	resources	-	worthwhile.	The	implications	of	this	will	be	considered	in	greater	detail	
in	a	subsequent	section	of	the	chapter.	
	
Within	 Wales	 itself,	 the	 international	 affairs	 department	 carries	 out	 functions	 that	 may	
appear	similar	to	the	UKFCO;	“we	advise	on	diplomatic	issues,	protocol”	as	well	as	working	to	
raise	the	profile	of	Wales	internationally.	While	there	was	some	suggestion	that	colleagues	in	
Whitehall	 would	 take	 umbrage	 at	 the	 suggestion	 that	 Wales	 has	 its	 own	 foreign	 office,	
functionally	 the	 department	 represents	 its	 “nearest	 equivalent”.	 Nonetheless,	 the	Welsh	
Government	staff	working	both	 in	and	out	of	Wales	aren’t	usually	 identified	as	diplomats,	
despite	their	day-to-day	work	being	“the	diplomatic	side”	of	external	relations.11	The	current	
First	Minister	Carwyn	Jones	instigated	a	reorganisation	shortly	after	he	took	office	in	2011	
and	brought	these	overseas	offices	under	his	portfolio,	and	therefore	operationally	under	the	
remit	of	the	International	Relations	department.	Arguably,	this	move	represents	a	broader	
shift	towards	viewing	overseas	representation	as	part	of	a	more	cohesive	international	-	or	
diplomatic	-	strategy.		
	
Despite	 Wales	 having	 its	 own	 international	 offices	 -	 both	 co-located	 with	 the	 FCO	 and	
independent	of	it	-	it	is	also	clear	that	such	representation	is	expected	to	form	a	supplement	
																																																						
11	Interview	data,	senior	Welsh	Government	official	2013	
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to	the	activities	of	the	UKFO	and	other	UK-wide	bodies,	who	have	a	remit	to	promote	the	
interests	of	all	the	UK’s	constituent	parts.	According	to	Wales’	international	strategy:	
We	 maintain	 our	 own	 network	 of	 offices	 abroad	 where	 we	 have	 strong	
interests	 to	 represent	 but	 these	 are	 a	 supplement,	 not	 a	 replacement,	 for	
wider	 UK	 representation.	 We	 cannot	 replace	 the	 reach	 and	 depth	 of	 UK	
representation	abroad,	nor	do	we	aim	to	do	so.	We	work	with	UK	bodies	to	
ensure	that	interests	are	reflected	and	we	draw	on	UK	resources	to	assist	in	
the	direct	promotion	of	Welsh	priorities	(Welsh	Government,	2015d)	
	
Even	where	such	strong	interests	call	for	a	direct	representation	from	Wales,	co-location	as	
part	of	a	wider	UK	representation	clearly	has	 its	advantages.	 It	appears	that	these	may,	 in	
part,	depend	upon	the	attitudes	and	legal	requirements	in	the	receiving	state.	For	example,	
the	Welsh	Government’s	representative	in	the	UAE	is	part	of	the	UK	British	Embassy	because	
of	 the	 specific	 international	 context	 there;	a	diplomatic	passport	 is	 “necessary	 to	 live	and	
work	there”.	Likewise,	in	the	EU,	Wales	has	diplomatic	members	of	staff	on	its	team,	as	the	
Welsh	Government	is	able	-	indeed	required	-	to	act	as	part	of	UKREP.	Working	relationships	
with	the	UKFCO	are	“generally	good”,	a	concordat	governs	the	relationship	and	the	Welsh	
Government	will	take	advice	if	“something	innovative	or	possibly	confrontational	comes	up.	
If	we’re	involved	in	a	particular	country	and	we’re	having	a	visit	for	example	then	we’ll	take	
expert	advice	on	the	UK	line”.12	‘Generally	good’	relations,	of	course,	implies	that	sometimes	
these	relations	are	not	so	good;	a	dynamic	that	is	explored	in	Chapters	4	and	5	of	this	thesis.	
	
The	rationale	for	what	the	Welsh	Government,	as	an	independent	entity,	can	and	cannot	do	
diplomatically	is	always	referred	back	to	devolved	competences.	If	Wales	is	responsible	for	a	
policy	area	domestically,	then	it	-	and	broadly	the	UK	Government	-	accepts	that	where	this	
area	has	an	international	dimension,	the	Welsh	Government	has	a	legitimate	interest	in	it.	
One	way	of	conceptualising	this	accepted	diplomatic	‘space’	is	to	consider	it	a	border	zone,	
with	“a	back	stop	and	a	 front	stop”.	The	backstop	 in	 this	case	would	be	 issues	where	 the	
Welsh	 Government	 knows	 that	 acting	 or	 intervening	 would	 be	 stepping	 clearly	 into	 the	
territory	of	the	UKFCO.	For	example,	the	Welsh	Government	as	been	lobbied	from	time	to	
																																																						
12	Interview	data,	Senior	Welsh	Government	Official	2013	
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time	on	highly	controversial	issues	-	Congolese	rights	under	the	Congo	DRC,	the	‘Armenian	
question’	(both	from	groups	wanting	the	Welsh	Government	to	recognise	a	genocide,	and	
indeed	from	the	Turkish	Ambassador	dissuading	the	government	from	entering	the	debate)	-	
and	 has	 had	 to	 defer	 in	 these	 instances	 to	 the	 competence	 of	 the	 UKFCO.	 There	 is	 the	
potential	for	Welsh	Ministers	to	pass	on	such	representations	informally	to	the	UKFCO,	but	
for	the	most	part	“there	is	a	backstop,	there	is	a	line	we	won’t	cross	in	terms	of	competence”:	
In	return	for	the	recognition	[from	the	UK	Government]	that	we	have	the	right	
to	act	 in	 relation	 to	 these	areas…	because	 they	 relate	 to	our	 competences,	
there	is	a	duty	on	us	not	to	act	on	areas	over	there	which	are	clearly	not…and	
where	we	would	risk,	albeit	at	the	margins,	sending	out	a	mixed	message…	a	
contrary	message	to	that	of	the	UK	state	as	a	whole.13	
With	 issues	such	as	 these,	where	 there	 is	a	clear	“UK	 line”,	on	human	rights	 for	example.	
According	to	a	different	interviewee:	
We’re	careful	not	to	trespass	outside	our	patch.	If	we	are	told	by	the	FCO	that	
a	certain	country	is	not	in	favour	or	is	non-grata	then	we	wouldn’t	arrange	a	
meeting	with	our	minister	and	a	representative	of	that	country.	We	are	part	of	
the	UK,	we	have	our	own	set	of	responsibilities,	it’s	not	in	our	interest	to	try	
and	develop	our	own	way	of	doing	things.14	
As	for	a	front	stop,	the	Welsh	Government	would	therefore	“only	interest	ourselves	in	the	
things	for	which	we	have	devolved	responsibility”.	Occasionally,	however,	maintaining	a	clear	
dividing	line	can	be	“a	little	bit	tricky”.	There	is	a	“fuzzy	area”	in	the	middle	of	such	a	border	
zone,	where	the	Welsh	Government	may	act	because	they	“think	it’s	the	right	thing	to	do”.	
The	 examples	 quoted	 here	 were	 REGLEG,	 which	 aroused	 some	 suspicions	 in	 the	 UK	
Government	 when	 Wales	 joined	 the	 organisation	 in	 2000,	 and	 activities	 around	 climate	
change.	15	
	
Nevertheless,	unlike	the	Scottish	Government,	whose	activities	we’ll	consider	in	the	following	
section,	the	Welsh	Government	has	prioritised	region-region	international	linkages,	which	are	
rarely	 subject	 to	 any	 significant	 controversy.	 In	 fact,	 a	 second	 senior	Welsh	 Government	
official	noted	that,	whereas	the	Scottish	Government	has	two	members	of	staff	at	 the	UK	
																																																						
13	Interview	data,	Senior	Welsh	Government	Advisor	2013	
14	Interview	data,	Senior	Welsh	Government	Official	2013	
15	Interview	data,	Senior	Welsh	Government	Advisor	2013	
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Embassy	in	Beijing,	the	Welsh	Government	“don’t	have	people	in	the	Embassy,	sitting	on	the	
side”.	Instead:	
We’re	 developing	 relationships	 at	 regional	 level	 -	 Beijing	 municipal	
government,	Chongquing	government,	Shanghai	government.	The	Scots	aren’t	
taking	that	same	approach.	So	they’re	sitting	inside	the	Embassy	and	I	think,	
though	 I’m	 not	 sure	 anyone	would	 admit	 it,	 that’s	 caused	 certain	 tensions	
because	the	Scots	want	to	deal	directly	with	the	Chinese	Government.16	
	
Dealing	 with	 foreign	 regional	 governments	 doesn’t	 necessarily	 mean,	 however,	 that	 the	
‘diplomacy’	 is	 always	 informal,	 or	 simply	 ‘public	 diplomacy’.	 Though	 the	 UK’s	 sub-state	
governments	cannot	sign	international	treaties,	there	is	a	formal	element	to	much	of	their	
work.	 Bilaterally,	Memoranda	 of	 Understanding	were	 a	 frequently	 used	modus	 operandi,	
particularly	in	the	early	years	of	Wales’	paradiplomacy.	They	have	fallen	out	of	favour	recently	
-	“we	don’t	now	look	for	a	piece	of	paper	to	make	a	relationship	work”	-	though	they	are	still	
widely	 used	 in	 China,	where	 the	MoUs	 are	 taken	 as	 a	 gesture	 of	 good	will	 and	 a	way	 of	
“opening	 up	 the	 dialogue”.17	 Ministerial	 visits	 also	 form	 a	 key	 part	 of	Wales’	 diplomatic	
relationships.	Visits	from	the	First	Minister	in	particular	are	seen	as	hugely	important,	but	all	
ministerial	visits	are	viewed	as	a	way	to	“open	doors”,	particularly	in	countries	such	as	China	
where	Governmental	structures	are	so	significant.18	The	Welsh	First	Minister	is	a	cabinet-rank	
Minister	 in	 the	UK	Government,	and	 thus	 should	benefit	 from	the	same	FCO	support	and	
facilitation	as	other	UK	Government	Ministers.	Whether	this	always	bears	out	in	practice	is	
questionable,	problems	with	fast	track,	for	example,	have	been	cited	in	interview	data.	
	
Indeed,	the	Chinese	context	offers	a	particularly	interesting	case	study	in	the	decision-making	
process	around	‘opting	in’	to,	or	indeed	out	of,	the	VCDR.	The	Welsh	Government	has	pursued	
a	 close	 relationship	 with	 the	 Chinese	 region	 of	 Chongquing	 since	 2006,	 when	 the	 first	
Memorandum	of	Understanding	between	the	two	regions	was	signed.	In	September	of	that	
year,	a	Welsh	Affairs	Officer	was	assigned	to	the	British	Consulate	General	 in	Chongquing,	
tasked	with	taking	forward	the	Wales-Chongquing	relationship,	and	was	quickly	followed	by	
																																																						
16	Interview	data,	Senior	Welsh	Government	Official	2013	
17	Interview	data,	Senior	Welsh	Government	Official	2013	
18	Interview	data,	Senior	Welsh	Government	Official	2013	
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a	 second	 post	 a	 year	 later.	 However,	 in	 January	 2011	 the	Welsh	 Government	 opened	 a	
separate	office	in	Chongquing,	and	the	two	posts	were	relocated	there.		The	office	is	located	
near	to	both	the	British	Consulate	General	and	the	British	Council,	but	is	not	formally	part	of	
the	 Consulate.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Chongquing,	 both	 private	 interview	 data	 and	 published	
ministerial	reports	hint	at	the	advantages	perceived	by	the	Welsh	Government	in	distancing	
themselves	from	the	rest	of	the	UK.	According	to	a	written	statement	by	Huw	Lewis,	a	Welsh	
Government	Minister	who	visited	Chongquing	in	2013:	
Wales’	relationship	with	Chongquing…	has	been	thriving	since	the	signing	of	
the	first	MOU	in	2006.	The	relationship	is	the	most	extensive	and	most	active	
between	any	part	of	the	UK	and	China.	My	visit	to	China	was	an	eye-opening	
experience	in	a	number	of	ways.	I	have	been	hugely	impressed	by	the	way	our	
staff	on	the	ground	have	built	up	the	profile	and	reputation	of	Wales,	working	
through	the	Government	relationships	we	have	established.	It	is	testament	to	
the	strength	of	those	relationships	at	Government	level	that	Wales	has	largely	
been	able	 to	avoid	getting	caught	up	 in	 the	tensions	which	are	apparent	at	
national	UK	and	China	levels.19	
Operating	independently	at	a	region-region	level	means	that	without	having	the	burden,	the	
responsibility	 of	 all	 of	 foreign	 policy,	 there	 is	 an	 element	 of	 discretion,	 an	 element	 of	
maximising	 the	 relationships	 for	 specific	policy	goals.	Contrary	 to	what	one	might	expect,	
therefore,	it	appears	that	in	certain	circumstances,	not	being	part	of	an	official	Embassy	or	
Consulate	may	actually	be	beneficial	to	relationships	‘on	the	ground’,	particularly	in	countries	
such	 as	 China	 where	 controversial	 foreign	 policy	 issues	 abound.	 Where	 the	 decision	 on	
whether	or	not	to	co-locate	may	be	made	on	the	basis	of	practicalities,	in	some	cases	this	has	
other	consequences:	helpfully	extricating	the	activities	of	a	sub-state	government	from	their	
state-contemporaries.	This	said,	however,	there	are	also	security	issues	which	may	make	co-
location	impractical,	and	these	are	apparent	also	in	the	Chinese	context.20		
	
Alternately,	 explanations	 for	 co-location	 with	 British	 Consulates	 may	 also	 confound	
expectations.	In	2002,	the	Welsh	Government	opened	its	‘flagship’	US	office	in	New	York’s	
Chrysler	 building.	 However,	 in	 the	 face	 of	mounting	 criticism	 over	 the	 operating	 costs	 of	
overseas	offices	in	general,	and	this	one	in	particular,	the	office	was	closed	down	in	2011	and	
																																																						
19	Welsh	Government	Minister	Huw	Lewis,	written	statement	14th	March	2013	
20	Private	correspondence,	Welsh	Government	official	July	2015	
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staff	moved	to	 the	UK	Consulate,	a	move	widely	 reported	to	be	 for	cost-saving	reasons.21	
There	is	certainly	a	link	between	paradiplomacy	and	the	economic	climate	-	one	borne	out	
clearly	in	Wales	following	the	financial	crisis	in	2008;	“the	sub-national	diplomacy	scene	is	low	
hanging	fruit	when	it	comes	to	re-ordering	priorities	in	a	time	of	monetary	austerity”.22	In	the	
face	of	examples	such	as	this,	the	decision	of	whether	or	not	to	utilise	the	diplomatic	status	
and	resources	of	the	UK	Government	through	overseas	co-location	appear	largely	pragmatic,	
possibly	related	more	to	the	cost	of	commercial	property	in	different	locations	than	to	the	
value	to	Wales’	diplomacy	of	operating	under	the	VCDR.	Indeed,	the	general	principle	guiding	
the	Welsh	Government’s	overseas	office	location	is	that,	where	“practical	and	economically	
viable”,	co-location	is	the	preferred	position.23		
	
Scotland’s	Overseas	Offices	
Making	 a	 comparison	 between	 the	 diplomatic	 strategies	 of	 Wales	 and	 Scotland	 is	 not	
straightforward.	 Firstly,	 the	 Scottish	 SNP	 Government	 has	 clear	 ambitions	 for	 Scottish	
independence,	 ambitions	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 global	 attention	 during	 2014’s	 referendum.	
Secondly,	 Scotland’s	 overseas	 representation	 is	 divided	 between	 the	 activities	 of	 Scottish	
Development	International	and	the	Scottish	Government,	unlike	in	Wales	where	the	Welsh	
Government	 itself	 is	 the	only	outward-facing	governmental	body.	SDI	has	29	offices	 in	19	
countries,	including	Scotland	itself,	while	the	Scottish	Government	has	only	4	international	
offices	in	Brussels,	Washington,	Toronto	and	Beijing.	Seven	of	SDI’s	international	offices	form	
part	of	official	British	representations.	Importantly,	all	four	of	the	Scottish	Government	offices	
also	form	part	of	official	UK	Embassies,	Consulates,	High	Commissions	or	UKREP.	Where	the	
status	 of	 the	 Scottish	Government’s	 overseas	 offices	 is	 perhaps	 simpler	 to	 assess	 than	 in	
Wales;	 they	 are	 all	 official	 diplomatic	 representations	 as	 they	 operate	 out	 of	 official	 UK	
missions,	 the	 status	 of	 Scottish	 Development	 International’s	 offices	 is	 less	 clear.	 The	
unambiguous	trade	and	investment	focus	would	seem	to	imply	that	these	offices	were	not	
																																																						
21	BBC	news	report	‘Wales	staff	to	leave	New	York	Chrysler	building’	23rd	December	2010	
22	Interview	data,	Senior	Welsh	Government	Advisor	2013	
23	Private	correspondence,	Welsh	Government	official	July	2015	
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diplomatic	entities,	yet	their	co-location	in	seven	instances	with	official	UK	missions	suggests	
otherwise.	 As	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Wales’	 overseas	 offices,	 it	 appears	 that	 housing	 Scottish	
representations	 within	 UK	missions	 is	 often	 a	 more	 pragmatic	 choice	 -	 both	 in	 terms	 of	
accessing	foreign	policy	makers	and	in	simple	economic	terms	-	than	‘going	it	alone’,	but	this	
is	a	choice	which	is	dependent	on	the	country	the	offices	are	located	within	and	the	attitudes	
of	this	receiving	government.		
	
However,	what	sets	the	two	devolved	regions’	diplomacy	apart	most	markedly	is	that	Scottish	
diplomacy	 is	 frequently	 directed	 at	 national	 governments,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 Welsh	
Government’s	 region-region	 partnership	 approach.	 This	 shift	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 the	
formation	 of	 an	 SNP	 government	 in	 2006,	 where	 they	 immediately	 began	 to	 “expand	
Scotland’s	 role	 internationally”	 (Fabiani,	 2014:	 32).	 This	 took	 the	 form	 both	 of	 new	
geographical	 and	 thematic	 foci	 (towards	 Asia	 and	 an	 expansion	 of	 the	 international	
development	fund),	and	in	terms	of	the	level	of	resources	directed	at	international	affairs:	
seeing	a	54%	real-terms	increase	between	the	budget	from	the	financial	year	2004-2005	to	
2009-2010	 (Fabiani,	 2014:	 36).	 	 According	 to	 former	 Scottish	 Government	 Minister	 for	
Europe,	 External	 Affairs,	 Culture	 and	 the	 Gaelic	 Language	 Linda	 Fabiani,	 “the	 principal	
difference	between	the	SNP	Government	and	its	predecessors	was	they	we	very	deliberately	
presented	Scotland	as	a	nation	in	its	own	right,	rejecting	the	notion	that	Scotland	is	simply	a	
region	of	the	United	Kingdom”	(Fabiani,	2014:	32).		Returning	to	the	Scottish	Government’s	
current	 focus	on	 relations	with	 states,	 a	good	example	 can	be	 found	 in	 the	 stated	aim	of	
Scotland’s	 North	 American	 offices	 is	 to	 establish	 “solid	 government	 to	 government	
relationships	at	Federal	and	state	level”.	This	has	been	achieved	through	frequent	meetings	
with	the	State	Department	and	establishing	links	with	White	House	staff	in	the	US,	while	in	
Canada	“with	the	assistance	of	the	High	Commission”	Scottish	representatives	have	met	with	
“key	federal	officials	from	a	number	of	ministries”.	Scottish	overseas	offices	also	support	links	
with	 both	 the	 Scottish	 Canadian	 Parliamentary	 Association	 in	 Ottawa	 and	 the	 Friends	 of	
Scotland	 Caucuses	 in	 the	 US	 Senate	 and	 House	 of	 Representatives.	 This	 overseas	
representation	 in	 North	 America	 is	 the	 “Scottish	 government’s	 diplomatic	mission	 to	 the	
region”:	
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As	 such	 it	 has	 a	 role	 to	 play	 within	 the	 wider	 diplomatic	 communities	 in	
Washington	DC	 and	 in	Ottawa.	 Over	 the	 past	 year,	 the	 SAO	 has	 sought	 to	
engage	 more	 pro-actively	 with	 diplomats	 from	 other	 nations	 to	 heighten	
awareness	 of	 its	 existence	 and	 to	 establish	 connections	 and	 network.	
Examples	include	meeting	with	a	number	of	individuals	from	EU	Member	State	
Embassies,	individuals	from	Central	and	South	American	Embassies,	engaging	
with	the	World	Bank,	the	Inter-American	Development	Bank,	think	tanks	and	
other	multi-national	organisations	(Scottish	Government,	2015b:	para	28).	
	
In	 China,	 the	 Scottish	 Government	 office	 in	 Beijing	 facilitates	 cooperation	 between	 the	
Scottish	Government	and	both	the	State	Council	in	China	and	the	Legislative	Council	in	HKSAR	
(Scottish	Government,	2015b:	para	20).24	Meanwhile,	Ministerial	visits	focus	on	national	level	
politicians,	apparent	in	both	Alex	Salmond’s	highly	publicised	visit	to	China	in	2010	and	Nicola	
Sturgeon’s	more	recent	trips	to	both	China	and	Washington	in	2015.	According	to	Professor	
Michael	 Keating,	 giving	 evidence	 to	 a	 Scottish	 Parliamentary	 enquiry	 in	 2010	 “nationalist	
Governments	want	to	sign	deals	with	states	because	that	enhances	their	status”.	Yet,	at	the	
same	 time	 “when	 it	 comes	 to	 practical	 functional	matters,	 all	 Governments	 of	 whatever	
complexion	are	looking	for	regional	level	interlocutors”	(Michael	Keating,	cited	in	a	report	of	
the	Scottish	Parliament,	2010:	1718).	Indeed,	it	is	not	the	case	that	the	Scottish	Government	
forgoes	regional	links	entirely	-	they	partner	with	‘priority	geographic	areas’	in	China	such	as	
Shanghai,	Tianjin	and	Province	of	Shandong	-	rather	that,	unlike	many	regional	governments	
operating	internationally,	they	also	aim	to	deal	directly	with	foreign	national	governments.		
	
This	 focus	 on	 nation-state	 interactions	 is	 significant	 when	 assessing	 the	 effects	 that	
paradiplomatic	 activity	 may	 have	 on	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 VCDR.	 Scottish	 Government	
diplomats	 are	 party	 to	 the	 convention	 as	 they	 operate	 exclusively	 out	 of	 official	 UK	
representations,	 most	 often	 dealing	 with	 official	 diplomatic	 representations	 of	 a	 foreign	
government.	The	type	of	diplomatic	activities	they	engage	in	therefore	mirror	state-practices	
very	closely,	yet	their	diplomatic	status	is	one	loaned	from	the	UK	Government.	There	is	an	
																																																						
24	Written	 submission	 from	 the	 Scottish	Government	 on	 the	work	 of	 its	 overseas	 offices,	
provided	to	the	Scottish	Parliament’s	European	and	External	Relations	committee	as	part	of	
their	Connecting	Scotland	Enquiry.	Meeting	26th	March	2015.	Paragraph	20	
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outstanding	question	lurking	here:	where	do	Scottish	diplomats	take	their	political	direction	
from,	London	or	Edinburgh?	
	
Taking	 the	 international	activities	of	 the	Scottish	Government	at	 face	value,	one	could	be	
forgiven	for	assuming	that	it	was	a	small	state,	rather	than	a	sub-state	authority.	However,	
the	vast	majority	of	Scotland’s	diplomatic	activities	take	place	with	the	facilitation	of	the	UK	
FCO:	ministerial	visits,	cultural	diplomacy	carried	out	through	events	and	activities	in	Brussels	
and	the	Scottish	government’s	other	overseas	offices,	the	overseas	offices	themselves	and	
engagement	with	 EU	 institutions.	 In	 a	 letter	 to	 the	 convenor	 of	 the	 Scottish	 Parliament’s	
European	and	External	Relations	Committee,	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Scotland	points	to	the	
fact	that,	of	the	50	international	visits	made	by	the	Scottish	Government	in	a	16	month	period,	
most	of	these	were	facilitated	by	the	UK	Government	(Secretary	of	State	for	Scotland,	2014).	
The	proportion	of	visits	that	the	FCO	is	required	to	facilitate	seems	to	depend	on	the	target	
country	 in	 question,	 their	 openness	 towards	 sub-state	 governments,	 and	 the	 level	 that	
Scottish	 Government	Ministers	 wish	 to	 access.	Meetings	 with	 private	 firms	 and	 business	
leaders	may	form	a	part	of	the	Scottish	Government’s	diplomatic	activities	that	they	are	able	
to	orchestrate	 independently,	but	access	 to	Ministers	 in	a	 foreign	national	Government	 is	
something	generally	mediated	by	UK	authorities.25		
	
When	sub-state	governments	operate	solely	at	a	region-region	level,	this	may	be	interpreted	
as	an	area	of	diplomatic	activity	subsidiary	to	that	taking	place	between	nation	states	and	
therefore	one	which	falls	outside	the	scope	of	the	treaty,	and	the	types	of	activity	which	it	
was	intended	to	regulate.	However,	when	one	sub-state	government	enters	into	diplomatic	
relations	 with	 a	 foreign	 nation-state	 government,	 this	 strays	 more	 clearly	 and	 perhaps	
disruptively	into	a	domain	typically	reserved	for	states.	These	activities	may	be	precisely	the	
type	of	interactions	that	fall	squarely	under	the	remit	of	the	VCDR,	yet	the	peculiar	state-like	
yet	non-sovereign	status	of	Scotland	as	a	devolved	region	of	the	UK	may	yet	exclude	it	as	an	
independent	 entity	 from	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 treaty.	 In	 official	 diplomatic	 activities,	 Scottish	
																																																						
25	The	failure	of	Alex	Salmond	to	secure	meetings	independently	with	the	French	and	Chinese	
governments	was	the	subject	of	a	series	of	reports	in	the	Daily	Telegraph	in	2012,	based	on	
dossiers	received	in	response	to	their	FOI	requests	
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diplomats	would	be	‘borrowing’	their	status	from	the	UK	Government,	yet	take	their	political	
direction	from	elsewhere.	How	this	split	between	political	accountability	and	legal	status	or	
authority	might	manifest	in	the	future	is	a	key	challenge	for	the	future	robustness	of	the	VCDR	
as	a	treaty	regulating	formal	diplomatic	relations.	
	
One	 particularly	 ‘thorny’	 issue	 in	 this	 area	 is	 recognition.	 In	 their	 analysis	 of	 the	 EU’s	
diplomatic	 identity,	Wouters	 and	Duquet	 (2012:	 33)	 point	 to	 the	possibility	 of	 a	 situation	
whereby	“the	EU	intends	to	accredit	a	diplomatic	representative	to	a	third	country	that	is	not	
recognized	by	all	27	member	states”.	This	could	happen,	the	authors	argue,	despite	the	fact	
that	 EU	member	 states	 retain	 the	exclusive	 competence	 to	 recognize	other	 states	 and/or	
governments,	which	is	a	preliminary	condition	to	enter	into	diplomatic	relations.	States	are	
the	only	actors	in	international	law	that	are	able	to	recognize	other	states	-	“be	it	de	jure	or	
de	 facto”.	 In	 the	case	of	 sub-state	governments,	 similar	 scenarios	have	arguably	emerged	
already.	The	Scottish	Government,	for	example,	has	unequivocally	called	for	the	recognition	
of	an	independent	Palestinian	State.	In	a	letter	to	the	UK	Foreign	Secretary	Phillip	Hammond	
in	October	2014,	Scottish	External	Affairs	Minister	Humza	Yousaf	argued	called	on	 the	UK	
Government	“to	take	action	and	formally	recognise	the	state	of	Palestine”,	and	also	outlined	
“the	Scottish	Government’s	support	 for	the	opening	of	a	Palestinian	consulate	 in	Scotland	
and	highlighted	the	need	for	a	Palestinian	embassy	in	the	UK”	(Press	Release	from	the	Scottsh	
Government,	2014b).	Though	Scotland	itself	cannot	formally	recognise	Palestine,	the	issuing	
of	 such	 unequivocal	 views	 on	 its	 status	 inevitably	 complicates	 perceptions	 of	 the	 UK’s	
position.	Similar	issues	have	arisen	in	Wales,	where	-	in	large	part	due	to	the	size	of	the	Somali	
Diaspora	within	Wales	-	the	National	Assembly	and	the	Welsh	Government	have	been	key	
targets	for	activities	designed	to	secure	international	recognition	for	Somaliland.	In	perhaps	
the	 most	 contentious	 ‘diplomatic’	 move,	 the	 National	 Assembly	 for	 Wales	 extended	 an	
invitation	to	the	Somaliland	government	to	attend	the	Royal	opening	of	the	Senedd	in	2006,	
an	initiative	interpreted	by	the	Somaliland	-	and	Welsh	-	presses	as	official	recognition	of	the	
break-away	government’s	legitimacy	(The	Somaliland	Times,	2006;	Wales	Online,	2006).		
	
The	difference	between	the	activities	of	sub-state	governments,	on	the	one	hand,	and	small	
state	governments	on	the	other	may	be	one	that	is	increasingly	difficult	to	discern	on	a	day-
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to-day	level.	However,	under	international	law,	this	distinction	remains	a	pertinent	one.	The	
difference	 also	 has	 some	 relevance	 in	 a	 more	 pragmatic	 sense:	 the	 Welsh	 Assembly’s	
reported	 ‘recognition’	 of	 Somaliland	or	 the	 Scottish	Government’s	 support	 for	 a	 separate	
Palestinian	 state	does	not	 carry	 the	 same	diplomatic	or	 legal	 force	as	 similar	actions	by	a	
sovereign	state.	However,	at	a	political	level,	this	‘unofficial’	recognition	may	indeed	have	an	
effect,	albeit	a	lesser	one.	The	ambiguity	surrounding	the	status	of	sub-state	governments	is	
compounded	by	widespread	 confusion	 regarding	 the	 architecture	of	 devolved	or	 regional	
government	(such	as	between	the	National	Assembly	for	Wales	as	a	legislature,	and	the	Welsh	
Government	 as	 an	 executive)	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 designated	 ‘foreign	 office’	 from	 which	
diplomatic	messages	are	directed.		
	
Turning	 to	 Scotland’s	 approach	 to	 international	 affairs	 more	 generally,	 the	 Scottish	
Government’s	 latest	 international	 strategy,	 published	 in	2015,	 calls	 for	 an	 ‘embedding’	 of	
internationalisation	 across	 its	 areas	 of	 competence.	 It	 also	 points	 to	 the	 fact	 that	
internationalisation	has	been	identified	as	an	integral	strand	in	Scotland’s	Economic	Strategy,	
and	 therefore,	as	with	most	 sub-state	governments	participating	at	an	 international	 level,	
boosting	 trade	 and	 investment	 is	 a	 key	 priority	 taken	 forward	 to	 international	
representations.	However,	the	strategy	also	identifies	the	importance	of	Scotland’s	role	as	a	
“good	global	citizen”,	meaning	that:	
Scotland	will	contribute	to	wider	goals	of	promoting	international	stability	and	
equality	in	other	world	regions,	which,	in	addition	to	the	foremost	objective	of	
working	in	partnership	to	deliver	positive	local	change,	can	act	to	support	long-
term	 human	 and	 economic	 security	 within	 Scotland.	 As	 part	 of	 this	
commitment	we	will	continue	our	advocacy	of	human	rights,	we	will	continue	
to	contribute	to	the	multilateral	management	of	international	crises,	and	we	
will	continue	to	deliver	our	distinctive	international	development	programme	
(Scottish	Government,	2015c:	10).	
It	 is	 not	 typical	 for	 sub-state	 governments	 to	 have	 this	 type	 of	 pronounced	 normative	
dimension	to	their	paradiplomatic	activities,	however	there	are	other	instances	of	sub-state	
governments	prioritising	international	aid	and	development.	Both	Flanders	and	two	Spanish	
regions,	 for	 example,	 have	 close	 development	 links	 with	 parts	 of	 South	 Africa	 and	 Latin	
America	 respectively	 (Michael	Keating,	 cited	 in	a	 report	by	 the	Scottish	Parliament,	2010:	
1720-1721).	Similarly,	the	Finnish	region	of	AÅland	has	built	a	reputation	around	promoting	
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its	 distinct	 model	 of	 conflict	 resolution	 and	 normative	 diplomacy	 around	 this	 area	 more	
generally	 (Wigell,	 2013).	 	Wales	 shares	 some	 similar	 ambitions	 to	 Scotland,	 notably	 in	 its	
Wales	for	Africa	programme	and	activities	around	a	Fair	Trade	Wales.	 	 Indeed,	though	the	
stated	 ambition	 to	 be	 a	 ‘good	 global	 citizen’	 and	 the	 prominence	 that	 normative	 issues	
receive	 is	distinctive	about	Scotland’s	 international	 strategy,	Wales	has	also	 foregrounded	
these	issues	in	more	recent	documents	(Welsh	Government,	2016),	and	legislation	such	as	
the	Well-being	of	Future	Generations	(Wales)	Act	2015.	What	is	perhaps	more	surprising	in	
Scotland’s	case,	however,	is	that	despite	its	very	limited	formal	competence	in	the	areas	that	
might	equip	its	global	role	in	international	crisis	management	or	good	global	citizenry,	it	has	
achieved	significant	recognition	in	this	area	as	part	of	its	‘nation	branding’	efforts	(Scottish	
Government	Strategic	Research,	2012).		Whether	it’s	a	speech	about	gender	equality	to	the	
Chinese	Friendship	Association,	declarations	on	UK	Government	defence	and	international	
development	policy	or	the	appropriation	of	Chinese	‘panda	diplomacy’,	Scottish	diplomacy	
aims	to	influence	national-level	politicians,	offer	its	own	‘line’	on	foreign	policy	and	generally	
take	 its	 brand	of	 good	 global	 citizenry	 to	 the	world	 stage	 (see	 'no	 aid	money	 for	military	
interventions',	Scottish	Government,	2013a;	'Alex	Salmond	bamboozled	the	public	on	panda	
advert',	 The	 Independent,	 2012;	 Speech	 by	 First	Minister	 Nicola	 Sturgeon	 to	 the	 Chinese	
Friendship	Association,	Scottish	Government,	2015a).	
	
Alongside	 its	 international	 offices	 and	 those	 of	 SDI,	 the	 Scottish	Government	 engages	 on	
specific	 policy	 issues	 identified	 in	 separate	 policy	 documents,	 as	well	 as	 its	 One	 Scotland	
Partnership	Country	Plans	with	China,	 India,	Pakistan,	Canada	and	the	USA.	As	part	of	 the	
SNP’s	programme	for	Government	2014-2015	a	series	of	Investment	Hubs	in	“key	overseas	
locations”	will	be	piloted,	bringing	together	“resources	and	partners	in	particular	location	and	
co-ordinate	and	deliver	activity	on	the	ground”	(Scottish	Government,	2015c:	6).	Within	the	
Scottish	Government	itself,	under	First	Minister	Nicola	Sturgeon	there	is	a	Cabinet	Secretary	
for	Culture,	Europe	and	External	Affairs	as	well	as	a	Minister	 for	Europe	and	 International	
Development.	These	 titles	 reflect	a	subtle	shift	 in	 the	Scottish	Government’s	 international	
priorities	post-referendum	that	foregrounds	the	European	context	ever	more	strongly:	the	
Cabinet	 Secretary’s	 previous	 title	 was	 Culture	 and	 External	 Affairs	 and	 the	 Ministerial	
portfolio	was	for	External	Affairs	and	International	Development.		
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For	sub-state	governments,	acting	within	the	European	context	is	perhaps		seen	as	a	more	
legitimate	 extension	 of	 their	 domestic	 competences	 than	 forays	 into	 the	 broader	
international	environment;	it	certainly	represents	a	more	“institutionalised	and	habitualised	
context”	 (Wyn	 Jones	 and	 Royles,	 2012:	 251).	 There	 is	 a	 general	 acknowledgement	 of	
Scotland’s	legitimate	interest	in	decision-making	at	a	European	level	as	it	impacts	directly	on	
Scotland	 itself	 in	 numerous	 policy	 areas.	 In	 the	 wake	 of	 2014’s	 referendum	 on	 Scottish	
independence,	and	in	the	spectre	of	a	second	UK-wide	referendum	on	EU	membership,	this	
context	now	offers	Scotland	a	space	to	conduct	paradiplomacy	that	both	engages	directly	
with	policy	making	through	its	representation	under	the	banner	of	UKREP	and	allows	 it	to	
foreground	its	‘pro-European	credentials’	to	both	domestic	and	European	audiences.		
	
Undoubtedly,	Scotland’s	international	presence	has	been	marked	strongly	in	recent	years	by	
the	independence	referendum.	This	applies	to	the	activities	the	Scottish	Government	wishes	
to	engage	in,	positioning	itself	as	a	pro-European	small	country,	natural	kin	to	its	neighbours	
in	the	‘Nordic	arc	of	prosperity’.	It	is	also	represented	in	the	relationship	between	the	Scottish	
and	UK	Governments,	who	have	been	on	opposing	sides	of	a	highly	controversial	campaign,	
and	-	naturally	-	whose	working	relationship	has	been	duly	challenged.	It	also	means	there	
has	 been	 a	 wealth	 of	 speculation,	 in	 policy	 documents	 or	 position	 papers	 and	 from	
parliamentary	inquiries,	shedding	light	on	the	ways	in	which	the	diplomacy	of	Scotland	as	a	
sub-state	government	is	seen	to	be	constrained	(or	otherwise)	on	account	of	this	status,	how	
it	would	differ	as	an	independent	state,	and	thus	on	the	currency	of	official	diplomatic	status	
more	generally.		
	
The	view	of	the	SNP,	 immediately	prior	to	the	referendum	on	Scottish	 independence,	was	
that	Scotland	would	be	better	served	by	having	“diplomats	directly	serving	its	interests	in	key	
countries”,	not	 just	 in	Brussels,	Washington	and	Beijing	 (Scottish	Government,	2009:	para	
4.5).	 	The	same	position	paper	argued	that	under	a	‘Devo	Max’	model	of	devolution	there	
could	 be	 ‘Scottish	 interest	 sections’	 in	 British	 Embassies	 in	 major	 European	 countries,	
alongside	the	Scottish	Government’s	existing	overseas	representation.	This	position	would	
seem	to	suggest	that	there	is	no	major	dissatisfaction	with	the	role	that	Scottish	Government	
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officials	are	able	to	play	when	they	act	as	diplomats	as	part	of	UK	overseas	representations.	
Indeed,	the	position	paper	fails	to	cite	any	real	benefits	that	a	wholly	separate	representation	
from	an	independent	Scotland	would	realise.		
	
From	the	UK	Government’s	perspective,	nothing	was	guaranteed	in	terms	of	any	independent	
Scotland’s	ability	to	utilise	existing	UK	diplomatic,	security	and	intelligence	resources.	There	
might	be	overlapping	interests	between	the	rest	of	the	UK	and	an	independent	Scotland,	but	
the	UK	would	only	cooperate	to	the	extent	that	it	was	in	its	own	interest	(UK	Secretary	of	
State	for	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Affairs,	2013:	para	17).	The	Secretary	of	State	summed	
up	the	existing	relationship	as	follows:	
The	benefits	of	this	support	and	collaboration	are	substantial	for	example	in	
terms	 of	 promotional	 services	 in	 support	 of	 Scottish-based	 business,	 and	
positioning	 Scotland	 within	 the	 UK	 offer,	 access	 to	 project	 leads	 and	
promotional	activities	designed	to	attract	 foreign	direct	 investment.	 It	 is	 for	
this	 reason	that	many	of	 the	22	Scottish	Government’s	offices	overseas	are	
located	within	 the	 UK’s	 Embassies	 and	 High	 Commissions	 (UK	 Secretary	 of	
State	for	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Affairs,	2013:	para	17).26		
Certainly,	 there	 is	 an	 argument	 that	 the	 ability	 of	 Scotland,	 and	 the	UK’s	 other	 devolved	
regions,	to	utilise	a	‘two-track’	diplomatic	strategy;	drawing	on	UK	structures	and	resources	
as	 well	 as	 initiate	 independent	 activities,	 may	 magnify	 their	 international	 influence,	 and	
effectiveness,	in	relation	to	similar	sized	small-states.	For	example,	it	has	been	argued	that	
Scotland’s	 influence	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 may	 actually	 be	 weakened	 should	 it	 gain	
membership	 as	 a	 small	 member	 state,	 rather	 than	 a	 region	 of	 a	 much	 larger	 state	 (UK	
Secretary	of	State	 for	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Affairs,	2013:	para	105).27	 Importantly,	
however,	this	added	value	is	only	realised	where	the	sub-state	and	nation-state	governments	
have	overlapping	interests.	In	the	context	of	the	2016	referendum	on	the	UK’s	membership	
of	the	European	Union,	and	the	Scottish	Government’s	calls	in	its	wake	for	a	second	vote	on	
Scottish	independence,	it	seems	unlikely	that	any	residual	‘added	value’	remains.		
																																																						
26	This	number	includes	SDI	offices.	
27	This	argument	is	strongly	refuted	by	the	Scottish	Government.	
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Germany’s	Basic	Law	and	the	Status	of	Bavaria	under	the	VCDR	
	
Germany’s	 Federal	 Constitution,	 the	 Basic	 Law	 or	 Grundgesetz	 (GG),	 enumerates	 specific	
roles	for	the	Länder	in	the	field	of	foreign	policy.	Article	32	[Foreign	Relations},	below,	states	
that:	
	
1. Relations	with	foreign	states	shall	be	conducted	by	the	Federation	
2. Before	the	conclusion	of	a	treaty	affecting	the	special	circumstances	of	a	Land,	that	
Land	shall	be	consulted	in	a	timely	fashion.	
3. Insofar	as	the	Länder	have	power	to	legislate	they	may	conclude	treaties	with	foreign	
states	with	the	consent	of	the	federal	government	
	
Underpinning	 this	 Article	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 Federal	 Republic	 of	 Germany	 should	 be	
represented	 as	 a	whole,	 rather	 than	 as	 separate	 Länder	 (Nass,	 1989:	 165);	 a	 noteworthy	
ambition	given	that	the	Länder	themselves	were	constituted	prior	to	the	Federal	Republic.	
The	formal	rights	of	the	Länder	in	foreign	policy	are	exercised	in	three	principal	ways:	through	
their	Federal	chamber	in	the	Bundesrat	(Article	59),	their	consultation	on	all	treaties	affecting	
their	exclusive	competences,	and	in	their	original	right	to	conclude	international	treaties	as	
identified	in	Article	32(3)	above	(Nass,	1989:	-166).		
	
However,	the	drafting	of	Article	32	left	outstanding	questions	as	to	the	role	it	prescribes	the	
Länder	and	a	series	of	theses	can	be	identified	regarding	the	distribution	of	foreign	relations	
competence	 between	 the	 Federal	 and	 Land	 levels.	 These	 range	 from	 a	 centralist	
understanding	whereby	the	Federation	is	entitled	to	enter	into	treaties	in	all	fields,	or	even	
to	 implement	 any	 legislation	 it	 deems	 necessary	 to	 fulfil	 its	 foreign	 policy,	 through	 to	 a	
federalist	 interpretation	whereby	 the	Federation	only	has	 rights	 to	 conclude	 international	
treaties	within	 its	 own,	 narrow,	 areas	 of	 legislative	 competence	 (Panara,	 2010:	 62-63).	 In	
practice,	however,	arrangements	as	to	foreign	affairs	are	governed	by	the	Lindau	agreement	
of	1957,	arguably	“the	basis	of	modern	German	treaty-making”	that	survived	the	reunification	
process	and	is	a	key	feature	of	Germany’s	system	of	‘co-operative	federalism’	(Hernandez,	
2013:	502).	Under	the	Lindau	agreement	the	Länder	agreed	to	delegate	-	for	the	most	part	-	
their	treaty-making	powers	to	the	federal	government;	allowing	it	to	conclude	treaties	in	its	
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own	right	when	the	subject	was	deemed	to	be	of	predominantly	federal	concern	-	including	
consular	treaties	and	treaties	concerning	the	establishment	or	membership	of	international	
organisations.	 In	 return,	 the	 Federal	 government	 agreed	 that,	 where	 a	 treaty	 was	 of	
predominantly	 Länder	 concern,	 they	 would	 seek	 their	 approval	 before	 the	 agreement	
became	 internationally	 binding	 (Hernandez,	 2013:	 502;	 Panara,	 2010:	 63-64).	 Though	 the	
Lindau	 agreement	 is	 not	 constitutionally	 binding	 itself,	 Panara	 (2010:	 64)	 contends	 that	
infringement	 of	 the	 Agreement	 would	 arguably	 be	 “justiciable	 before	 the	 Federal	
Constitutional	 Court	 since	 it	 would	 amount	 to	 a	 breach	 of	 the	 unwritten	 constitutional	
principle	of	Federal	loyalty	(Bundestreue)”.	
	
The	Basic	Law	does	not,	however,	speak	to	any	area	of	international	activity	beyond	treaty-
making.	Once	again,	this	leaves	us	with	questions	as	to	what	sorts	of	activities	the	Länder	are	
permitted	 to	undertake.	Under	a	 strict	 interpretation	of	Article	32	“contacts	between	 the	
Länder	and	foreign	governments	that	do	not	serve	to	conclude	or	execute	treaties	are	not	
permitted”,	 an	 interpretation	 further	 supported	 by	 the	 notion	 of	 external	 unity	 that	
underpins	the	article	 in	 its	entirety	(Nass,	1989:	176).	However,	Nass	goes	on	to	provide	a	
contrasting	view	point;	if	Article	32	only	regulates	international	relations,	meaning	diplomatic	
and	 consular	 relations,	 treaty	 relations	 “and	 other	 acts	 and	 deeds	 vis-à-vis	 states	 and	
international	organizations”,	other	activities	by	the	Länder	would	not	be	forbidden,	though	
“the	principle	of	allegiance	to	the	federation	imposes	upon	them	certain	duties	of	loyalty”.	
However,	Nass	concludes,	neither	extreme	view	“matches	constitutional	reality”	(Nass,	1989:	
167-168).	According	to	Panara	(2010:	67),	the	Länder’s	foreign	relations	power	“is	limited	to	
signing	 international	agreements.	This	precludes	them	from	performing	unilateral	acts,	 for	
example	 the	 recognition	 of	 foreign	 states	 or	 governments”.	 However,	 the	 Länder’s	
agreements	with	 “those	 entities	which	have	no	 international	 legal	 personality	 (regions	or	
other	sub-state	entities),	lie	outside	of	the	sphere	of	application	of	Article	32(3)	GG.	Therefore	
the	Federal	Government’s	consent	is	not	required”.	
	
When	it	comes	to	overseas	representation	and	ministerial	visits,	there	is	a	clear	demarcation	
between	 economically	 driven	 activities	 and	 diplomatic	 visits,	 the	 later	 being	 exclusively	
organised	by	the	German	Diplomatic	Service	“working	to	common	interests”	(Keating,	2010a:	
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paragraph	7.1),	once	again	reflective	of	Germany’s	system	of	cooperative	federalism.		Indeed,	
Länder	 overseas	 offices	 (which,	 as	 will	 be	 discussed	 below,	 are	 predominantly	 those	 of	
Bavaria)	including	those	in	Brussels	do	not	have	any	sort	of	diplomatic	status.	Under	the	terms	
of	 the	 VCDR,	 therefore,	 German	 Länder,	 and	 Bavaria	 specifically	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 our	
discussion,	are	not	party	to	the	convention.	The	question	as	to	whether	the	German	Länder	
have	any	international	subjectivity	in	their	own	right,	however,	is	perhaps	harder	to	answer.	
Länder	can	make	international	treaties	in	their	own	name,	yet	these	treaties	are	subject	to	
consent	by	the	Federal	Government,	making	it	unclear	as	to	who	the	international	subject	
actually	 is.	According	to	Panara	(2010:	66)	the	prevailing	view	is	that	“the	Länder’s	 limited	
international	subjectivity	is	not	inherent,	but	‘conferred	by’	article	32(3)	GG.	This	should	have	
a	real	constituent	effect	on	their	capacity	to	act.	Consequently,	if	a	Land	concludes	a	treaty	
without	federal	consent,	this	should	be	considered	as	being	concluded	ultra	vires	in	respect	
of	both	domestic	and	international	law”.	Therefore,	despite	Bavaria’s	unusual	ability	to	sign	
international	treaties	in	its	own	name,	it	cannot	do	so	independently,	i.e.	in	the	absence	of	
approval	from	the	Federal	Government.		
	
In	 practice,	 though	 Länder	 do	 make	 use	 of	 this	 ability	 to	 sign	 international	 treaties,	 the	
resulting	agreements	are	generally	focussed	on	local-level	and	cross-border	issues.	Dr	Paul	
Fischer	 from	 the	 Bavarian	 State	 Chancellery,	 giving	 evidence	 to	 the	 Scottish	 Parliament’s	
Connecting	Scotland	enquiry	 in	March	2015,	outlines	Bavaria’s	position	as	concerns	treaty	
making	in	some	detail:		
In	outlining	the	main	features	of	Bavaria’s	international	relations	policy,	I	want	
to	emphasise	at	the	start	that	conducting	external	relations	is	a	constitutional	
right	of	the	German	Länder.	Although	Article	32(1)	of	the	Basic	Law	reserves	
foreign	affairs	to	the	federal	state,	Article	32(2)	allows	individual	states	within	
their	 sphere	 of	 competence,	 which	 includes	 culture,	 education,	 media,	
security,	 health	 and	 environmental	 protection,	 and	 in	 agreement	 with	 the	
federal	 Government,	 to	 negotiate	 and	 conclude	 treaties	 with	 foreign	
countries.	Bavaria	has	always	made	use	of	 that	 constitutional	 right	and	has	
thereby	maintained	diplomatic	relations	below	the	level	of	foreign	policy…	We	
would	 not	 call	 most	 of	 them	 [Bavaria’s	 international	 treaties]	 treaties;	 we	
would	call	most	of	them	administrative	agreements.	We	have	signed	one	with	
Tunisia,	for	example,	and	it	was	not	a	treaty	of	 international	 law	but	one	in	
which	our	Administrations	agreed	to	work	in	specific	fields	of	cooperation.	It	
is	quite	rare	to	have	real	treaties…	they	are	very	rare		(Fischer,	2015).	
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Despite	 the	 conservative	way	 in	which	Bavaria’s	 international	 treaty-making	 powers	 have	
manifested,	the	overall	trend	is	for	Länder	to	have	an	increasing	role	in	international	affairs,	
and	this	is	especially	so	in	Bavaria	(Panara,	2010;	Moore,	2006).	This	is	in	part	due	to	a	more	
general	reorganisation	of	the	German	diplomatic	service	under	Foreign	Minister	Klaus	Kinkel	
during	the	1990s,	whereby	classical	diplomatic	missions	were	required	to	extend	their	remits,	
taking	on	important	economic	development	roles	which	required	them	to	work	much	more	
closely	with	Länder	governments.	Additionally,	globalisation	and	European	integration	have	
meant	 that	 “the	 fields	 of	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 Länder…	 public	 administration,	 economic	
development	 and	 cultural	 education,	 all	 these	 have	 achieved	 much	 more	 international	
dimensions”.28	At	the	same	time,	the	activities	of	the	EU	are	increasingly	encroaching	upon	
Länder	competences.	In	the	case	of	Bavaria,	this	has	resulted	in	an	element	of	euro-scepticism	
that	 feeds	 into	 its	European-paradiplomacy,	often	exerting	a	conservative	pressure	on	the	
Federal	 Government	 in	 this	 regard	 and	 being	 particularly	 vigilant	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
Subsidiarity	 monitoring.29	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 emphasis	 Bavaria	 places	 on	 its	 high-profile	
Brussels	representation	(‘Schloss	Neuwahnstein’	according	to	critics	(Moore,	2006))	seems	to	
reflect	attempts	to	portray	the	distinctiveness,	economic	and	political	clout	of	the	region.		
	
Bavaria’s	Overseas	Offices	
	
Bavaria	is	the	most	active	of	all	the	German	Länder	when	it	comes	to	overseas	representation,	
and	 indeed	 paradiplomacy	more	 broadly.	 In	 fact	 it	 is	 the	 only	 Land	 that	maintains	 a	 full	
network	 of	 overseas	 offices,	 and	 the	 offices	 themselves	 are	 a	 relatively	 new	 concept	 for	
Bavaria,	one	that	 the	Bavarian	Government	claims	 is	proving	“very	successful…you	have	a	
permanent	 presence	 there,	 you	 can	 develop	 really	 modern	 networks”.30	 Alongside	 its	
overseas	 offices,	 Bavaria	 has	 several	 formalised	 areas	 of	 international	 activity:	 the	
																																																						
28	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
29	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	official	2013	
30	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
	 116	
international	 contacts	 of	 the	 members	 of	 the	 state	 government31,	 intergovernmental	
commissions	-	with	both	states	and	third	regions,	inter-regional	working	groups,	cooperation	
with	consular	corps	(which	are	particularly	numerous	in	Bavaria),	as	well	as	providing	support	
for	 agencies	 with	 an	 international	 focus	 and	 individual	 projects.	 These	 broader	 external	
relations	 are	 driven	 by	 a	 relatively	 recent	 written	 strategy	 that	 aims	 to	 codify	 and	
institutionalise	 the	 much	 more	 personalised	 and	 ad	 hoc	 approach	 of	 previous	 Minister	
Presidents.32		
	
In	total,	Bavaria	has	23	offices	overseas	with	a	global	representation,	including	in	Europe,	the	
USA	and	China.	For	the	most	part,	these	offices	are	commercial	in	nature,	the	decision	about	
where	to	site	them	is	driven	almost	exclusively	by	economic	considerations	and	their	remit	is	
very	clearly	trade	and	investment.33	The	offices	are	mostly	run	by	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	
and	partly	funded	by	the	Government,	running	in	close	cooperation	with	the	private	sector	
(Keating,	2010b:	1722	appendix	2).	There	are,	however,	three	representative	offices	that	do	
have	a	political	function:	Quebec,	Brussels	and,	most	recently,	the	Czech	Republic.	Some	of	
Bavaria’s	overseas	offices	-	including	the	‘political’	representation	in	Quebec	-	are	co-located	
with	the	German	Chamber	of	Commerce,	but,	unlike	the	co-location	of	Scottish	and	Welsh	
offices	with	British	Embassies,	are	not	able	 to	 ‘opt	 in’	 to	 the	diplomatic	 status	of	German	
Federal	institutions.		
	
Bavaria’s	 Quebec	 office	 was	 established	 in	 Montreal	 in	 1999,	 building	 on	 a	 cooperation	
agreement	 already	 a	 decade	 old.	 The	 office	 has	 a	 “special	 status,	 accredited	 with	 the	
Government	 of	 Quebec”,	 largely	 because	 “Quebec	 itself	 encourages	 this	 representation”	
(Keating,	 2010b:	 paragraph	 4.3).	 Meanwhile,	 the	 representation	 in	 Prague	 “is	 quite	
special…for	historical	reasons,	after	the	war,	relations	with	our	neighbours	the	Czech’s	were	
difficult…it	is	a	great	achievement	to	have	that	office	and	representation	in	Prague”	(Fischer,	
2015:	 5).	 This	 office	 was	 established	 as	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 rapprochement	 between	 the	
																																																						
31	 These	 contacts	 are	 appraised	 and	 monitored	 in	 an	 unusually	 thorough	 way,	 with	
accompanying	statistics.	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
32	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
33	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
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Bavarian	and	Czech	Governments	that	also	saw	high-level	ministerial	visits	between	them.	
Indeed,	Czech	Prime	Minister	Sobotka	“regarded	the	opening	of	the	representative	offices	to	
be	a	significant	event,	and	one	which	will	again	raise	Czech-Bavarian	relations	to	a	new	level”	
(Government	of	the	Czech-Republic,	2014:	press	release).		From	the	Bavarian	perspective,	the	
symbolism	of	such	an	office	overrode	concerns	as	to	its	practicality	or	economic	viability	that	
would	normally	rule	these	types	decisions.34	
	
Within	 the	 EU	 context,	 Bavaria	was	 one	 of	 the	 first	 Länder	 to	 open	 a	 Brussels	 office.	 An	
‘information	office’	was	opened	in	1987	before	being	upgraded	-	in	its	own	estimation	-	to	
the	Representation	of	the	Free	State	of	Bavaria	following	the	ratification	of	the	Maastricht-
Treaty	and	the	establishment	of	the	committee	of	the	Regions	in	the	early	1990s.	European	
representative	offices	are	considered	the	“most	 important	area	of	external	activity	for	the	
German	Länder”	(Panara,	2010:	61).	Bavaria’s	Brussels	office,	following	a	relocation	in	2004,	
is	particularly	symbolic,	as	expressed	by	one	senior	Bavarian	official:	“it’s	grand,	it’s	historic…	
it’s	an	exclamation	mark	saying	we	are	here	in	Brussels…	we’re	in	this	big	area	and	we	took	
this	historic	building	so	everyone	who	comes	to	the	European	Parliament	has	to	pass	it”.35		
	
Bavaria’s	European	office	-	and	those	of	its	Land	contemporaries	-	has,	however,	been	the	
subject	of	controversy	as	to	their	nomenclature	and	diplomatic	status.	The	Länder	Brussels	
offices	are	modelled	around	the	representation	of	Länder	governments	in	Berlin,	where	the	
dual	 roles	 of	 policy-influencing	 and	 representation	 are	 carried	 out	 using	 largely	 “soft	
instruments”	of	political	influence	(Moore,	2006:	196).	Questions	were	initially	raised	as	to	
the	 legality	 of	 these	 offices	 but	 by	 1991	 “the	 general	 legal	 consensus	 was	 that	 these	
institutions	were	constitutionally	acceptable,	as	long	as	their	activities	did	not	run	into	the	
territory	 of	 classic	 diplomacy	 reserved	 for	 the	 federal	 government,	 such	 as	 consular	 or	
diplomatic	activities”	(Moore,	2006:	196).	Of	particular	controversy	is	the	term	by	which	these	
EU	offices	are	known.	German	Länder	 -	 including	Bavaria	 -	opt	 to	 refer	 to	 their	European	
																																																						
34	Indeed	the	economic	credentials	of	this	office	were	claimed	not	to	be	a	factor	weighing	into	
the	decision	to	open	it.	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013;	Interview	
data,	senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	official	2013	
35	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	official	2013	
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offices	 as	 Vertretungen	 or	 representations,	 directly	 contradicting	 the	 spirit	 of	 a	 new	
constitutional	 regulation,	 the	EUZBLG,	which	“accepted	 the	 legitimacy	of	Länder	offices	 in	
Brussels	as	permanent	‘links’	to	the	EU	institutions,	provided	these	acted	merely	to	support	
Länder	domestic	competences	and	did	not	impinge	upon	the	federal	government’s	diplomatic	
role”.	 Federal	 officials	 in	 the	 German	 Permanent	 Representation	 in	 Brussels	 are	 “strictly	
warned	not	to	use	the	term	Vertretung	when	referring	to	the	Länder	offices,	regardless	of	the	
offices’	own	names,	and	 to	 instead	 refer	 to	 these	simply	as	Länder	 information	or	Liaison	
offices	(Moore,	2006:	200-202).		
	
Bavaria’s	extravagant	EU	offices	in	particular	are	seen	to	flout	this	regulation,	in	establishing	
“a	strong	physical	presence	for	the	Bavarian	government	in	the	EU”	and	enhancing	“the	scope	
of	 its	 political	 capability	 on	 European	 matters”,	 it	 is	 “clearly	 a	 representation	 of	 Länder	
interests	 in	 Brussels”	 (Moore,	 2006:	 202).	 However,	 despite	 continued	 non-
acknowledgement	of	the	term	by	the	federal	government,	it	seems	that	the	controversy	over	
the	role	of	Länder	representations	has	abated,	at	 least	on	a	day-to-day	level;	the	question	
“arises	every	now	and	again…	the	federal	 level	has	accepted	that	we	are	there”.36	Despite	
this,	when	comparing	its	parliamentary	European	representation	with	its	Scottish	and	Welsh	
counterparts,	one	Bavarian	interviewee	remarked	that	the	Federal	Government	“would	not	
even	think	of	giving	us	diplomatic	status”.37		
	
Alongside,	 and	 indeed	 illustrated	 by,	 the	 overseas	 offices	maintained	 by	 the	 Freistaat	 of	
Bavaria,	 there	 are	 perhaps	 three	 key	 features	 which	 are	 particularly	 distinctive	 about	 its	
‘diplomacy’.	These	are:	 its	ability	 to	 interact	with	state-level	actors	 (in	 the	absence	of	any	
diplomatic	status),	the	particular	role	that	Bavarian	politicians	can	play	internationally	owing	
to	their	position	within	the	Federal	government,	and	the	self-assuredness	with	which	Bavaria	
carries	out	the	role	of	‘critical	friend’	both	to	the	Federal	Government	and	to	the	EU.	
	
																																																						
36	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	official	2013	
37	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	official	2013	
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Turning	firstly	to	Bavaria’s	relationships	with	foreign	states,	we	are	presented	with	a	clear	
narrative:	“if	you	want	to	understand	Bavaria	and	how	it	operates	internationally	today	you	
have	to	look	at	how	Bavaria	has	evolved	historically	and	culturally.	How	Bavaria	has	evolved	
economically	and	as	a	result	of	that	how	the	constitutional	and	the	political	framework	is	in	
which	we	operate”.38	Bavaria’s	size,	the	strength	of	its	economy,	its	historic	significance	and	
unique	political	status	within	the	Federal	Republic	all	grant	it	a	special	‘status’	that	allows	it	
to	interact	with	sovereign	states	on	a	much	more	equitable	footing	than	many	other	regions.	
This	 impacts	 Bavaria’s	 own	 paradiplomatic	 ambitions;	 its	 public	 strategy	 “Bavaria	 in	 the	
world”	 highlights	 its	 manifold	 interactions	 with	 foreign	 Governments;	 “usually	 several	
meetings	are	held	every	week,	 in	Bavaria	and	abroad”	39,	as	well	as	the	way	 in	which	 it	 is	
viewed	and	partnered	by	states	themselves.	According	to	one	interviewee:	
The	analysis	 that	 these	 states	make	 is	 that	Bavaria	may	not	be	a	 sovereign	
state,	but	they	look	at	the	size,	at	the	importance,	at	the	economic	power,	and	
when	 you	 look	 at	 Bavaria	 in	 that	 context,	 even	 today	 by	 sheer	 physical	
presence,	we	outweigh	perhaps	8	or	9	inside	the	European	Union.	So	we	are,	
Bavaria	itself	is	bigger	than	many	states.40	
The	Bavarian	State	Government	does	not	use	this	advantage	indiscriminately.	Instead,	there	
is	 a	 clearly	 targeted	 and	 sophisticated	 attempt	 to	 use	 these	 state-like	 characteristics	 to	
interact	with	nation	states	of	a	similar	size	in	its	European	neighbourhood,	much	as	we	found	
evidence	for	in	the	case	of	Scotland.	Commenting	on	the	large	number	of	foreign	consulates	
inside	 Bavaria,	 which,	 at	 110,	 is	 the	 highest	 concentration	 outside	 of	 Berlin,	 the	 same	
interviewee	elaborated	on	this	relationship:	
For	 them,	 for	 the	 Ambassador,	 it’s	 much	 easier	 for	 the	 Consul-General	 in	
Munich	to	deal	with	the	Bavarian	Government	and	much	more	fruitful	for	the	
country…	 very	 often	 an	 Ambassador	 in	 Berlin	 is	 one	 Ambassador	 amongst	
many	others.	And	he	has	to	access	the	Chancellor	and	the	Administration,	she	
is	dealing	with	the	Russians	and	the	Americans,	so	maybe	here	we	have	more	
attention	for	the	smaller	ones”.41	
																																																						
38	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
39	Bavaria	in	the	World	
40	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
41	Interview	Data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
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The	competitive	overtones	in	this	explanation	will	be	explored	in	further	detail	in	subsequent	
chapters,	 but	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 our	 current	 discussion	 the	 focus	 remains	 Bavaria’s	
concentration	on	a	particular	type	of	foreign	state	with	which	to	conduct	its	paradiplomacy.	
A	different	interviewee	expands	further,	alluding	to	an	intra-European	hierarchy	and	Bavaria’s	
position	within	it:	
It	might	also	depend	[Bavaria’s	ability	to	interact	with	states]	on	the	weight,	so	
to	speak,	of	Bavaria.	For	Example	our	Minister	President…	he	has	for	example	
met	Mr	Samaras	from	Greece,	so	a	region	meets	at	the	international	level…	I	
have	seen	last	week	there	was	a	delegation	of	Czech	representatives	to	the	
Parliament	and	they	said	that	Bavaria	was	a	key	partner	and…	‘It	is	unthinkable	
for	 them	 to	 go	 to	 Berlin	 without	 having	 stopped	 in	 Munich’…	 So	 this	 is	
interesting,	now	that,	from	the	EU	perspective,	we	are	regions…	but	still	we	
can…we	really	can	go	quite	far.	Of	course	as	I	said	it	depends,	we	would	not	
claim	to	have	relations	to	the	French	Government	-	it’s	not	really,	this	is	some	
sort	of	thing	the	federal	level	should	do.42		
	
From	this	series	of	extracts	 it	appears	that	Bavaria	targets	states	with	which	 it	can	‘work’;	
similar	sized	entities	-	either	 in	terms	of	physical	size	or	economic	or	political	significance,	
while	 leaving	the	Federal	Republic’s	key	allies,	such	as	France,	aside.	The	explanation	that	
relations	with	the	French	Government	is	something	reserved	for	the	Federal	level	seems	to	
be	related	to	the	preclusion	of	Bavaria	from	‘diplomatic’	relations,	though	the	separation	of	
such	relations	from	other	areas	of	a	relationship	between	Bavaria	and	a	sovereign	state	might	
seem	somewhat	artificial.	Panara	(2010:	68)	explains	this	moratorium	as	follows:	
The	Länder	perform	other	activities	in	the	international	arena	[beyond	treaty	
making].	 For	 example	 they	 often	 meet	 representatives	 of	 foreign	
governments.	 This	 type	 of	 activity	 can	 have	 no	 diplomatic	 status	 because	
diplomatic	and	consular	relations	are	the	Federation’s	exclusive	responsibility.	
The	Länder	cannot	depart	from	the	fundamental	guidelines	of	federal	foreign	
policy.	This	is	to	prevent	them	from	developing	what	is	usually	referred	to	as	
‘Nebenaußenpolitik’,	which	translates	as	‘foreign	policy	on	the	side.	
As	 an	 example	 of	 this	 type	 of	 activity,	 Panara	 (2010:	 68)	 cites	 the	 example	 of	 a	meeting	
between	the	Minister	President	of	Bavaria	and	the	Indian	Minister	of	Finance	in	2007,	where	
they	agreed	on	an	annual	meeting	on	economic	 relations	between	Bavaria	and	 India	 that	
																																																						
42	Interview	Data,	Senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	official	2013	
	 121	
would	 take	 place	 in	 Munich.	 Though	 Panara	 argues	 that	 this	 does	 not	 represent	 a	 “full	
‘Bavarian	 foreign	 policy’,	 it	 is	 significant”.	 Indeed,	 what	 marks	 the	 distinction	 between	
diplomatic	activity	or	‘foreign	policy’	and	these	sorts	of	high-level	encounters	is	particularly	
difficult	to	enumerate.	This	is	especially	so	given	Bavaria’s	stated	focus	on	consular	activities,	
a	key	area	of	traditional	diplomacy.		
	
Compounding	 this	 ambiguity	 is	 the	 special	 significance	 of	 Bavaria	 in	 Germany’s	 Federal	
politics,	owing	to	the	current	Federal	CDU-CSU	coalition	Government	and	the	CSU’s	longer-
standing	role	as	a	federally	significant	party.		This	has	very	clear	implications	for	the	status	of	
the	Minister-President	of	Bavaria,	as	leader	of	the	CSU.	This	stature	is	determined	by	external	
perceptions,	and	these	in	turn	are	“determined	by	the	fact	that	he	is	the	head	of	the	political	
party	of	the	CSU	and	has	direct	influence	in	the	Federal	government”.	As	such,	third	parties:	
Know	that,	or	are	being	told	by	diplomats,	that	he	is	probably…number	two	or	
three	 in	 German	 politics.	 And	 that	 Chancellor	 Merkel	 cannot	 do	 anything	
without	his	consent.	And	this	is	something	of	course	that	weighs	in.43	
This	has	implications	at	a	personal	level.	The	development	of	Bavarian	paradiplomacy	owes	
much	 to	Minister	President	 Francis	 Strauss,	 a	 Federal	politician	who	 returned	 to	Bavarian	
politics	bringing	with	him	both	a	foreign	network	and	name	recognition.	Strauss:	
	Started	to	do	things	that	no	other	Minister	President	had	done	before.	Like	
going	to	Russia.	And	then…because	he	was	known	as	a	political	figure…	so	they	
decided,	they	looked	at	him	and	said	‘hey	this	is	somebody	we	can	talk	to’.	So	
he	was	introduced	and	it	was	easy	for	him	to	get	access	to	people	that	were	
not	on	the	same	level.	Because	he	came	from	the	other	level.44	
Additionally,	 Germany’s	 constitutional	 structure,	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
Bundesrat,	can	provide	various	opportunities	for	foreign	networking,	and	the	positioning	of	
Bavaria	alongside	neighbouring	European	states:	
There	was	a	case	last	year	where	Bavaria	was	the	president	of	the	Bundesrat	
and	 our	Minister	 President	 he	made	 some	 trips,	 of	 course	 not	 as	 Bavarian	
Minister	President	but	as	a	representative	of	Germany,	of	the	second	chamber,	
to	even,	to	represent	Germany	to	some	heads	of	Government	-	I	think	he	went	
to	the	Netherlands	and	to	Belgium	and	so	on,	so	this	is	according	to	the…	its	
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44	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
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legal	under	the	German	constitution	it	was	no	Bavarian	foreign	policy	of	course	
but	it	shows	that	also,	the	regions	have	rights	to	do	foreign	policy.	45	
However,	the	politically	important	role	that	Bavaria	plays	within	German	Federal	politics,	and	
indeed	the	significance	granted	to	Länder	in	general	under	the	German	constitution,	can	also	
translate	into	a	restrictive	or	conservative	force	upon	German	foreign	policy.	The	CSU	have	
been	 vocal	 in	 their	 criticisms	 of	 what	 they	 see	 as	 Chancellor	 Merkel’s	 lenient	 policy	 on	
migration,	most	 notably	 in	 the	wake	 of	 the	 refugee	 crisis	 of	 2015.	 Absent	 from	Bavaria’s	
paradiplomatic	portfolio	is	any	of	the	development	or	normative	paradiplomacy	seen	in	both	
Scotland	and	Wales.	Relatedly,	Bavaria’s	attitude	to	the	European	Union	is	measured	in	tone.	
In	 particular,	 it	 has	 long	 been	 concerned	 about	 EU	 policy	 encroaching	 on	 its	 legislative	
capacity,	and	it	takes	seriously	its	role	as	a	“critical	but	constructive	partner”	of	both	the	EU	
and	the	Federal	Government.46		
	
Indeed,	the	role	of	‘critical	friend’	is	one	that	appears	time	and	again	in	reference	to	Bavaria’s	
external	activities,	and	in	relation	to	their	position	vis	a	vis	the	Federal	Government.	Once	
again,	Bavaria’s	unique	history	is	relevant	here.	Unlike	both	the	Federal	Republic	and	the	post-
unification	‘hyphenated’	Länder,	Bavaria	has	existed,	with	almost	identical	borders,	for	more	
than	1500	years,	and	with	a	particularly	strong	“unbroken”	 identity.47	Bavaria,	whose	own	
constitution	was	created	in	1946,	was	the	only	Länder	to	initially	reject	the	proposed	Basic	
Law	 in	 1949,	 believing	 it	 to	 have	 too	 few	 [centrifugal]	 federalist	 elements.48	 Bavaria,	
therefore,	can	“afford	to	be	the	critical	partner”,	but	-	owing	to	the	constitutional	and	political	
stability	 of	 the	 German	 federation,	 indeed	 its	 own	 brand	 of	 ‘cooperative	 federalism’	 -	
“without	questioning	the	federalism	as	a	whole.	So…it	may	be	a	bit,	well,	the	counterpart	to	
Berlin….	 for	example	here	the	CSU	tries	 to	be	a	bit	more	right	 than	Merkel’s	Berlin	at	 the	
moment	 but	 this	 is	 some	 sort	 of	 good-cop,	 bad-cop	 game”.49	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 the	
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46	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	official	2013	
47	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013.	See	also	Hepburn	E.	(2008a)	The	
Neglected	Nation:	 The	 CSU	 and	 the	 Territorial	 Cleavge	 in	 Bavarian	 Party	 Politics.	German	
Politics	17:	184-202.	
48	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013.	
49	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	official	2013	
	 123	
independence	debates	 currently	 coursing	 through	 inter-governmental	 relations	 in	 the	UK,	
Spain	 or	 Belgium,	 the	 stability	 of	 German	 Federalism	 allows	 Bavaria	 some	 all-important	
political	leeway.		
	
More	generally,	Bavaria	sees	itself	as	cooperating	“very,	very	well”	with	Federal	organisations	
-	indeed,	it	relies	heavily	on	federal	institutions	when	it	comes	to	accessing	foreign	structures,	
embassies	 and	ministerial	 visits.	 However,	 “when	 we	meet	 there	 is	 always	 some	 sport	 -	
there’s	a	political	language,	we	are	Bavarians	and	so	we	play	with	the	images,	so	we	have	a	
playful	and	colourful	 language	when	we	speak	but…	in	fact	we	are	bound	by	the	common	
interest”.50	This	congruence	of	interests	is	particularly	pronounced	given	Bavaria’s	economic	
status,	which	allows	it	to	play	a	significant	role	in	the	direction	of	Germany’s	“innovation	and	
export	 driven	 economy”;	 other	 Länder	 are	 envious	 of	 this	 role,	 but	 “they	 don’t	 have	 the	
budgets”.51		
	
As	the	preceding	passages	have	outlined,	Bavaria	has	no	status	under	the	VCDR;	it	is	not	party	
to	the	convention	in	its	own	right,	nor	is	it	permitted	to	‘opt	in’	via	co-location	of	its	overseas	
offices	with	the	Federal	Republic	of	Germany.	The	position	of	the	Federal	Government	is	also	
clear	in	terms	of	Bavaria	not	having	the	ability	to	conduct	foreign	relations,	in	particular	those	
‘tools’	inherent	to	Germany’s	own	federal	foreign	policy	-	diplomacy	and	consular	relations.	
However,	 here	 we	 also	 find	 grey-areas,	 and	 contradictions	 in	 term.	 Bavaria	 maintains	
relationships	 with	 foreign	 sovereign	 states,	 it	 even	 signs	 negotiates	 and	 concludes	
international	 treaties	with	 such	 states.	 It	 also	 has	 a	 select	 few	 ‘political’	 offices	 overseas,	
premised	on	relationships	with	states	(in	the	Czech	Republic),	powerful	regions	(Quebec)	and	
international	 organisations	 (Brussels).	 	 It	 boasts	 the	 highest	 concentration	 of	 foreign	
consulates	outside	of	Berlin,	and	acknowledges	the	attractiveness	of	its	own	government	as	
a	 point	 of	 access	 for	 these	 Consulate-Generals.	 Its	 European	 office	 is	 quite	 deliberately	
positioned	so	that	any	visitor	to	the	European	Parliament	must	encounter	it.	It	is	difficult	to	
reconcile	 this	 reality	with	view	that	Bavaria	does	not	maintain	a	 foreign	policy,	or	at	 least	
																																																						
50	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
51	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
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diplomatic	relations.	 	However,	equilibrium,	of	sorts,	seems	to	exist.	For	example,	Bavaria,	
and	 other	 German	 Länder,	 maintain	 that	 their	 European	 offices	 are	 Vertretung	 or	
‘representations’.	 The	 Federal	 Government	 hasn’t	 challenged	 this	 development	 in	 the	
German	 Constitutional	 Court,	 yet	 they	 forbid	 their	 own	 representatives	 from	 using	 this	
terminology	to	describe	what	they	term	the	‘information	offices’	of	the	Länder	in	Brussels.	A	
commonly	 understood	 ‘line’	 exists	 which	 the	 Bavarian	 Government	 is	 clear	 not	 to	 cross,	
seemingly	 in	 return	 for	 the	 cooperation	 of	 the	 Federal	 Government	 in	 orchestrating	 an	
advanced	paradiplomatic	platform.	Crucially,	and	in	contrast	to	the	relationship	between	the	
Scottish	 and	 UK	 Governments,	 these	 endeavours	 are	 rooted	 in	 a	 congruence	 of	 -	 largely	
economic	 -	 interests,	 and	 set	 within	 a	 robust	 framework	 of	 constitutional	 stability	 and	
cooperative	federalism.	It	is	within	this	context	that	high-level	relations	with	states,	such	as	
India	and	Russia,	have	been	allowed	to	take	place	with	little	in	the	way	of	controversy.52	In	
the	 contrast	 between	 Scotland	 and	 Bavaria	 we	 perhaps	 see	 similar	 behaviours	 being	
interpreted	in	markedly	different	ways,	owing	to	the	political	context	in	each	case.	
	
Conclusion	
	
In	trying	to	survey	the	diplomatic	representations	of	sub-state	governments,	Scotland,	Wales	
and	Bavaria	in	this	instance,	Berridge’s	classification	of	‘unconventional’	bilateral	diplomacy	
(2005:	137-143)	is	perhaps	useful.	Though	this	typology	is	intended	to	describe	the	activities	
of	states,	when	resident	embassies	of	the	‘conventional	kind’	cannot	be	maintained	for	one	
reason	or	 another,	 functionally	 -	 and	 indeed	 in	 some	 terminology	 -	 these	unconventional	
activities	 describe	 fairly	 accurately	 the	 diplomacy	 of	 many	 sub-state	 governments.	 For	
example,	the	Welsh	Government’s	overseas	that	operate	outside	of	official	UK	missions,	and	
Bavaria’s	three	‘political’	offices	bear	many	of	the	same	characteristics	of	what	Berridge	terms	
‘representative	offices’;	“a	mission	that	looks	and	operates	much	like	an	Embassy,	the	only	
																																																						
52	Having	said	this,	relations	between	Bavaria	and	Russia	since	2016	have	begun	to	cause	a	
great	deal	of	political	tension	with	the	German	Federal	Government	and	will	be	explored	in	
Chapter	Six	of	this	thesis.	
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difference	being	 its	 informality”	 (Berridge,	2005:	45	emphasis	original).	Additionally,	a	key	
structure	of	unconventional	diplomacy	as	exposed	by	Berridge,	interest	sections,	is	precisely	
what	 the	 Scottish	 Government	 have	 called	 for	 under	 any	 possible	 ‘devo	 max’	 model	 of	
devolution,	allowing	them	to	have	a	more	clearly	distinguished	representation	inside	British	
embassies	abroad	(Scottish	Government,	2009).		
	
There	 is,	 therefore,	a	precedent	and	a	series	of	structures	relating	to	sub-state	diplomatic	
representations	abroad	-	both	when	they	operate	as	part	of,	and	 independent	 from,	their	
host	state’s	mission.	However,	the	proliferation	of	paradiplomatic	activities	still	presents	as-
yet-unanswered	questions.	Which	Government	are	 ‘paradiplomats’	ultimately	accountable	
to?	If	co-location	were	in	operation,	then	one	would	assume	this	was	the	foreign	office	of	the	
host-state.53	 However,	 where	 this	 might	 at	 times	 be	 a	 murky	 area	 -	 at	 other	 times	 it	 is	
abundantly	 clear	 that	 political	 direction	 is	 taken	 from	 the	 devolved,	 not	 the	 national	
government.	 In	 Scotland’s	 case,	 for	 example,	 the	 Scottish	 Government	 representation	 in	
Brussels	is	clear	that	they	take	their	political	direction	from	“Edinburgh,	not	London”	(Scottish	
Government,	2009:	para	2.6).		Another	key	outstanding	issue	is	the	practice	of	recognition.	
As	discussed	earlier	in	the	chapter,	sub-state	governments	are	not	able	to	officially	recognise	
breakaway	governments	or	independent	states,	yet	they	do	have	-	an	often	public	-	view	on	
such	matters.	 Though	 their	 informal	 support	 or	 recognition	may	 not	 carry	 any	weight	 in	
international	law,	it	is	not	at	all	difficult	to	imagine	a	scenario	where	their	positions	were	used	
to	influence	other	members	of	the	international	community,	and,	certainly,	may	confuse	and	
even	hamper	their	host-state’s	policy	in	this	area.	Equally,	one	might	speculate	that	positions	
held	‘under	the	radar’	by	sub-state	governments	could	even	be	utilised	by	a	central	state,	in	
order	to	signal	tacit	support	or	improve	relations.	
	
The	 title	of	 this	chapter	uses	 the	phrase	 ‘skirting	officialdom’.	 It	 is	worth	 returning	 to	 this	
central	theme	in	concluding	these	discussions.	Wales	and	Scotland	both	carry	out	official	and	
unofficial	diplomatic	activities.	In	Wales’	case,	the	Government	has	overseas	representations	
																																																						
53	 Indeed	 this	 is	what	 the	Memorandum	of	Understanding	between	 the	UK	and	Devolved	
Governments	states	in	no	uncertain	terms.	B4.27,	D4.23	
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that	 form	 part	 of	 official	 UK	 diplomatic	 missions	 and	 representative	 offices	 that	 are	
independent	 of	 the	 UK’s	 diplomatic	 structures,	 and	 thus	 by	 definition	 are	 ‘informal’	
diplomatic	entities.	As	the	preceding	sections	discussed,	the	decision	of	whether	or	not	to	co-
locate	with	the	UK	Government,	and	give	Welsh	representations	diplomatic	status	-	‘opting	
in’	 to	 the	 VCDR	 -	 is	 made,	 perhaps	 surprisingly,	 on	 a	 fairly	 pragmatic	 basis.	 The	 Welsh	
Government	does	not	seem	to	experience	any	major	problems	in	carrying	out	their	‘brand’	of	
diplomacy	 outside	 of	 UK	 missions,	 and	 indeed	 -	 as	 referenced	 in	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	
Chongquing	representation	-	acting	outside	of	an	official	representation	may	even	have	its	
advantages.	In	the	case	of	Wales,	its	emphasis	on	region-region	linkages	means	that	‘informal’	
diplomacy	is,	in	most	instances,	perfectly	adequate	for	its	needs.	Diplomacy	between	regional	
governments	of	 this	kind	may	 look	and	sound	much	 like	 ‘official’	or	 ‘formal’	diplomacy,	 it	
certainly	has	the	pomp	and	ceremony	to	fit,	yet	it	remains	outside	of	the	scope	of	the	VCDR,	
subsidiary	to	interactions	at	a	nation	state	level.		
	
Meanwhile,	 none	 of	 Bavaria’s	 international	 offices	 -	 including	 its	 three	 ‘political’	
representations,	enjoy	diplomatic	status.	However,	even	though	these	representations	are	
un-affiliated	 and	 thus	 outside	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 VCDR,	 interaction	with	 nation	 states	 is	
possible,	particularly	so	when	these	are	of	a	similar	geographical	size	or	weight	to	Bavaria	
itself,	though	relations	with	states	of	a	vastly	different	status	have	also	been	evidenced	in	this	
Chapter.	Taking	place	within	a	particular	context	of	German	cooperative	federalism,	Bavaria’s	
economic	 prowess,	 political	 significance	 and	 independent	 historical	 status	 -	 alongside	 the	
heightened	stature	awarded	to	its	politicians	as	a	result	of	its	role	in	a	Federal	constitution	-	
a	 lack	 of	 diplomatic	 status	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 hamper	 the	 activities	 of	 Bavaria’s	 overseas	
offices.	As	with	 all	 paradiplomatic	 activities	 taking	place	outside	of	 the	more	 regimented,	
institutionalised	scope	of	formal	state-state	relations,	context	is	king.	Similarly,	the	accord	of	
interests	between	Bavaria	and	the	Federal	Government,	particularly	under	current	governing	
arrangements,	means	that	Ministerial	visits	and	other	high-level	access	is	able	to	be	arranged	
by	Federal	 institutions	with	 little	 friction.	Meanwhile,	 the	 fact	 that	Bavaria	maintains	only	
three	 ‘representative’	 offices	 -	 as	part	of	 a	much	 larger	network	of	 trade	and	 investment	
offices	 -	 perhaps	 signals	 the	 Bavarian	 government’s	 satisfaction	 with	 diplomatic	
representation	as	a	constituent	part	of	the	Federal	Republic.	Arguably,	this	dynamic	is	easier	
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to	achieve	in	a	federation	of	previously	constituted	states	than	in	a	system	of	devolution	such	
as	the	UK,	where	the	devolved	governments	are	subsidiary	to	the	national	parliament,	and	
once	again	Bavaria’s	secure	identity,	Germany’s	system	of	cooperative	federalism,	and	the	
CSU’s	 position	 within	 the	 Federal	 government	 all	 aid	 the	 smooth-operation	 of	 inter-
governmental	 relations.	 As	 for	 the	 status	 of	 Bavaria’s	 diplomacy,	 however,	 we	 do	 see	
qualitatively	 different	 interpretations	 emerge,	 even	 a	 form	of	 political	 ‘doublespeak’.	 The	
Bavarian	Chancellory	see	themselves	as	being	able	to	carry	out	“diplomatic	relations	below	
the	level	of	foreign	policy”.	Yet,	as	our	discussion	on	the	controversy	surrounding	the	Länder’s	
Brussels	offices	demonstrated,	the	Federal	Government	maintains	that	the	proper	scope	of	
Länder	activities	expressly	precludes	diplomacy,	something	reserved	to	the	federal	level.	In	
the	Bavarian	case,	it	appears	that	it	is	less	the	process	of	diplomatic	negotiation	that	is	‘off	
limits’,	rather	than	the	substance	of	certain	foreign	policy	areas.	The	contours	of	this	exclusion	
seem	 to	 vary	 along	 with	 the	 broader	 political	 context	 at	 the	 time,	 as	 strained	 relations	
between	the	CSU	in	Bavaria	and	Chancellor	Merkel’s	Federal	Government	since	2016	have	
demonstrated.	
	
For	Scotland,	meanwhile,	the	decision	to	host	its	governmental	representations	exclusively	
within	UK	diplomatic	missions	tells	us	something	different	yet	again.	In	this	case,	the	Scottish	
Government’s	desire	to	interact	with	state-level	representations,	some	of	which	are	of	vastly	
different	size	and	international	significance	than	itself	-		in	China,	in	the	USA,	in	Japan	and	in	
Canada	-	means	that	it	requires	the	formality	and	diplomatic	status	that	co-location	with	the	
UK	brings.	Scotland	does	also	maintain	relations	with	smaller	states,	of	an	equivalent	size	to	
itself:	it	has	offices	in	Dublin	and	Oslo,	for	example.	However,	the	Scottish	experience	perhaps	
demonstrates	the	continued	importance	of	‘official’	diplomatic	representations,	a	message	
often	subsumed	by	discussions	of	the	broadening	of	diplomatic	practices,	the	proliferation	of	
diplomatic	actors	and	the	weakening	of	 the	traditional	diplomatic	system.	To	secure	high-
level	 access	 with	 states,	 to	 engage	 with	 the	 “wider	 diplomatic	 community”	 (Scottish	
Government,	2015b:	para	28)	and	to	be	accorded	the	status	of	a	diplomat	-	for	all	sorts	of	
practical	reasons	-	the	Scottish	Government	has	determined	that	acting	under	the	umbrella	
of	the	UK	state,	and	thus	under	the	terms	of	the	VCDR,	is	a	necessary	feature	of	its	overseas	
representation.	Somewhat	ironically,	the	bitterness	of	the	pill	in	this	case	-	given	the	Scottish	
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Government’s	desire	for	independence,	and	generally	fraught	inter-governmental	relations	-	
is	perhaps	testament	to	the	enduring	relevance	of	a	more	traditional	style	of	diplomacy.	
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Chapter	4:	‘It’s	[not	always]	the	Economy,	stupid’:	the	Politics	of	Paradiplomacy		
	
Introduction	
	
By	a	significant	margin,	the	most	commonly	maintained	explanation	for	sub-state	diplomacy	
is	a	need	to	pursue	international	trade	and	investment.	 In	other	words,	 ‘it’s	the	economy,	
stupid’.	And,	certainly,	sub-state	governments	do	need	to	fight	for	their	place	in	the	global	
market,	and	many	are	making	great	successes	of	doing	so.	As	economic	units,	leading	regions	
-	the	Californias	of	this	world	-	outweigh	many	states	in	terms	of	their	size	and	significance	in	
the	 global	marketplace.	 Likewise,	 domestic	 policy	 platforms	often	 rely	 on	 the	 sourcing	 of	
extra-national	funds,	and	the	electoral	success	of	sub-state	governments	is	thus	premised	on	
their	ability	to	make	the	region	known	as	an	attractive	place	to	do	business.		
	
However,	beyond	the	role	that	economic	development	undoubtedly	plays	in	the	fortunes	of	
sub-state	governments,	there	are	other	reasons	that	the	‘economy	card’	is	being	played	so	
consistently.	Primarily,	 it	 represents	a	way	 to	naturally	place	sub-state	governments	 in	an	
international	context.	Writing	in	the	late	1990s,	Cohn	and	Smith	argued	that	“international	
involvement	is	still	not	considered	to	be	an	‘ordinary’	activity	for	most	sub-national	units,	as	
it	 is	 for	 central	 governments”	 (1996:	 33).	 Though	 such	 activity	 has	 become	 much	 more	
common	 in	 the	 intervening	 years,	 it	 maintains	 what	 Hocking	 described	 as	 an	 “aura	 of	
inappropriateness”	 (1999:	 36).	 Economic	 development,	 meanwhile,	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 primary	
rationale	of	sub-state	governance:	cloaking	paradiplomatic	activity	 in	this	same	legitimacy.	
For	 example,	 Wyn	 Jones	 and	 Royles	 (2012:	 256)	 	 contrast	 the	 international	 trade	 and	
investment	promotion	activity	 in	Wales	with	 its	 international	development	policy,	arguing	
that	 the	 former	 “is	 very	 clearly	 related	 to	 a	 devolved	 competence,	 namely	 economic	
development,	providing	a	robust	legal	basis	for	WAG’s	role”.	In	the	eyes	of	a	range	of	actors	
therefore	 -	 domestic	 constituencies,	 international	 partners	 and	 host-state	 governments	 -	
paradiplomatic	activity	is	seen	as	more	‘normalised’	in	an	economic	context.		
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Relatedly,	by	virtue	of	their	core	mission,	international	trade	and	investment	activities	of	sub-
state	governments	are	in	a	better	position	when	it	comes	to	now	ubiquitous	budget	cuts	and	
re-prioritisation.	Turning	again	to	the	Welsh	case,	the	following	extract	from	an	interview	sets	
out	this	relationship	quite	clearly:	
There	is	a	really	 important	 interplay	between	the	state	of	the	economy	and	
the	sub-national	diplomacy	scene,	because	the	sub-national	diplomacy	scene	
is	 low	 hanging	 fruit	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 re-ordering	 priorities	 in	 a	 time	 of	
monetary	austerity.	And	we	ourselves	are	not	immune	from	that.	We’ve	had	
to,	in	the	last	4-5	years,	be	much	more	questioning	about	our	ability	to	jump	
onto	aeroplanes	and	go	here	or	there,	or	wherever…	we	haven’t	withdrawn	
completely,	but	we	have	to	think	much	more	carefully.54	
Therefore,	if	an	economic	case	can	be	made	for	paradiplomacy	-	a	task	made	all	the	easier	if	
this	 is	direct	 trade	and	 investment	promotion,	 though	 the	 ‘logic’	 can	also	be	 stretched	 to	
other	 profile	 raising	 activities	 -	 it	 acts	 as	 insulation	 against	 pressure	 to	 retrench	 to	 the	
domestic	sphere.		
	
Appealing	to	economic	motivations	for	paradiplomatic	activity	thus	lends	it	legitimacy,	while	
helping	to	insulate	it	from	budgetary	pressures.	However,	the	fact	is	that	the	actual	practice	
of	sub-state	diplomacy	-	in	general	terms,	as	well	as	specifically	in	our	three	cases	-	goes	well	
beyond	the	scope	of	trade	and	investment	promotion.	There	are	clearly	other	motivations	at	
play.	The	paradiplomacy	literature	hints	at	what	these	might	be:	 identity	construction	and	
the	generation	of	symbolic	capital	 (Royles,	2010;	Wyn	Jones	and	Royles,	2012),	normative	
ambitions	(Wigell,	2013),	the	mobilisation	of	a	territorial	cleavage	(Hepburn,	2008a),	to	gain	
policy	traction	at	national	levels	(Albina,	2010)	and	-	most	resolutely	-	nation	building	(Keating,	
1997;	 Keating,	 1999;	 Lecours	 and	Moreno,	 2001;	 Lecours,	 2002;	 Lecours,	 2007;	 Lecours,	
2008).	If	we	ask	the	question,	therefore,	‘why	do	regions	go	abroad’,	in	the	ways	outlined	in	
the	previous	chapter,	the	answers	are	at	once	ideological,	instrumental	and	-	perhaps	in	terms	
of	getting	‘swept	up	in	the	tide’	-	sometimes	reactive.		
	
This	Chapter	considers	the	politics	of	paradiplomacy;	the	ways	 in	which	differing	domestic	
and	 international	 contexts	 and	 the	motivations	 of	 sub-	 and	 nation-	 state	 actors	 result	 in	
																																																						
54	Interview	data,	Senior	Welsh	Government	Official	2013	
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particular	types	of	international	activity,	modes	that	do	not	correspond	to	purely	economic	
rationales.	 In	other	words,	 it	asks	why	sub-state	governments	conduct	the	more	advanced	
paradiplomatic	 activities	 that	 they	 do	 -	 both	 in	 our	 three	 cases	 and	 more	 broadly.	 The	
paradiplomatic	 literature	 has	 established	 that	 nation	 building	 (as	 a	 broad	 term)	 is	 a	 key	
motivator	 for	 sub-state	 governments	 in	 their	 international	 endeavours.	 However,	 this	
relationship	needs	to	be	considered	in	greater	detail	if	we	are	to	fully	understand	its	nature.	
Not	 all	 sub-state	 governments	 use	 paradiplomacy	 to	 ‘build	 the	 nation’	 in	 the	 same	way.	
Instead,	a	range	of	strategies	are	used	to	achieve	a	variety	of	goals.	For	Wales,	aligning	itself	
with	the	dominant	international	discourses	of	sustainable	development,	gender	equality	and	
citizen	engagement	 is	a	way	 to	place	 the	nation	 in	a	 similarly	enlightened	group	of	 ‘good	
internationalists’,	reinforcing	the	“myth	of	Welsh	radicalism”.	In	Scotland,	paradiplomacy	aids	
nation	building	by	aligning	the	Scottish	Government	with	similarly	sized	states,	mimicking	a	
foreign	 policy	 that	 puts	 it	 in	 a	 special	 category	 among	 its	 Nordic	 neighbours.	 In	 Bavaria,	
paradiplomacy	 is	 used	 to	 demonstrate	 state-like	 economic	 and	 administrative	 actorness,	
emphasising	Bavaria’s	history	as	a	sovereign	state.	
	
As	a	starting	point,	this	chapter	accepts	the	assertions	of	the	paradiplomatic	literature	and	
acknowledges	 that	paradiplomacy	 is	a	particularly	useful	 tool	 in	 sub-state	nation	building.	
However,	 it	 probes	 this	 relationship	 further	 and	 -	 in	 doing	 so	 -	 reframes	 paradiplomatic	
interactions	 as	 part	 of	 a	 sovereignty	 game.	 By	 using	 this	 terminology,	 the	 intention	 is	 to	
conceptualise	 and	 account	 for	 the	 ‘back	 and	 forth’	 between	 states	 and	 sub-state	
governments	 that	 revolve	 around	 the	 rightful	 or	 legitimate	 sites	 of	 power	 and	 political	
authority.	While	accepting	the	basic	utility	of	paradiplomacy	in	nation	building	endeavours,	
this	analysis	takes	a	step	back	and	places	paradiplomacy	within	the	context	of	a	bigger	-	and	
much	 longer	 -	 sovereignty	game	that	 sub-state	governments	are	playing	with	 their	nation	
state	counterparts.	While	nation-building	is	part	of	this	game,	the	game	itself	is	broader	-	it	is	
about	 the	 relative	 roles	 and	 power	 relationships	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 sub-state	
government.	 It	 is	 these	 -	 traditionally	 hierarchical	 -	 roles	 and	 relationships	 which	
paradiplomacy	 necessarily	 plays	 on	 and	 challenges.	 A	 brief	 outline	 of	 the	 framework	 of	
sovereignty	games	follows,	before	the	chapter	moves	on	to	assess	the	nature	of	the	games	
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being	played	 in	each	of	our	case	studies,	and	the	ways	 in	which	paradiplomacy	feeds	 into	
them.	
	
Sub-state	Sovereignty	Games	
In	their	examination	of	Welsh	paradiplomacy,	Wyn	Jones	and	Royles	(2012:	251)	argue	that	
sub-state	 diplomacy	 represents	 a	 particularly	 good	 field	 within	 which	 to	 study	 inter-
governmental	relations,	or	IGR.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	leading	role	occupied	by	states	
in	international	affairs,	as	well	as	the	“prerogatives	and	privileges	that	are	entailed	by	it”,	are	
very	often	“jealously	guarded”	by	states:	
Especially	in	the	context	of	regional	actors	within	the	borders	of	the	state	who	
chafe	 at	 the	 restrictions	 inherent	 in	 the	designation	 ‘stateless	 nation’.	 Sub-
state	 diplomacy	 increases	 the	 potential	 for	 tension	 in	 central	 -	 sub-state	
relations	and	can	therefore	highlight	the	limits	of	IGR:	or	more	precisely,	the	
potentially	limiting	and	disciplining	role	of	sovereignty	on	relations	between	
states	and	regional	actors	(Wyn	Jones	and	Royles,	2012:	251).	
Another	way	to	characterise	this	relationship,	and	the	back-and-forth	between	the	state	and	
the	sub-state	government,	is	with	the	vocabulary	of	a	sovereignty	game.	For	Adler-Nissen	and	
Gad	(2014:	3),	sovereignty	games	are,	fundamentally	“strategic	claims	in	relation	to	authority	
and	 responsibility	 referring	 to	 sovereignty”.	 The	games	 themselves,	 the	authors	 continue,	
play	 out	 in	 “discourses,	 institutions	 and	 practices”,	 and	 in	 playing	 such	 games	 the	 actors	
eventually	end	up	“stretching	the	meaning	and	functions	of	sovereignty”.		
	
By	virtue	of	the	association	between	statehood	and	diplomatic	actorness,	the	international	
relations	of	 sub-state	units	 necessarily	 touch	on	 -	 even	 in	 an	 implicit	 sense	 -	 sovereignty.	
Therefore,	as	well	as	paradiplomacy	representing	a	useful	framework	for	exploring	the	role	
and	 limits	 of	 intergovernmental	 relations,	 the	 functioning	 of	 these	 inter-governmental	
relationships,	perhaps	in	their	most	broad	sense,	further	offers	an	illuminating	frame	from	
which	to	understand	the	motivations	and	conditioning	factors	behind	sub-state	diplomacy	
itself.	 Different	 types	 of	 intergovernmental	 relationships	 -	 in	 terms	 of	 party	 political	
congruence,	the	division	of	competences	between	tiers	of	government	and	the	institutional	
and	working	arrangements	in	place	-	all	potentially	impact	upon	the	nature	and	the	scope	of	
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paradiplomatic	 practices	 that	 the	 sub-state	 government	 engages	 in.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	
precise	contours	of	the	relationship	between	the	different	actors	in	a	sub-state	sovereignty	
game	are	constitutive	to	the	nature	of	the	game	itself.		
	
If	we	accept	 the	metaphor	of	 a	 sovereignty	 game,	we	 can	 identify	 them	 in	 all	manner	of	
guises.	Calls	for	increased	powers,	for	competence	over	specific	issues	and	renegotiations	of	
the	basis	of	federal	or	devolved	arrangements	all	represent	claims	about	relative	power	and	
authority.	 These	 claims	 are	 often	 made	 with	 an	 appeal	 to	 popular	 sovereignty	 and	 are	
grounded	 in	 the	 moral	 framework	 of	 self-determination.	 Paradiplomacy	 is	 one	 field,	 or	
operational	space,	in	which	this	game	is	played	out	to	great	effect.	This	is	due	to	how	closely	
foreign	 affairs	 and	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 sovereignty	 are	 tied	 together.	 By	 conducting	
paradiplomacy,	 sub-state	 governments	 are	 making	 a	 strategic	 claim	 about	 power	 and	
authority	 -	 namely	 over	 a	 competence	 or	 issue	 area	 that	 sits	 within	 the	 broader	 field	 of	
diplomacy	or	 foreign	affairs.	 This	 strategic	 claim	 is	 the	essence	of	 a	 sovereignty	 game.	At	
heart,	such	activities	-	in	our	three	case	studies	-	seem	to	be	all	about	the	recognition	of	the	
sub-state	 government	 as	 something	 more	 than	 a	 ‘mere	 region’.	 It	 doesn’t	 have	 to	 be	
recognition	as	a	natural	state-in-waiting	or	even	a	potential	state,	but	rather	that	it	has	some	
sort	of	special	status	and	significance	warranting	its	‘seat	at	the	table’.	
	
	Sub-state	sovereignty	games	are	 in	 fact	 remarkably	similar	 to	what	Adler-Nissen	and	Gad	
categorise	as	post-colonial	or	post-imperial	sovereignty	games	(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2014)	
-	indeed	many	of	these	units	would	also	fall	under	the	umbrella	term	of	being	‘sub-state’.	For	
Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	the	concept	of	a	post-colonial	sovereignty	game	is	a	way	to	understand	
the	 “interplay	 between	 postimperial	 relations	 and	 European	 integration”;	 it	 allows	 for	
analysis	of	how	“micro-polities	manoeuvre	between	different	centres”,	their	‘metropole’	or	
referent	state	and	the	European	Union.	For	the	authors,	post-colonial	‘micro	polities’	–	here,	
Adler	Nissen	and	Gad	are	looking	specifically	at	the	Nordic	region	–	represent	a	special	type	
of	actor:	
	
Being	neither	 formally	 sovereign	nor	 simplify	hierarchically	 subordinated	 to	
their	metropole,	the	self-governing	countries	are	political	entities	that	do	not	
readily	 fit	 the	 conceptual	 categories	 offered	 by	 the	 conventional	 theory	
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addressing	 international	 politics	 and	 international	 law…	 Self-government	
arrangements	may	even	include	the	transfer	of	jurisdiction	in	some	areas	of	
foreign	 affairs	 (Loukacheva,	 2008:109)	 –	 an	 area	 traditionally	 so	 closely	
articulated	ot	sovereignty	that	it	is	considered	the	prerogative	of	the	sovereign	
(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2014:	16)	
	It	 is	 a	 way	 to	 ‘open	 up’	 the	 concept	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 explore	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 it	 is	
negotiated,	taking	in	a	range	of	possible	self-governing	arrangements	and	degrees	of	relative	
subjetivity	(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2014:	7,	14).		
	
Just	 like	 postcolonial	 sovereignty	 games,	 sub-state	 sovereignty	 games	 revolve	 around	 the	
acknowledgement	 of	 the	 polity	 or	 ‘potential	 state’	 as	 a	 player	 of	 the	 game.	 	 The	 key	
difference,	however,	is	that	the	‘potential	stateness’	of	sub-state	governments	as	a	broader	
group	is	more	contested,	and	the	relationship	between	the	state	and	sub-state	government	
is	more	traditionally	hierarchical.	Nonetheless,	in	the	case	of	sub-state	governments,	it	is	this	
very	 right	 to	 participate	 that	 is	 being	negotiated	 through	paradiplomatic	 actions,	 and	 the	
acceptance	 of	 the	 claim	 varies	 to	 a	 significant	 degree	 across	 states	 and	 sub-state	
governments.	In	sub-state	sovereignty	games,	paradiplomacy,	in	particular,	becomes	a	way	
to	mark	out	the	‘special’	status	of	the	polity	through	encroaching	on	a	traditionally	state-held	
domain,	and	in	other	ways	revolves	around	the	status	of	the	region	within	the	state.	The	chart	
below	outlines	the	sovereignty	game	structure	as	envisaged	by	Addler-Nissen	and	Gad,	with	
the	addition	of	sub-state	sovereignty	games	by	the	author.	
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Essentially,	the	argument	here	is	that	stateless	nations	may	conduct	paradiplomacy	as	part	of	
a	sovereignty	game,	one	played	with	the	implicit	objective	of	being	acknowledged	as	a	rightful	
player	in	this	game	itself.	The	sovereignty	game	is	about	the	status	of	the	region	within	the	
state,	rather	than	any	set	end-point	or	fixed	objective:	it	is	played	out	in	the	actions	of	the	
sub-state	governments	and	the	counter-actions,	reactions	or	restrictions	from	the	state.	It	is	
shaped	 by	 the	 parties	 in	 power	 at	 each	 tier	 of	 government	 and	 the	 system	 of	 inter-
governmental	relations	between	the	state	and	the	sub-state	level.		
Sovereighty	game:	"strategic	claims	in	relation	to	authority	and	
responsibility,	referring	to	sovereignty"	Adler-Nissen,	2014:3
At	least	two	players;	a	shared	understanding	of	the	game	being	
played;	an	implicit	or	explicit	reference	to	an	either/or	conception	of	
sovereignty;	no	fixed	rules;	centres	around	the	relational	distribution	
of	subjectivity	(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad	2012).
Vertical	Games
At	least	two	players	- involves	the	
allocation	of	competences	
between	sub-state,	state	and	
international	actors	such	as	the	EU	
(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2012)	
Postcolonial	sovereignty	games:	
involve	the	acknowledgement	of	the	
polity	or	'potential	state'	as	a	player	of	
the	game	(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2012)
First	round:	polity	aquires	
independence,	 becomes	a	state	and	the	
game	becomes	a	horizontal	one	(Adler-
Nissen	and	Gad,	2012,
Remainders	of	this	process	 get	stuck	in	
the	first	round,	don't	aquire	
independence.	 Now	the	sovereignty	
game	is	played	through	the	tactical	
non-acquiring	of	indepdnece	 (Adler-
Nissen	and	Gad,	2012)
Other	soveriegnty	games:	EU/member	
states.	Revolves	around	relative	
competences	and	power	distributions	
(Adler	-Nissen	and	Gad,	2012)
Sub-state	soverignty	games:	about	
acknowledging	that	the	region		has	
some	sort	of	claim	to	special	status.	
First	round:	some	regions	seek	and	
aquire	independence	 (becomes	a	
horizontal	game),	or	the	right	to	
vote/decide	upon	independence	 (claim	
to	a	seat	at	the	table	accepted	-
remains	a	vertical	game)
Regions	not	actively	seeking	statehood	or	who	
have	tired	and	failed	to	aquire	it	nonetheless	
utilise	their	claim	to	a	seat	at	the	table,	the	game	
becomes	about	the	status	of	the	region	within	
the	state	
Horizontal	Games
At	least	two	players	of	equal	
(formal)	status	- most	commonly	
between	states	(Adler-Nissen	and	
Gad,	2012)
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The	notion	of	sovereignty	games,	as	Adler-Nissen	and	Gammeltoft-Hansen	are	keen	to	point	
out	 (2008:	 7),	 is	 intended	 only	 as	 a	 heuristic	 device.	 However,	 the	 focus	 on	 a	 game	 as	
comprised	of	players,	rules	and	moves	is	one	that	is	particularly	useful	in	this	context.	It	is	a	
way	to	“open	up’	the	concept	of	sovereignty	and	consider	its	negotiation,	instead	of	treating	
it	 as	 a	 static	 condition	 (Adler-Nissen	 and	Gad,	 2014:	 7,	 14)	 Rather	 than	 focussing	 on	 the	
perceived	end-goal	of	governing	parties,	we	can	 instead	consider	the	game	 in	 its	entirety.	
Much	 like	 devolution,	 famously	 “a	 process,	 not	 an	 event”,	 a	 sovereignty	 game	 is	 not	
something	with	a	defined	end-point	-	it	is	the	game	itself,	rather	than	any	eventual	score,	that	
is	the	subject	of	this	study.		
	
Nation	Building	and	the	Mimicry	of	Statehood:	Playing	the	Long	Game	
	
An	essential	element	of	a	sovereignty	game	is	the	performance	of	sovereignty.	In	other	words,	
to	make	a	strategic	claim	about	authority	and	responsibility,	a	sub-state	government	must	
perform	 the	 narrative	 of	 sovereignty.	 In	 ‘vertical’	 sovereignty	 games,	 “political	 and	
administrative	 elites	 are	 playing	 on	 the	 different	 legal	 and	 symbolic	 structures	 related	 to	
sovereignty	to	enhance	their	autonomy	in	both	the	domestic	and	the	 international	arena”	
(Adler-Nissen	 and	Gammeltoft-Hansen,	 2008:	 12).	One	way	 for	 sub-state	 governments	 to	
enact	 this	 performance	 of	 sovereignty	 is	 through	 the	 mimicry	 of	 a	 type	 of	 actor	 whose	
sovereignty	is	undisputed,	and	indeed	is	a	central	tenet	of	their	character	and	status	on	the	
world	stage:	the	sovereign	state.	Such	mimetic	performances	can	therefore	be	understood	as	
moves	in	the	sovereignty	game,	moves	which	may	recast	the	balance	of	power	between	state	
and	sub-state	actors	or	impact	the	self-perception	of	the	affective	region.		
	
The	concept	of	‘mimicry’,	for	these	purposes	-	a	strategy	of	outwardly	demonstrating	state-
like	characteristics	in	the	absence	of	formal	sovereignty	(McConnell,	2016;	McConnell	et	al.,	
2012)	is,	fundamentally,	all	about	perception.	The	perceptions	of	external	actors	that	the	unit	
has	some	semblance	of	legal	competence	or	diplomatic	authority	matters	even	though	such	
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competence	 may,	 in	 fact,	 be	 absent.	 This	 feat	 is	 achieved	 by	 playing	 on	 the	 powerful	
associations	between	sovereignty,	diplomacy,	statehood	and	nationhood.		In	some	instances	
this	mimicry	may	take	the	form	of	parody;	for	example,	‘micropatias’	or	self-declared	states	
that	represent	a	protest	movement	draw	heavily	on	formalised	performances	and	established	
narratives	around	sovereignty	and	international	recognition	(McConnell	et	al.,	2012:	810).	In	
other	 cases,	 such	 as	 those	 of	 break-away	 governments	 and	 unrecognised	 states	 seeking	
formal	recognition	as	a	full	state,	the	mimicry	undertaken	has	the	clear	aim	of	establishing	
their	right	or	appropriateness	as	the	legitimate	representative	of	their	people	and	easing	the	
path	 towards	 full	 statehood	 by	 appearing	 as	 natural	 kin	 to	 existing	 members	 of	 the	
international	community.	In	the	case	of	the	Tibetan	Government	in	Exile	(TGiE),	the	strategy	
adopted	 is	 one	 keen	 to	 “appropriate	 symbols	 of	 legitimacy	 in	 order	 to	 maintain	 their	
governmental	claims,	with	the	“language	of	stateness”	(Hansen	and	Stepputat,	2001:9)	being	
particularly	important	as	they	negotiate	their	place	on	the	international	stage”	(McConnell,	
2016:	806).	
	
If	we	accept	that	a	key	motivator	for	paradiplomatic	activity	is	the	desire	to	‘build	the	nation’	
domestically,	 then	a	mimetic	 framework	 is	one	within	which	we	can	most	 clearly	 see	 the	
process	unfolding.	In	one	sense,	paradiplomacy	is	part	of	a	nation-building	process	in	that	it	
helps	 to	 anchor	 the	 nation	 in	 an	 accepted	 and	 familiar	 discourse	 that	 strengthens	 and	
normalizes	national	sentiments	in	a	domestic	setting.	This	is	enabled	by	taking	on	(mimicking)	
the	outward	 appearance	of	 a	 state:	 a	 defining	 characteristic	 of	which	being	 the	 ability	 to	
conduct	 diplomatic	 relations.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 goal	 of	 nation	 building	 is	 realized	 in	 a	
domestic	setting,	within	the	affective	region	itself.	In	another	sense,	mimicry	helps	to	convey	
the	 image	 of	 the	 nation	 outwards,	 again	 by	 appearing	 state-like	 and	 therefore	 more	
legitimate	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 international	 community.	 Coming	 full	 circle,	 this	 enhanced	
international	 legitimacy	 further	 reinforces	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 sub-state	 government	 as	
something	 ‘more	than’	a	mere	region	within	 its	own	constituency,	and	within	the	state	as	
whole.	This,	 in	turn,	 is	what	a	sovereignty	game	is	all	about:	relative	power	and	authority.	
Indeed,	 it	 neededent	 be	 within	 the	 restricted	 parameters	 of	 identifiable	 nation	 building	
project	that	this	dynamic	plays	out,	it	is	less	the	‘nation’	component	that	is	critical	than	the	
desire	 to	use	a	strong	sub-state	 identity	as	part	of	a	political	project,	making	a	statement	
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about	relative	power	and	authority.	The	ways	in	which	much	paradiplomacy	can	be	construed	
as	 projecting	 and	 bolstering	 an	 identity	 that	 chimes	 with	 dominant	 liberal	 international	
norms,	for	example	around	democracy	promotion,	gender	equality	and	environmentalism,	
can	be	seen	as	evidence	of	this	relationship.		
	
McConnell	(2016)	points	to	this	phenomenon	-	of	crafting	an	international	message	to	‘fit’	
dominant	international,	predominantly	‘Western’	norms	-	in	the	case	of	the	TGiE.	Here,	the	
argument	is	that	“the	rationale	for	much	of	the	TGIE’s	investment	in	state-like	institutions,	
practices	and	discourses’”	has	been	the	‘seeking	of	legitimacy’;	“of	the	exile	administration	
wanting	 to	 prove	 itself	 trustworthy	 and	 deserving	 of	 support	 in	 the	 eye	 of	 international	
audiences”(McConnell,	 2016:	 161).	 This	 form	of	 diplomacy	 and	 statecraft	 has	been	about	
crafting	 a	 message	 and	 an	 identity	 that	 fit	 in	 with	 the	 expectations	 of	 contemporary	
international	politics.	It’s	“a	classic	case	of	telling	particular	(Western)	audiences	what	they	
want	to	hear”.	In	this	case,	it	is	that	the	Tibetan	people	are	peaceful,	democratic,	concerned	
with	the	rights	of	Women	and	the	environment.	In	fact,	McConnell	goes	on	to	argue	that,	“in	
recent	years	the	TGiE	has	been	engaged	in	an	almost	tick-box	exercise	of	meeting	the	criteria	
of	these	norms	of	good	governance”	(2016:	160).		
	
There	are	clear	parallels	between	this	exercise	and	the	norm-driven	international	activities	of	
Scotland	and	Wales,	both	in	terms	of	the	precise	themes	that	are	drawn	upon	and	the	ways	
in	 which	 such	 messages	 attempt	 to	 marry	 the	 external	 perceptions	 of	 the	 nation	 with	
dominant	 international	 norms.	 Most	 notable	 in	 this	 regard	 are	 their	 international	
development	 programs	 -	 Wales	 for	 Africa	 and	 Scotland-Lesotho	 -	 but	 the	 work	 of	 both	
Scotland	 and	 Wales	 around	 the	 UK’s	 response	 to	 climate	 change	 and	 the	 democracy	
promotion	 exercises	 of	 the	 legislatures	 in	 both	 nations	 (specifically	 with	 regards	 to	 e-
democracy	 and	 citizen	 engagement)	 also	 point	 to	 such	 a	 project	 of	 norm-alignment.	 In	
Bavaria,	the	role	of	mimicry	in	their	paradiplomatic	endeavours	appears	more	closely	aligned	
to	their	effectiveness	and	economic	actorness,	key	‘state-like’	characteristics,	rather	than	any	
thematic	 mimicry	 of	 liberal	 international	 norms.	 Having	 said	 this,	 they	 do	 also	 conduct	
normative	paradiplomacy	-	seen	most	clearly	in	the	technical	and	legal	assistance	provided	to	
emerging	 democracies	 in	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe.	 An	 outline	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
	 139	
sovereignty	 game	 being	 played	 in	 each	 of	 our	 case	 studies,	 and	 the	 range	 of	 mimicking	
strategies	that	each	sub-state	government	employs	in	their	paradiplomacies,	will	be	explored	
in	more	detail	below.	
I. Wales	
The	sovereignty	game	being	played	in	Wales	is	one	that	could	be	described	as	volatile.	As	Wyn	
Jones	&	Scully	argue:	“the	record	of	Welsh	constitution	building	is	a	record	of	failure…	the	
successive	edifices	constructed	have	been	characterized	by	almost	continual	instability”(Wyn	
Jones	and	Scully,	2012).	The	original	devolution	dispensation	agreed	in	1998	and	granting	only	
secondary	law-making	powers	was	profoundly	flawed.	The	agreement	was	replaced	in	2006	
by	a	new	Government	of	Wales	Act	formally	separating	the	National	Assembly	and	the	Welsh	
Assembly	 Government	 and	 unlocking	 some	 primary	 law	making	 powers	 -	 though	 heavily	
circumscribed.	The	powers	of	the	National	Assembly	were	further	enhanced	in	2011,	allowing	
full	 law-making	 powers	 -	 though	 still	 in	 limited	 areas	 conferred	 to	 the	 Assembly	 by	
Westminster.	Despite	two	further	Government	of	Wales	Acts,	the	scope	of	the	powers	held	
by	the	National	Assembly	for	Wales	are	still	the	subject	of	debate,	both	in	terms	of	the	specific	
issue	areas	over	which	the	Assembly	has	competence,	and	on	the	principle	of	a	conferred,	
rather	than	reserved-powers,	model	of	devolution.	In	addition	to	this	constitutional	volatility,	
other	factors	leave	their	mark	on	the	nature	of	the	sovereignty	game	being	played	in	Wales.	
The	electoral	dominance	of	Welsh	Labour,	and	the	‘clear	red	water’	historically	separating	
Welsh	Labour	from	its	national	counterparts,	has	meant	that	the	nation-building	project	in	
Wales	has	not	been	monopolised	by	a	sub-state	nationalist	party,	but	rather	has	been	a	more	
inclusive	project	 to	which	parties	across	 the	political	 spectrum	seem	to	subscribe	 to,	with	
greater	or	lesser	enthusiasm	(Royles	and	Wyn	Jones,	2010:	253).	In	more	recent	times,	there	
is	 a	 sense	 that	UK-wide	 Labour	 party	 has	 instead	moved	 to	 the	 ‘left’	 of	Welsh	 Labour;	 a	
different	 dynamic	 perhaps,	 but	 the	 key	 element	 of	 differentiation	 remains.	 Lastly,	 party	
political	incongruence	across	the	whole	of	the	UK	means	that	there	are	more	than	two	players	
in	 this	 sovereignty	 game:	 Scotland	 is	 used	 as	 a	 reference	 point,	 to	 seek	 additional	 or	
reconfigured	powers	and	to	provide	precedent	and	context	for	Wales’	external	relations.	The	
nature	of	this	game	as	it	plays	out	in	a	paradiplomatic	frame	is	explored	below.	
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The	ways	in	which	the	National	Assembly	for	Wales,	as	a	devolved	legislature,	engages	in	the	
project	of	nation-building	 is	 particularly	 illuminating,	 and	points	 to	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	
mantle	of	nationhood	adds	prestige	and	legitimacy	to	different	tiers	of	government	(Lecours	
and	Moreno,	2001;	Lecours,	2002;	Keating,	1999).	The	NAfW	can	be	seen	to	have	carved	out	
a	distinctive	approach	to	paradiplomacy,	one	that	was	led	thematically	by	the	priorities	of	its	
Presiding	 Officer,	 Welsh	 Labour’s	 Rosemary	 Butler	 between	 2011-2016.55	 These	 themes	
defined	a	body-wide	strategy	adopted	for	 international	engagement,	based	around	citizen	
engagement,	e-democracy,	sustainability	and	scrutiny.	Added	to	this	list	is	the	issue	of	gender	
equality,	which	the	Presiding	Officer	profiled	in	a	number	of	inward	visits	and	public	events.56		
According	 to	 senior	 officials	 within	 the	 Assembly,	 the	 point	 of	 distinction	 between	 their	
approach	 to	 paradiplomacy	 and	 that	 of	 the	 Welsh	 Government	 is	 that,	 where	 the	
Government	 requires	 economic	 outputs	 from	 its	 interactions,	 the	 Assembly	 is	 “driven	 by	
democratic	goals”.57	The	desire	to	be	seen	as	“a	beacon	for	learning”	-	for	example	sharing	
best	practice	on	scrutiny	with	African	Parliaments	of	a	similar	size	to	Wales’	devolved	body	-	
speaks	 clearly	 to	 a	 strategy	of	mimicry;	 promoting	dominant	 international	 norms	 to	 third	
countries	-	mimicking	the	diplomatic	and	democracy	promotion	roles	of	Western	states	-	is	a	
way	to	evidence	their	prevalence	within	Wales	itself.	As	a	nation	building	mechanism,	this	
allows	 the	 nation	 and	 the	 values	 it	 embodies	 -	 as	 a	 young,	 transparent	 and	 tolerant	
democracy,	“small,	 smart	and	successful”	 (Royles,	2010)	 -	 to	be	communicated	externally,	
demonstrating	to	the	international	community	its	commitment	to	these	norms	by	espousing	
them	elsewhere.	This	form	of	mimicry	also	acts	to	build	the	nation	internally,	bringing	the	
prestige	of	an	international	educator,	an	exemplar	in	the	field	of	democracy	building,	back	to	
the	home	front.		
	
The	Welsh	Government’s	paradiplomatic	activities	also	have	a	strong	link	to	such	dominant	
international	 norms,	 despite	 the	 economic	 rationales	 that	 are	 frequently	 cited.	 This	 is	
particularly	apparent	 in	the	ways	that	their	diplomatic	endeavours	 feed	 into	the	 ‘myth’	of	
Welsh	radicalism	(Wyn	Jones	and	Royles,	2012)	and	the	‘clear	red	water’	between	the	Welsh	
																																																						
55	Interview	data,	Senior	National	Assembly	for	Wales	officials,	2013	
56	Interview	data,	Senior	National	Assembly	for	Wales	officials,	2013	
57	Interview	data,	Senior	National	Assembly	for	Wales	officials,	interview	2013	
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and	UK	Labour	parties.	Wyn	Jones	and	Royles	explore	the	role	that	Welsh	paradiplomacy	plays	
in	 identity-building,	 finding	 that	 this	 has	 not	 primarily	 been	 seen	 in	 the	mobilisation	 of	 a	
territorial	cleavage	by	a	single	party,	but	in	all	parties’	responses	to	the	emergence	of	one.	
Such	evidence	can	perhaps	be	deduced	from	the	fact	that	-	as	in	Scotland	-	it	was	Labour	and	
Conservative	politicians	who	“played	the	leading	role	in	sub-state	diplomacy”.	This	was	partly	
because	of	the	“political	usefulness	of	sub-state	diplomacy	for	such	‘unionist’	politicians	as	a	
means	of	undermining	‘nationalist	claims	that	independence	is	a	prerequisite	for	engagement	
in	international	affairs”	(Wyn	Jones	and	Royles,	2012:	253).	However,	the	authors	continue	
with	their	suspicions	that	there	was	more	than	simple	instrumentalism	at	play	in	the	Welsh	
case,	arguing	that	“members	of	state-wide	parties	may	well	support	the	development	of	sub-
state	diplomatic	activity	not	only	 to	head	off	 ‘the	Nats’	but	also	because	 they	 themselves	
subscribe	to	a	nation	building	project	at	the	sub-state	level”	(2012:	253).	This	nation-building	
project,	 the	 authors	 argue,	 can	 explain	much	 of	 the	Welsh	 Government’s	 paradiplomatic	
activity;	“in	particular,	the	programme	expressed	a	desire	to	project	a	certain	vision	of	Welsh	
nationhood	that	stresses	internationalism	as	a	core	element	of	the	‘radical	tradition’,	itself	
one	of	the	constitutive	myths	of	Welsh	politics”	(Wyn	Jones	and	Royles,	2012:	260).	In	Wales,	
the	informality	of	much	paradiplomatic	activity	allows	for	a	distinct	identity	to	be	played	out	
in	a	multitude	of	ways	that	transcend	the	relatively	narrow	scope	of	the	Welsh	Government’s	
authority	 under	 their	 current	 devolution	 dispensation.	 Furthermore,	 the	 coherence	 of	
paradiplomatic	 activities	 around	 the	 themes	 of	 international	 development	 -	 including	
branding	Wales	a	‘the	first	ever	fair	trade	nation’,	the	protection	of	minority	languages	and	
action	on	climate	change	seems	to	suggest	a	strategic	alignment	with	dominant	international	
norms,	bolstering	its	nation-building	project.	
	
One	would	assume	that	party	political	congruence	or	incongruence	(where	"governments	at	
different	levels	within	a	state	are	led	by	distinct	political	parties”	(McEwan	et	al.,	2012:	187)–	
would	 matter	 greatly	 in	 a	 sub-state	 sovereignty	 game.	 However,	 evidence	 from	 Wales	
demonstrates	that	the	relationship	between	these	two	variables	is	not	at	all	straightforward;	
constitutional	issues	and	territorial	cleavages	cross-cut	the	more	traditional	left-right	axis	of	
the	UK’s	party	political	system.	As	we	have	seen,	it	is	not	just	sub-state	nationalist	parties	who	
engage	in	nation-building,	utilising	paradiplomacy	in	the	processes	and	-	likewise	-	it	 is	not	
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necessarily	the	case	that	party-political	incongruence	will	always	manifest	in	an	antagonistic	
paradiplomatic	stance.	The	cases	of	Wales	is	in	fact	quite	complex	in	this	regard.	Despite	a	
further	degree	of	incongruence	between	Welsh	and	UK	Governments	following	the	formation	
of	 a	 Conservative	 -	 Liberal	 Democrat	 coalition	 Government	 in	 Westminster	 in	 the	 2010	
Parliament	(whereas	previously	a	Welsh	Labour-Plaid	Cymru	coalition	in	Wales	and	a	Labour	
Government	in	Westminster	aligned	the	two	Governments	along	left-leaning	terms),	there	
remained	a	surprising	level	of	continuity	in	terms	of	Welsh	paradiplomatic	activity.	This	could	
partly	be	attributed	to	there	being	a	less	pressing	need	for	the	group-interest	definition	and	
territorial-mobilization	functions	of	paradiplomacy,	given	that	the	domestic	agendas	of	the	
two	 governments	 are	 already	 divergent	 to	 a	 significant	 degree.	 Indeed,	 one	 Welsh	
interviewee	points	to	the	fact	that,	contrary	to	what	one	might	expect:	
The	real	division	within	the	UK	in	terms	of	policy	dynamics,	from	the	Welsh	
context,	is	not	between	the	Labour	party	in	Wales	and	the	Conservative	party	
at	 the	UK	 level,	 the	 real	 difference	 is	 between	 Cardiff	 Bay	 and	Whitehall…	
whoever	is	in	power	at	Westminster	and	Whitehall,	it	is	still	Westminster	and	
Whitehall…	 in	 the	 international	context,	 that’s	 the	more	 important	division,	
it’s	the	division	between	different	tiers	of	government.	This	is	probably	more	
significant,	 in	 a	way,	 than	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 parties,	 the	 political	
difference.58	
	
That	 this	 division	between	different	 tiers	 of	 government	was	 the	 salient	one,	 rather	 than	
anything	more	party	political,	 lend	weight	to	the	argument	that	 -	 rather	than	being	about	
specific	issues	or	party-political	dynamics,	the	sovereignty	game	is	first	and	foremost	about	
relative	power	 and	 subjectivity.	Additionally,	 the	 existence	of	 party-political	 incongruence	
between	 Welsh	 Labour	 and	 the	 (then)	 Conservative-Liberal	 Democrat	 UK	 Government	
coalition	 actually	 enabled	 inter-governmental	 relations	 that	were	 in	 some	ways	 improved	
from	the	status-quo	ante.	According	to	the	same	Welsh	Government	interviewee:	
In	a	sense,	when…	the	coalition	government	came	in	three	years	ago,	there	
was	 probably	 an	 element	 of	 sort	 of	 mutual	 relief…	 at	 that	 point,	 if	 the	
administration	here	disagrees	with	the	administration	there,	it	feels	entitled	
to	say	so	very	freely	and	very	easily,	there’s	no	embarrassment	about	saying	
so	and	they	expect	that	and	they	accept	it.	Where,	of	course,	with	the	Labour	
administrations	they	had	to	bury	them	and	these	sort	of	subterranean	cables	
																																																						
58	Interview	data,	senior	Welsh	Government	official	2013	
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were	laid	in	place,	everything	had	to	be	under-ground,	in	a	curious	way	now	it	
is	a	little	bit	easier	to	disagree.	Yes,	there’s	tension,	everyone	expects	there	to	
be	tension,	you	can	talk	about	the	tensions	now.59	
This	‘mutual	relief’	has	been	enabled,	however,	by	the	fact	that	the	incoming	UK	Government	
coalition	has	not	attempted	to	‘clamp	down	or	inhibit	our	ability	to	operate	in	this	space”,	
instead	honouring	the	“protocol	and	precedents	which	exist”.	60	However,	current	UK	political	
discussion	around	Brexit	will	undoubtedly	introduce	new	strains	on	this	relationship,	not	least	
because	the	‘stakes’	are	now	so	much	higher.	
	
In	Wales,	therefore,	we	see	a	clear	attempt	to	align	a	‘new	democracy’	with	dominant,	liberal	
and	internationalist	norms.	The	Welsh	Government’s	mimicry	of	both	this	particular	narrative	
and	more	broadly	of	the	symbols	and	language	of	stateness	can	be	construed	as	part	of	an	
attempt	to	build	the	nation	domestically,	to	enhance	the	credibility	of	Wales	as	a	‘real	player’,	
deserving	 of	 a	 seat	 at	 the	 international	 table.	 Specifically,	 paradiplomacy	 -	 owing	 to	 its	
informal,	 largely	 non-statutory	 nature	 -	 enables	Wales	 to	 perform	 sovereignty	 in	 a	more	
visible	 and	 arguably	 convincing	manner	 than	 it	 is	 traditionally	 allowed,	 within	 its	 narrow	
purview	of	conferred	powers.	This	means	that	it	remains	a	particularly	effective	tool	for	the	
Welsh	Government,	and	seems	to	represent	a	core	element	of	its	broader	sovereignty	game	
and	efforts	 to	reposition	 itself	 in	relation	both	to	the	UK	Government	and	other	devolved	
nations.		
	
	
II. Scotland	
	
The	sovereignty	game	that	Scotland	plays	is	one	with	heightened	stakes.	Unlike	in	Wales	or	
Bavaria,	the	prospect	of	an	independent	-	i.e.	fully	sovereign	-	Scotland	is	a	credible	one;	the	
Scottish	 Government	 in	 2014	 directly	 raised	 this	 prospect	 through	 a	 referendum	 of	 the	
Scottish	electorate.	Although	the	vote	result	in	a	narrow	‘no’	to	Scottish	independence,	the	
																																																						
59	Interview	data,	senior	Welsh	Government	official	2013	
60	Interview	data,	senior	Welsh	Government	official	2013	
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game	was	indelibly	marked	by	the	moves	made	-	both	by	the	Scottish	Government	in	calling	
for	the	vote,	and	by	the	UK	Government	in	its	acknowledgement	of	the	right	of	the	Scottish	
people	to	ultimately	decide	on	continued	membership	of	the	Union.	The	game	is	also	marked	
by	the	recent	party-political	dominance	of	the	SNP,	a	dominance	that	‘ought’	to	have	been	
impossible	under	the	voting	arrangements	agreed	for	the	Scottish	Parliament	(Cairney,	2011:	
2)	and,	as	in	the	case	of	European	post-colonial	sovereignty	games,	is	often	played	out	with	
reference	to	the	EU	-	in	particular,	with	the	narrative	of	an	independent	Scotland	integrated	
within	a	European	Union.		
	
Just	 as	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 sovereignty	 game	 in	 Scotland	 stands	 apart	 from	our	 other	 case	
studies,	Scotland’s	nation-building	project,	and	the	role	that	paradiplomacy	plays	within	it,	is	
also	markedly	different	 to	 that	 evident	 in	Wales	 and	Bavaria.	 For	many	 stateless	nations,	
Wales	included,	independence	-	an	eventual	state	corresponding	with	the	nation	-	is	not	the	
overriding	aim	of	nation	building	efforts,	at	 least	not	 in	the	medium	term	perspective.	For	
Scotland	however,	alongside	nations	such	as	Catalonia	and	FFlanderss,	 there	 is	arguably	a	
more	explicit	programme	of	state	building	that	is	the	perceived	end-point	of	‘softer’	nation	
building	 strategies.	 In	 these	 instances,	 the	 value	 of	 sub-state	 diplomacy	 is	 potentially	
heightened:	not	only	do	mimicking	strategies	enhance	the	credibility	of	the	stateless	nation,	
by	 allowing	 it	 to	 appear	 a	 natural	 bedfellow	 of	 established	 states,	 they	 also	 allow	 an	
alternative	‘state’	message	to	be	communicated,	differentiating	the	stateless	nation	-	in	terms	
of	its	style	of	diplomacy	or	international	policy	-	from	the	host	state.	This	twin-track	approach,	
seeking	both	credibility	as	an	international	‘player’	and	distance	from	the	host	state,	was	very	
much	 in	 evidence	 in	 the	 period	 leading	 up	 to	 Scotland’s	 independence	 referendum	 in	
September	2014,	and	it	is	here	that	this	analysis	will	focus.	The	Scottish	Government’s	white	
paper	on	 independence	 sets	out,	 in	a	 chapter	on	 international	 relations	and	defence,	 the	
points	of	differentiation	envisaged	under	the	conditions	of	a	 ‘yes’	vote	in	the	referendum.	
Several	themes	emerge	that	are	marked	in	their	explicit	distancing	from	UK	policy:	levels	of	
military	spending,	approaches	to	nuclear	weaponry,	attitudes	towards	the	European	Union,	
the	 relative	 importance	 of	 international	 consensus	 and	 coalition	 building,	 the	 placing	 of	
constitutional	 ‘locks’	 on	 military	 action,	 and	 the	 value	 of	 international	 development	 and	
peace-building.	
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Introducing	this	section	of	the	white	paper,	the	Scottish	Government	lay	out	their	alternative	
vision	for	foreign	and	defence	policy	post-independence:	
Under	 our	 plans,	 Scotland’s	 foreign,	 security	 and	 defence	 policies	 will	 be	
grounded	in	a	clear	framework	of	participating	in	rules-based	international	co-
operation	 to	 secure	 shared	 interests,	 protecting	 Scotland’s	 people	 and	
resources	and	promoting	sustainable	economic	growth	(Scottish	Government,	
2013b:	206).	
So	 far,	 so	 uncontroversial;	 though	 there	 does	 seem	 to	 be	 an	 implied	 rebuke	 to	 the	 UK	
Government	 in	 this	 statement.	 Indeed,	 the	 chapter	 then	 moves	 on	 to	 draw	 lines	 of	
comparison	between	the	envisaged	approach	of	an	 independent	Scotland	and	the	current	
and	historical	international	policies	of	the	UK	Government,	lamenting	the	fact	that	“we	are	
represented	by	a	Westminster	Government	that	has	based	its	actions	too	often	on	different	
international	 priorities.	We	 see	 that	most	 clearly	 in	matters	 of	war	 and	peace	 and	 in	our	
relationship	with	the	EU”	(Scottish	Government,	2013b:	209).	Drawing	this	distinction	most	
markedly,	the	white	paper	continues:	
While	the	UK	seeks	an	ability	to	project	global	power,	an	independent	Scotland	
can	 choose	 a	 different	 approach.	 If	 in	 government,	 we	 will	 direct	 our	
international	 efforts,	 first	 and	 foremost,	 into	 deepening	 and	 consolidating	
relationships	with	 friends	and	partners,	new	and	old,	across	 the	world	and,	
through	this,	expanding	opportunities	for	people	and	businesses	in	Scotland	
(Scottish	Government,	2013b:	210).	
While	distancing	an	independent	Scotland	from	the	rest	of	the	UK,	the	white	paper	is	also	
keen	to	draw	allegiances	and	make	reference	to	existing	states	whose	approaches	to	foreign	
policy	were	more	or	less	in	line	with	that	being	proposed.	This	strategy	further	evidences	the	
Scottish	 Government’s	 twin	 track	 approach	 to	 its	 nation-building	 efforts:	 at	 once	 placing	
Scotland	happily	amongst	a	cohort	of	other	small,	liberal	democracies	and	at	the	same	time	
allowing	their	distinctiveness,	and	the	specific	values	of	Scotland	as	a	stateless	nation,	indeed	
state-in-waiting,	 to	 be	 articulated.	 The	 first	 element	 of	 this	 strategy	 is	 exemplified	 in	 the	
following	passage:	
Scotland	starts	with	an	enviable	reputation	and	a	strong	international	identity.	
Our	international	brand	is	one	of	our	most	important	assets	as	a	country.	Even	
without	 independent	 status,	 Scotland’s	 international	 brand	 value	 already	
ranks	15th	out	of	50	nations,	according	to	international	comparisons	published	
in	2012.	Scotland	has	continually	scored	highly	and	is	ranked	similarly	to	-	and	
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often	ahead	of	 -	 other	 comparably-sized,	 high	 income	democracies	 such	as	
Denmark,	 Finland,	 Ireland	 and	 New	 Zealand	 (Scottish	 Government,	 2013b:	
210-211).		
Once	the	similar	qualities	of	Scottish	and	other	relatively	small,	liberal	democracies	have	been	
established,	 the	 white	 paper	 then	 moves	 on	 to	 transposing	 those	 aspects	 of	 Scottish	
nationhood,	 their	 national	 values	 of	 tolerance,	 openness	 and	 pragmatism,	 onto	 the	
framework	of	foreign	and	defence	policy.	The	implicit	contrast	running	through	the	following	
passage	is	that	between	such	value-led	approaches	to	international	affairs	that	draw	strongly	
on	soft-power	resources	and	are	cohered	around	a	respect	for	coalitions	and	multilateralism,	
versus	the	militarism	and	uni-	or	bilateralism	of	the	UK	state	-	whose	overseas	footprint	is	
based	on	 “an	 imperial	 past”	 and	 “a	desire	 for	more	global	power”	 (Scottish	Government,	
2013b:	211):	
An	 independent	 Scotland	 can	emulate	 comparable	 countries	with	 the	most	
effective	 approach	 to	 international	 affairs:	 soundly	 based	 policies	 which	
enable	 the	 country	 to	 engage	 seriously	 and	 competitively	 in	 the	 world;	
rigorous	 priorities	 for	 our	 international	 focus;	 and	 the	 right	 external	
relationships	to	advance	and	protect	our	 interests.	Countries	of	comparable	
size	to	Scotland	take	 lead	roles	 in	 international	organisations.	Sweden,	New	
Zealand,	Switzerland	and	Finland	have	all	made	significant	global	contributions	
to	 security,	 peace	 and	 reconciliation	 initiatives.	 New	 Zealand,	 for	 example,	
played	a	key	role	in	the	Oslo	Process	that	banned	cluster	bombs	and	similar	
weapons.	These	nations	capitalise	on	their	soft	power	and	build	coalitions	-	
normally	informal	and	related	to	specific	issues	-	to	advance	their	objectives.	
The	effectiveness	of	a	 coalition	 lies	 less	 in	 the	 sheer	numbers	 involved	and	
more	in	their	ability	to	develop	strong	and	sound	arguments	for	negotiations	
(Scottish	Government,	2013b:	225).	
	
The	distinction	between	an	independent	Scotland’s	international	policies	and	those	of	the	UK	
is	drawn	most	clearly	with	regards	to	defence	policy,	and	nuclear	weaponry	more	specifically,	
as	the	following	passage	demonstrates:	
An	independent	Scotland	will	have	the	opportunity	to	decide	our	own	defence	
priorities	to	ensure	our	security,	in	partnership	with	our	allies	and	within	the	
wider	international	community.	It	will	be	the	people	of	Scotland,	through	our	
Parliament	who	will	decide	whether	or	not	our	young	men	and	women	are	
sent	 to	war	and	we	can	choose,	 through	our	written	constitution,	 to	put	 in	
place	 safeguards	 to	 ensure	 that	 Scottish	 forces	will	 only	 ever	 participate	 in	
military	activity	that	is	internationally	recognised	as	lawful	and	in	accordance	
with	the	principles	of	the	UN	charter	(Scottish	Government,	2013b:	234).	
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Instead	of	the	UK’s	perceived	militarism,	an	independent	Scotland	would	instead	“create	an	
approach	to	defence	that	positions	us	as	partners	for	peace	in	the	wider	world”,	taking	its	
place	 as	 a	 non-nuclear	member	 of	 NATO	 and	 committing	 to	 the	 compete	 withdrawal	 of	
Trident.	Part	of	this	new	approach	would	be	the	development	of	a	written	constitution	for	
Scotland,	banning	nuclear	weapons	on	Scottish	soil	and	including	a	 ‘triple	 lock’	on	military	
deployments	 (Scottish	Government,	2013b:	235-236).	 The	 inclusion	of	 this	policy	 -	on	 the	
development	of	a	written	constitution	-	allows	for	the	further	distancing	of	an	independent	
Scotland	from	the	UK	and	its	arcane,	perhaps	outdated	unwritten	constitution	and	the	‘old	
boy’s	 club’	 of	 Westminster	 politics.	 Instead,	 it	 places	 the	 Scottish	 nation	 amongst	 an	
assemblage	 of	 modern,	 liberal,	 democracies	 who	 prioritise	 an	 open	 and	 accountable	
parliamentary	process.	
	
These	 particular	moves,	made	 by	 Scotland	 in	 its	 sovereignty	 games	 throughout	 the	 2014	
referendum	 process,	 all	 highlight	 the	 broader	 strategy	 that	 Scotland	 employs	 in	 its	
paradiplomacy.	Specifically,	it	mimics	a	certain	type	of	state:	a	small,	liberal	democracy	akin	
to	its	Nordic	neighbours.	During	the	referendum,	the	nature	of	the	sovereignty	game	changed	
as	a	direct	challenge	was	made	to	the	relative	power	distribution	between	Scotland	and	the	
UK;	it	was	no	longer	about	a	seat	at	the	table	as	a	‘potential’	state.		
	
III. Bavaria	
The	sovereignty	game	evident	in	Bavaria	is	one	premised	on	an	altogether	sounder	and	more	
settled	constitutional	arrangement	between	it	and	the	Federal	Government.	Unlike	in	Wales	
and	 Scotland,	 the	 power	 dispersal	 between	 state	 and	 sub-state	 government	 is	 both	
(reasonably)	 clear	 and	 stable.	 Instead,	 the	 game	 is	 played	 largely	 with	 reference	 to	 the	
financial	burden	and	responsibility	borne	by	Bavaria,	with	occasional	moves	made	to	remind	
the	Federal	and	other	Land	Governments	of	this	willing	act	of	self-sacrifice.	The	history	of	
Bavaria	 as	 a	 sovereign	 is	 frequently	 played	 on	 and	 referenced	 as	 a	 way	 to	 push	 at	 the	
boundaries	of	their	formal	constitutional	capabilities,	in	areas	such	as	EU	representation	and	
policy	 input	 -	with	a	 key	 component	of	 its	 sovereignty	 games	being	 the	 resistance	of	 any	
further	 encroachment	 (as	 the	 Bavarian	 Government	 sees	 it)	 by	 the	 EU	 on	 their	 own	
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competences.	Therefore,	while	the	sovereignty	games	being	played	in	Bavaria	may	be	‘milder’	
than	 those	 in	 Scotland	and	Wales,	both	of	whom	 -	 in	different	ways	 -	want	 to	 recast	 the	
relationship	between	state	and	sub-state	government,	 the	game	does	 indeed	harness	 the	
discursive	 power	 of	 sovereignty	 in	 appealing	 to	 the	 special	 status	 of	 Bavaria	 within	 the	
German	 Federation.	 In	 the	 current	 political	 climate,	where	Bavaria’s	Government	wish	 to	
exert	a	conservative	moderating	force	on	the	Federal	Coalition,	this	game	is	played	in	multiple	
arenas	-	both	through	the	actions	of	the	Bavarian	State	Government,	and	through	the	Prime	
Minister’s	role	in	the	Federal	Government.	
	
For	Bavaria,	the	ways	that	paradiplomatic	activity	feed	into	its	nation-building	project	stand	
apart	from	those	demonstrated	in	Wales	and	Scotland.	Almost	entirely	absent	are	appeals	to	
dominant,	liberal,	international	norms.	Instead,	the	history	of	Bavaria	as	an	‘ancient	state’,	
and	both	the	political	and	economic	power	that	it	currently	wields	within	the	German	Federal	
Republic	are	 the	resources	upon	which	 it	draws	 in	 its	mimicry	of	statehood.	Thematically,	
Bavarian	paradiplomacy	in	fact	departs	from	such	dominant	norms,	reflecting	a	conservative	
agenda	that	is	wary	both	of	European	integration	and	broader	migration.	The	nation	that	is	
reflected	and	bolstered	through	such	engagements,	therefore,	is	one	whose	legitimacy	stems	
from	the	essential	tenets	of	statehood:	effectiveness,	influence	and	the	historical	architecture	
of	a	fully	fledged	sovereign.	What	is	being	mimicked,	in	this	case,	is	not	the	specific	discourse	
of	dominant	international	norms,	but	instead	the	efficiency	and	economic	actorness	of	a	state	
per	se.	The	 international	personality	that	 is	created,	however,	 is	also	one	that	reflects	the	
national	 distinctiveness	 of	 the	 Bavarian	 people,	 both	 rebellious	 and	 self-assured	 in	 their	
traditions;	traits	that	the	conservative	paradiplomacy	of	the	state	performs	for	the	benefit	of	
domestic	and	international	audiences.		
	
The	narrative	of	Bavarian	statehood	is	thus	one	of	an	effective	and	ancient	state,	willingly	
relinquishing	an	element	of	sovereignty	to	belong	to	the	German	Federation,	but	ever	mindful	
of	the	fact	that	it	possess	such	state-like	qualities	in	its	own	right.	Bavaria’s	current	borders	
are	“almost	identical”	to	its	origins:	“the	shape	has	somehow	been	transformed	by	different	
events,	but	the	core	of	it	is	still	there	since	1500	years”.	Important	to	Bavaria’s	current	status	
is	the	period	of	Wiltesbark	rule,	between	1180	and	1919,	an	almost	800	year	period	of	“one	
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single	dynasty	 leading	this	part	of	 the	world	and	shaping	 its	 identity”.	This	stable	 identity,	
combined	with	the	geographical	position	of	Bavaria,	allowed	it	to	occupy	a	particular	place	in	
the	history	of	Europe	as	a	‘middle	power’:		
Bavaria	has	always	been	a	kind	of	a	middle	power	inside	all	these	turmoil	it	has	
considered	 itself	 -	 it	has	strived	to	be	-	a	more	 important	power,	by	maybe	
trying	to	become	king,	the	Kaiser,	or	Emperor,	and	has	always	had	coalitions,	
it	 has	 always	 been	marked.	Munich	 has	 never	 achieved	 the	 ambitions	 that	
were	 there	 to	 Paris,	 Vienna,	 Berlin	 and	 Rome	 -	 because	 these	 are	 really	
described	the	four,	the	quadrangle	that	we	are	located	in	the	centre	of,	which	
has	always	shaped	the	special	influence.61	
	
This	narrative	is	one	inextricably	bound	with	the	political	ideals	and	objectives	of	Bavaria’s	
dominant	party,	the	CSU	-	a	party	whose	very	success	is	in	turn	bound	up	in	their	ability	to	
carve	out	and	mobilise	a	distinct	territorial	cleavage	in	the	state’s	politics	(Sutherland,	2001).	
According	 to	 Hepburn,	 the	 CSU	 has	mobilised	 a	 Bavarian	 identity	 “as	 part	 of	 its	 political	
project”	(Hepburn,	2008a:	184-185),	and	their	ability	to	harness	the	idea	of	Bavarian	cultural	
distinctiveness	has	been	key	to	their	gaining	political	power	(Hepburn	and	Hough,	2012:	93).	
The	international	stage	is	a	particularly	useful	one	when	it	comes	to	articulating	this	Bavarian	
identity.	 Speaking	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 choice	of	 the	 term	 ‘nation’	 to	describe	Bavaria,	 in	 an	
English-speaking	context,	Hepburn	sees	such	declarations	as	evidence	of	the	CSU’s	desire	for	
Bavaria	“to	be	considered	as	a	distinct	political	and	cultural	entity	on	a	par	with	the	stateless	
nations	of	the	developed	world”	(Hepburn,	2008a:	185).	As	a	move	in	the	sovereignty	game,	
Bavaria	is	appealing	to	other	sub-state	governments	internationally	and	claiming	membership	
of	this	more	exclusive	club	of	nations.	There	is	a	related	desire	on	the	part	of	Bavarian	officials	
and	 politicians	 for	 their	 international	 activities	 to	 reflect	 and	 reaffirm	 Bavaria’s	 ‘special	
history’;	a	history	that	provides	enduringly	relevant	reference	points	in	an	explanation	of	how,	
and	why,	Bavaria’s	paradiplomacy	has	evolved	to	its	current	state.	The	following	extract	from	
an	 interview	with	a	 senior	Bavarian	Government	official,	discussing	 the	 leadership	of	King	
Maximilian	during	the	30	years	war,	demonstrates	this	linkage	well.	62			
His	 philosophy	 was	 to	 lead	 an	 internal	 reform	 of	 the	 state,	 not	 a	 reform	
through	reformation	but	internal	reform.	He	called	upon	the	Jesuits	he	called	
																																																						
61	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	Official,	2013	
62	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official,	interview	2013	
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on	 the	Dominicans	 and	 other	 clergy	 that	 should	 conduct	 a	 reform.	 And	 he	
conducted	 a	 reform	 of	 the	 state	 and	 he	 reigned	 over	 Bavaria…	 during	 this	
period	the	war	of	thirty	years	and	he	came	out	with	almost	a	balanced	budget.	
So	this	is	really	a	comparison,	I	don’t	want	to	draw	these	parallels	too	often	
but	 this	 was	 a	 remarkable	 man,	 his	 decisions	 shaped	 really	 Bavaria	 and	
determined	the	position	of	Bavaria	 inside	the	then	confessionally	separated	
parts	of	Germany,	it	was	really	his	mark	that	he	left	upon	Bavaria.63	
	
Indeed,	its	distinctive	history	binds	Bavaria	to	the	very	“birth	of	Europe”.64	This	centrality	to	
the	 major	 events	 in	 European	 and	 latterly	 German	 history	 has	 left	 Bavaria	 with	 a	 self-
assuredness	 that	 marks	 it	 apart	 from	 other	 German	 Länder,	 and	 is	 reflected	 in	 their	
understanding	of	the	relationship	between	the	Federation	and	state	governments:		
So	in	1946	the	Bavarian	constitution	which	is	now	our	constitution	was	made,	
and	in	1949,	only	in	1949,	the	German	constitution.	So	its	an	important	fact	to	
note	that	the	Länder	were	constituted	before	the	federal	republic	of	Germany,	
and	it	was	the	Länder	that	sat	together	and	drafted	-	under	the	supervision	of	
the	allied	forces	-	a	new	constitution	for	Germany	and	then	voted	on	it.	And	
Bavaria	voted	against	the	new	constitution	because	it	was	said	to	have	too	few	
federalist	 elements	 -	 in	 our	 case	 federalism	means	 centrifugal	 rather	 than	
centripetal	powers	-	and	so,	but	at	the	same	time	it	was	decided	that	if	all	the	
others	accepted	we	would	go	through	anyway.	So	this	is	what	happened.	And	
then	we	became	part	of	this	new	federal	republic	of	Germany,	Bavaria	was	one	
of	the	-	you	can	see	by	the	name	-	was	one	of	the	states	who	was	left	fairly	
untouched	 in	 its	 historical	 shape,	 unlike	 all	 those	 who	 have	 these	 hyphen	
names,	you	can	see	it	by	the	hyphen	that	they	are	composed	as	new	entities.65	
	
The	 legacy	 of	 Bavaria’s	 unbroken	 identity,	 its	 centrality	 to	 the	 ‘birth	 of	 Europe’	 and	 its	
historical	‘middle	power’	status	is	that	it	sees	itself	as	a	polity	with	much	to	teach	incipient	
states.	A	key	strand	of	its	international	activities	relate	to	the	support	-	what	might	otherwise	
be	termed	democracy	assistance	-	of	countries	in	Central,	Eastern	and	South-East	Europe	“on	
the	way	into	the	EU”.	It	is,	in	other	words,	normative	paradiplomacy.	Specifically,	the	Bavarian	
Government	focuses	on:	“the	fight	against	organised	crime,	cross-border	cooperation	among	
administrative	 bodies,	 the	 exchange	 of	 expertise	 and	 qualification	 of	 executive	 staff”,	
																																																						
63	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official,	2013	
64	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official,	2013	
65	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official,	interview	2013	
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primarily	 through	 the	 framework	of	 twinning	projects.	 Examples	 include	experts	 from	 the	
Bavarian	 judiciary	 providing	 advice	 on	 legislation	 in	 countries	 of	 Eastern	 and	 South-East	
Europe	in	fields	such	as	under-cover	investigation	and	the	fight	against	corruption,	and	the	
advisory	service	of	Bavarian	administrative	personnel	on	issues	involving	state	supervision	of	
local	authorities	(Bayerische	Staatskanzlei,	2010).		This	form	of	normative	paradiplomacy	may	
not	follow	the	precise	trajectory	of	international	development	projects	in	Wales	and	Scotland,	
and	the	broader	narratives	around	them	may	differ,	yet	the	emphasis	on	‘official	to	official’	
learning	 and	 exchange	 is	 really	 quite	 similar	 to	 the	 reciprocal	 approach	 to	 sustainable	
development	that	is	at	the	centre	of	both	the	Wales	for	Africa	and	Scotland	Lesotho	projects.	
The	mimicry	of	 this	 type	of	 low	profile,	 pragmatic	democracy	assistance	 is	 also	a	 form	of	
diplomacy	that	demonstrates	its	state-like	qualities	in	a	pragmatic	way,	focussed	on	expertise	
and	experience.	This	paradiplomacy	 thus	displays	 those	attributes	of	Bavarian	nationhood	
that	are	premised	on	its	history	as	an	ancient	state	and	its	overall	competence	and	political	
prowess	within	a	Federal	structure.	
	
Contrasted	with	Wales’	paradiplomacy	-	drawing	on	the	‘myth	of	Welsh	radicalism’	-	Bavaria’s	
paradiplomacy	draws	on	perceptions	of	efficiency	and	transparency,	demonstrably	a	part	of	
the	self-identification	of	the	Bavarian	nation.	Democracy	assistance	in	Central,	Eastern	and	
South-East	Europe	also	builds	on	aspects	of	Bavarian	nationhood	that	relate	to	its	more	recent	
history	 -	 and	 indeed	 the	 aspect	 of	 ‘self-sacrifice’	 implied	 in	 its	 ratification	 of	 the	German	
Constitution	 despite	 the	 perceived	 lack	 of	 protection	 for	 Länder	 autonomy.	 Perhaps	 in	 a	
conscious	rejoinder	to	its	legacy	as	the	birthplace	of	the	Nazi	movement,	Bavaria’s	response	
to	German	reunification	in	the	1990s	presented	an	opportunity	to	recast	the	nation	in	a	more	
positive	light,	willingly	absorbing	significant	economic	cost	for	the	benefit	of	the	Federation	
as	a	whole:	
In	 1990	 with	 the	 unification	 came	 the	 enlargement	 or	 the	 unification	 of	
Germany	which	led	again,	Bavaria	positioned	itself	to	be	proud	to	be	part	of	
this	–	it’s	an	unquestioned	situation	that,	nobody	ever	in	Bavaria	with	all	the	
separatism	 that	 is	 part	 of	 our	 political	 folk	 lore,	 has	 never	 questioned	 the	
unification	process.	I	don’t	know	if	it	is	surprising	but	it	is	noteworthy,	that	this	
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is	something	that	was	even	with	all	the	economic	difficulties,	has	never	been	
questioned.66	
After	 German	 reunification,	 the	 population	 of	 Bavaria	 expanded	 significantly,	 leading	 the	
state	 to	 become	 “much	more	 German	 and	 international	 than	 it	 used	 to	 be”,	 leading	 the	
reunification	phase	to	mark	“another	era”	in	the	state’s	development,	all	of	which	feed	into	
its	current	nation-building	exercises.67		
	
The	paradiplomacy	of	sub-state	governments	reflects	hugely	different	levels	of	contestation.	
Of	 course,	 whether	 or	 not	 a	 region	 cooperates	 with	 state-activities,	 or	 adopts	 a	 more	
confrontational	stance	can	vary	on	an	ad	hoc	basis,	but	it	can	also	be	discerned	as	an	overall	
feature	of	paradiplomatic	strategy,	in	terms	of	the	prevalence	of	one	approach	over	the	other.	
In	the	German	context,	Bavaria	is	keen	to	stress	that	it	conducts	‘foreign	affairs’,	rather	than	
‘foreign	 policy’,	 a	 reserved	 area	 of	 activity	 which	 remains	 solely	 the	 purview	 of	 Berlin,	
something	 which	 Criekemans	 argues	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 limited	 number	 of	 ‘political’	
representations	that	it	maintains	abroad	(Criekemans,	2010b:	41).	However,	despite	the	fact	
that	Bavaria’s	CSU	is	a	core	member	of	the	Federal	Government	coalition,	the	diplomacy	of	
Bavaria	could	be	interpreted	as	being	slightly	more	conflictual	-	or	at	least	assertive	-	than	one	
might	expect.	Bavarian	officials	have	spoken	of	the	role	of	‘critical	friend’	that	they	are	able	
and	willing	to	play	in	terms	of	their	paradiplomacy,	vis-à-vis	the	Federal	government.	This	role	
is	 facilitated	 both	 by	 the	 constitutional	 stability	 of	 the	 Federal	 Republic	 and	 Bavaria’s	
individual	strength	within	it;	“no	one	is	really	questioning	us	so	we	can	afford	to	be	the	critical	
partner	without	questioning	federalism	as	a	whole…	we	are	strong	regions	within	a	stable	
state”.68	This	role	of	critical	friend	entails	a	degree	of	political	‘play’;	within	an	overall	“spirit	
of	cooperation”,	there	remains	“some	sport,	there’s	a	political	language	-	we	are	Bavarians	
and	so	we	play	with	the	images”.69	The	Bavarian	CSU	positions	itself,	quite	carefully,	as	“a	bit	
more	 right”	 than	Merkel’s	Berlin,	 as	part	of	 a	 “good-cop,	bad-cop	 routine”	 related	 to	 the	
unique	 position	 of	 the	 state	 within	 the	 Federal	 coalition	 government.	 Bavaria’s	 recent	
																																																						
66	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official,	2013.	
67	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official,	2013.	
68	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	official	2013	
69	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
	 153	
response	to	mass	migration	-	this	time	from	outside	Europe	-	has	in	turn	demonstrated	the	
limits	 to	 its	 openness,	 and	 has	 precipitated	 a	more	 ‘hard-line’	 diplomatic	 stance	when	 it	
comes	to	issues	around	migration.	
	
Indeed,	the	weight	of	Bavaria	-	in	political	and	economic	terms	–	seems	to	make	it	particularly	
attractive	as	a	the	partner	for	the	Federal	Government	in	many	international	endeavours;	the	
claim	from	a	senior	Bavarian	Government	official	is	that	other	German	states	are	in	some	way	
“envious”	 of	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 are	 able	 to	 cooperate	with	 the	 Federal	 Government,	 a	
position	deemed	unavailable	to	other	German	Länder	because	they	simply	“don’t	have	the	
budgets”.70	It	is	this	combination	of	an	economically	privileged	position,	with	the	historical	
weight	and	current	political	significance	of	Bavaria	-	and	the	leaders	of	its	governing	CSU	-	
that	seems	to	allow	Bavaria	to	carve	its	own	relations	with	states,	notably	Greece	and	the	
Czech	Republic,	and	to	ensure	that	its	euro-scepticism	is	heard	very	clearly	on	both	German	
and	European	stages.71	This	conservative	approach	to	international	politics	may	also	manifest	
as	a	constraining	force	within	the	Federal	CDU-CSU	coalition,	though	this	‘behind	the	scenes’	
influence	 is	 harder	 to	 assess.	 The	 public	 criticism	 of	 Chancellor	Merkel’s	 response	 to	 the	
2016/2016-refugee	 crisis	 from	 Bavarian	 State	 Premier	 Horst	 Seehofer	 and	 other	 CSU	
politicians	 indicates	 that	such	pressures,	on	 issues	with	key	 foreign	policy	 implications,	do	
indeed	exist	within	the	Federal	coalition	Government	(Deutsche	Welle,	2015).	
	
The	 Bavarian	 Government’s	 paradiplomacy	 thus	 reflects	 both	 its	 own,	 autonomous,	
international	standing	-	as	an	historically	important	power	-	and	the	desire	to	ensure	that	it	
maintains	 its	 privileged	 position	 with	 relation	 the	 Federal	 Government.	 In	 other	 words,	
Bavaria’s	unique	position	within	Germany	-	and	the	role	of	‘critical	friend’	that	it	plays	to	the	
Federal	Government	-	both	facilitate	and	motivate	its	paradiplomacy.	The	international	stage	
offers	an	important	arena	for	Bavaria’s	cultural	and	political	distinctiveness	to	be	performed	
for	 the	 benefit	 of	 multiple	 audiences:	 both	 within	 the	 state	 and	 the	 Federation.	 The	
sovereignty	game	being	played	in	Bavaria	is,	in	many	-	perhaps	subtle	–	ways,	different	to	that	
																																																						
70	Interview,	senior	Bavarian	Government	official,	2013	
71	Interview,	senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	official,	2013	
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in	 both	Wales	 and	 Scotland.	 Bavaria	 has	 always	 occupied	 an	 unusual	 position	within	 the	
broadly	stable	German	Federation:	a	previous	sovereign	state	with	a	particularly	 long	and	
consistent	 ‘un-hyphenated’	 history,72	 it	 was	 the	 only	 Länder	 to	 reject	 the	 German	
Constitution,	before	eventually	ratifying	it	for	the	perceived	‘greater	good’.	It	has	been	the	
most	active	Länder	in	paradiplomatic	terms	and	has	consistently	pushed	at	the	boundaries	of	
its	 legal	 competence,	 particularly	 in	 the	 representative	 functions	 of	 its	 overseas	 offices,	
notably	in	Brussels.	The	Bavarian	Government	has	played	on	this	special	status	in	the	moves	
that	 it	makes	as	part	of	 their	broader	 sovereignty	game:	using	 these	markers	as	a	way	 to	
safeguard	 its	 competences	 (which	 it	 sees	as	under	 threat	 from	European	 integration)	and	
regional	distinctiveness.			
	
Conclusion	
We	began	this	chapter	with	reference	to	the	economic	realities	facing	sub-state	governments,	
and	it	is	worth	briefly	returning	to	that	starting	point.	All	paradiplomatic	activity	represents	
an	 expenditure	 of	 resource:	 whether	 that	 is	 the	 running	 costs	 of	 a	 full	 overseas	 office,	
entertaining	visiting	VIPs,	the	plane	tickets	and	hotel	rooms	required	for	 ‘overseas	jaunts’,	
the	administrative	burden	of	belonging	to	networks,	signing	Memoranda	of	Understanding	-	
even	the	Ministerial	time	and	energies	involved	in	responding,	via.	press	release,	to	global	
issues	or	crises.	The	current	financial	context	facing	sub-state	governments,	at	least	in	Europe,	
is	straightened,	and	government	at	all	levels	faces	new	expectations	in	terms	of	accountability	
for	 the	money	 that	 they	spend.	Given	 this,	 the	question	of	why	sub-state	governments	 in	
these	circumstances	still	pursue	paradiplomacy	-	where	 it	does	not	provide	an	obvious,	or	
arguable,	economic	return	on	precious	investment	-	is	one	that	we	should	continue	to	ask.		
	
The	answer	isn’t	easily	deducible.	Very	rarely	is	there	a	single,	clear	and	rationale	calculation	
that	we	 can	 point	 to.	 Do	 sub-state	 governments	 use	 paradiplomacy	 to	 ‘build	 the	 nation’	
domestically?	Yes,	undoubtedly.	In	reality,	however,	they	do	this	in	various	way	and	to	various	
ends.	The	value	a	sovereignty	games	metaphor	lies	in	allowing	us	to	consider	this	multitude	
																																																						
72	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
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of	motivations	on	the	part	of	all	the	composite	players,	the	moves	in	the	game	made	both	by	
the	sub-state	government	and	its	nation-state	counterpart	(or	other	actors	-	with	Scotland	
often	 providing	 a	 frame	 of	 reference	 for	 Wales’	 sovereignty	 game),	 and	 the	 shifting,	
expansion	and	contraction	of	the	rules	that	the	game	operates	under.	In	short,	it	enables	us	
to	see	a	fuller	picture	of	the	more	political	motivations	that	drive	paradiplomacy,	an	activity	
that	is	often	-	owing	to	the	close	association	between	international	agency	and	sovereignty	
or	statehood	per	se	-	a	statement	about	relative	power	and	authority.	These	statements	are	
not	always	explicit,	nor	do	moves	in	the	game	have	to	be	rationally	directed	towards	anything	
at	all	for	them	to	still	be	“meaningfully	conceived	as	included	in	the	game”	(Adler-Nissen	and	
Gad,	2014:	18).		
	
The	sovereignty	games	being	played	in	each	of	our	case	studies	differ	in	important	ways:	there	
are	different	configurations	of	power	between	each	of	our	cases	and	their	respective	state	
governments,	 as	well	 as	 different	 systems	 of	 intergovernmental	 relations	 and	 degrees	 of	
party-political	congruence.	Though,	perhaps	surprisingly,	each	case	-	at	different	times	and	in	
different	ways	-	utilises	the	strategy	of	mimicry	in	a	similar	range	of	ways:	to	appear	as	natural	
kin	to	existing	states,	to	demonstrate	adherence	to	dominant,	liberal	international	norms	and	
to	 emphasise	 state-like	 capacities	 or	 effectiveness.	 The	 games	 themselves	 encompass	 a,	
perhaps	more	distinct,	variety	of	moves:	towards	independence	in	Scotland,	a	protection	of	
existing	competences	 in	Bavaria	and	an	 incremental	rebalancing	of	devolved	and	reserved	
powers	in	Wales.		
	
And,	 yet.	 These	 sovereignty	 games	 are	 also	 remarkably	 similar.	 At	 heart,	 the	 game	being	
played	 in	 each	 of	 these	 three	 cases	 is	 about	 the	 recognition	 of	 their	 ‘special’	 status,	 as	
something	more	than	a	‘mere	region’.	Sovereignty	games,	to	go	back	to	Addler-Nissen	and	
Gad’s	conception,	are	about	the	very	constitution	of	one	of	the	parties	‘as	a	party	to	the	game’	
itself	(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2014:	20).	In	reaching	and	conducting	themselves	upon	a	world	
stage,	making	 forays	 into	an	area	of	policy	 “so	 closely	articulated	 to	 sovereignty	 that	 it	 is	
considered	 the	 prerogative	 of	 the	 sovereign”	 (Adler-Nissen	 and	 Gad,	 2014:	 16),	
paradiplomats	are	doing	more	than	simply	dealing	with	the	necessary	overspill	of	domestic	
competence.	In	sum;	‘it’s	all	political’.		
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Chapter	 5.	 Sub-state	 governments	 as	 International	 Agents:	 Learning	 to	 ‘Walk	 the	
Walk’?	
	
Introduction	
	
Agency	 is	 a	 relatively	 unexplored	 concept	 in	 the	 field	 of	 paradiplomacy.	 That	 structural	
dynamics	have	taken	the	foreground	in	analyses	of	sub-state	diplomacy	owes	much	to	timing;	
regions	 and	 ‘stateless	 nations’	 were	 (re)establishing	 themselves	 as	 units	 of	 political	
significance	 just	 as	 the	 tide	 of	 globalisation,	 internationalisation	 and	 ‘intermestic’	 politics	
swept	the	international	relations	stage.	There	was	clearly	an	important	interplay	between	the	
two	phenomena.	The	blurring	of	boundaries	between	the	domestic	and	the	international,	and	
those	separating	‘high’	and	‘low’	politics,	the	diffusion	of	political	authority	amongst	states	
and	newer	actors	of	increasing	significance	all	implicated	sub-state	governments	in	structures	
and	 policy	 areas	 previously	 beyond	 their	 competences.	 Sub-state	 governments	 have	
undoubtedly	used	this	more	favourable	context	to	pursue	their	 international	ambitions,	at	
other	times	they	have	been	less	willingly	thrust	into	areas	that	are	outside	their	chosen	frame	
of	reference.	However,	the	natural	linkages	between	these	two	broad	categories	of	change	
and	 transformation	 do	 not	 necessarily	 embody	 a	 causal	 relationship,	 or	 at	 the	 least	 any	
causality	is	not	a	satisfactory	explanation	for	the	entirety	of	paradiplomatic	activity.	
	
The	relationship	between	the	‘new’	context	and	opportunities	facing	sub-state	governments	
and	the	ways	in	which	they	choose	to	react	to	it	is	one	that	has	not	been	fully	problematized	
within	the	paradiplomacy	literature.	The	key	exceptions	to	this	rule	are	the	works	of	Lecours	
(2007;	2002;	2008;	Lecours	and	Moreno,	2001),	who	has	explicitly	addressed	the	question	of	
sub-state	agency	in	the	context	of	nation	building	and	the	role	of	paradiplomacy	in	identity-
construction,	and	Keating	(1999),	who	attempted	to	categorise	the	motivations	regions	had	
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in	pursuing	international	profiles;	political,	cultural	and	economic.	The	relative	sidelining	of	
agency	is	all	the	more	surprising	given	that	the	variety	of	sub-state	diplomacy	is	one	of	 its	
defining	 features.	 According	 to	 Criekemans	 (2010b:	 39)	 “researching	 regional	 sub-state	
diplomacy	 is	 sometimes	 like	 comparing	 apples	with	pears:	 they	 look	 and	 taste	different”.	
Whilst	some	-	 indeed	much	-	of	this	variety	can	be	accounted	for	by	structural	differences	
within	the	region	or	stateless	nation	itself,	in	terms	of	foreign	affairs	capacities	for	example,	
there	is	clearly	another	side	to	the	paradiplomacy	story.	As	explored	in	the	preceding	chapter,	
the	ways	in	which	sub-state	governments	choose	to	participate	in	international	affairs	seems	
to	depend	not	just	on	the	qualities	of	the	region	itself	but	on	the	political	choices	made	by	its	
government,	which	 in	 turn	are	 informed	by	 the	dynamics	of	party	 competition	and	 inter-
governmental	relations	within	the	region	and	the	wider	state	it	sits	inside.		
	
This	chapter	looks	in	detail	at	the	ways	in	which	different	sub-state	governments	construct	
their	 international	 agency.	 In	 particular,	 it	 employs	 the	 framework	 of	 Performativity	 to	
investigate	the	discrete	‘performances’	that	tell	both	external	actors	and	domestic	audiences	
how	the	sub-state	government	sees	itself,	its	region	or	stateless	nation,	and	the	place	that	it	
aspires	 to	 on	 the	 world	 stage.	 A	 Performativity	 framework	 attempts	 to	 go	 beyond	 fixed	
classifications	 of	 actors	 and	 capabilities	 and	 instead	 look	 at	 the	 actual	 interactions	 taking	
place,	and	the	messages	that	these	actions	convey	to	both	internal	and	external	audiences	in	
the	 process.	 In	 important	 ways,	 this	 perspective	 overcomes	 the	 challenge	 of	 analysing	
paradiplomatic	activities	in	a	way	that	takes	into	account	the	often-conflictual	messages	sent	
by	its	component	actors:	sub-state	politicians	and	officials	as	well	as	diplomats	at	the	national	
level	and	those	from	‘receiving’	states	and	regions.	Relating	back	to	the	metaphor	of	a	sub-
state	 sovereignty	 game,	 here	 we	 are	 examining	 the	 moves	 in	 the	 game:	 how	 the	 game	
manifests	on	a	day-to-day	basis	and	the	ways	 in	which	sub-state	governments	are	able	to	
position	themselves	as	credible	international	agents.	
	
Paradiplomacy	is	indeed	a	field,	and	a	practice,	full	of	contradictions.	On	the	one	hand,	we	
are	 told	 that	 sub-state	 internationalism	 is	 ‘all	 about	 the	economy’,	a	necessary	activity	 to	
maintain	and	support	one’s	domestic	policy	platform.	Yet,	on	the	other,	the	political	rhetoric	
that	surrounds	even	the	most	mundane	activity	has	clear	overtones	of	much	grander,	and	
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more	 overtly	 ‘diplomatic’	 ambitions.	 And	 again,	 this	 political	 rhetoric	 then	 dissipates	 into	
surprisingly	amicable	working	arrangements	and	relations	on	the	part	of	officials	in	sub-	and	
nation-state	governments.	In	turn,	the	‘official’	or	‘party’	line	from	nation-state	governments	
is	alternately	one	of	non-acknowledgement	of	paradiplomacy	as	a	matter	of	any	significance,	
to	one	where	the	practice	infringes	uncomfortably	on	national	competences	and	the	cohesive	
diplomatic	identity	of	the	state.	Moreover,	sub-state	governments	may	use	paradiplomacy	to	
gain	power	vis-à-vis	the	central	state,	whilst	at	the	same	time	the	central	state	may	use	their	
regions’	paradiplomacy	as	a	 type	of	 ‘back	channel’,	bolstering	national	 foreign	policy.	The	
framework	of	Performativity	allows	us	to	investigate	the	empirical	practice	of	paradiplomacy	
in	a	way	that	brings	these	inherent	tensions	and	contradictions	to	light,	telling	a	much	more	
nuanced	-	and,	hopefully,	accurate	-	story	in	the	process.		
	
In	addition	to	employing	a	Performativity	framework,	this	chapter	also	explores	the	role	of	
legitimacy	in	its	analysis	of	sub-state	agency	creation.	When	engaging	directly	in	international	
politics,	 sub-state	 governments	 display	 a	 range	 of	 strategies	 aimed	 at	 legitimising	 their	
international	activities.	Indeed,	legitimacy	is	a	crucial	part	of	international	actorness	in	and	of	
itself.	 Some	 opt	 to	 ‘mimic’	 state-like	 diplomacy	 (McConnell	 et	 al.,	 2012),	 whereas	 others	
choose	to	operate	more	in	the	mode	of	an	NGO,	focussing	more-or-less	exclusively	on	one	
issue	area.	This	choice	manifests	in	the	nature	of	the	relationships	sought	and	maintained	on	
the	international	stage,	and	these	‘positionings’	in	turn	articulate	different	messages	about	
the	 perceived	 status	 of	 the	 sub-state	 government	 itself,	 and	 the	 broader	 international	
position	that	they	aspire	to.	The	‘legitimacy	question’	is	a	further	area	that	the	paradiplomacy	
literature	has	yet	to	address	in	any	depth.	Yet,	the	range	of	legitimating	strategies	that	sub-
state	governments	employ	to	enhance	their	claims	to	international	agency	are	probing	not	
just	 for	 the	 study	 of	 paradiplomacy,	 but	 also	 for	 the	 ‘bigger’	 questions	 of	 International	
Relations.	 Questions	 such	 as:	 who	 ‘counts’	 as	 an	 international	 actor?	 What	 weight	 do	
international	norms	and	logics	of	appropriateness	carry	in	the	process	of	agency	creation?	
How	is	agency	denied	or	conditioned	by	the	activities	of	states	or	other	actors?	What	is	the	
relationship	between	internal	and	external	legitimacy?	
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Despite	the	overlap	of	terminology:	mimicry,	sovereignty	games	and	legitimacy,	the	focus	of	
this	chapter	is	distinct	from	the	one	immediately	preceding	it.	Here,	rather	than	concerning	
ourselves	 with	 the	 motivations	 that	 sub-state	 governments	 have	 for	 conducting	 their	
paradiplomacies,	and	the	ways	in	which	the	configurations	of	their	unique	sovereignty	games	
influence	these	driving	forces,	the	focus	is	instead	on	how	these	actors	manage	to	execute	
their	strategies	on	the	global	stage.	In	other	words,	it	investigates	the	precise	moves	within	
the	sovereignty	game	that	allow	sub-state	governments	to	develop	an	international	profile:	
learning	to	‘walk	the	walk’	and	‘talk	the	talk’	of	diplomats.	
	
This	 chapter	 progresses	 as	 follows.	 After	 a	 brief	 introduction	 to	 the	 framework	 of	
Performativity	and	a	discussion	of	its	applicability	to	paradiplomatic	studies,	the	subsequent	
section	 uncovers	 the	 precise	 ways	 in	 which	 sub-state	 governments	 attempt	 to	 bring	
legitimacy	to	their	international	roles,	both	internally	and	externally,	specifically	looking	to	
the	 framework	 of	 ‘mimicry’	 as	 a	 particularly	 useful	 legitimising	 strategy.	 Finally,	 three	
examples	will	be	explored	which	demonstrate	the	role	that	an	individual	performance,	or	a	
set	 of	 performances,	 can	 have	 in	 securing	 this	 legitimacy,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 processes	 of	
contestation	 that	 go	 with	 it:	 the	 establishment	 of	 Bavaria’s	 ‘grand’	 new	 European	
representation;	the	launch	of	the	‘Wales	for	Africa’	development	assistance	programme	and	
Scottish	diplomacy	surrounding	the	arrival	of	two	Chinese	Pandas	in	an	Edinburgh	zoo.	The	
arguments	 put	 forward	 here	 build	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 ‘lessons	 from	 the	 margins’	 can	 be	
particularly	illuminating	(McConnell	et	al.,	2012;	Hocking,	1999).	By	looking	at	the	real-life,	
day-to-day	practices	of	diplomacy	as	carried	out	by	a	marginal	and	contested	diplomatic	actor	
we	can	potentially	 learn	something	more	about	diplomacy	and	 international	politics	more	
generally.	These	 implications	will	 then	be	addressed	 in	greater	detail	 in	chapter	six	of	 this	
thesis.	
	
Paradiplomacy	as	Performance:	An	Introductory	Note	
The	framework	-	or	vocabulary	-	of	Performativity	has	sociological	roots	and	maintains	loose	
English	School	and	constructivist	associations,	at	least	within	its	applications	to	IR	research;	
	 161	
though	its	theoretical	underpinnings	are	notably	fluid	and	varied,	drawing	on	a	particularly	
wide	range	of	sources	(in	an	international	politics	context	see	Neumann,	2003;	McConnell	et	
al.,	2012;	Barry,	2013;	Ringmar,	2012;	Weber,	1998;	Bueger,	2011).	According	to	Neumann	
(2003:	341):	“instead	of	assuming	a	set	of	functions	and	a	state	structure	and	then	deducing	
a	set	of	truth	claims	from	these	assumptions,	a	growing	number	of	scholars	have	begun	to	
scrutinize	 how	 world	 politics	 are	 actually	 performed”.	 This	 shift	 in	 focus	 allows	 for	 the	
heterogeneity	of	international	politics,	and,	crucially	for	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	lends	
itself	to	an	exploration	of	the	ways	in	which	international	‘agents’	become	so.		
	
A	recent	workshop	on	this	theme	explored	the	Performativity	framework	in	more	detail.	In	
the	 context	 of	 controversial,	 or	 perhaps	 unexpected,	 ‘performances’	 from	 a	 variety	 of	
marginal	international	relations	actors,	from	financial	markets	to	armed	rebels,	the	workshop	
asked	a	series	of	questions.	Do	different	performances	create	different	qualities	of	agency?	
How	are	‘self’	and	‘other’	linked	in	performances	of	agency?	Can	performances	of	agency	fail,	
and	if	so	what	are	the	consequences?	How	is	agency	denied,	sabotaged	or	de-constructed?	
The	explicit	task	of	the	workshop	was	to	“make	visible	the	work	that	goes	into	the	production	
of	actors	in	international	politics”.73	
	
For	paradiplomatic	investigations,	these	questions	are	all	key.	Sub-state	governments	were	
traditionally	thought	of	as	domestically	bound	actors,	yet	they	are	increasingly	looking	to	the	
international	 sphere,	 attempting	 to	 establish	 themselves	 as	 legitimate	 actors	 in	 this	 new	
context.	Therefore	there	 is	a	clear	and	defined	process	of	agency-creation	to	be	explored.	
Meanwhile,	 the	 ‘nested’	 context	 that	paradiplomacy	necessarily	 takes	place	within	means	
that	messages	are	simultaneously	being	sent	and	 received	by	a	variety	of	 relevant	actors.	
‘Performing’	 international	 politics	 conveys	 meaning	 to	 external	 actors	 (in	 terms	 of	 the	
capacities	or	relevance	of	sub-state	governments	as	policy	makers),	to	domestic	audiences	
(in	terms	of	the	image	portrayed	of	the	region	and	its	international	status),	and	to	the	‘host	
state’	 itself,	 perhaps	 challenging	 their	 competence	 in	 certain	 areas.	 A	 Performativity	
																																																						
73	 ‘Performativity	 and	 International	 Politics’,	 workshop	 held	 at	 the	 Goethe	 University	
Frankfurt	on	the	21st-22nd	February	2014.	Author	in	attendance.	
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framework	further	lends	itself	to	exploring	in	greater	depth	the	dynamic	between	host-state	
and	 sub-state	 governments;	 in	 particular	 the	 ways	 that	 agency-creation	 may	 be	 policed,	
constrained	or	indeed	facilitated	by	the	former.	
	
The	framework	of	Performativity	also	has	a	natural	congruence	with	the	role	of	‘mimicry’	in	
the	legitimation	of	sub-state	diplomacy,	which	itself	is	about	performing	and	re-performing	
narratives	of	international	actorness,	statesmanship	and	diplomacy	(McConnell	et	al.,	2012).	
The	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 international	 performances	 of	 sub-state	 governments	 mimic	 or	
otherwise	the	traditional	discourse	of	state-diplomacy	perhaps	tells	us	something	both	about	
the	 discrete	 aims	 of	 that	 actor,	 and	more	 broadly	 about	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 those	 pre-
existing	international	norms	themselves.	
	
The	new	rules	of	the	game	
	
To	the	extent	that	paradiplomacy	has	become	‘normalised’	(Cornago,	2010)	in	the	past	two	
decades,	 this	 has	 not	 occurred	 in	 a	 vacuum.	 Much	 has	 been	 written	 about	 opportunity	
structures	 provided	 by	 the	 processes	 of	 European	 integration	 and	 the	 related	 rise	 of	
regionalism	and	devolution,	both	within	the	EU	and	beyond	(Hepburn,	2007;	Hepburn,	2009;	
Elias,	 2008;	 Keating,	 2008;	 Keating,	 1999;	 Hepburn,	 2008b;	 Carter	 and	 Pasquier,	 2010;	
Aldecoa	 and	 Keating,	 1999b;	 Aldecoa	 and	 Keating,	 1999a;	 Moore,	 2008a;	 Bursens	 and	
Deforche,	2008).	But	there	is	perhaps	also	a	messier,	more	contested	story	to	be	told	around	
the	unbundling	of	sub-state	governments	from	their	domestic	policy	settings.	Authors	such	
as	 Buzan	 and	 Albert	 (2010:	 333)	 and	 Schreuer	 (1993:	 450)	 have	 highlighted	 the	de	 facto	
functional	differentiation	in	the	international	system	that	has	arisen	from		a	new	diversity	of	
actors	entering	 into	arrangements	with	one	another.	Both	of	 these	authors	 -	writing	 from	
different	 disciplines	 and	 seventeen	 years	 apart	 -	 also	 argue	 that	 their	 respective	 fields,	
international	 relations	 and	 international	 law,	 have	 failed	 to	 properly	 account	 for	 these	
changes.	 For	 example,	 Schreuer	 (1993:	 450)	 argues	 that	 the	 typical	 classification	 of	 such	
agreements,	 specifically	between	 sub-state	governments,	 as	 “extra-legal	 and	not	properly	
belonging	to	the	sphere	of	international	law”,	is	“probably	more	the	expression	of	an	inability	
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to	come	to	terms	with	this	phenomenon	than	an	adequate	description	of	reality”.	Perhaps	a	
case	of	the	disciplining	function	of	state-sovereignty	discourses,	activities	falling	outside	these	
parameters	 are	 -	 knowingly	 or	 otherwise	 -	 reclassified	 as	 non-diplomatic,	 extra-legal	 and,	
therefore,	 largely	 inconsequential.	 	 In	the	specific	context	of	sub-state	diplomacy,	Hocking	
(1999:	21)	argues	that:	“many	of	the	terms	coined	during	the	1980s	to	describe	[sub-state	
diplomacy]…	such	as	paradiplomacy	or	protodiplomacy	-	are	suggestive	of	a	second-order	set	
of	activities,	pale	 imitations	of	 ‘real’	diplomacy,	and	help	to	disguise	the	distinctiveness	of	
what	is	being	examined”.	
	
Literature	on	this	 ‘new	phenomenon’	and	 its	 relationship	to	the	discipline	of	 international	
relations	 abounded	 for	 a	 period	 in	 the	 late	 1980s	 -	 early	 2000s,	 specifically	 in	 terms	of	 a	
disaggregation	 of	 concepts	 bundled	 up	 in	 the	 “Westphalian	 myth”	 or	 “Westphalian	
syndrome”	(Caporaso,	2000).	Several	authors	questioned	the	field’s	ability	to	conceptualise	
such	a	change,	given	the	pervasiveness	of	established	norms	(Ruggie,	1993;	Caporaso,	2000;	
Albert	 et	 al.,	 2001).	 Specifically,	 Ruggie	 (1993:	 140-143)	 argues	 that	 there	 is	 “an	
extraordinarily	 impoverished	 mind-set	 at	 work”,	 one	 only	 able	 to	 “visualize	 long-term	
challenges	 to	 the	 system	 of	 states	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 entities	 that	 are	 institutionally	
substitutable	for	the	state”.	He	continues	that:	
We	are	not	very	good	as	a	discipline	at	studying	the	possibility	of	fundamental	
discontinuity	 in	 the	 international	 system;	 that	 is	addressing	 the	question	of	
whether	the	modern	system	of	states	may	be	yielding	 in	some	 instances	to	
postmodern	forms	of	configuring	political	space.	We	 lack	even	an	adequate	
vocabulary;	and	what	we	cannot	describe,	we	cannot	explain	(Ruggie,	1993:	
143).		
The	consequence	of	such	an	inability	to	account	for	these	challenges	to	the	norms	of	absolute	
sovereignty,	 authority	 and	 territoriality	 is	 that	 certain	 areas	 of	 international	 activity	 are	
‘down-graded’,	and	not	considered	in	terms	of	their	potential	impact	or	significance	on	this	
higher	 plane	 of	 international	 society.	 For	 Lapid,	 the	 International	 Relations	 discipline’s	
“fascination	with	sovereign	statehood	has	greatly	decreased	its	ability	to	confront	issues	of	
ethnic	nationhood	and	political	otherhood”	(Lapid,	1996:10	cited	in	Shain	and	Barth,	2003:	
460).	 	For	the	purposes	of	our	discussion,	a	similar	argument	may	be	made	as	it	relates	to	
scant	attention	paid	to	paradiplomatic	activity	from	within	the	field	of	International	Relations.	
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Though	highly	contested,	one	could	certainly	make	the	argument	that	the	appropriation	of	
international	policy	space	by	sub-state	units,	and	in	many	cases	the	claims	to	representation	
they	 make,	 has	 theoretical	 consequences	 for	 the	 discipline	 of	 International	 Relations.	 In	
particular,	the	competing	claims	as	to	who	can	authoritatively	‘speak	for	the	people’,	on	the	
one	 hand,	 and	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	 external	 identity	 of	 a	 state	may	 be	 altered	 by	 the	
international	activities	of	its	constituent	units,	on	the	other,	would	seem	to	be	a	core	part	of	
what	Ruggie	describes	as	the	“unbundling”	of	territoriality,	a	central	concept	whose	neglect	
on	the	part	of	international	relations	scholars	he	treats	as	akin	to	“never	looking	at	the	ground	
one	is	walking	on”	(1993:	173).	Indeed,	by	allowing	sub-state	governments	a	role	in	external	
affairs,	limited	by	contextual	and	constitutional	factors	in	different	states,	both	the	state	and	
sub-state	 governments	 may	 be	 conceived	 of	 entering	 into	 what	 Caporaso	 (2000:	 4-5)	
describes	as	a	“sovereignty	bargain”,	one	of	many	such	bargains	that	must	go	un-accounted	
for	because	“concepts	such	as	sovereignty	and	territoriality	have	been	treated	as	if	they	could	
take	on	two	possible	values	-	present	or	absent,	sovereign	or	not	sovereign,	territorial	or	non-
territorial”.	Once	again,	 the	 framework	of	 sovereignty	games	 seems	particularly	 apt	here,	
allowing	us	to	better	account	for	the	range	of	possibilities	regarding	the	distribution	of	power	
and	authority	amongst	different	tiers	of	government.	
	
However,	 as	 much	 as	 the	 language	 of	 Westphalian	 sovereignty	 might	 constrain	 the	
exploration	of	empirical	shifts	in	the	practice	of	global	politics,	the	language	of	transformation	
and	 change	 may	 equally	 misrepresent	 the	 precise	 nature	 of	 these	 developments.	 In	 a	
paradiplomatic	context,	Hocking	(1999:	20)	contends	that	“if	there	has	been	a	‘power	shift’	
in	world	politics,	underpinned	by	new	economic	 forces	and	the	growing	 influence	of	 ‘new	
actors’	 such	 as	 non-governmental	 organisations	 (NGOs),	 it	 has	 been	 more	 subtle	 than	
sometimes	suggested,	and	mapping	it	is	proving	to	be	a	contentious	exercise”.	In	theoretical	
terms,	paradiplomatic	activities,	therefore,	can	be	caught	between	the	proverbial	rock	and	
hard-place:	appropriated	as	evidence	of	systemic	shifts	 in	global	politics	or	dismissed	as	a	
largely	irrelevant	provincial	practice.	The	more	nuanced	story	struggles	to	be	told.	Analysing	
paradiplomacy	in	process,	rather	than	event,	terms,	in	particular	the	ways	in	which	it	relates	
to	the	trajectory	of	sub-state	nationalism	and	‘soft’	nation	building,	may	be	more	illuminating.			
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In	 sum,	 considering	 paradiplomacy	 as	 part	 of	 a	 messier,	 more	 contentious	 story	 of	 the	
multiplicity	of	political	agency	in	the	post-cold	war	era	is	something	more	than	‘explaining	it	
away’	as	a	consequence	of	the	pre-determined	logics	of	globalization,	European	integration	
and	 regionalism.	 Such	 political	 agency	 on	 the	 part	 of	 sub-state	 governments,	 as	 we	 will	
explore	below,	 is	potentially	 transformative	 in	 itself:	 in	 the	ways	 that	 it	challenges	 -	often	
implicitly	 -	 the	 authority	 of	 other	 actors.	 The	 agreements,	 relationships	 and	 institutions	
created	by	sub-state	actors	as	part	of	their	interactions	with	one	another	draw	on	typically	
‘governmental’	attributes	and	sources	of	 legitimacy:	 representativeness,	effectiveness	and	
territoriality.	If	these,	then,	are	the	‘new	rules	of	the	game’,	the	political	agency	of	certain	
sub-state	governments	has	 changed	 the	 structural	 context	 that	 all	 sub-state	governments	
now	 face	 in	 the	 international	 sphere.	 Is	 paradiplomatic	 activity	 thus	 informed	 by	 an	
expectation	that	this	 is	what	sub-state	governments	 ‘should’	be	doing;	much	as	regions	 in	
asymmetric	 states	 are	 ‘learning	 to	 catch	 the	wave’	 of	 constitutional	 reform	 and	 regional	
autonomy	(Hombrado,	2011)?	The	role	of	inter-group	learning	and	norm	creation	amongst	
sub-state	governments	has	been	little	studied	in	a	paradiplomacy	context,	yet	there	is	clear	
evidence	 of	 this	 sort	 of	 referencing	 from	 the	 actors	 themselves.	 For	 example,	 Bavaria	
frequently	uses	its	contemporaries	to	convey	messages	about	precisely	what	‘type’	of	actor	
it	 is:	 it’s	 a	 ‘regional	 leader’,	 placed	 alongside	other	 economically	 advanced,	 constitutional	
regions	 in	a	global	network	of	 that	nomenclature,	 it’s	a	nation	 	 “very	 similar	 to	Scotland”	
(Minister	President	Eberhard	Sinner,	cited	in	Hepburn,	2008a:	185),	but	not	“comparable”	to	
‘separatist’	 Catalonia.74	 The	 ‘new	 rules	 of	 the	 game’	 thus	 both	 reflect	 the	 new-found	
international	agency	of	sub-state	governments,	and	the	context	that	sub-state	governments,	
as	a	broader	category	of	actor,	find	themselves	within.	Considering	it	from	this	perspective	
perhaps	provides	a	more	contested,	overtly	political	and	agency	focussed	account	than	those	
of	globalization	and	regionalism,	at	least	the	former	of	which	has	a	tendency	to	treat	regions	
themselves	as	passive	participants	in	the	process.	A	performativity	framework,	meanwhile,	
allows	us	to	more	accurately	account	for	the	paradoxical	nature	of	paradiplomacy:	the	push	
																																																						
74	 Interview	data,	 Senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	Official	 2013.	Hepburn	 citation	of	 course	
refers	to	Scotland	before	the	SNP’s	first	minority	government	in	2007.	
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and	pull	dynamics	that	seem	to	be	a	feature	across	all	of	our	case	studies.	Paradiplomacy	both	
challenges	and	reinforces	state-level	diplomacy.	Looking	 in	detail	at	 the	exact	 interactions	
taking	place,	 free	from	rigid	assumptions	about	what	the	sub-state	tier	can	and	should	be	
doing	on	an	international	stage,	allows	these	contradictory	forces	to	come	to	the	fore.			
	
A	focus	on	the	political	agency	of	sub-state	governments	is	therefore	a	key	contribution	of	
this	chapter.	 In	order	to	appropriate	international	space,	sub-state	governments	must	first	
make	 some	 sort	 of	 claim	 as	 to	 their	 international	 legitimacy.	 In	 other	 words,	 they	 must	
convince	other	actors	of	their	virtue	on	the	global,	rather	than	the	local,	stage.	This	task	is	in	
many	ways	a	priori	-	what	comes	next	is	the	day-to-day	business	of	‘walking	the	walk’	and	
‘talking	 the	 talk’	 of	 an	 international	 actor.	 The	 concept	 of	 legitimacy	 as	 it	 relates	 to	
international	 relations	 is	 addressed	 below.	 The	 utility	 or	 otherwise	 of	 mimicry	 as	 a	
legitimating	 strategy	 will	 also	 be	 examined,	 before	 we	 move	 on	 to	 consider	 three	 short	
examples	 -	 from	 each	 of	 our	 case	 studies	 -	 which	 demonstrate	 these	 aforementioned	
processes	of	agency	creation	and	contestation.		
	
	
Speaking	‘for	the	people’	or	speaking	‘like	a	state’?	Paradiplomacy	and	Legitimacy	
	
According	to	Mulligan	(2006:	349-350):	“few	problems	loom	larger	in	political	life,	in	both	the	
theory	and	practice	of	government,	than	those	phrased	in	terms	of	‘legitimacy’”.	As	such,	he	
continues,	legitimacy	has	“come	to	the	fore	as	a	‘master	question’	of	international	relations”.	
It	is	at	once	a	concept	that	“seems	to	signify	some	crucial	and	reasonably	discrete	feature	of	
political	life”,	and	yet	at	the	same	time	is	highly	elusive,	allied	with	a	range	of	“conceptual	
affiliates”	 from	 “legality	 to	 popular	 approval	 to	 moral	 appropriateness”.	 In	 other	 words,	
despite	the	inherent	ambiguity	of	the	term,	it	is	used	by	both	theorists	and	practitioners	as	if	
the	definition	is	instead	concrete,	compounding	this	lack	of	clarity	(Mulligan,	2006:	349-351).	
		
For	Collingwood	(2006:	439)	“in	an	era	of	globalisation,	discrepancies	have	emerged	between	
political	 ideas	 and	 the	 realities	 of	 the	 global	 distribution	 of	 power”.	 Relatedly,	 therefore,	
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Collingwood	 argues	 that	 two	 particular	 questions	 result	 from	 such	 discrepancies:	 “the	
question	of	which	actors	should	exercise	power	at	the	international	level”,	and	“which	rules	
should	govern	their	action”.	At	the	heart	of	such	questions	is	the	notion	that	the	processes	of	
globalisation	 cited	 above	 “have	 given	 economic	 and	 political	 power	 to	 actors	 that	 are	
insufficiently	 accountable	 to	 citizens”,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 “formal	 accountability”	 owed	 to	
voters	by	democratic	states	(Collingwood,	2006:	446).	Debate	abounds	as	to	who	is,	and	who	
is	not,	a	legitimate	actor,	as	well	as	to	what	the	relationship	between	internal	and	external	
legitimacy	ought	to	be.	Such	discussion	takes	in	issues	from	the	perceived	internal	illegitimacy	
of	postcolonial	African	states,	 lacking	“affinity	with	constituent	 sub-state	groups”	 (Okafor,	
2000:	522),	to	the	European	Union’s	recently	established	external	 legitimacy,	crafted	from	
notions	of	a	“normative,	value-driven”	international	policy”	(Youngs,	2004:	415).	
	
The	diplomacy	of	 sub-state	governments,	however,	poses	 slightly	different	questions.	The	
formal	link	between	voters	and	their	democratically	elected	government	does	exist,	in	exactly	
the	same	way	as	between	a	state	and	its	citizens.	The	question	is	perhaps	instead	whether	
this	legitimacy	extends	to	areas	beyond	their	‘usual’	and	overwhelmingly	domestic	spheres	
of	 activity.	 If	 “’legitimate’	 behaviour	 is	 rightful	 behaviour:	 undertaken	 by	 the	 appropriate	
authority,	 in	 line	 with	 an	 agreed	 set	 of	 rules,	 and	 with	 appropriate	 or	 intended	 effects”	
(Collingwood,	2006:	444),	then	the	challenge	for	sub-state	governments	is	to	make	a	claim	to	
such	appropriateness	both	in	the	international	fields	it	enters,	and	in	terms	of	the	ways	in	
which	 it	operates.	For	paradiplomacy,	 therefore,	 the	 ‘legitimacy	question’	 is	 twofold.	Sub-
state	 governments,	 particularly	 those	 representing	 stateless	 nations,	 covet	 legitimacy	 in	
terms	of	 representing	 their	 ‘people’;	 there	 can	be	 competitive	overtones	 to	 such	actions,	
representing	 their	 people	 better,	 or	 more	 accurately,	 than	 the	 state.	 The	 Scottish	 voice	
following	 the	 2016	 Brexit	 referendum	 arguably	 reflects	 a	 key	 example	 of	 this	 dynamic.	
Additionally,	sub-state	governments	attempt	to	establish	a	legitimacy	to	their	international	
activities,	a	‘right’	to	act	in	the	global	arena.	For	some	sub-state	actors,	therefore,	practicing	
diplomacy	in	a	way	that	mirrors	its	most	prestigious	form,	inter-state	diplomacy,	is	a	method	
of	 achieving	 such	 legitimacy.	 This	 is	 both	 because	 of	 the	 axiomatic	 relationship	 between	
diplomacy	 and	 representation	 (Sharp,	 1999)	 and	 because	 of	 the	 role	 of	 diplomacy	 in	
conferring	legitimacy,	as	a	discourse	of	“recognition	and	authority”	(McConnell	et	al.,	2012:	
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804).	This	is	the	case	not	only	with	inter-state	diplomacy,	though	this	may	be	a	pinnacle	in	
the	 regard,	 but	 also	 with	 other	 forms	 of	 diplomacy	 that	 appear	 ‘official’	 in	 one	 form	 or	
another.	In	another	vein,	the	grounding	of	paradiplomacy	in	domestic	competences	-	or	issue	
areas	where	the	‘rightness’	of	sub-state	involvement	is	taken	more-or-less	for	granted	-	also	
acts	as	a	source	of	legitimacy,	with	sub-state	governments	appealing	to	their	position	at	the	
‘receiving	end’	of	global	governance	on	a	variety	of	issues,	from	the	environment	to	terrorism.	
	
Making	such	claims	to	legitimacy,	for	‘new’	diplomatic	actors,	is	perhaps	made	an	easier	task	
by	the	diffusion	of	authority	(both	towards	transnational	organisations,	on	the	one	hand,	and	
sub-state	groups	on	the	other)	that	-	arguably	-	has	already	taken	place,	leaving	“redefined	
criteria	of	political	 legitimacy”	 in	 its	wake	 (Rosenau,	1992:	256).	 	What,	 then,	might	 these	
redefined	criteria	of	political	legitimacy	look	like?	Taking	one	forthright	view,	for	Guibernau	
(1996:	59-62)	the	matter	is	in	fact	straightforward,	at	least	as	it	applies	to	the	‘downward’	
direction	 of	 travel:	 a	 legitimate	 state	 is	 one	 that	 corresponds	 to	 the	 nation,	 where	 an	
illegitimate	state	is	one	which	is	comprised	of	different	nations.	For	the	group	of	sub-state	
governments	 representing	 ‘stateless	 nations’,	 this	 classification	 is	 clearly	 significant,	 and	
indeed	much	of	their	more	advanced	paradiplomatic	activity	represents	a	clear	contest	for	
exactly	which	authority	most	accurately	‘speaks	for	the	people’	of	the	nation	in	question.	The	
role	of	foreign	policy,	in	particular	its	exclusion	from	most	constitutional	provisions	for	sub-
state	autonomy,	even	in	the	case	of	federations,	is	crucial	for	Guibernau	(2004:	1254).	It	is	
this	 exclusion	 that	 precludes	 such	 sub-state	 nations	 from	 practising	 meaningful	
independence,	 a	 sentiment	 that	 perhaps	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 paradiplomatic	
practices	-	especially	in	those	cases	where	a	stateless	nation	employs	particularly	advanced	
and	ambitious	strategies	-	for	the	purposes	of	mimicking	the	foreign	policy	functions	of	the	
state,	and	the	value	of	the	symbolic	capital	that	such	strategies	can	generate.	Guibernau	sees	
stateless	nations	as	a	particular	type	of	political	community,	one	growing	in	significance	and	
“able	 to	 capture	 and	 promote	 sentiments	 of	 loyalty,	 solidarity	 and	 community	 among	
individuals	who	 seem	 to	 have	 developed	 a	 growing	 need	 for	 identity”	 (Guibernau,	 2004:	
1255).	
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However,	even	if	we	accept	the	argument	that	sub-state	political	communities,	particularly	
those	 representing	 distinct	 nations,	 are	 ever-more	 salient	 and	 growing	 in	 significance,	
establishing	legitimacy	in	their	international	endeavours	is	a	separate	process,	one	which	is	
being	shared	with	other	non-state	actors	operating	at	the	international	level.	In	diplomatic	
terms,	the	issue	of	legitimacy	is	essential,	representing	the	basis	for	recognition	of	the	actors	
involved	in	international	affairs	and	then	conferred	on	individual	political	actors	in	diplomatic	
negotiations	 (La	 Porte,	 2012;	 McConnell	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 There	 is	 also	 perhaps	 a	 revealing	
tautology	 in	 evidence	 here:	 in	 the	 international	 realm,	 the	 key	 source	 of	 legitimacy	 is	
international	 recognition.	 Other	 forms	 of	 legitimacy	 exist,	 including	 democratic	
representativeness	-	through	elections	in	the	case	of	governments	-	or	the	“delegation”	of	
this	legitimacy	to	international	bodies	(La	Porte,	2012:	450).	In	the	case	of	non-sate	actors,	
legitimacy	 is	 granted	 -	 by	 the	 public	 and	 other	 political	 actors	 -	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	
‘representativity’,	 or	 their	 “capacity	 to	 represent	 the	 public’s	 interests	 in	 deliberation	
processes.”	 Here,	 La	 Porte	 is	 referring	 primarily	 to	 NGOs	 and	 other	 transnational	
organisations,	and	this	‘representativity’	corresponds	to	the	quantity	or	quality	of	the	citizens	
who	 share	 their	 ideas,	 values	 or	 initiatives”	 (La	 Porte,	 2012:	 454).	 In	 addition	 to	 these	
representative	qualities,	the	idea	of	effectiveness	as	an	alternate	source	of	legitimacy	has	also	
been	 considered	 from	 the	 view	 of	 non-state	 actors	 (La	 Porte,	 2012:	 452);	 signified	 by	
expertise	for	NGOs	and	policy-networks	(Sharp,	1999:	55),	or	by	economic	prowess	and	the	
ability	to	‘get	things	done’	in	the	case	of	cities	(Acuto,	2013;	Bulkeley	and	Schroeder,	2011;	
Curtis,	2011).	
	
For	directly	elected	sub-state	governments,	able	to	draw	on	‘representative’	legitimacy,	their	
claims	to	a	role	outwith	the	borders	of	the	state	are	premised	on	two	distinct	narratives.	The	
first	is	that,	“foreign	affairs	are	not	autonomous	-	they	are	always	about	something”	(Hocking,	
1986:	 480).	 In	 other	 words,	 claims	 to	 legitimacy	 are	 based	 on	 a	 sub-state	 government’s	
domestic	competences	and	the	‘necessary’	international	components	or	ramifications	of	such	
domestic	powers.	According	to	‘Bavaria	in	the	World’,	published	by	the	state	Government,	
“for	a	highly	advanced	state	 like	Bavaria,	with	a	deeply	 rooted	 identity,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	
imagine	 a	 sound	 future	 development	 without	 it	 being	 embedded	 in	 an	 international	
framework”	(Bayerische	Staatskanzlei,	2010)	.	The	second	narrative	rests	on	the	role	of	sub-
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state	governments,	as	elected	officials	of	the	region	or	stateless	nation,	in	representing	the	
specific	interests	of	that	region	where	they	differ	from	those	of	the	host-state	at	large.	For	
example,	in	the	UK,	newly	devolved	regions	were	able	to	participate	in	EU	policy	processes	in	
much	more	formalised	and	extensive	ways	following	the	election	of	sub-state	authorities	in	
1999,	drawing	on	a	“new	source	of	legitimacy”	(Bulmer	et	al.,	2006:	77).		
	
In	sum,	legitimacy	is	a	concept	that	is	central	to	paradiplomatic	activity:	either	being	asserted	
by	 a	 sub-state	 government,	 or	 indeed	 denied	 or	 challenged	 by	 other	 actors.	 Sub-state	
governments	 draw	 on	 multiple,	 overlapping	 and	 occasionally	 contradictory	 sources	 of	
legitimacy	in	their	international	engagements.	The	most	compelling	of	these	are	often	their	
representational	 qualities:	 as	 elected	 representatives	 of	 a	 clearly	 defined	 community	 or	
locale.	 In	 some	 cases,	 and	 certainly	 in	 those	 of	 stateless	 nations,	 the	 claims	 of	 sub-state	
governments	 can	 go	 a	 step	 further:	 to	 represent	 a	 distinct	 ‘people’.	 Clearly,	 these	 claims	
overlap	with	those	made	by	a	sovereign	state:	representing	the	larger	community	or	territory	
within	which	the	smaller	unit	resides.			
	
The	 particularity	 of	 a	 sub-state	 government’s	 claim	 to	 legitimacy	 is	 therefore	 premised	
precisely	on	their	difference	to	the	‘host’	state.	Whether	in	terms	of	economic	prowess,	or	
high-tech	industries	-	as	in	the	paradiplomatic	activities	of	California,	Beijing	and	Bavaria;	their	
normative	credentials	-	as	 in	the	international	sustainable	development	activities	of	Wales	
and	Scotland	or	the	democracy	assistance	programmes	of	Bavaria;	or	 indeed	their	relative	
deprivation	 or	 political	 or	 ethnic	 subjugation.	 Sub-state	 governments	 appeal	 both	 to	
principles	 of	 national	 sovereignty	 and	 self-determination	 -	 the	 attributes	 or	 interests	 of	 a	
‘people’	of	a	region	or	stateless	nation	-	and	to	functional	discourses	of	geo-strategic	position,	
territory	or	productivity.	Bavaria	is	perhaps	a	case-in-point	of	successfully	combining	these	
two	discourses.	Their	diplomatic	activity	is	both	steeped	in	its	history	and	special	status	as	a	
‘Freistaat’	(it’s	‘reusable	past’	to	use	Hepburn’s	term	(2008a:	:187)),	and	strategically	focussed	
around	the	narrative	of	its	high-tech	industry,	a	balancing	act	manifest	in	the	phrase	‘laptop	
und	lederhosen’	(Criekemans,	2010b:	:41).	Such	claims	to	legitimacy	on	the	basis	of	difference	
or	particularity	can	be	identified	in	singular	instances,	for	example	when	a	region	stands	to	
be	disproportionally	affected	by	an	environmental	 issue,	or	 indeed	 if	 its	position	 leaves	 it	
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particularly	vulnerable	to	conflict	or	international	crime.	Domestic	political	considerations	can	
also	temporarily	mobilise	these	claims	-	the	2014	Scottish	independence	referendum	being	a	
key	example	here.	Moreover,	the	discourse	of	particularity	may	be	a	near	constant	theme	
running	through	a	sub-state	government’s	international	agency,	and	the	claims	it	makes	to	a	
legitimate	presence.	The	premise	of	much	of	Quebec’s	paradiplomacy,	for	example,	is	that	of	
its	cultural,	linguistic	and	historical	particularity	within	the	Canadian	context.	More	broadly,	
however,	 we	 can	 point	 to	 a	 particularly	 prevalent	 -	 and	 arguably	 effective	 -	 legitimating	
strategy	 for	 the	 international	 activities	of	 sub-state	 governments:	mimicry.	 This	 feature	 is	
seen	in	each	of	our	three	case	studies,	though	in	remarkably	varied	guises.	
	
Looking	to	locate	the	particular	‘unofficial’	diplomacies	of	those	non-state	actors	that	aspire	
to	some	aspects	of	‘stateness’,	McConnell	et	al	(2012:	804)	argue	that	by	“adapting	Bhabha’s	
notion	of	mimicry	to	diplomatic	discourse,	it	demonstrates	how	non-state	diplomacies	draw	
on,	mimic	and	intervene	in	the	realm	of	formal	political	action	in	ways	which	both	promote	
‘official’	 state	 diplomacy	 as	 an	 ideal	 and	 dilute	 its	 distinction	 from	 other,	 ‘unofficial’	
diplomacies’”.	In	doing	so,	the	authors	both	identify	the	strategies	used	by	non-state	actors	
to	legitimise	their	international	activities,	and	at	the	same	time	account	for	the	curious	effects	
that	such	activities	have	on	other,	official	diplomatic	actors.	In	this	second	regard,	unofficial	
diplomacies	are	understood	as	both	“resemblance	and	menace”	(McConnell	et	al.,	2012).	By	
mimicking	 symbols	of	 statehood	 -	adorning	meetings	and	conferences	with	national	 flags,	
designating	‘foreign	offices’	or	ministries	-	and	re-performing	narratives	of	state	sovereignty	
through	attempts	to	“imitate	formal	and	official	diplomatic	practices”,	non-state	actors	are	
seen	as	bolstering	the	very	 international	system	that	they	also	challenge.	Yet,	at	the	same	
time,	their	very	presence	on	the	international	stage,	and	the	extent	to	which	they	are	able	to	
claim	 a	 portion	 of	 the	 international	 legitimacy	 typically	 reserved	 for	 states,	 weakens	 the	
state’s	monopoly	on	such	concepts,	and	indeed	challenges	the	“composition	and	status	of	the	
interstate	system”	(McConnell	et	al.,	2012:	804).		
	
The	cases	considered	by	McConnell	et	al.	-	the	Tibetan	Government	in	Exile,	the	International	
Christian	 Embassy	 in	 Jerusalem	 and	 Micropatrias	 (such	 as	 the	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	
Bobalania	-	“self	declared	nations	that	mimic	and	in	many	ways	parody	established	sovereign	
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nation-states”)	 -	 all	 constitute	 “remainders”,	 left	 over	 from	 the	 ‘legitimate’	 international	
system.	According	to	the	authors,	“it	is	their	excess	that	provides	the	constitutive	outside	to	
the	diplomatic	 realm.	 Even	as	 their	 existence	 threatens	 that	 system,	 the	 system	 relies	on	
them	for	representational	force	to	reify	systematic	norms”.	However,	at	the	same	time,	the	
cases	 also	 “illustrate	 the	 representational	 power	 that	 can	 be	 tapped	 into	 through	 those	
discourses	and	practices”	(McConnell	et	al.,	2012:	811).		The	systemic	effects	of	such	unofficial	
diplomacies	are	therefore	moderated:	mimicry	represents	an	important	tool	or	strategy	for	
non-state	actors	wishing	to	‘tap	into’	more	conventional	forms	of	legitimacy	and	authority	on	
the	world	stage,	while	at	the	same	time	fundamentally	restates	and	reaffirms	the	privileged	
status	 of	 states	 as	 the	 preeminent	 actors	 in	 international	 relations.	 	 In	 other	 words,	 the	
system-reinforcing	 effects	 of	 mimicry	 might	 account	 for	 the	 tepid	 ways	 in	 which	
paradiplomatic	action	is	understood	to	have	transformed	the	realm	of	diplomacy:	for	how	
subversive	can	such	activities	be,	if	mimicry	is	the	sincerest	form	of	flattery?	The	following	
section	 considers	 the	 ‘mimicked’	 performances	 of	 Scotland,	Wales	 and	 Bavaria	 in	 detail,	
highlighting	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	official	 and	 the	unofficial	 interact	 and,	 in	 turn,	help	 to	
constitute	one	another.			
	
I. The	curious	case	of	Scotland’s	Pandas	
	
The	Scottish	Government’s	increasingly	confident	paradiplomacy	can	perhaps	help	to	shed	
important	 light	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 official	 and	 unofficial	 diplomacies,	 and	 the	
contest	 for	 legitimacy	 in	 representing	 ‘the	 people’	 of	 Scotland.	 Indeed,	 one	 particular	
performance	can	illustrate	the	process	of	international	agency	creation	-	and	contestation	-	
quite	clearly.	The	Scottish	independence	referendum,	and	the	long	campaign	leading	up	to	it,	
proved	a	strong	catalyst	in	the	development	of	international	agency.	Areas	of	‘high’	politics	-	
those	typically	‘out	of	bounds’	for	sub-state	governments	-	such	as	security	and	defence	policy	
-	were	suddenly	brought	into	the	discursive	arena	of	the	Scottish	Government,	faced	with	the	
prospect	of	Scotland	assuming	the	mantle	of	statehood.	Institutional	developments	quickly	
followed:	 a	 ‘Defence	Policy	Unit’	was	 soon	established,	 as	was	 a	 new	ministerial	 post	 for	
External	Affairs	and	International	Development.	As	a	consequence,	Scottish	ministers	-	often	
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controversially	 -	 entered	 into	 debates	 on	 aspects	 of	 the	UK	Government’s	 foreign	 policy,	
claiming	 a	 legitimate	 voice	 in	 the	 ‘big	 questions’	 facing	 the	 state	 as	 a	 whole,	 from	 the	
recognition	of	Palestine	to	international	aid	policy.		
	
The	Scottish	Government	has	made	no	secret	of	 its	ambition	 to	 strengthen	 relations	with	
China.	Since	2006,	 they	have	published	two	5-year	strategies	dedicated	to	developing	this	
relationship,	citing	-	in	the	most	recent	strategy	-	that:	
	The	 2012-13	 once	 in	 a	 decade	 transition	 in	 national	 leadership	 in	 China	
presents	 every	 country	 with	 fresh	 challenges	 and	 opportunities	 for	
establishing	broader	and	deeper	links	with	China…	The	Scottish	Government	is	
committed	to	developing	a	long-term	relationship	with	China	based	on	shared	
values,	partnership	and	trust	(Scottish	Government,	2012).		
As	 part	 of	 this	 overall	 strategy,	 the	 Scottish	 Government	 outlines	 four	 guiding	 principles	
underpinning	 “all	 of	 Scotland’s	 dealings	 with	 China	 and	 against	 which	 success	 will	 be	
measured”:	securing	sustainable	economic	growth,	respect	for	human	rights	and	the	rule	of	
law,	 understanding	 of	 culture	 and	 increasing	 Scotland’s	 influence	 (Scottish	 Government,	
2012).		
	
It	is	within	this	context	that	the	narrative	employed	by	the	Scottish	Government	following	the	
arrival	of	two	Chinese	Giant	Pandas	in	Edinburgh’s	Zoo,	must	be	understood.	That	Tian	Tian	
and	 Yang	 Guang	 are	 now	 firmly	 ensconced	 on	 Scottish	 soil	 could	 not	 have	 escaped	 the	
attention	of	any	visitor	to	Edinburgh	airport	in	December	2011,	or	indeed	for	several	years	
afterwards;	 life-sized	 cardboard	 cut-outs	 of	 the	 pair	were	 one	 of	 the	 first	 sights	 to	 greet	
inbound	passengers.	 It	was	with	 similar	 fanfare	 that	 the	 Scottish	Government	 announced	
their	 arrival,	 taking	 out	 a	 full-page	 advert	 in	 Scottish	 newspapers	 with	 the	 headline	
‘Celebration	of	links	between	Scotland	and	China	as	pandas	arrive	in	Edinburgh’.	The	article	
went	on	to	state:	
Scotland’s	links	with	China	go	back	a	long	way	-	from	the	19th	century,	when	
trading	first	brought	tea	to	our	shores,	to	the	modern	day	with	Scots	pupils	
learning	 Mandarin.	 Now,	 in	 a	 symbolic	 gesture	 of	 friendship	 between	 the	
countries,	and	following	five	years	of	political	and	diplomatic	talks,	the	Chinese	
are	gifting	 two	giant	pandas	 to	 live	 in	 Scotland,	under	 the	 custodianship	of	
Edinburgh	Zoo…The	Pandas’	presence	is	a	sign	of	a	strengthened	alliance	with	
China,	and	opens	up	new	opportunities	in	trade,	culture	and	education	with	
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the	 world’s	 fastest	 growing	 economy.	 So	 as	 the	 countries’	 relationship	
continues	to	flourish,	it’s	fitting	that	the	traditional	Scots	song	Auld	Land	Syne	
is	widely	known	in	China	as	the	Friendship	Song.(Scottish	Government	advert,	
cited	by	BBC	Scotland,	2012).	
	
Despite	the	fact	that	the	‘panda	diplomacy’	was	officially	conducted	between	the	Chinese	and	
UK	states	(with	the	agreement	being	signed	between	the	two	governments	in	London	and	
witnessed	by	UK	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Nick	Clegg	and	Vice	Premier	of	China	Li	Keqiang),	
albeit	with	a	commercial	agreement	in	place	for	the	pandas	to	be	housed	at	Edinburgh	zoo,	
the	Scottish	Government	attempted	to	appropriate	this	action.	Their	claim	was	that	the	‘gift’	
was	evidence	of	the	strong	links	between	the	two	nations	-	China	and	Scotland	-	one	made	
several	times	in	subsequent	campaigns.	Given	that	the	pandas’	arrival	in	Edinburgh	coincided	
with	a	high-profile	trade	mission	to	China	by	Alex	Salmond	and	other	Scottish	officials,	the	
appropriation	of	the	‘panda	diplomacy’	appeared	to	be	a	reasonably	orchestrated	attempt	to	
demonstrate	Scotland’s	autonomous	international	standing,	as	something	more	than	-	and	
distinct	from	-	a	part	of	the	UK.	Indeed,	during	his	visit	to	China	Alex	Salmond	is	quoted	as	
stating,	 once	 again,	 that	 “The	 great	 gift	 of	 these	 giant	 pandas	 symbolises	 the	 great	 and	
growing	 relationship	 between	 Scotland	 and	 China,	 which	 we	 will	 take	 further	 forward	
tomorrow	when	Vice	Premier	Li	and	I	meet	and	discuss	Scotland	and	China’s	business,	cultural	
and	diplomatic	 links	which	are	growing	ever	stronger	to	the	benefit	of	both	nations”	(Alex	
Salmond,	 cited	 by	 BBC	 Scotland,	 2011).	 In	 all	 but	 name,	 this	 interaction	mimicked	 -	 very	
effectively	-	official	diplomacy	between	sovereign	states.	
	
In	fact,	the	aforementioned	Scottish	Government	advert	was	later	banned	by	the	advertising	
standards	authority	for	misleading	the	public	about	the	commercial	nature	of	the	deal;	the	
term	‘gift’	was	found	to	be	misleading	(BBC	Scotland,	2012).		Meanwhile,	the	interpretation	
of	the	UK	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office	and	UK	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Nick	Clegg	was	
that	 the	arrival	of	 the	pandas	was	a	 “reflection	of	 the	 strength”	of	 their	 relationship	with	
China:	“it	shows	that	we	can	co-operate	closely	not	only	on	commerce,	but	on	a	broad	range	
of	 environmental	 and	 cultural	 issues	as	well”.	An	FCO	Minister	 added	 that	 “being	able	 to	
welcome	these	pandas	today	is	the	culmination	of	many	years	hard	work	in	both	the	UK	and	
China…the	 loan	 symbolises	a	 strengthening	of	our	 relationship	with	China…I	am	sure	 that	
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thousands	of	British	people	will	 enjoy	 visiting	 the	pandas”	 (Press	 release,	UK	Foreign	and	
Commonwealth	Office,	2011).	
	
Meanwhile,	 the	 Chinese	 Ambassador	 to	 the	 UK	 is	 quoted	 as	 stating	 that:	 “Pandas	 are	 a	
Chinese	national	treasure.	This	historical	agreement	 is	a	gift	 to	the	people	of	the	UK	from	
China.	It	will	represent	an	important	symbol	of	our	friendship	and	will	bring	our	two	people	
closer	 together”	 (Press	 release,	 UK	 Foreign	 and	 Commonwealth	 Office,	 2011).	 Friendship	
between	 two	 peoples	 and	 two	 nations	 is	 a	 theme	 which	 runs	 through	 each	 of	 these	
statements,	yet	it	is	clear	that	there	is	some	discrepancy	in	terms	of	exactly	which	two	peoples	
and	 two	 nations	 are	 linked	 by	 such	 friendship.	 How	 successful	 Scotland	 has	 been	 in	 its	
attempts	to	claim	a	diplomatic	relationship	with	China	through	this	performance	remains	to	
be	seen.	The	tussle	over	 ‘ownership’	of	 the	panda	diplomacy	 -	a	hugely	 important	part	of	
China’s	foreign	policy	(Hartig,	2013)	-	could	be	seen	from	the	minute	that	the	two	pandas	
touched	down	at	Edinburgh	airport	 and	 is	 still	 being	played	out.	 Scotland’s	 relations	with	
China	have	become	a	cornerstone	of	its	economic	development	strategy,	and	the	symbol	of	
the	two	pandas	is	one	that	the	Scottish	Government	was	keen	to	capitalise	upon.	Indeed,	as	
paradiplomatic	performances	go,	this	was	remarkably	clear-cut	in	its	attempt	to	sanction	its	
own	legitimacy.	From	referencing	shared	attributes	of	nationhood	through	to	a	sophisticated	
mimicking	of	official,	high-level	bilateral	diplomacy,	the	Scottish	Government	were	able	to	
both	 make	 a	 claim	 for	 the	 rightness	 of	 its	 place	 as	 China’s	 partner	 -	 as	 the	 legitimate	
interlocutors	for	the	Scottish	people	-and	for	the	appropriateness	of	its	activities	in	diplomatic	
terms,	in	the	wake	of	its	“five	years	of	political	and	diplomatic	talks”	(Scottish	Government,	
cited	by	BBC	Scotland,	2012).	
	
Additionally,	this	performance	of	‘panda	diplomacy’	should	be	seen	in	the	political	context	at	
the	time.	Earlier	in	the	year	the	2011	Scottish	Parliament	election	had	delivered	the	first	SNP	
majority	government,	indeed	the	first	majority	government	altogether	since	the	Parliament	
itself	was	opened,	a	feat	widely	lauded	in	the	context	of	a	mixed-member	electoral	system	
designed	to	make	such	a	result	improbable	(Cairney,	2011:	2).	With	Alex	Salmond	returning	
as	 First	Minister,	 a	 referendum	on	Scottish	 independence	was	now	 firmly	on	 the	political	
cards.	The	Edinburgh	Agreement,	an	undertaking	on	 the	part	of	both	 the	Scottish	and	UK	
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Governments	to	ensure	that	a	referendum	on	Scottish	independence	could	take	place,	was	
signed	on	the	15th	of	October	2012	and	followed	months	of	protracted	negotiations	between	
the	 two	 governments.	 Therefore	 the	 timing	 of	 the	 pandas’	 arrival	 takes	 on	 an	 added	
significance:	it	fell	during	a	period	in	which	the	SNP,	with	a	newly	strengthened	mandate,	was	
positioning	Scotland	as	a	potential	state-in-waiting.	Demonstrating	their	ability	to	negotiate	
with	a	dominant	economic	actor	such	as	China	was	a	crucial	component	in	this	task,	allowing	
leading	politicians	such	as	Alex	Salmond	to	play	the	role	of	global	statesperson,	‘mimic’	high-
status,	bilateral	diplomacy	and	communicate	the	SNP’s	ambitions	for	sovereign	statehood	to	
audiences	in	Scotland,	across	the	UK	and	indeed	globally.		
	
II. Vanguard	Wales	in	Copenhagen	&	Lesotho	
‘People	in	Wales	have	big	hearts.	They	belong	in	a	small	country	but,	oh	man,	they	really	have	
the	kick	of	a	mule’.	Archbishop	Desmond	Tutu	on	his	visit	to	Wales,	October	2012	
	
The	 international	 performances	 of	 Wales,	 as	 a	 sub-state	 government,	 are	 not	 normally	
directed	at	 third	 states	 (as	we	 see	evidence	of	 in	both	Scotland	and	Bavaria),	 though	 the	
branding	 of	 ‘Nato	 Wales’	 held	 in	 Newport	 during	 2015	 arguably	 acts	 to	 mediate	 this	
distinction.	Predominantly,	the	focus	is	on	region	to	region	and	multilateral,	network-based	
engagement.	 In	this	 ‘case	study	within	a	case	study’,	therefore,	we’ll	 look	at	two	different	
performances	 that	 speak	 to	 the	 same	 broad	 narrative.	 This	 narrative	 reflects	 the	 use	 of	
domestic	statutory	instruments	and	devolved	authority	over	issues	with	a	clear	‘genesis’	in	
the	National	Assembly	to	consciously	broaden	the	limited	international	remit	that	Wales	has	
under	the	terms	of	the	Government	of	Wales	Act	2006.	 	Wales	has	proved	adept	at	using	
these	domestically-grounded	instruments	to	link	to	dominant	liberal,	international	discourses	
and	to	tie	 itself	 into	global	programmes	and	structures	-	for	example	the	UN’s	Millennium	
Development	Goals	or	international	climate	change	fora.	A	clear	attempt	to	ground	Wales’	
international	engagements	in	territory	where	it	has	a	perceived	legitimacy,	derived	from	the	
devolved	responsibilities	that	the	sub-state	government	has	at	a	domestic	level,	can	be	seen	
in	 its	paradiplomacy.	These	areas	are	consciously	expanded;	networking	opportunities	are	
seized	and	the	profile-raising	and	nation	building	advantages	of	such	activities	are	reaped.	
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The	two	sets	of	performances	we	will	consider	are	those	relating	firstly	to	Wales’	involvement	
in	the	Network	of	Regional	Governments	for	Sustainable	Development	(nrg4SD)	-as	a	founder	
of	the	group	and	then	acting	as	co-chair	during	the	Copenhagen	Summit	on	climate	change	-	
and	 secondly	 the	Wales	 for	 Africa	 programme,	 the	 basis	 for	 its	 launch	 in	 2006	 and	 the	
subsequent	 piece	 of	 legislation	 that	 builds	 on	 its	 novel	 legal	 framework,	 the	 2015	 Future	
Generations	Act.	
	
Nrg4SD	was	formed	after	a	world	summit	on	sustainable	development	 in	Johannesburg	 in	
2002.	Wales	was	 a	 key	 founding	member	of	 the	 group,	 chairing	 the	 session	 at	which	 the	
participants	 signed	up	 to	 the	 ‘Gautend	Declaration’,	bringing	 the	network	 into	 fruition.	 In	
Rhodri	Morgan’s	words,	 ‘this	event	would	not	have	 taken	place	without	 the	 leadership	of	
Wales	and	other	core	regions’	(Royles,	2012:	173).	A	key	period	for	Wales’	involvement	in	the	
network	came	post	2007	when	Jane	Davison	became	Minister	for	sustainability,	environment	
and	housing.	She	then	became	co-chair	in	2009,	a	period	which	placed	her	in	the	international	
spotlight	leading	up	to	the	Copenhagen	Summit.	During	this	period	she	was	‘highly	visible	in	
representing	 the	 network	 internationally’	 (Royles,	 2012:	 175).	 Using	 a	 direct	 method	 of	
influence,	 in	 the	 run	up	 to	Copenhagen	she	“represented	both	 the	network	and	Wales	at	
several	high-profile	events”,	and	then	during	the	summit	itself:	
She	met	a	number	of	senior	international	leaders	and	counterparts	across	the	
UK,	 chaired	 UNDP	 and	 climate	 group	 side	 events	 and	 spoke	 at	 events	
organised	 by	 the	 European	 Environment	 Agency	 and	 the	 United	 Nations	
environment	programme.	Day	after	being	elected	the	First	Minister	of	Wales,	
Carwyn	Jones	symbolically	attended	the	climate	leader’s	summit	arranged	by	
the	 climate	 group	 and	 spoke	 at	 a	 UN	 HABITAT-sponsored	 side-event	 in	
Copenhagen	(Royles,	2012:	175).	
In	 one	 notable	 exchange,	 Governor	 of	 California	 Arnold	 Schwarzenegger	 praised	 ‘Welsh	
efforts	to	tackle	climate	change’,	telling	Jane	Davidson	and	her	officials	to	‘keep	up	the	good	
work’.	Davidson	was	attending	the	reception	at	the	Copenhagen	Summit,	hosted	by	Governor	
Schwarzenegger,	in	her	capacity	as	chair	of	Nrg4SD	and	as	the	Welsh	Minister	responsible	for	
climate	change;	an	enhanced	platform	which	had	seen	her	deliver	an	address	to	“political	
leaders	around	the	world”	on	the	role	that	sub-national	government	can	play	 in	efforts	to	
tackle	climate	change	(BBC	Wales,	2009).	All	of	these	performances	reflect	the	ways	in	which	
a	domestic	platform	or	rationale	within	Wales	-	in	this	case	the	statutory	responsibility	it	has	
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for	 sustainable	 development	 -	 can	 open	 international	 doors,	 providing	 an	 international	
legitimacy	and	a	platform	it	would	otherwise	lack.	
	
Undoubtedly,	 there	has	 been	 a	 high	 level	 of	ministerial	 commitment	 to	 the	 issue	 area	of	
sustainable	 development	 and	 to	 nrg4SD	 and	 these	 have	 been	 crucial	 to	 the	 international	
rewards	that	the	activities	have	borne:	
WAG’s	 [the	 Welsh	 Assembly	 Government]	 strong	 political	 engagement	 in	
nrgd4SD	has	clearly	benefited	Wales	in	achieving	a	higher	profile	and	has	given	
an	 international	 platform	 for	 its	 sustainable	 development	 policies…	 more	
broadly,	 WAG’s	 engagement	 has	 contributed	 to	 strengthening	 Wales	
international	 profile	 and	 branding.	 One	 interviewee	 explained	 ‘there	 are	
immense	opportunities	that	have	been	afforded	to	the	network	and	therefore	
to	 the	 regions/country	 of	 which	 the	 chair	 represents	 in	 terms	 of	 issues	 of	
representation	and	being	able	to	have	that	regional	government	dialogue	on	
a	world	stage	(Royles,	2012:	176).	
Essentially,	 this	 is	 a	 case	 where	 learning	 to	 walk	 the	 international	 walk,	 and	 talk	 the	
international	talk,	has	come	to	Wales	through	the	conscious	expansion	of	their	-	relatively	
narrow,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 our	 other	 two	 case	 studies	 -	 domestic	 remit.	 The	 Welsh	
Government’s	diplomacy	surrounding	the	Copenhagen	Summit	portrayed	the	message	that	
Wales	-	as	a	region	charged	with	implementing	climate	change	legislation	and	carrying	the	
statutory	responsibility	for	sustainable	development	-	deserved	a	voice	in	negotiations	aimed	
at	 creating	 an	 international	 regulatory	 framework	 in	 this	 same	 issue	 area.	 By	 consciously	
linking	the	local	and	the	global	elements	of	this	debate,	they	have	helped	to	position	regional	
governments	per	se	as	a	legitimate	actor	in	this	field.		In	its	other	capacity	as	chair	of	nrg4SD	
during	 these	 negotiations,	Wales	was	 afforded	 a	 higher	 profile	 and	 an	 official	 role	 in	 the	
proceedings,	allowing	interactions	with	international	organisations	and	an	audience	which	it	
may	otherwise	have	struggled	to	attract.	
	
This	careful	grounding	of	paradiplomacy	in	the	domestic	obligations	of	sub-state	governance	
is	 something	which	we	 see	 frequently	 in	Wales.	 According	 to	 one	 senior	member	 of	 the	
National	Assembly	for	Wales,	whether	or	not	an	issue	area	has	a	grounding	in	the	legislative	
competence	of	Wales	is	crucial:	
Clearly…	the	meat	and	potatoes	of	foreign	affairs	is	a	state	level	responsibility.	
But	then	in	the	minds	of	the	actors	there	is	quite	a	lot	of	room	for	an	interest	
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in	 foreign	 relations	 because	 politics	 is	 conducted	 in	 a	 global	 world,	 in	 a	
European	world,	in	various	structures.	Some	of	which	have	very	direct	links	to	
Wales	-	European	regional	policy	for	example	-	CAP,	environment	increasingly,	
there’s	lots.	So	that	draws	us	into	the	European	dimension.	But	then	climate	
change	 agendas	 draw	 you	 into	 activities,	 the	 UN.	 But	 it	 tends	 to	 be	 fairly	
functional…	to	what	does	relate	to	devolved	responsibilities.75		
Indeed,	the	same	interviewee	goes	on	to	argue	that	where	an	issue	has	a	“genesis”	 in	the	
National	Assembly,	this	enables	the	international	dimensions	of	the	area	to	be	taken	on,	and	
is	where	sub-state	activities	are	able	to	contribute	most	effectively.	The	context	of	Wales’	
international	performances	are	therefore	key	to	their	perceived	legitimacy	and	effectiveness.	
For	a	different	interviewee:	
Groups	like	nrg4SD,	organisations	like	that	which	have	an	EU	base	but	which	
are	trying	to	interact	with	other	groups	across	the	globe,	I	suppose	n	a	sense	
are	kind	of	pioneering	organisations,	and	I	guess	it’s	the	kind	of	global	climate	
change	infrastructure	which	have	made	that	possible	in	that	sort	of	context.	
So	I	think	there	has	to	be	a	context	for	these	sorts	of	things.	I	think	in	an	ideal	
world	you	might	be	able	to	say	‘well,	regions	can	do	it	for	themselves’,	and	you	
know.	I	think	the	reality	is	that	there	has	to	be	an	international	context	which	
is	driven	by	sovereign	states	in	order	for	the	sub-states	to	be	able	to	make	a	
meaningful	contribution	of	the	back	of	that.	And	that’s	my	sense	of	it.76	
This	 same	 rationale	 -	 of	 Wales’	 international	 legitimacy	 stemming	 from	 its	 devolved	
competences	-	can	be	seen,	and	arguably	has	been	stretched	in	a	more	deliberate	fashion,	in	
the	Welsh	Government’s	 flagship	Wales	 for	 Africa	 programme.	 As	Wyn	 Jones	 and	 Royles	
explain	(Wyn	Jones	and	Royles,	2012),	the	statuary	basis	for	this	initiative	was	far	from	clear-
cut:	
Given…	that	international	development	is	a	reserved	matter,	the	constitutional	
basis	 for	 Assembly	 action	 required	 some	 innovative	 interpretation	 of	 its	
powers.	Consequently,	lawyers	were	involved	in	‘wading	through	legislation’	
seeking	grounds	on	which	Wales	might	act.	The	concept	of	 ‘mutual	benefit’	
became	central	 to	 justifying	WAG’s	actions.	Both	Wales	and	the	developing	
world	were	to	be	beneficiaries	(WAG	2006,1).	The	concern	with	constitutional	
propriety	was	highlighted	by	the	fact	that	the	‘every	particular	action	that	we	
have	taken	under	the	framework	has	been	checked	with	lawyers...	there	is	a	
legal	 paragraph	 attached	 to	 every	 submission	 sent	 to	 the	 First	Minister	 to	
approve	the	spending	of	money’	(Wyn	Jones	and	Royles,	2012:	260).	
																																																						
75	Welsh	Assembly	Member,	interview	2013	
76	Senior	Welsh	Government	Advisor,	interview	2013	
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The	 performance	 of	 Wales	 in	 the	 field	 of	 international	 development	 is	 therefore	 one	
grounded	 in	 a	 hard-fought	 appropriation	 of	 the	 issue	 area	 and	 a	 novel	 statutory	 basis	 of	
mutual	 reciprocity.	 Broader	 themes	 also	 feed	 into	 Wales’	 performances	 in	 this	 regard,	
however:	the	image	of	Wales	as	an	outward	looking,	tolerant	nation,	making	an	‘identifiably	
Welsh’	contribution	to	international	development.	In	celebrating	10	years	of	the	Wales	for	
Africa	Programme,	a	Welsh	Government	report	makes	these	links	rather	clearly:		
Wales	has	always	been	an	outward	looking	nation,	keen	to	play	our	part	in	the	
world.	Ten	years	ago,	in	keeping	with	that	outward	looking	spirit,	we	launched	
our	Wales	for	Africa	programme	to	encourage	more	people	 in	Wales	to	get	
involved	with	development	work	 in	Africa…	 these	partnerships	 characterise	
the	Welsh	 approach	 to	 international	 development,	 where	 experiences	 and	
knowledge	are	shared	in	a	spirit	of	mutual	respect	and	reciprocity.	This	vibrant,	
civil-society	 based	 approach	 has	 seen	 friendships	 formed	 across	Wales	 and	
Africa,	 as	 people	 work	 together	 practically,	 purposefully	 and	 meaningfully	
towards	achieving	the	UN’s	Sustainable	Development	Goals	SGDs.	The	vision	
of	the	SDGs	is	that	of	a	shared,	sustainably	developed	word	in	which	no	one	is	
left	 behind.	 The	 Welsh	 Government	 is	 committed	 to	 being	 a	 part	 of	 the	
response	to	achieving	this	(Welsh	Government,	2016).	
	
Not	only,	therefore,	are	Wales’	performances	as	part	of	this	programme	aimed	at	bringing	
forward	a	novel	approach	to	international	development,	but	they	also	allow	Wales	to	tie	itself	
to	 broader	 international	 structures	 and	 discourses	 -	 such	 as	 the	 UN’s	 sustainable	
development	 goals	 -	 enhancing	 its	 international	 legitimacy	 as	 it	 is	 seen	 to	 make	 an	
‘identifiably	Welsh’	contribution	to	this	issue	area	(Government,	2006),	arguably	in	a	fashion	
which	is	readily	understood	and	accepted	by	other	members	of	the	international	community.	
The	messages	Wales	sends	in	this	regard	are	not	of	a	sub-state	government	attempting	to	
challenge	or	circumvent	the	activities	of	a	sovereign	state,	but	instead	bring	a	smaller-scale,	
practical,	 network-based	 approach	 to	 a	 global	 issue	 area.	Once	 again,	 political	will	within	
Wales	has	appears	to	have	been	at	the	heart	of	this	process.	As	one	interviewee	puts	it:	
With	Wales	for	Africa	you	could	perfectly	well	argue,	and	people	do	from	time	
to	time,	 ‘what’s	that	got	to	do	with	us’,	we’re	not	an	aid	giving	body’…	so	 I	
suppose,	and	actually	that	takes	me	to	the	second	point	I	was	going	to	make,	
that’s	a	very	good	example,	in	that	we’re	driven	by	our	own	powers,	but	we’re	
also	sort	of	driven	by	political	 judgement,	political	will	and	I	think	Wales	for	
Africa	is	a	good	example	of	that.	I	mean,	I	think	basically	it’s	because	Ministers,	
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this	Government,	the	previous	Government,	want	to	do	it.	Because	there	is	a	
political	will	and	political	enthusiasm	to	have	an	engagement	between	Wales	
as	a	developed	country	and	other	parts	of	Africa	which	are	un-developed	or	
less-developed.	And	again	though,	interestingly	in	the	case	of	Wales	for	Africa	
I	think	that	was	a	case	not	just	of	political	will	here,	but	political	will	 in	civic	
society,	where	people	were	already	doing	stuff.77	
	
The	 ‘creative’	 interpretation	of	Wales’	 devolution	dispensation	 to	 allow	 for	 the	Wales	 for	
Africa	programme	(aided	to	a	large	degree	by	the	precedent	set	by	Scotland	in	its	Lesotho	
programme),	as	well	as	the	model	of	reciprocity	borne	out	by	this	particular	model	have	also	
inspired	new	legislation	in	Wales,	explicitly	harnessing	the	future	wellbeing	of	Welsh	citizens	
to	a	 range	of	global	 issues	and	 therefore	bringing	 them	 in	 to	 the	discursive	 fold	of	Welsh	
politics:	
Wales	for	Africa’s	contribution	to	the	SDGs	[Sustainable	Development	Goals]	
helps	to	facilitate	an	identifiably	Welsh	response	on	international	action	based	
around	co-development	in	a	partnership	approach…	in	a	pioneering	piece	of	
legislation,	 the	 Welsh	 Government’s	 Wellbeing	 of	 Future	 Generations	 Act	
(2015)	commits	us	to	improving	the	social,	economic	and	cultural	well-being	
of	 Wales.	 Since	 its	 passing,	 public	 bodies	 in	 Wales	 are	 more	 focussed	 on	
helping	 Wales	 demonstrate	 its	 commitment	 to	 the	 seven	 wellbeing	 goals	
including	Goal	7	-	a	‘Globally	Responsible	Wales’	(Welsh	Government,	2016).	
According	 to	 a	 director	 of	 Division	 for	 Sustainable	 Development	 in	 the	 Department	 of	
Economic	and	Social	Affairs	at	the	United	Nations:	
The	Wales	 Future	 Generations	 Act	 captures	 the	 spirit	 and	 essence	 of	 two	
decades	of	United	Nations	work	in	the	area	of	sustainable	development	and	
serves	as	a	model	for	other	region	and	countries…	we	hope	that	what	Wales	is	
doing	today	the	world	will	do	tomorrow.	Action,	more	than	words,	is	the	hope	
for	our	current	and	future	generations	(Welsh	Government,	2016).	
In	 Wales,	 the	 international	 performances	 around	 climate	 change	 and	 sustainable	
development	 do	 not	 typically	 attempt	 to	 mimic	 traditional	 state-state	 diplomacy	 or	
discourses	in	the	ways	that	we	find	evidence	of	in	Scotland.	Having	said	this,	crucial	to	many	
of	the	Welsh	paradiplomatic	endeavours	explored	above	-	and	elsewhere	in	this	thesis	–	are	
the	precedents	that	Scotland	has	set	in	these	same	areas.	Wales	for	Africa	is	premised,	to	a	
large	 extent,	 on	 Scotland’s	 international	 development	 programme	 in	 Lesotho.	 Indeed,	
																																																						
77	Interview	data,	Senior	Welsh	Government	Advisor,	2013
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Scotland	also	belongs	to	many	of	the	same	networks	as	Wales	and	has	a	similar	focus	on	areas	
such	as	climate	change	and	the	UN’s	Millennium	Development	Goals.	The	difference	is	that	
in	 addition	 to	 these	network	based,	multilateral	 activities,	 Scotland	also	 engages	 in	much	
more	 ‘state-like’	 endeavours	 which	 inevitably	 alter	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 its	 broader	
paradiplomatic	presence	is	interpreted	by	other	actors,	in	particularly	the	UK	Government.		
	
Returning	to	Wales,	in	the	absence	of	some	of	the	more	ambitious	or	controversial	activities	
seen	 in	 both	 Scotland	 and	 Bavaria,	 the	Welsh	 Government	 has	 been	 able	 to	 operate	 in	
perhaps	 a	 more	 benign	 political	 context	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 paradiplomacy.	 Wales	 has	
successfully	 draw	 upon	 on	 the	 legitimacy	 and	 the	 representational	 opportunities	 of	 both	
broader	 regional	 networks	 -	 such	 as	 nrg4SD	 -	 and	 of	 international	 organisations	 and	
structures,	 such	 as	 the	 UN,	 specifically	 in	 relation	 to	 its	 millennium	 development	 goals.	
Notable	in	its	approach	has	been	the	painstaking	grounding	of	international	programmes	on	
climate	 change	 and	 international	 development	 in	 domestic	 statutory	 authority	 and	
legitimacy.	 It	 has	 also	 been	 seen	 to	 perform	 something	 ‘identifiably	 Welsh’	 on	 the	
international	 stage:	 the	 role	 it	 has	 executed	 is	 not	 one	 easily	 confused	with	 a	 state,	 but	
something	inherently	smaller	scale.	In	committing	to	an	approach	of	mutual	reciprocity,	both	
in	the	Wales	for	Africa	programme	and	under	the	Wales	Future	Generations	Act,	Wales	 is	
harnessing	the	power	of	its	smaller	size,	the	necessities	of	grounding	international	aid	in	its	
own	benefit,	abilities	and	competences	in	order	to	create	an	approach	that	is	more	likely	to	
be	welcomed	by	the	international	community	-	and	the	UK	Government	-	and	at	the	same	
time	is	arguably	more	purposeful	and	perhaps	effective	than	alternative	models	(Anyimadu,	
2011).			
	
III. Bavaria	in	Brussels	
	
Portraying	and	harnessing	the	notion	of	Bavarian	cultural	distinctiveness	has	been	crucial	in	
terms	of	gaining,	and	maintaining,	political	power	in	the	Land,	and	has	been	central	to	the	
success	of	the	governing	CSU	(Hepburn	and	Hough,	2012:	93).	This	has	obvious	implications	
for	the	international	activities	of	Bavaria,	particularly	within	Europe;	representing	a	key	arena	
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for	 the	 performances	 of	 Bavaria	 as	 a	 strong,	 economically	 successful	 former	 sovereign,	
grounded	by	its	special	historical	significance	and	cultural	identity.	There	is,	therefore,	a	clear	
domestic	political	motivation	in	performing	Bavaria’s	cultural	distinctiveness	internationally.	
	
Indeed,	in	Bavaria	we	find	that	the	‘special’	position	of	the	Freistaat	-	in	both	historical	and	
economic	terms	-	is	frequently	referenced	as	part	of	its	claims	to	legitimacy	in	international	
arenas.	According	to	Bavarian	Minister	Eberhard	Sinner;	“Bavaria	is	one	of	the	oldest	states	
in	Europe…we	are	very	different	from	the	rest	of	Germany,	we	like	to	be	independent.	We	
fight	for	more	competences	and	powers	for	the	regions”	(Hepburn,	2008a:	194).	This	claim	to	
‘special	 significance’	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 attention	 paid	 by	 Bavarian	 officials	 to	 its	 ‘un-
hyphenated’	 status;	 the	 image	 of	 Bavaria	 as	 a	 long-standing,	 unchanging	 presence	 in	 the	
world	is	a	key	part	of	its	attempts	to	appear	‘state-like’,	in	contradistinction	to	the	“cluttered	
identity”	 of	 the	 “hyphenated	 states”,	 such	 as	 Baden-Württemberg	 or	 North-Rhine-
Westphalia.78	Similarly,	Bavaria	is	able	to	employ	its	treaty	making	power	not	only	“to	create	
substantial	 content-based	 cooperation	 with	 other	 partners”,	 but	 also	 -	 importantly	 -	 “to	
further	‘build’	and	‘enhance	the	international-legal	recognition	of	the	region’”	as	“a	player	
that	 should	 be	 taken	 seriously	 in	 the	 “international	 arena’”	 (Criekemans,	 2010b:	 45);	
mimicking	the	treaty-based	international	arrangements	maintained	by	states.	
	
Bavaria’s	relationship	with	the	European	Union	stands	out	amongst	its	sub-state	government	
peers.	The	reasons	for	this	are	twofold.	Firstly,	Bavaria	has	a	particularly	well-resourced	and	
impressive	representation	in	the	heart	of	Brussels,	marking	 its	status	as	 ‘one	of	the	oldest	
states	in	Europe’.	However,	at	the	same	time,	the	state’s	European	interactions	are	strongly	
marked	by	its	euro	scepticism,	with	subsidiarity	legislation	and	monitoring	being	the	foremost	
areas	 of	 its	 activity.	 This	 euro	 sceptic	 approach	 to	 EU	 politics	 has	 much	 to	 do	 with	 the	
assessment	that	European	policy	is	encroaching	upon	the	natural	territory	of	Länder	such	as	
Bavaria,	‘hollowing	out’	the	role	they	previously	occupied	and	leaving	insufficient	room	for	
sub-state	influence	within	European	institutions.	Indeed,	the	role	of	the	Bavarian	Parliament’s	
EU	representative	seems	to	be	the	direct	scrutiny	and	monitoring	of	European	institutions	
																																																						
78	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	Official	2013	
	 184	
themselves,	 rather	 than	 keeping	 its	 own	 Bavarian	 Government	 in	 check.79	 From	 the	
scrupulous	practice	of	the	Early	Warning	System	to	the	continued	critiques	of	the	subsidiary	
system,	both	the	Bavarian	Parliament	and	its	Government	take	it	upon	themselves	to	be	the	
active	watchdogs	of	sub-state	competence,	considering	it	both	a	right	and	a	duty	to	be	the	
“critical	but	constructive	partner	of	the	EU”.80			
	
Set	amongst	this	backdrop,	the	establishment	of	Bavaria’s	current	Brussels	representation	in	
2004	can	be	considered	an	important	performance	of	its	‘special’	significance	in	Europe,	not	
only	mimicking	but	in	fact	outshining	the	official	representations	of	member-states,	including	
its	own	Federal	Government.	 	The	specific	 context	 is	also	 important	here.	The	opening	of	
independent	Länder	offices	 in	Brussels	was	 initially	“highly	controversial”,	with	“questions	
raised	as	to	their	legality”,	under	the	German	Constitution.	Indeed,	the	response	of	the	Länder	
themselves	was	to	“work	initially	to	fudge	the	basis	upon	which	their	first	EU	offices	were	
built”	(Moore,	2006:	196).	The	building	of	Bavaria’s	current	representation	was	therefore	a	
clear	 signal	 both	 to	 the	 Federal	 Government,	 and	 to	 European	 institutions,	 of	 Bavaria’s	
legitimate	presence	in	European	affairs.	According	to	Moore	(2006:	192):	
The	new	Bavarian	European	Union	(EU)	representation,	which	opened	at	the	
end	 of	 September	 2004,	 has	 set	 an	 important	 precedent	 among	 regional	
offices	 in	 Brussels.	 Paid	 for	 and	 lavishly	 renovated	 at	 a	 cost	 of	 almost	 E30	
million	 to	 the	 Bavarian	 taxpayer,	 the	 building	 cuts	 an	 impressive	 figure,	
sandwiched	between	 the	 European	Parliament	 building	 in	 Brussels	 and	 the	
new	Commission	headquarters.	The	presence	of	Bavaria	in	the	EU	is	thus	set	
to	become	one	which	will	be	even	more	difficult	to	overlook	
Speaking	of	the	new	representation,	a	senior	Bavarian	parliamentary	official	reasoned	that:	
It’s	grand.	It’s	historic….	It’s	an	exclamation	mark	saying	we	are	here	in	Brussels	
and	we	are	not	anywhere,	we’re	not	in	some	office	building	-	we’re	in	this	big	
area	 and	 we	 took	 this	 historic	 building	 so	 everyone	 who	 comes	 to	 the	
European	 Parliament	 has	 to	 pass	 it.	 So	 this	 part	 of…the	 strategy,	 or	 the	
message,	to	say…	we	do	something	really	special.81	
																																																						
79	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	Official	2013	
80	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	Official	2013	
81	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	Official	2013	
	 185	
Indeed,	this	message	of	Bavarian	‘specialness’	amongst	sub-state	governments	is	something	
of	a	recurring	theme.	According	to	a	different	interviewee,	Bavaria’s	ability	to	interact	with	
sovereign	states	-	such	as	the	Czech	Republic	-	depends	upon	the	calculation	that	such	actors	
make	as	to	Bavaria’s	own	status.	The	determination	follows,	therefore,	that	“Bavaria	might	
not	be	sovereign”,	but	its	size,	importance	and	economic	power,	means	that	they	“outweigh	
perhaps	8	or	9	[member	states]	inside	the	European	Union”.82	
	
In	 light	 of	 this	 self-perception,	 the	 Bavarian	 representation	 in	 Brussels	 again	 looks	 to	
represent	 a	 convincing	 performance	 of	 its	 power	 and	 status.	 Through	 mimicking,	 in	 an	
elaborate	fashion,	the	official	representations	of	member	states,	Bavaria	is	placing	itself	-	in	
purely	visual	terms	-	in	this	very	‘category’	of	actor,	distancing	itself	from	its	sub-state	peers	
in	the	process.	Given	the	importance	of	the	territorial	cleavage	within	Bavarian	politics,	such	
a	demonstration	of	status	thus	reflects	a	variety	of	motivations	that	the	sub-state	government	
may	have	for	its	paradiplomacy.	By	enhancing	its	ability	to	influence,	and	ultimately	constrain,	
European	policy,	as	well	as	monitor	the	activities	of	European	institutions,	Bavaria	looks	to	
safeguard	its	own	areas	of	competence.	At	the	same	time,	however,	such	performances	send	
a	message	of	 stature	 to	 the	 federal	government	 -	 reasserting	 its	 role	as	 ‘critical	 friend’	 to	
Berlin,	 as	 well	 as	 bolstering	 Bavarian	 identity	 and	 cultural	 distinctiveness.	 Critics	 of	 the	
representation	have	argued	that	it	“harks	back	to	the	days	of	King	Ludwig	II”,	and	branded	
the	offices	“Schloss	Neuwahnstein”	-	the	turreted	hilltop	castle	built	for	the	King	during	the	
19th	century	(Moore,	2006:	192).	However,	given	the	centrality	of	the	Freistaat	narrative	to	
Bavaria’s	paradiplomacy,	and	the	role	of	its	‘special	history’	in	understanding	its	status	both	
inside	Germany	and	beyond,	such	criticisms	seem	to	lose	their	potency.	Instead,	they	become	
a	 rather	 apt	 caricature	 of	 Bavaria’s	 current	 international	 position:	 a	 self-assured,	 critical	
partner	 of	 the	 Federal	 Republic,	 with	 a	 privileged	 international	 status	 stemming	 from	 its	
unique	history,	and	facilitated	by	its	economic	prowess.		
	
																																																						
82	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	Official	2013	
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Conclusion	
	
Simply	 by	 conducting	 even	 the	 most	 humdrum	 of	 paradiplomatic	 activities,	 sub-state	
governments	are	engaged	 in	building	their	 international	agencies.	By	reaching	out	beyond	
their	domestic	remits,	a	process	of	agency	creation	is	underway.	Examining	this	process	from	
a	performativity	perspective	allows	us	to	“make	visible	the	work	that	goes	into	the	production	
of	actors	in	international	politics”.83	Of	course,	with	agency	creation	comes	contestation	and	
the	close	policing	of	boundaries:	we	have	seen	this	manifest	in	numerous	guises	as	part	of	
the	case-studies	above.	From	the	UK	and	Scottish	Government’s	tussle	over	China’s	act	of	
‘Panda	 diplomacy’;	 to	 the	 slow	 acceptance	 and	 unspoken	 compromise	 over	 Bavaria’s	
European	representation,	and	indeed	the	status	of	all	Land	‘Vertung’;	to	the	painstaking	and	
‘creative’	interpretation	of	the	statue	books	in	Wales	and	Scotland	to	allow	a	legal	basis	of	
mutual	reciprocity	in	their	international	aid	efforts.		
	
For	McConnell	et	al,	paradiplomatic	scholarship	has	traditionally	focussed	on	the	descriptive,	
rather	than	the	analytical,	meaning	that	“these	scholars	rarely	question	the	legitimating	work	
that	diplomacy	accomplishes	or	attend	to	the	performative	aspects	of	diplomatic	practice”	
(McConnell	et	al.,	2012:	806).	This	chapter	has	sought	to	raise	those	very	questions.	We	have	
considered	 the	 various	 ways	 in	 which	 sub-state	 governments	 have	 attempted	 to	 secure	
legitimacy	 through	 the	 nature	 of	 their	 diplomatic	 interactions:	 drawing	 on	 their	
representational	 qualities;	mimicking	 core	 features	 of	 official,	 bilateral	 diplomacy;	making	
explicit	 their	 position	 on	 the	 ‘front	 line’	 of	 global	 governance.	 Key	 differences	 were	 also	
identified	 in	 the	 range	 of	 performances	 we	 considered,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 what	 form	 of	
diplomacy	the	sub-state	government	undertook	and	in	the	ways	that	the	legitimacy	of	these	
actions	was	grounded.	In	Bavaria,	we	saw	the	literal	‘trappings	of	statehood’	mimicked	in	a	
highly	visual	fashion	with	the	strategic	location	and	scale	of	its	Brussels	representation.		In	
this	case,	Bavaria	drew	heavily	on	its	history	as	a	sovereign	and	its	economic	prowess	in	order	
to	position	itself	-	in	a	geographical	sense	-	as	kin	to	full	EU	member	states,	rather	than	other	
																																																						
83	 The	 aim	of	 the	 Performativity	 and	 International	 Politics’,	workshop	held	 at	 the	Goethe	
University	Frankfurt	on	the	21st-22nd	February	2014.	Author	in	attendance.	
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regions.	 In	Scotland,	an	act	of	bilateral	diplomacy	actually	exchanged	 -	 in	 ‘official’	 terms	 -	
between	 China	 and	 the	 UK	 was	 appropriated	 as	 evidence	 of	 a	 diplomatic	 relationship	
between	China	and	itself,	as	a	sub-state	government.	Mimicking	very	closely	the	discourse	
and	 procedures	 involved	 in	 official	 bilateral	 diplomacy,	 Scotland	 was	 performing	 an	
international	 agency	 more	 closely	 resembling	 a	 small-state,	 rather	 than	 a	 sub-state	
government.	In	Wales,	activities	around	climate	change	mitigation	saw	it	adopt	a	primarily	
network	based,	region-to-region	approach,	drawing	on	the	legitimacy	of	its	domestic	remit	
as	 a	 governmental	 actor	 at	 the	 implementation-end	 of	 global	 decision	 making	 on	 the	
environment.	Through	its	position	as	co-chair	of	nrg4SD	Welsh	Ministers	gained	access	to	a	
range	of	international	organisations	and	a	high-level,	global	audience,	conferring	this	profile	
and	legitimacy	on	separate	performances	in	its	own	capacity	as	a	sub-state	government.	In	
its	 Wales	 for	 Africa	 programme	 and	 in	 the	 Future	 Generations	 Act	 of	 2015,	 the	 Welsh	
Government	have	consciously	expanded	their	domestic	remit	to	encompass	an	international	
and	sustainable	development	function,	drawing	both	on	these	statutory	requirements	and	on	
dominant,	 liberal	 and	 international	 discourses	 -	 aligned	 to	 and	 associated	 with	 broader	
programmes,	 such	as	 the	UN’s	millennium	development	goals	 -	 to	achieve	 legitimacy	and	
credibility	as	an	agent	in	this	sphere.		It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	these	process-
tracing	exercises	provided	only	 isolated	examples.	 	They	are	 intended	to	demonstrate	 the	
range	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 sub-state	 international	 agency	 is	 created	 and	 in	 which	 sub-state	
governments	 seek	 legitimacy	 in	 these	 roles,	 rather	 than	 to	 ascribe	 a	 hard-and-fast	 set	 of	
characteristics	about	each	of	our	cases.	Indeed,	Scotland	also	contributes	to	climate	change	
fora	and	maintains	an	international	development	programme	with	a	very	similar	basis	and	in	
similar	ways	to	Wales,	as	well	as	exhibiting	a	perhaps	more	contentious	range	of	state-like	
mimicking	activities.	
	
As	highlighted	at	the	outset	of	this	chapter,	it	is	difficult,	when	looking	at	the	international	
agencies	 of	 sub-state	 governments,	 to	 avoid	 being	 subsumed	 by	 either	 of	 two	 -	 equally	
unhelpful	 -	 arguments:	 that	 paradiplomacy	 is	 either	 system	 transforming	 or	 entirely	
parochial,	and	inconsequential.	Considering	in	greater	detail	three	‘cases	within	a	case	study’	
has	hopefully	enabled	us	to	see	the	processes	of	agency	creation	and	contestation	with	some	
greater	 clarity;	 processes	 which	 lend	 evidence	 to	 neither	 of	 the	 extreme	 interpretations	
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mentioned	above.	The	subsequent	chapter	will	return	to	the	central	question	underpinning	
this	 and	 the	 preceding	 chapters,	 which	 -	 at	 heart	 -	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 consequences	 of	
paradiplomacy.	It	attempts	to	outline	the	range	of	ways	in	which	the	practice	matters,	both	
in	theoretical	terms	-	for	the	disciplines	of	international	relations,	comparative	politics	and	
diplomatic	studies	-	and	in	a	more	empirical	sense.		
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Chapter	6:	Sub-state	Diplomacy:	the	Good,	the	Bad,	and	the	Ugly?		
	
Introduction	
Hybridity	is	not	a	new	concept	within	international	relations	(Hocking,	1999;	Hocking,	1997;	
Hocking,	 1986)	 .	With	 the	 proliferation	 of	 non-state	 actors	 associated	 with	 globalisation,	
regional	integration	and	multilateralism,	not	only	is	it	a	truism	to	say	that	the	state	is	no	longer	
the	only	internationally	relevant	actor,	but	also	that	the	host	of	other	actors	operating	at	the	
international	 level	 possess	 differing	 qualities	 and	 characteristics.	 The	 international	
personalities	of	these	entities	are	often	hybrid	ones:	supranational	institutions	can	act	in	ways	
previously	reserved	to	states,	as	an	arbiter	of	international	force,	for	example,	yet	may	not	
poses	 the	 representational	 qualities	 of	 states	 themselves.	 International	 NGOs	 or	 citizens’	
groups	may	legitimately	represent	the	interests	of	constituent	groups	overlapping	with	those	
of	 states;	 yet	 not	 have	 the	 diplomatic	 authority	 or	 institutional	 capacity	 to	 serve	 these	
interests	effectively.	Such	hybridity	is	significant	in	the	sense	that	it	opens	up	new	diplomatic	
space,	presenting	alternative	practices	that	operate	under	a	different	-	perhaps	less	stringent	
-	set	of	‘rules’.	Indeed,	allowing	for	this	sort	of	international	differentiation	has	theoretical	
consequences.	According	to	Sidaway	(2003,	p.	174	cited	in	McConnell	et	al.,	2012:	811)	“this	
suggests	too	the	possibility	of	other	analytical	frameworks…beyond	the	presence	or	absence	
of	 undifferentiated	 sovereign	 power,	 towards	 a	 contextual	 understanding	 of	 different	
regimes,	apparatus,	expressions	and	representations	of	sovereignty”.	For	Adler-Nissen	and	
Gad,	postcolonial	micro-polities	“mime	certain	aspects	of	sovereignty”,	appearing	‘sovereign	
but	not	quite”.	This	produces	a	“hybridisation	which	questions	sovereignty	as	an	either/or	
concept”(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2012:	8).	
	
Sub-state	 governments	 are	 a	 particular	 type	 of	 hybrid	 actor:	 able	 to	 represent	 a	 distinct	
constituency	that	often	identifies,	in	a	meaningful	way,	with	that	region.	This	is	particularly	
true	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 sub-state	 government	 represents	 a	 ‘stateless	 nation’,	 such	 as	
Scotland,	Catalonia	or	Quebec,	but	it	is	not	exclusively	in	these	instances	that	regional	identity	
is	 salient.	 Indeed,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 increasing	 regional	 autonomy,	 and	 in	 the	 shadow	 of	
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independence	debates	in	Scotland,	FLänders	and	Catalonia,	alongside	the	more	ubiquitous	
pressures	of	‘glocalisation’	(Hocking,	1999),	regional	or	sub-state	identity	is	an	increasingly	
important	one.	Not	only	do	sub-state	governments	have	this	 representational	quality,	but	
they	are	able	to	combine	it	with	the	‘official’	resources	of	government:	Ministers,	Parliaments,	
Civil	Servants	and	budgets.	Both	of	these	facets	overlap,	and	sometimes	directly	challenge,	
their	equivalents	at	central	state	level:	state	‘national’	identity,	state	officials	and	so	on.	The	
hybridity	 of	 sub-state	 governments	 is	 therefore	 found	 in	 their	 ‘sovereignty	 bound’	 yet	
‘sovereignty	 free’	 nature	 (Hocking,	 1999);	 they	 carry	 out	 diplomatic	 activities	 often	 very	
similar	to	smaller	states,	yet	crucially	lack	external	sovereignty	and	autonomous	diplomatic	
authority	 under	 international	 law.84	 In	 turn,	 this	 raises	 questions	 over	 the	 status	 and	
significance	of	their	diplomacy	as	it	relates	to	other	actors.	In	particular	circumstances,	sub-
state	governments	can	‘speak’	for	the	entire	state	(such	as	when	acting	as	part	of	state-wide	
delegations	in	EU	fora)	as	well	as	for	the	region,	at	times	in	concert	with	state-diplomacy,	at	
times	directly	contradicting	it.		
	
However,	with	very	few	exceptions,	foreign	policy	-	at	least	in	its	more	traditional	sense	-	is	
not	within	the	official	purview	of	sub-state	governments.85	Where	there	is	a	role,	it	is	a	limited	
one:	related	to	the	unavoidably	‘international’	aspects	of	domestic	competences.	Indeed,	the	
very	 concept	 of	 sub-state	 ‘paradiplomacy’	 remains	 illogical	 for	 some:	 where	 national	 or	
Federal	governments	are	tasked	with	external	relations	and	the	‘high’	politics	of	diplomacy,	
security	and	defence,	the	role	of	the	regional	layer	is	to	manage	the	local:	schools,	hospitals	
and	housing.	The	principle	of	subsidiarity,	whereby	decisions	are	to	be	taken	at	the	lowest	
appropriate	level,	enshrined	in	EU	treaty	law,	would	also	seem	to	limit	the	‘natural’	abilities	
																																																						
84	Some	sub-state	‘representations’	abroad	-	including	Wales	and	Scotland	-	can	be	granted	
diplomatic	status	through	cooperation	with	the	host-states,	operating	through	the	authority	
of	that	state.	
85	 One	 key	 exception	 proving	 this	 rule	 is	 the	 case	 of	 Belgium,	 where	 both	Wallonia	 and	
Flanders	have	constitutional	responsibility	for	their	own	foreign	relations.	Additionally,	the	
Faroe	Islands	were	granted	the	ability	to	enter	into	foreign	relations	by	a	specific	Act	between	
the	autonomous	community	and	Denmark	in	2005,	arguably	as	a	way	to	appease	demands	
for	enhanced	self-rule.			
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of	 the	 sub-state	 tier	 in	 such	 fields.	Certainly,	UK	opinion	polling	 repeatedly	bears	out	 this	
disassociation	between	the	regional	and	the	global	in	terms	of	constitutional	preferences.86		
	
All	of	this	-	the	lack	of	constitutional	and	institutional	competence,	the	conceptual	dissonance	
and	the	absence	of	public	pressure	for	regions	to	assume	control	in	this	domain	-	renders	the	
actual	scope	of	sub-state	international	relations	all	the	more	surprising.	Without	significant	
‘push’	factors,	it	seems	-	as	the	preceding	chapters	have	sought	to	demonstrate	-	that	many	
sub-state	governments	are	nonetheless	choosing	to	develop	international	agency.	Sub-state	
governments	thus	represent	a	key	study	in	the	ways	in	which	new	actors	are	able	to	enter	
into	 international	 politics	 and	 become	 ‘diplomats’.	 As	 international	 entities,	 sub-state	
governments	have	both	responded	to	a	series	of	new	opportunity	structures	(provided	for	by	
internal	reorganisation	within	states,	as	well	as	new	institutions	and	financial	forces	at	a	pan-
regional	or	global	level	(Lecours,	2002))	and	-	crucially	-	have	demonstrated	a	seeming	desire	
to	appropriate	this	domain	for	their	own	aims.		
	
This	 chapter	 addresses,	 and	ultimately	 rejects,	 the	 arguments	 that	 sub-state	diplomacy	 is	
something	 inherently	progressive	(‘democratising’	 foreign	policy),	dangerous	(undermining	
the	state	or	encouraging	rampant	nationalism),	or	indeed	inconsequential	(‘provincialism	writ	
large’).	 Instead,	 the	 central	 argument	 developed	 here	 is	 that,	 much	 like	 the	 diplomatic	
behaviours	of	states,	paradiplomacy	can	indeed	contribute	to	global	politics	all	sorts	of	ways	
-	both	welcome	and	unwelcome	from	the	perspective	of	states	 themselves.	However,	 the	
significance	of	the	practice	extends	beyond	this	pragmatic	level.	Sub-state	governments	are	
able	 to	do	particular	 ‘things’	 in	 their	diplomacy,	by	virtue	of	 their	hybrid	status.	Sub-state	
diplomacy	 looks	 and	 sounds	 very	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 states,	 yet	 they	 are	 not	 states.	 This	
																																																						
86	 One	 recent	 survey	 into	 Welsh	 constitutional	 preferences	 found	 that	 only	 15%	 of	
respondents	 thought	that	National	Assembly	 for	Wales	should	have	control	of	 the	area	of	
foreign	affairs	and	defence,	contrasting	with	other	areas	where	further	devolution	had	been	
suggested,	such	as	policing	(63%),	renewable	energy	(70%)	and	courts	and	criminal	 justice	
(35%).	Beaufort	Public	Opinion	Survey	on	Non	Fiscal	Powers,	evidence	to	the	Commission	on	
Devolution	 in	 Wales		
http://commissionondevolutioninwales.independent.gov.uk/files/2013/08/Beaufort-
Opinion-survey-on-Non-Fiscal-powers.pdf	
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ambiguity	can	result	in	undoubtedly	‘messy’	scenarios	and	requires	that	the	phenomenon	be	
problematized	in	a	much	fuller	sense	within	international	relations	and	diplomatic	theory.	In	
doing	so,	the	chapter	acknowledges	the	task	outlined	by	Hocking	(1999:	18-21),	in	engaging	
with	the	ways	in	which	such	hybrid	cases	“move	us	beyond	profitless	debates	as	to	who	are	
and	who	are	not	significant	actors	in	world	politics”.	
	
International	relations	‘a	la	carte’?	
	
In	Wales,	 Scotland	 and	 Bavaria,	 the	 ‘spectre	 of	 the	 state’	 both	 limits	 and	 informs	 much	
paradiplomatic	activity.	For	example,	whilst	the	Scottish	Government’s	international	relations	
are	often	likened	to	those	of	similar	sized	small	states	(particularly	those	that	Scotland	is	keen	
to	align	 itself	with	 in	the	Scandinavian	‘arc	of	prosperity’),	who	also	tend	to	operate	niche	
diplomatic	strategies,	it	is	in	fact	the	devolved	status	of	Scotland,	and	its	membership	of	the	
UK,	that	renders	the	context	markedly	different.	On	the	one	hand,	this	context	necessarily	
limits	the	type	of	diplomatic	activities	possible.	It	excludes,	for	example,	security	and	defence,	
and	as	discussed	in	subsequent	sections	of	this	chapter,	this	is	not	necessarily	to	the	region’s	
detriment,	 often	 leaving	 their	 profile	 intact	whilst	 the	 sovereign	 state	 bears	 the	 brunt	 of	
unpopular	decisions	or	diplomatic	fracas.		Meanwhile,	this	status	makes	the	articulation	of	a	
distinct	 international	 identity	 all	 the	 more	 important	 for	 sub-state	 governments,	 as	 it	 is	
deemed	necessary	to	distinguish	between	devolved	or	regional	level	and	national	or	federal	
positions,	 values	 and	 decisions.	 Normative	 diplomacy,	 focussing	 on	 international	
development,	climate	change	or	democracy	assistance,	for	example,	therefore	comprises	a	
significant	element	Wales	and	Scotland’s	external	activities	(as	in	Bavaria	also).	On	the	other	
hand,	however,	sub-state	access	both	to	the	UK’s	international	resources	and	reputation,	but	
also,	though	heavily	circumscribed,	to	its	policy-making	machinery,	means	that	for	nations	or	
regions	 of	 their	 size,	 Scotland	 and	 Wales	 have	 greater	 potential	 for	 agenda-setting,	 as	
opposed	to	opinion-taking,	on	international	issues.	In	Bavaria,	meanwhile,	the	fact	that	the	
dominant	 party,	 the	 CSU,	 also	 frequently	 -	 including	 in	 the	 present	 period	 -	 occupy	 a	
significant	position	in	Federal	politics,	owing	to	the	coalition	governing	arrangements	,	also	
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allows	for	a	twin-track	approach	to	international	influence.	Therefore,	though	the	numbers	
of	areas	in	which	sub-state	governments	can	act	‘autonomously’	are	limited,	they	are	able	to	
draw	 upon	 a	 broader	 framework	 of	 both	 hard	 and	 soft	 power	 resource	 through	 their	
membership	of	the	host	state	itself.			
	
The	 essential	 characteristics	 of	 sub-state	 governments	 as	 diplomatic	 agents	 are	 therefore	
informed	both	by	their	ambiguous,	hybrid	status	(as	governmental,	but	non-sovereign	actors)	
and	the	role	of	power	relations	-	fundamentally	asymmetric	-	between	the	sub-	and	nation	
state	 (with	 sub-state	 diplomacy	 always	 taking	 place	 within	 this	 ‘spectre	 of	 the	 state’).	
Together,	 these	 characteristics,	 and	 the	 international	 context	 facing	 sub-state	 diplomats,	
combine	to	create	a	unique	operational	space,	one	qualitatively	different	from	that	within	
which	states	operate.	
	
Sub-state	 governments	 undertake	 a	 range	 of	 activities	 that	may	 appear	 largely	 similar	 in	
composition	 to	 those	undertaken	by	 smaller	 states.	 These	 activity	 clusters	 include	border	
diplomacy,	participation	in	international	and	multilateral	fora	(such	as	previously	mentioned	
nrg4SD)	and	soliciting	international	trade	and	investment	(maintaining	representative	offices	
abroad).	 They	 often	 develop	 some	 element	 of	 niche	 or	 normative	 diplomatic	 strategy	 -	
including	‘norm	entrepreneurship’	(Wigell,	2013)	-	and	they	rely	heavily	on	public	diplomacy	
(Huijgh,	 2010)	 to	 reach	 global	 audiences.	 Some	 are	more	or	 less	 explicitly	 geared	 around	
achieving	 independence	 (sometimes	 termed	 proto-diplomatic	 strategies	 (Duchacek,	 1990;	
Soldatos,	1990)),	whilst	the	majority	of	regions	have	no	such	immediate	aim.	Instead,	their	
engagement	 in	 the	 international	 sphere	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 precursor	 for	 sovereign	
statehood,	and,	indeed,	their	hybrid	nature	(Hocking,	1999;	1997)	would	seem	to	be	a	more-
or-less	permanent	feature	of	the	international	system.		
	
At	the	same	time,	there	remain	important	differences	between	the	international	agencies	of	
sub-	and	small-state	governments.	Sub-state	governments	are	almost	universally	excluded	
from	a	direct	role	in	areas	of	‘high	politics’,	in	particular	defence	and	security	policy.	They	lack	
membership	 of	 most	 influential	 international	 organizations	 and	 typically	 have	 smaller	
institutional	capacities	in	the	field	of	diplomacy	and	international	affairs.	The	status	of	sub-
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state	 diplomacy	 is	 therefore	 ambiguous.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 many	 sub-state	 governments	
conduct	‘official’	diplomatic	relations	with	states	themselves,	implying	an	equality	that	belies	
their	disparate	legal	statuses.	On	the	other	hand,	the	bulk	of	sub-state	diplomacy	takes	place	
on	a	 region-region	 level	 -	 often	with	 the	 same	pomp	and	 ceremony	 seen	with	 traditional	
diplomacy,	yet	not	possessing	the	same	weight	as	similar	arrangements	between	sovereign	
states,	which	would	take	primacy.		
	
The	practice	of	paradiplomacy	by	stateless	nations,	even	where	secession	is	not	the	goal	of	
governing	parties,	arguably	makes	a	claim	for	the	legitimacy	of	a	form	of	national	or	‘popular’	
sovereignty:	how	states	respond	to	this	claim	represents	an	equally	interesting	marker	as	to	
the	dominance	of	such	international	norms.	At	the	very	least,	stateless	nations,	autonomous	
regions	and	unrecognised	states	(although	in	very	different	ways)	all	“question	the	direct	link	
between	internal	and	external	sovereignty”	(Caspersen,	2012:	:11).	Is	it	possible,	as	Krasner	
argues	(1999:	:4-5),	for	an	entity	to	have	certain	sovereign	variants	but	not	others,	rendering	
the	 concept	 of	 sovereignty	 neither	 static	 nor	 indivisible,	 nor	 absolute?	 If	 we	 accept	 this	
distinction,	we	potentially	allow	for	 the	hybrid-nature	of	stateless	nations	as	 international	
actors	to	be	meaningfully	conceptualised.	
	
Sub-state	 governments	 are	 able	 to	 occupy	 a	 unique	 operational	 space;	 one	 defined	 and	
expanded	primarily	-	though	not	exclusively	-	through	their	 interactions	with	one	another.	
This	 space	 has	 particular	 qualities,	 being	 largely	 symbolic,	 non-statutory,	 only	 loosely	
institutionalised	and	hugely	varied.	Alongside	the	hybrid	nature	of	sub-state	diplomacy,	the	
utilisation	 of	 this	 operational	 space,	 and	 development	 of	 a	 specific	 type	 of	 international	
profile,	has	a	clear	and	once	again	differentiated	 link	with	processes	of	domestic	polity	or	
nation	building	-	and	is	marked	by	the	nature	of	relations	with	the	host	state.		
	
The	 ambiguous	 status	 of	 sub-state	 governments	 as	 international	 actors	 allows	 them	 to	
maintain	a	particular	type	of	international	profile;	donning	a	diplomatic	hat	only	in	certain	
circumstances.	 These	 actors	 are	 both	 free	 from	 the	 requirements	 (in	 terms	 of	 financial	
resources	and	political	capital)	of	high	politics,	security	and	defence	and,	at	the	same	time,	
able	 to	 ‘skirt	 around’	 controversial	 diplomatic	 issues	 under	 the	 cover	 of	 lacking	 such	 a	
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responsibility.	Taken	to	its	extremes,	sub-state	governments	might	be	able	to	‘free	ride’	on	
the	 foreign	policy	 of	 their	 host-state,	 accentuating	 distinctiveness	where	 this	 has	 positive	
connotations	(the	CSU’s	success	in	transforming	Bavaria	into	a	high-tech	economy,	the	SNP’s	
anti-nuclear	perspective	or	Wales’	interest	in	international	development	or	gender	equality),	
yet	deferring	to	state-wide	competence	when	a	distinct	profile	would	not	be	beneficial.	
	
The	Scottish	context	offers	some	important	insights	into	the	possible	advantages	of	the	hybrid	
international	 profiles	 maintained	 by	 sub-state	 governments.	 In	 numerous	 respects,	 the	
international	standing	of	Scotland	as	a	distinct	nation	 is	very	high.	 In	 recent	survey	of	 the	
international	reputations	of	50	nations,	Scotland	represented	the	single	non-sovereign	nation	
to	be	polled	 in	a	global	cohort,	 ranking	15th	 in	 terms	of	 recognition	 (Scottish	Government	
Strategic	Research,	2012).	Scotland	was	“scored	and	ranked	similarly	and	often	ahead	of	the	
other	smaller,	high	income,	liberal	democracies	on	the	index:	Denmark,	Finland,	Ireland	and	
New	 Zealand”.	 Perhaps	 most	 importantly	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 discussion,	 Scotland’s	
strongest	rating	was	in	the	area	of	governance,	which	“considers	public	opinion	regarding	the	
level	of	national	government	competency	and	fairness,	as	well	as	its	perceived	commitment	
to	global	 issues	 such	as	peace,	poverty	and	 the	environment”.	 	 In	 the	2012	poll,	 Scotland	
climbed	to	13th	position	on	this	indicator,	the	most	significant	improvement	in	perceptions	
coming	from	the	international	stage	(rather	than	from	UK	panels):	
	Scotland’s	 reputation	 has	 improved	 for	 its	 endeavour	 to	 reduce	 global	
poverty,	 followed	 by	 its	 efforts	 in	 protecting	 the	 environment,	 and	
responsibility	in	the	areas	of	global	peace	and	security	(Scottish	Government	
Strategic	Research,	2012).	
That	a	devolved	government	with	no	formal	competence	in	areas	of	global	peace	and	security	
can	build	 and	maintain	 such	a	 strong	 international	 reputation	 in	 these	areas	of	 activity	 is	
bordering	on	the	extraordinary.	Indeed,	this	feat	can	be	related	to	the	fact	that	much	of	the	
work	 that	 sub-state	 governments	 ‘do’	 on	 the	 international	 stage	 is	 restricted	 to	 public	
diplomacy	(Huijgh,	2010):	a	reflection	of	both	the	limited	formal	scope	for	decision	making	or	
‘high’	diplomacy,	and	the	comparative	advantage	that	non-state	actors	can	develop	in	this	
regard.	The	success	of	such	‘soft’	enterprises	in	the	Scottish	context	is	certainly	evidenced	by	
such	data.	
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Part	of	this	relative	success,	however,	can	perhaps	be	attributed	to	the	lack	of	other	burdens	
of	international	actorness	that	have	fallen	on	Scottish	actors	and	Scottish	resources	when	it	
comes	to	international	affairs	and,	more	importantly,	foreign	and	defence	policy.	Such	issues	
were	recently	foregrounded	in	the	context	of	the	Scottish	independence	referendum.	Much	
had	been	made	of	Scotland’s	external	reputation	and	hence	the	hypothetical	 international	
standing	 of	 Scotland	 as	 an	 independent	 state.	 However,	 from	 the	 position	 of	 a	 devolved	
nation,	 the	 Scottish	Government	has	perhaps	been	able	 to	 give	 the	 illusion	 of	 far	 greater	
international	 agency	 that	 it	 actually	 maintains.	 The	 Scottish	 Government	 has	 not	 been	
required	 to	 invest	 significant	 resources	 in,	 for	 example,	 comprehensive	 diplomatic	 and	
consular	 representation	 (instead	 Scottish	 officials	 are	 located	 in	 a	 smaller	 number	 of	
strategically	 important	 locales,	co-located	with	UK	missions).	Similarly,	 it	has	been	able	 to	
benefit	from	the	hard	power,	geo-political	strategic	influence	and	economic	weight	of	the	UK,	
in	addition	to	the	UK’s	considerable	soft-power	resources.	Indeed,	the	question	of	whether	
Scotland	could	expect	to	achieve	a	net	gain	in	foreign	policy	terms,	in	a	post-independence	
scenario,	recurred	time	and	again	in	both	in	Holyrood	and	Westminster	during	the	course	of	
the	referendum	campaign	(for	example:	UK	House	of	Commons	Foreign	Affairs	Committee,	
2013;	Scottish	Government,	2013b).87		Maintaining	the	illusion	of	participatory	rights	without	
the	accompanying	responsibilities	of	full-membership	of	the	international	system	can	mean	
that	 sub-state	 governments,	 on	 occasion,	 are	 in	 an	 optimum	 position	 to	 achieve	 their	
particular	 international	 ambitions.	 Under	 more	 benign	 circumstances,	 there	 would	 be	
nothing	‘bad’	or	disconcerting	about	this	scenario	from	a	state’s	perspective.	However,	in	the	
context	of	an	increasingly	fractious	relationship	with	the	UK	government,	Scotland	may	well	
be	 viewed	 as	 an	 unwelcome	 ‘free-rider’	 on	 the	 UK’s	 diplomatic	 profile,	 by	 virtue	 of	 its	
selective	approach	to	international	engagement.	The	reverse	of	this	argument,	however,	can	
perhaps	best	be	displayed	by	Scotland’s	current	predicament	as	the	UK	prepares	to	leave	the	
European	 Union;	 evidence	 of	 the	 hard,	 non-negotiable	 constraints	 that	 border	 the	
operational	space	that	sub-state	governments	are	able	to	occupy.		
	
																																																						
87	 These	 issues	 are	 raised	 in	 the	 report	 of	 the	 UK	 House	 of	 Commons	 Foreign	 Affairs	
Committee:	‘Foreign	policy	considerations	for	the	UK	and	Scotland	in	the	event	of	Scotland	
becoming	an	independent	country’,	May	2013	
	 197	
Characterising	sub-state	diplomacy	
	
If	we	take	the	hybridity	of	sub-state	governments,	and	the	unique	operational	space	that	they	
occupy,	 as	 our	 starting	 point	 then	 the	 effects	 or	 implications	 of	 paradiplomacy	 can	 be	
conceptualised	in	numerous	ways.	The	ability	to	pick-and-choose	international	relations	on	
an	‘a	la	carte’	basis	(albeit	from	a	restricted	menu),	could	be	conceived	of	as	a	type	of	free-
riding,	a	fairly	pejorative	concept	that	nonetheless	would	describe	those	cases	where	sub-
state	diplomacy	became	competitive	with	 that	of	 the	central	 state.	To	expand	 the	cycling	
metaphor,	perhaps	more	generously,	sub-state	governments	could	be	seen	to	‘free-wheel’	in	
the	vacuum	 left	behind	state-diplomacy:	drawing	on	broader	 state	 resources	and	political	
capital	but	insulated	from	the	same	levels	of	scrutiny	and	expectation	-	not	to	mention	legal	
and	constitutional	obligations.	This	position	might	be	conceived	as	a	reasonably	privileged	
one,	 and	 it	 certainly	 has	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 sorts	 of	 activities	 that	 sub-state	 governments	
choose	to	engage	in.	The	effects	of	these	activities	for	the	broader	diplomatic	system	-	as	well	
as	specific	actors	within	 it	 -	 can	manifest	 in	several	ways,	and	we	will	briefly	 survey	 them	
below.	From	the	perspective	of	host	states,	paradiplomatic	activities	might	be	perceived	as	
largely	benign	(the	paradiplomacy	of	‘good	intentions’)	or	indeed	helpful	to	specific	foreign	
policy	 aims	 or	 the	 international	 reputation	 of	 the	 state	 as	 a	 whole	 (value-added	
paradiplomacy).	However,	other	types	of	activity	may	be	perceived	as	threatening	the	host-
state’s	 standing,	 principally	 in	 commercial	 terms,	 as	 sub-state	 and	 host-state	 diplomatic	
strategies	 compete	 for	 finite	 resources	 (competitive	 paradiplomacy).	 Perhaps	 of	 greater	
significance	for	states,	and	arguably	taking	on	geo-political	implications,	are	those	instances	
where	 a	 sub-state	 government	 enters	 the	 ‘big	 leagues’	 of	 diplomacy,	 through	 contesting,	
undermining	 or	 befuddling	 key	 parts	 of	 the	 state’s	 foreign	 policy	 (paradiplomacy	 on	 the	
‘fringes’	 of	 high	 politics	 and	 the	 paradiplomacy	 of	 recognition).	 The	 ongoing	 fallout	 from	
2016’s	 Brexit	 referendum	 in	 the	 UK	 is	 arguably	 a	 telling	 example	 of	 this	 dynamic.	 The	
following	 sections	 of	 this	 chapter	 go	 on	 to	 explore	 these	 tentative	 categories	 of	 activity,	
demonstrating	 the	 range	 of	 ways	 that	 paradiplomacy	 manifests,	 and	 the	 meaning	 or	
significance	such	practices	hold	for	a	variety	of	other	actors.	The	discussion	aims	to	illuminate	
the	potential	complexity	of	certain	types	of	paradiplomatic	activity.	
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I. Paradiplomacy	of	good	intentions	
	
The	 unique	 operational	 space	 that	 sub-state	 governments	 occupy	 can	 be	 utilised	 for	
normative	goods	-	including	to	the	benefit	of	states	themselves,	adding	another	tool	to	the	
range	of	strategies	available	for	dealing	with	protracted	international	issues.	Looking	beyond	
our	three	case	studies	temporarily,	the	example	of	the	autonomous	region	of	Åland,	whose	
‘special	 arrangements’	 vis-à-vis	 Finland	 have	 been	 regarded	 as	 a	 possible	 template	 for	
resolving	ethnic	conflict	in	other	settings	(Wigell,	2013:	:67),	is	particularly	illustrative	here.	
Wigell’s	study	identifies	Åland	itself	as	practicing	norm	entrepreneurship:	utilising	its	history	
and	special	 status	as	an	autonomous	region	as	 its	 ‘international	card’,	and	advocating	the	
‘Åland	example’	as	a	model	for	international	conflict	resolution.	Such	norm	entrepreneurship	
has	its	roots	in	both	“genuinely	altruistic	reasons”,	and,	importantly,	in	the	normative	capital	
that	 such	 international	activity	can	generate	 for	Åland	 -	particularly	 in	 relation	 to	Finland.	
According	to	Wigell	(2013:	:77)	“the	normative	power	Åland	gains	through	the	promotion	of	
the	 Åland	 Example	 can	 thus	 be	 used	 to	 influence	 its	 domestic	 relations	with	 the	 Finnish	
government”.	 Wigell	 then	 queries	 the	 seemingly	 conspicuous	 absence	 of	 the	 Finnish	
government’s	 activities	 in	 promoting	 the	 Åland	 example,	 given	 its	 proactive	 use	 of	 norm	
entrepreneurship	in	other	domains.	Wigell	argues	that	part	of	this	reluctance	(though	there	
were	also	important	factors	relating	to	the	balance	of	power	vis-à-vis	Åland	itself)	to	promote	
this	domestic	example	relates	to	the	concern	of	diplomats	that	“promoting	the	Åland	Example	
may	 harm	 Finland’s	 diplomatic	 relations	 with	 certain	 states	 in	 which	 minority	 issues	 are	
sensitive,	such	as	Spain	or	Turkey”	(2013:	:82).	For	Åland	itself,	there	are	no	such	constraints	
on	their	international	activities.	At	the	same	time,	the	‘special	status’	and	‘lived	history’	of	
Åland	perhaps	makes	it	better	placed	to	fulfil	the	role	of	norm	entrepreneurs	in	this	domain	
than	the	Finnish	state.		
	
Indeed,	normative	diplomacy	has	become	a	mainstay	of	much	sub-state	paradiplomacy.	As	
discussed	in	the	preceding	chapter,	Both	Wales	and	Scotland	have	designated	international	
development	programmes	(and	Scotland	has	recently	appointed	a	Minister	for	International	
Development)	which	have	been	lauded	for	their	novel	approach,	representing	an	additional	
model	of	development	premised	on	reciprocity	and	mutual	exchange.	The	features	of	this	
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‘model’	were	in	fact	informed	by	the	requirement	by	both	Wales	and	Scotland	to	justify	their	
endeavours	under	their	responsibility	for	sustainable	development	-	lacking,	as	they	do,	any	
formal	competence	for	international	development.	However,	this	unusual	arrangement	has	
proved	particularly	beneficial	as	a	more	targeted	approach	supplementing	the	activities	of	
the	 UK	 state	 (Anyimadu,	 2011).	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 unintended	 consequence	 of	 sub-state	
governments’	qualities	and	limitations	 in	the	international	sphere	 is	an	enhanced	range	of	
tools	with	which	to	address	a	key	global	issue.	Where	there	is	certainly	a	welcome	degree	of	
symbolic	capital	generated	for	Wales	and	Scotland	through	their	international	development	
activities,	one	cannot	entirely	discount	the	more	genuine	normative	ambitions	behind	the	
programmes.	For	Wyn	Jones	and	Royles	(2012:	260)	there	is	no	contradiction	between	the	
role	 that	 the	 ‘Wales	 for	 Africa’	 programme	 plays	 in	 projecting	 -	 and	 promoting	 -	 welsh	
internationalism	and	the	“genuine	commitment	of	many	Assembly	Members	to	international	
development”.	
	
Normative	paradiplomacy	 in	Bavaria	arguably	emerges	 from	 its	unique	 ‘burden	of	history’	
and	 is	 manifest	 in	 the	 special	 relationship	 it	 pursues	 with	 the	 Czech	 Republic.	 Relations	
between	the	two	have	historically	been	challenged	by	the	post-war	relocation	of	the	Sudeten	
people,	 from	what	 is	 today	 the	Czech	Republic,	 to	Bavaria.	 The	Bavarian	office	 in	Prague,	
opened	in	2014,	represents	a	clear	departure	from	its	other	overseas	offices,	whose	locations	
are	 determined	 primarily	 by	 commercial	 rationales.	 According	 to	 the	 head	 of	 Bavaria’s	
external	 relations	 department,	 Dr	 Paul	 Fischer,	 the	 representation	 “is	 quite	 special…	 for	
historical	reasons,	after	the	war,	relations	with	our	neighbours	the	Czechs	were	difficult,	it	is	
a	 great	 achievement	 to	have	 that	office	 and	 representation	 in	Prague”	 (Fischer,	 2015:	 5).	
More	explicitly,	a	senior	Bavarian	government	official	commented	that,	when	it	comes	to	the	
‘special	relationship’	that	Horst	Seehofer	has	built	with	the	Czech	Republic,	“considerations	
such	as	really	whether	it	is	useful,	or	practical	are	also	completed	by	[the]	question	‘isn’t	this	
important	 now,	 symbolically?’88	 In	 the	 Bavarian	 parliament,	 too,	 the	 idea	 of	 setting	 up	 a	
Czech-Bavarian	 parliamentary	 assembly	 was	 “not	 with	 a	 particular	 economic	 interest”	 in	
																																																						
88	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official,	2013	
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mind,	but	 rather	 to	have	“good	 relations”	with	 their	neighbours,	where,	at	 that	 time,	 the	
relationship	was	“strained”.89		
	
In	different	ways,	therefore,	all	three	cases	demonstrate	the	normative	ambitions	that	can	
drive	paradiplomacy	in	the	absence	of	what	may	regarded	as	a	‘sound	business	case’.	This	
does	not	mean	that	these	activities	bring	no	benefit	into	the	region	or	stateless	nation	itself;	
there	 are	 potential	 gains	 to	 be	made	 both	 in	 reputational	 terms	 -	 which	 aid	 the	 ‘nation	
branding’	exercises	that	sub-state	governments	across	the	board	are	involved	in	-	and	with	
regards	to	the	leverage	that	the	sub-state	government	holds	in	an	inter-governmental	setting.	
For	 the	 host-state,	 normative	 paradiplomatic	 activities	 on	 the	 part	 of	 their	 sub-state	
governments	would	seem	to	be	particularly	difficult	to	argue	against;	this	may	go	some	way	
towards	explaining	the	leeway	given	to	Scottish	and	Welsh	governments	in	constructing	the	
legal	 bases	 of	 their	 international	 development	 programmes.	 In	 another	 sense,	 however,	
normative	 paradiplomatic	 activities	 sit	 -	 as	 other	 forms	 of	 sub-state	 diplomacy	 -	 on	 a	
continuum.	A	range	of	different	factors	and	objectives	must	feed	into	decisions	on	where	and	
how	to	 invest	 the	 limited	resources,	both	diplomatically	and	 in	monetary	terms,	 that	sub-
state	governments	have	at	their	disposal.	Therefore,	isolating	normative	ambitions	over	and	
above	a	national	or	regional	interest	is	not	always	straightforward.	Furthermore,	there	are	
certainly	cases	-	such	as	the	recognition	by	the	Scottish	Parliament	and	the	Welsh	Assembly	
of	 the	 Armenian	 genocide	 -	 where	 normative	 objectives	 drive	 an	 activity	 that	 then	 has	
unwelcome	 diplomatic	 ramifications	 for	 both	 the	 sub-state	 and	 nation-state	 government,	
changing	the	character	and	the	implications	of	the	paradiplomacy	itself.	Nevertheless,	much	
as	with	the	diplomacy	of	nation-states,	the	paradiplomatic	activities	of	Wales,	Scotland	and	
Bavaria	cannot	always	be	reduced	to	instrumentalism;	normative	logics	have	a	place	in	driving	
and	determining	some	endeavours	and,	in	the	cases	of	Wales	and	Scotland,	have	come	to	be	
a	distinguishing	feature	of	their	overall	diplomatic	portfolios.	
	
	
																																																						
89	interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	official,	2013	
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II. Value-added	paradiplomacy	
	
That	sub-state	governments	have	their	own	international	agendas	-	limited	in	scope	though	
they	 tend	 to	 be	 -	 has	 not	 escaped	 the	 attention	 of	 national	 or	 ‘host	 state’	 governments.	
However,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 in	 our	 three	 case	 studies,	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 sub-state	
government	have	been	enabled	and	tolerated	to	perhaps	a	surprising	degree.	At	an	‘official	
to	 official’	 level,	 there	 is	 an	 acceptance	 and	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 role	 that	 sub-state	
governments	are	seeking	to	play	internationally.	According	to	a	senior	Welsh	policy	advisor,	
the	UK	Government	are	“content,	more	or	 less”	when	Wales	 involves	 itself	 in	“the	sort	of	
issues	for	which	we	have	responsibility	in	Wales”.90	Meanwhile,	a	senior	Welsh	Government	
civil	 servant	 characterises	 the	working	 relationship	with	 the	 FCO	as	 good,	 “it	 just	works…	
we’re	 not	 in	 touch	with	 them	every	 day,	we	 take	 their	 advice	 if	 something	 innovative	 or	
possibly	 confrontational	 comes	 up”.91	 Sticking	 with	 the	 Welsh	 case,	 the	 area	 of	 climate	
change	is	one	where	its	interests	firmly	coincide	with	those	of	the	UK	government,	and	there	
is	 evidence	of	 a	 collaborative	 approach	 to	 international	 climate	 policy	 that	 arguably	 adds	
value	 to	 the	UK’s	own	efforts.	 The	Welsh	Government	worked	 closely	with	 the	UK	 in	 the	
context	 of	 the	 Copenhagen	 Climate	 Change	 Summit	 in	 2009	 and	 gained	 UK	 Government	
ministerial	 support	 to	 recognise	 the	 role	 that	 sub-state	governments	have	 in	 the	“climate	
change	agenda”(Royles,	2011).	Wales	has	frequently	participated	in	official	UK	delegations	to	
Climate	Change	summits	(as	has	Scotland)	-	for	example	at	Council	of	Environment	Ministers	
meetings	leading	up	to	the	Copenhagen	summit	and	most	recently	the	Paris	Summit	in	2015	
-	recognising	the	role	of	devolved	governments	in	this	policy	domain.	In	this	particular	issue	
area,	where	-	as	in	the	case	of	the	US	Federal	Government	and	its	states	-	different	tiers	of	
government	often	have	conflicting	 interests	when	 it	comes	to	climate	change,	 in	 terms	of	
both	the	effects	and	the	burdens	of	implementation	felt,	there	is	arguably	clear	value	to	be	
added	by	the	presentation	of	a	united	front	in	international	negotiations,	something	which	
has	proved	to	the	benefit	of	both	the	Welsh	and	UK	Governments.		
	
																																																						
90	Interview	data,	senior	Welsh	Government	policy	advisor,	2013.	
91	Interview	data,	senior	Welsh	Government	Official,	2013	
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More	broadly,	in	each	of	our	three	cases	there	is	an	argument	to	be	made	that	the	distinctive	
national	identities	performed	paradiplomatically	can	add	value	to	the	diplomatic	profiles	of	
the	host-state.	This	 logic	plays	out	 in	 two	distinct	ways.	Firstly,	 the	attributes	of	sub-state	
governments	that	are	publicised	as	part	of	paradiplomatic	‘profile	raising’	activities	can	-	for	
the	most	part	-	be	seen	to	‘rub	off’	on	the	state	as	a	whole,	encouraging	tourism	or	investment	
that	is	not	just	confined	to	one	region.	The	UK	Government’s	promotion	of	St	David’s	day	or	
Burns	Night	(hosting	special	events	in	overseas	Embassies	and	using	social	media	to	publicise	
Scottish	 and	Welsh	 visitor	 attractions	 or	 exports)	would	 seem	 to	 evidence	 this	 perceived	
benefit.	 Secondly,	 with	 the	 normalisation	 of	 paradiplomatic	 activity,	 and	 the	 associated	
ascendancy	of	corresponding	norms	-	of	the	rights	of	regions	to	participate	in	international	
affairs	where	it	corresponds	to	a	domestic	competence,	and	the	need	to	allow	for	minority	
representation	 -	 the	 relationship	between	a	host	 state	and	 its	 sub-state	governments	has	
come	to	represent	an	important	part	of	their	international	profile,	and	hence	a	component	
of	 their	 ‘soft	 power’.	 This	 requirement	 was	 a	 key	 consideration	 in	 the	 UK	 Government’s	
diplomacy	in	the	midst	of	the	Scottish	referendum	on	independence,	where	it	was	at	pains	to	
ensure	that	its	overseas	staff	were	well	informed	and	respectful	of	the	discussions	and	were	
seen	to	be	enabling	the	democratic	free	will	of	Scottish	voters.	According	to	a	report	compiled	
by	 the	 UK	 Parliament’s	 Foreign	 Affairs	 Committee,	 there	was	 an	 opportunity	 to	 “show	 a	
peaceful	democracy	in	action”,	in	light	of	the	international	interest	in	the	UK	Government’s	
approach	to	the	referendum	(UK	Parliament's	Foreign	Affairs	Committee,	2013:	para	74).	In	
contrast,	Spain’s	handling	of	a	proposed	independence	referendum	in	Catalonia,	culminating	
in	“a	de	facto	state	of	emergency”,	“ending	Catalan	home	rule”	weeks	before	the	contentious	
vote	was	due	to	take	place	(The	Guardian,	2017)	perhaps	demonstrates	most	clearly	the	risks	
to	a	host-state’s	international	reputation.	
	
There	are,	of	course,	subtleties	to	the	interactions	of	host-state	and	sub-state	governments	
which	may	render	paradiplomacy	beneficial	to	the	central	government	at	some	times,	and	
less	 so	 at	 others.	 In	 Bavaria,	 this	 dynamic	 currently	 appears	 to	 be	 shifting.	 The	 CSU	 has	
traditionally	played	the	role	of	‘bad	cop’	to	the	Federal	Coalition	Government’s	‘good	cop’	to	
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the	mutual	advantage	of	both	governments.92	Conservative	voters	in	Federal	elections	have	
been	reassured	by	the	CSU’s	more	euro	sceptic	and	‘right	wing’	policies,	often	playing	out	
most	 noticeably	 in	 its	 interactions	 with	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 ‘watchdog’	 role	 it	 elects	 to	 play	
amongst	German	Länder	when	it	comes	to	the	rights	of	states	and	subsidiarity,	helping	to	
keep	these	voters	within	the	CSU/CDU	block.	However,	as	will	be	explored	in	a	subsequent	
section	 of	 this	 chapter,	 the	 recent	migration	 crisis	 and	 the	 CSU’s	 dim	 view	 of	 Chancellor	
Merkel’s	 handling	 of	 it,	 have	 led	 to	 a	 marked	 shift	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 two	
coalition	partners,	calling	into	question	the	mutually	advantageous	‘good	cop,	bad	cop’	game	
they	have	previously	played.	
	
III. Competitive	paradiplomacy	
	
The	‘bad’	of	paradiplomatic	activity	 is,	of	course,	not	too	dissimilar	from	the	‘bad’	of	state	
level	diplomacy.	However,	these	are	perhaps	occasions	where	the	ability	to	‘pick	and	choose’	
international	 activities	manifests	 in	 a	 competitive	 relationship	with	 the	 host-state.	 In	 this	
mode,	the	sub-state	government	is	able	to	mine	the	international	domain	for	specific	benefits	
whilst	 deferring	 to	 the	 competence	 -	 and	 drawing	 on	 the	 resources	 -	 of	 the	 state-level	
government.		The	effects	of	this	type	of	paradiplomacy	are	not	assumed	to	be	destabilising	
for	the	international	system;	rather	they	may	be	particularly	unwelcome	or	concerning	from	
the	perspective	of	state-level	diplomats.		
	
The	Welsh	Government,	for	example,	maintains	particularly	close	links	with	the	Chongquing	
Municipal	Government	 in	China;	 relations	 it	has	been	better	able	 to	cultivate	without	 the	
requirement	to	engage	with	more	controversial	diplomatic	issues	around	the	Chinese	state.	
Concerns	over	human	rights	standards	and	the	status	of	the	Dalai	Lama	inevitably	complicate,	
and	render	more	challenging,	UK-China	relations.	The	Welsh	Government,	however,	is	able	
to	 extract	maximum	 economic	 and	 cultural	 benefits	 from	 their	 engagement	with	 various	
Chinese	 Municipal	 governments,	 and	 avoid	 such	 matters	 of	 high-politics	 and	 diplomacy	
entirely.	 The	 implications	 of	 this	 hybrid	 international	 profile	 are	 therefore	 that,	 in	 some	
																																																						
92	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Parliamentary	Official,	2013	
	 204	
respects,	relations	with	such	Chinese	regions	are	stronger	with	Wales	than	they	are	with	the	
UK.93	Indeed,	the	same	official	went	on	to	elaborate	this	point	with	an	anecdote	about	the	
UK	 calling	 on	 Wales	 to	 facilitate	 meetings	 with	 Chongquing	 officials.	 This	 has	 practical	
implications	for	the	Welsh	Government:	allowing	an	ease	of	access	to	government	officials	
and	policy	makers	that	is	a	necessary	requirement	of	maintaining	economic	linkages	within	
the	highly	governmentalized	Chinese	context.		
	
However,	 the	 framework	 that	 the	Welsh	Government	 -	 and	 sub-state	 governments	more	
generally	-	operate	within	is,	of	course,	qualitatively	different	from	that	of	the	UK	(and	other	
state-level	governments).	For	one	thing,	the	international	activities	of	sub-state	government	
are	almost	entirely	unregulated.	Beyond	their	 lack	of	statutory	underpinning,	activities	are	
not	subject	to	anywhere	near	the	level	of	media	and	other	scrutiny	that	the	activities	of	state-
level	 actors	 encounter,	 both	 domestically	 and	 at	 an	 international	 level.	 The	 role	 of	
parliamentary	scrutiny	in	monitoring	diplomatic	activities	is	a	key	area	of	contrast	in	the	cases	
of	both	Wales	and	Scotland	-	in	comparison	to	their	Westminster	counterparts.	The	relatively	
small	size	of	these	two	institutions,	the	National	Assembly	for	Wales	in	particular,	and	the	
lack	of	international	expertise	in	their	membership	limit	the	degree	of	meaningful	scrutiny	
that	the	external	relationships	maintained	by	devolved	governments	are	subject	to.	The	focus	
of	the	two	parliamentary	bodies	on	legislative	-	as	opposed	to	Ministerial	-	scrutiny	means	
that	non-legislative;	quasi-diplomatic	activities	are	able	to	‘pass	under	the	radar’.		
	
It	does	not	seem	to	be	solely	at	the	regional	level	that	the	rewards	of	paradiplomatic	action	
can	be	reaped.	The	international	presence	of	sub-state	governments	also	provides	additional	
access	points	for	a	whole	host	of	other	actors:	states,	multi-national	companies,	NGOs	and,	
indeed,	 third	 regions.	 These	 nodal	 points	 have	 unique	 qualities,	 related	 to	 the	 recurring	
theme	of	hybridity.	Most	notably,	 the	 ‘scale’	of	 regional	government	means	 that	 they	are	
often	able	to	offer	third	parties	a	high	level	of	access	to	the	structures	of	government,	and	in	
particular	Ministerial	 ‘face	 time’,	 that	 represents	 a	 greatly	 valued	 diplomatic	 commodity.	
Indeed,	the	Bavarian	government	has	skilfully	used	their	relative	size	and	‘approachability’	in	
																																																						
93	As	judged	by	a	senior	Welsh	Government	Official,	interview	data	2013	
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their	commercial	paradiplomacy,	with	the	services	that	it	is	able	to	provide	for	international	
investors	 and	 trade	 partners	 -	 by	 virtue	 of	 its	 reduced	 scale	 -	 being	 key	 elements	 of	 it	
success.94	Again,	there	is	nothing	inherently	bad	about	this	type	of	activity;	rather	it	may	be	
perceived	as	unhelpful	 -	perhaps	even	undermining	 -	 for	 the	host-state’s	own	commercial	
diplomacy,	being	seen	in	overtly	competitive	terms.	
	
IV. Paradiplomacy	on	the	fringes	of	‘high	politics’	
	
Despite	 the	 insistence,	 in	 all	 three	 of	 our	 cases,	 that	 economic	 rationales	 dominate	
paradiplomacy,	 and	 foreign	policy	 in	 its	 traditional	 sense	 is	 exclusively	 reserved	 to	 states,	
once	 can	 find	 exceptions	 that	 question	 this	 overriding	 rule.	 Spanning	 a	 spectrum	 of	
motivations	 -	 from	 the	 commercial,	 to	 inter-governmental	 relations	 and	 even	 normative	
ambitions	-	instances	of	activities	which,	intentionally	or	not,	fall	at	the	fringes	of	‘high	politics’	
and	clearly	have	implications	for	the	foreign	policy	strategies	of	states,	can	be	found	in	both	
our	Scottish	and	Bavarian	cases.	
	
In	 Bavaria,	 perhaps	 the	 most	 controversial	 example	 of	 what	 some	 commentators	 have	
considered	a	 ‘foreign	policy	on	 the	 side’	under	 the	 leadership	of	Horst	Seehofer	occurred	
recently.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 particularly	 tense	 relations	 between	 Berlin	 and	 Moscow	 -	
heightened	by	a	 ‘war	of	words’	over	a	rape	allegation	made	by	a	Russian-German	woman	
against	 a	 refugee	 -	 	 the	 CSU’s	 condemnation	 of	 Chancellor	Merkel’s	 ‘open	 door’	 refugee	
policy,	 and	 the	presence	of	 EU	 sanctions	 against	Russia,	 the	Bavarian	 leadership’s	 visit	 to	
Moscow	 in	 early	 February	 2016	 drew	 widespread	 criticism.	 The	 following	 extract	 from	
German	broadcaster	Deutsche	Welle	demonstrates	the	tone	of	the	reaction	within	German	
presses:	
Seldom	have	relations	between	Berlin	and	Moscow	been	in	such	a	poor	state	
as	 they	 are	 now.	 Even	 Frank-Walter	 Steinmeier,	 Angela	 Merkel’s	 man	 for	
diplomacy,	cannot	shift	opinions	in	the	Russian	capital.	And	now,	in	the	middle	
of	 this	 diplomatic	 deep	 freeze,	 Horst	 Seehofer…	 will	 honour	 Kremlin	 boss	
Vladimir	 Putin	 with	 a	 visit	 on	 Thursday.	 Seehofer,	 of	 all	 people	 -	 Merkel’s	
																																																						
94	Interview	data,	senior	Bavarian	Government	official,	2013	
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biggest	refugee	policy	critic.	A	man	that	loves	to	polarize.	The	wrong	man	in	
the	wrong	place	at	the	wrong	time?	(Deutsche	Welle,	2016).	
International	commentators	further	picked	up	on	the	potentially	destabilising	implications	of	
the	visit	for	Chancellor	Merkel’s	foreign	policy.	According	to	the	BBC’s	Inside	Europe	blog,	the	
visit	 “could	do	more	 to	undermine	 than	boost	 the	Berlin	Government”;	 it	was	 -	 for	many	
German	politicians	“a	step	too	far”	(BBC	News	blog	'Inside	Europe',	2016).	Meanwhile,	the	
Irish	Times	cites	the	visit	as	causing	“alarm	and	annoyance	in	Berlin”,	taking	place	while	the	
“timing	is	delicate”,	and	the	Wall	Street	Journal	terms	the	move	a	“provocation	of	the	German	
Chancellor”,	 the	 agenda	 covering	 topics	 where	 he	 has	 clashed	 with	 Merkel	 previously	 -	
migration	and	sanctions	against	Russia	(The	Irish	Times,	2016;	The	Wall	Street	Journal,	2016).	
Reuters	 reports	 the	CSU’s	defence	 that	 the	 trip	 is	primarily	motivated	by	good	 relations	 -	
especially	in	trade	-	between	Bavaria	and	Russia,	but	argues	that	critics	are	not	reassured.	The	
article	cites	Roderich	Kiesewetter,	a	foreign	policy	spokesman	for	‘Merkel’s	conservatives	in	
Parliament’	as	stating	“Seehofer	has	clearly	positioned	himself	against	the	Chancellor	in	the	
debate	on	refugees	-	I	really	hope	he	doesn’t	go	on	this	trip”,	and	Niels	Annen,	senior	member	
of	 the	 Social	 Democrats,	Merkel’s	 junior	 coalition	 partner	 commenting	 “Foreign	 policy	 is	
made	in	Berlin,	not	in	Munich”	(Reuters	UK,	2016).	
	
The	 trip	 itself	 was	 organised	 by	 the	 mayor	 of	 Moscow,	 a	 typical	 arrangement	 for	 the	
international	visits	of	regional	leaders	and	one	which	would	ordinarily	have	cloaked	the	trip	
in	the	legitimacy	of	regional	interests.	However,	in	this	case,	the	visit	clearly	spoke	to	other	
motivations.	 Intergovernmental	 relations	were	 transparently	 at	play;	Bavaria,	owing	 to	 its	
geographical	position,	has	been	at	the	frontline	of	Chancellor	Merkel’s	refugee	policy	and	its	
CSU	government	have	been	highly	critical	of	the	policy	and	of	Merkel’s	handling	of	the	crisis.	
Indeed,	Bavarian	leader	Seehofer	argued	in	September	that:	“the	situation	in	Syria	could	not	
be	 brought	 under	 control	without	 Putin’s	 help”	 (Deustche	Welle,	 2016).	 The	 level	 of	 this	
personal	criticism	of	Chancellor	Merkel’s	leadership	seems	to	go	well	beyond	the	‘good	cop,	
bad	 cop’	 game	 that	 Bavaria	 plays	 with	 the	 Federal	 Government,	 the	 mutual	 advantage	
arguably	eroded	in	this	case.95	 	 Indeed,	there	is	also	a	transparent	congruence	of	interests	
																																																						
95	Interview,	senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013.		
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between	Russia	and	Bavaria	that	stands	in	contrast	to	the	policy	of	Berlin:	both	governments	
want	to	see	an	end	to	EU	sanctions	that	are	hampering	the	significant	 levels	of	trade	that	
have	previously	existed	between	them,	trade	especially	 important	to	Bavaria’s	agricultural	
sector.	Chancellor	Merkel,	meanwhile,	has	insisted	that	the	issue	of	sanctions	should	not	be	
discussed	 until	 “the	 cease-fire	 agreed	 between	 Russian-backed	 separatists	 and	 Ukrainian	
troops	is	respected”	(Reuters	UK,	2016).	
	
Therefore,	 in	 this	particular	case,	 the	 ‘domestic’	concerns	of	Bavaria	 -	 to	end	the	 influx	of	
refugees	and	to	increase	agricultural	exports	-	have	been	transposed	onto	an	international	
context	where	key	foreign	policy	considerations,	for	both	Russia	and	Germany	-	indeed	the	
EU	-	are	at	play.	Deutsche	Welle	argues	that	“the	CSU’s	brand	of	foreign	policy	has	always	had	
something	unique	about	 it”	and	that	Horst	Seehofer	“sees	himself	 in	this	tradition”.	What	
marks	the	change	here,	the	article	continues,	is	that,	where	Seehofer’s	“foreign	jaunts”	were	
previously	 about	 the	economic	 interests	of	Bavaria,	 the	 “flood	of	 refugees	has	 given	new	
arguments	 to	 the	 Bavarian’s	 foreign	 policy	 ambitions.	 Since	 refugees	 began	 arriving	 in	
Germany	via	Bavaria,	the	state’s	domestic	policies	have	become	federally	and	internationally	
relevant.	That	is	a	novelty”	(Deutsche	Welle,	2016).	
	
Indeed,	 the	 transcript	 of	 the	meeting	 between	Horst	 Seehofer	 and	 President	 Putin	 -	 one	
arranged	with	the	assistance	of	Seehofer’s	predecessor,	Edmund	Stoiber	-	shows	very	clearly	
that	the	ambitions	of	the	Bavarian	government	in	this	instance	go	well	beyond	the	domestic,	
and	that	the	visit	is	interpreted	by	both	leaders	as	part	of	a	broader	act	of	rapprochement.	To	
begin	 with,	 the	 meeting	 is	 grounded	 in	 Bavarian-Russian	 economic	 relations,	 and	 the	
‘friendship’	 between	 the	 two	 governments,	 referencing	 the	 ‘legendary’	 2006	 meeting	
between	Putin	and	Stoiber,	where	the	Russian	President	“planned	to	stay	for	an	hour,	but	
ended	up	staying	until	midnight”.	However,	 the	content	of	 the	discussions	quickly	 turn	 to	
foreign	policy,	as	the	following	extract	-	from	Horst	Seehofer	-	demonstrates:	
We	have	come	here	from	the	free	state	of	Bavaria,	which	traditionally	has	very	
intensive	ties	with	Russia,	and	we	want	to	maintain	these	ties.	Bavaria	is	part	
of	the	federal	government.	We	are	part	of	the	government	coalition,	and	we	
think	it	is	our	duty,	the	duty	of	our	hearts	and	souls,	to	put	a	bit	more	trust	
back	into	our	relations.	We	think	this	is	essential	in	today’s	situation,	looking	
at	what	is	happening	in	the	world.	I	am	very	pleased	that	you	said	today	that	
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we	are	not	coming	here	as	plotters.	Never	in	the	run-up	to	any	of	my	previous	
visits	 to	 other	 countries,	 have	 I	 heard	 as	 much	 untruthful	 and	 inaccurate	
information	as	I	have	this	time.	What	is	most	important	for	us	is	to	deepen	our	
relations,	above	all,	or	course,	our	economic	relations,	but	this	is	not	our	only	
goal.	I	think	we	need	to	do	the	same	in	culture	too,	and	in	science.	These	are	
things	we	will	discuss	too.	In	today’s	globalised	world,	we	in	Bavaria,	with	our	
population	of	13	million,	are	very	much	aware,	of	course,	of	what	is	happening	
every	day	 in	our	world,	whether	 in	Syria	or	 in	Ukraine,	whether	refugees	or	
crime.	And	we	believe	that	only	by	acting	together,	and	not	 in	conflict	with	
each	other,	can	we	solve	these	problems.	 In	 this	desire,	we	seek	not	 to	act	
against	our	federal	government,	but	together	with	it,	and	we	act	not	against	
Russia,	but	hope	to	work	together	with	Russia	(President	Putin,	2016).	
President	Putin	then	responds:	
As	for	various	rumours,	this	is	inevitable,	but	we	both	share	great	responsibility	
for	maintaining	jobs	and	continuing	cultural	ties,	and	we	know	your	attitude	
and	 your	 desire	 to	 do	 everything	 possible	 to	 normalise	 relations	 between	
Russia	and	Europe	and	Russia	and	Germany.	We	are	certainly	grateful	to	you	
for	this	(President	Putin,	2016).	
Interpreting	the	significance	of	this	exchange	in	foreign	policy	terms	requires	us	to	recall	the	
unique	status	of	the	CSU	both	in	Bavaria	itself	and	within	the	Federal	Republic.	The	current	
Federal	Government	coalition,	and	the	long-standing	alliance	between	the	CSU	and	the	CSU	
give	 both	 current	 and	 previous	 Bavarian	 leaders	 an	 international	 platform	 that	 goes	well	
beyond	 that	 offered	 to	 other	German	 Länder.	Horst	 Seehofer’s	 senior	 role	 in	 the	 Federal	
Government	means	that	third	parties	“know	that,	or	are	being	told	by	diplomats,	that	he	is	
probably…number	two	or	three	 in	German	politics.	And	that	Chancellor	Merkel	cannot	do	
anything	without	his	consent.	And	this	is	something	of	course	that	weighs	in”.96	However,	it	
is	equally	important	to	recall	that	this	visit	to	Moscow	was	not	undertaken	by	Host	Seehofer	
as	a	representative	of	the	Federal	Government,	but	rather	as	the	Prime	Minister	of	Bavaria.	
The	visit	was	arranged	by	the	Mayor	of	Moscow	and	explained	in	terms	of	Bavaria’s	important	
relationship	with	Russia	-	one	grounded	in	mutual	trade.	That	the	meeting	had	significance	
beyond	 Bavaria’s	 regional	 interests,	 nonetheless,	 was	 made	 explicit	 in	 President	 Putin’s	
reference	to	the	efforts	of	Horst	Seehofer	to	“normalise	relations	between	Russia	and	Europe,	
Russia	and	Germany”.	The	content	of	the	exchange	was	therefore	one	of	foreign	policy,	in	a	
tone	which	contradicted	the	previous	pronouncements	of	Chancellor	Merkel	and	ostensibly	
																																																						
96	Interview	data,	Senior	Bavarian	Government	official	2013	
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was	at	odds	with	current	Federal	Government	policy.	Horst	Seehofer	met	with	Chancellor	
Merkel	ahead	of	the	visit,	and	will	have	received	briefings	on	the	diplomatic	policy	of	Germany	
in	relation	to	Russia	and	the	key	foreign	policy	issues	likely	to	be	discussed.	However,	having	
been	‘backed	into	a	corner’	by	the	Bavarian	leadership	-	one	challenging	Chancellor	Merkel	
on	multiple	fronts	over	this	period	-	the	level	of	control	that	the	Federal	Government	in	fact	
maintained	over	this	exchange	appears	to	have	been	compromised.		
	
It	 is	 in	 this	 manifestation	 -	 where	 contentious	 aspects	 of	 the	 host	 state	 or	 Federal	
government’s	foreign	policy	appear	to	have	been	challenged	or	undermined	by	one	of	its	sub-
state	governments	-	that	the	implications	of	paradiplomacy	potentially	take	on	a	geo-political	
significance.	In	UK,	a	similar	situation	arose	when	a	SNP	delegation,	including	MPs	and	MSPs,	
led	 by	 former	 Scottish	 First	 Minister	 and	 current	 SNP	 foreign	 affairs	 spokesman	 in	
Westminster	Alex	Salmond,	visited	Iran	during	December	2015,	shortly	before	the	lifting	of	
sanctions	which	 followed	 an	 agreement	 between	 the	 E3+3	 (France,	 Germany,	 UK,	 China,	
Russia	and	the	USA)	and	Iran	on	a	nuclear	deal.	Though	this	agreement	was	reached	on	the	
14th	July	2015,	sanctions	were	only	lifted	once	the	International	Atomic	Energy	Agency	had	
verified	that	Iran	had	completed	all	the	necessary	steps	to	reach	‘implementation	day’,	on	
the	16th	January	2016.	The	visit	followed	incremental	and	tentative	improvements	in	the	UK’s	
relationship	with	Iran:	a	UK	Embassy	was	reopened	in	Tehran	in	late	August	2015,	with	Phillip	
Hammond	attending	the	opening	ceremony,	the	first	British	Foreign	Secretary	to	visit	the	city	
since	2003.	The	SNP’s	visit	was	arranged	-	and	funded	-	by	the	Iranian	Parliament.	
	
Nested	within	 in	a	clear,	and	arguably	compelling,	business	case	 for	Scottish-Iranian	trade	
following	 the	 lifting	 of	 sanctions,	 there	 was	 also	 a	 nascent	 foreign	 policy	message	 being	
conveyed	by	the	delegation.	According	to	Alex	Salmond:	
	The	 international	 agreement	 with	 Iran	 and	 rapprochement	 with	 the	West	
which	 has	 accompanied	 it,	 is	 the	 single	 most	 positive	 development	 in	
international	relations	over	the	past	year	and	the	most	important	diplomatic	
achievement	 of	 the	 Obama	 administration.	 Now	 that	 Iran	 has	 taken	 these	
steps	forward	to	return	to	the	international	community,	many	countries	have	
been	pursuing	the	prospect	of	a	new	market	place	for	their	goods	and	a	new	
trading	partner.	It	is	vital	that	Scotland	is	not	left	behind	as	out	key	strengths,	
particularly	in	education,	agricultural	technology,	oil	and	gas	and	finance,	are	
precisely	what	Iran	will	find	useful	after	25	years	of	sanctions…	by	establishing	
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a	dialogue	based	on	the	sound	Scottish	principle	of	enlightened	self-interest,	
we	are	building	a	partnership	that	will	serve	both	countries	well	for	the	future	
(Alex	Salmond,	cited	in	Herald	Scotland,	2015b).	
Meanwhile,	another	delegate	on	the	trip,	Bill	Kidd	MSP,	the	SNP’s	chief	whip	at	Holyrood	who	
also	co-chairs	a	parliamentary	group	for	nuclear	non-proliferation	and	disarmament,	states:	
“Scotland	 has	 a	 world-wide	 reputation,	 both	 civically	 and	 politically,	 for	
opposition	to	the	continued	existence	of	nuclear	weapons	both	at	home	and	
internationally	 and	 the	 Scottish	 Government	 is	 both	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 nuclear	
weapons	convention	and	of	UN	General	Secretary	Ban	Ki	Moon’s	Five-Point-
Plan	for	a	world	free	from	nuclear	weapons…Iran’s	re-emergence	on	the	world	
stage	as	a	full	international	partner	in	the	debate	on	nuclear	disarmament	can	
only	enhance	the	prospects	of	achieving	that	goal,	which	is	the	aim	of	the	great	
majority	of	nations	and	peoples	across	 the	globe”	 (Bill	Kidd,	cited	 in	Herald	
Scotland,	2015b).	
The	 visit	 to	 Iran	 entailed	 meetings	 with	 “the	 full	 range	 of	 government	 ministers	 and	
parliamentarians	 at	 the	 highest	 level,	 including	 foreign	 affairs	 minister	 Dr	 Zarif	 and	 the	
speaker	of	the	parliament	Dr	Ali	Larijani”,	as	well	as	securing	agreement	for	an	exchange	of	
full	 trade	 delegations	 in	 the	 spring	 of	 2016	 (Alex	 Salmond,	 cited	 in	 BBC	 News,	 2015).		
According	to	SNP	MP	Tasmina	Ahmed-Sheikh,	the	delegation	had	raised	the	issue	of	human	
rights	during	the	visit:	
Of	huge	importance	is	Dr	Zarif’s	reply	to	Alex	Salmond	that	Iran	is	prepared	to	
discuss	 the	 issue	 of	 human	 rights	 in	 an	 even-handed	 way	 with	 European	
countries.	 This	 included	 constructive	 discussion	 including	 the	 use	 of	 capital	
punishment	for	drug	trafficking.	This	points	to	real	progress	becoming	possible	
on	a	vexed	issue	and	is	a	vindication	of	our	policy	of	engagement	and	dialogue	
instead	of	confrontation	and	hectoring	(Tasmina	Ahmed-Sheikh,	cited	in	BBC	
News,	2015).	
According	to	an	Iranian	news	agency,	Tasnim,	Alex	Salmond	further	told	the	speaker	of	the	
Iranian	 Parliament	 that	 Scotland’s	 “ruling	 party	 has	 always	 been	 against	 the	 decisions	
Westerners	 make	 against	 Iran	 and	 believes	 these	 decisions,	 which	 have	 caused	 many	
problems	 for	 Iran	 as	well	 as	 other	 countries,	 are	 fundamentally	wrong”	 (Herald	 Scotland,	
2015b).		A	report	complied	by	the	SNP	delegation	following	the	visit	was	submitted	to	Scottish	
Ministers	and	later	released	under	freedom	of	information	laws.	The	report	argued	that	Iran	
‘recognises	Scotland	as	separate	to	the	rest	of	the	United	Kingdom’,	quoting	an	Iranian	vice-
minister	as	 telling	Alex	Salmond	that	“the	door	 is	not	open	to	every	delegation	 that	visits	
Iran”,	but	 that	 the	country	 is	willing	 to	work	with	Scotland.	Meanwhile	 the	head	of	 Iran’s	
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parliamentary	committee	on	foreign	policy	is	said	to	have	recognised	a	connection	between	
Iran	and	Scotland	going	“beyond	economic	ties”	(Herald	Scotland,	2016).		
	
Demonstrating	the	 ‘foreign	policy’	content	of	this	exchange,	Alex	Salmond	told	the	Herald	
Scotland,	on	his	return	from	Iran,	that	the	trip	highlighted	how	Scotland	‘can	use	its	political	
profile	to	create	foreign	policy	initiatives	and	opportunities	that	the	UK	government	would	
find	difficulty	in	accessing’,	and	referenced	the	warm	welcome	Scotland	received,	enjoying	
‘much	 more	 ministerial	 access	 than	 the	 recent	 UK	 Trade	 and	 Investment	 delegation	 to	
Tehran’.	According	to	the	former	First	Minister	“opposition	to	Western	adventurism	in	the	
Middle	East,	a	bilateral	stance	in	trade	talks	and	the	intent	to	hold	open	discussions	without	
lecturing	and	heckling”	are	all	areas	where	Scotland	can	‘outplay’	Westminster	when	it	comes	
to	foreign	policy	(Herald	Scotland,	2015c).	
	
The	UK	Government’s	reaction	to	the	trip	was	not	made	public,	though	several	UK	politicians	
voiced	 opposition.	 Alistair	 Carmichael,	 the	 former	 Liberal	 Democrat	 Scottish	 Secretary	
accused	 the	 SNP	of	 ‘hollowing	out’	 the	 role	of	 the	UK	Government	 in	 Scottish	public	 life.	
Specifically,	he	argued	that	“building	relations	with	a	country	which	has	the	recent	history	of	
Iran	 is	a	delicate	and	 finely	nuanced	business	and	many	people	will	wonder	whether	Alex	
Salmond	is	best-placed	to	do	a	job	like	that”	(Herald	Scotland,	2015a)	.	Meanwhile	a	former	
Scotland	Office	minister,	 Labour’s	George	 Foulkes,	 interpreted	 the	 visit	 as	Alex	 Salmond’s	
attempt	 to	 usurp	 the	 role	 of	 foreign	 secretary:	 “it’s	 a	 very	 dangerous	 precedent	 really.	
Relations	between	Britain	and	Iran	are	improving	but	are	still	very	delicate.	For	someone	like	
Salmond	to	go	could	create	tremendous	problems.	It’s	very	unwise”	(Herald	Scotland,	2015a).		
Despite	 the	 lack	 of	 official	 comment	 from	 the	 UK	 Government	 on	 the	 visit,	 an	 exchange	
between	Alex	Salmond	and	Phillip	Hammond’s	Foreign	Office	is	perhaps	more	indicative	of	
their	political	relationship.	According	to	a	Guardian	report	“Alex	Salmond	pays	for	supper	in	
Tehran	-	and	triggers	constitutional	crisis”	(The	Guardian,	2016),	the	UKFCO	sent	a	message	
to	the	Scottish	delegation,	whilst	en	route	to	Tehran,	explaining	that	they	were	not	entitled	
to	embassy	hospitality.	According	to	Alex	Salmond,	this	was	“quite	a	serious	matter	because	
it	indicates	the	deep	politicisation	of	the	Foreign	Office	under	Hammond…	the	Foreign	Office	
permanent	under-secretary	should	be	putting	his	foot	down	to	make	it	clear	it	is	the	British	
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Foreign	Office,	not	the	Tory	Foreign	Office”.	For	their	part,	a	spokeswoman	for	the	Foreign	
Office	said	“overseas	posts	follow	clear	guidance	on	arrangements	for	visiting	parties.	Visiting	
politicians	from	a	single	party	are	offered	a	general	political	briefing,	but	it	is	not	the	role	of	
overseas	posts	to	provide	hospitality	or	to	arrange	meetings	unless	it	is	for	an	official	visit	on	
her	majesty’s	government	business”.	It	is,	however,	worth	pointing	out	that	British	embassy	
officials	were	 included	 in	 talks	 during	 the	 visit,	 including	 on	 human	 rights,	 trade	 and	 the	
nuclear	pact,	and	that	the	staff	‘on	the	ground’	were	said	by	Alex	Salmond	to	be	helpful	and	
cooperative	(The	Guardian,	2016).	
	
At	one	level	of	analysis,	the	SNP	delegation	to	Iran	and	the	political	rhetoric	surrounding	it	
represents	a	‘storm	in	a	teacup’;	Alex	Salmond	-	known	for	being	a	provocative	and	outspoken	
advocate	of	Scotland’s	independent	international	standing	-	noisily	marking	out	the	territory	
of	 his	 new	 role	 as	 the	 SNP’s	 foreign	 policy	 spokesman.	 It	 was,	 after	 all,	 not	 a	 Scottish	
Government	 delegation,	 and	 thus	 the	 talks	 held	 were	 by	 their	 nature	 exploratory	 -	 no	
member	of	 the	delegation	was	authorised	 to	commit	 the	Scottish	Government	 to	 specific	
policy.	The	fact	that	the	Scottish	Government	itself	has	appeared	reticent	to	comment	on	the	
trip	or	publically	discuss	the	content	of	talks	would	indicate	that	they	perhaps	are	taking	a	
more	 cautious	approach	 to	 the	 relationship.	However,	when	examining	 the	effects	or	 the	
implications	of	paradiplomatic	activity,	there	is	perhaps	a	touch	of	Mark	Twain’s	‘never	let	
the	truth	get	in	the	way	of	a	good	story’.	In	other	words,	at	a	geopolitical	level,	the	fact	that	
it	was	not	 the	 Scottish	Government,	 but	 rather	 a	delegation	of	 SNP	politicians	 from	both	
Westminster	 and	 Holyrood	 that	 were	 taking	 a	 forthright	 view	 on	 the	 future	 relationship	
between	Scotland	and	Iran,	on	major	areas	of	foreign	policy	such	as	nuclear	proliferation	and	
human	rights,	and	on	the	perceived	failings	of	the	UK,	and	‘the	west’	more	generally,	may	
bear	little	relation	on	the	lasting	perception.		
	
There	are	also	instances	where	the	paradiplomatic	activities	of	a	sub-state	government	touch	
at	 the	 fringes	 of	 high-politics	 unintentionally,	 or	 where	 circumstances	 beyond	 the	
government’s	control	draw	them	into	debates	of	a	tenor	outside	of	their	‘comfort	zone’.	At	
the	least,	this	can	be	where	a	sub-state’s	foray	into	the	‘big	leagues’	of	diplomacy	can	begin;	
the	international	spotlight	that	a	sub-state	government	receives	can,	of	course,	then	be	used	
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to	further	other,	more	contentious	aims.	A	notable	example	in	this	regard	is	the	international	
diplomacy	 surrounding	 the	 release	 of	 Abdelbaset	Al-Megrahi,	 on	 compassionate	 grounds,	
from	 the	 Scottish	 prison	where	 he	 had	 been	 serving	 a	 sentence	 for	 his	 role	 in	 the	 1988	
Lockerbie	bombings.	The	complexities	of	this	case	(involving	the	UK,	Scotland,	the	USA	and	
Libya	-	as	well	as	both	commercial	and	political	sensitivities)	meant	that	misinterpretation	
and	contradiction	were	rife	in	its	reporting,	and	as	such	Scotland’s	‘diplomacy’	surrounding	
the	international	ramifications	of	the	decision	was	primarily	of	a	defensive	tone.	However,	
according	to	Kenealy	(2012a:	555),	as	the	case	unfolded,		“Scotland’s	paradiplomacy	shifted	
from	a	strategy	of	avoidance	to	one	using	the	release	to	further	the	idea	of	an	independent	
Scotland.	Presenting	the	release	in	such	a	way	was	to	bolster	the	idea	of	Scotland	as	a	distinct	
entity	with	 its	 own	 set	 of	 values,	 laws	 and	 customs	 and	 possessing	 an	 ability	 to	 operate	
autonomously	on	the	international	stage”.		
	
Kenealy	 characterises	 the	 decision	 as	 constituting	 a	 “two-level	 process:	 the	 British	
Government’s	 behaviour	 was	 characterised	 by	 commercial	 interests;	 and	 the	 Scottish	
Governments	 by	 calculated	 compassion”	 (2012a:	 556).	 In	 sum,	 he	 argues	 that	 the	
paradiplomatic	element	of	the	case	stems	from	the	Scottish	Government’s	decision	to	release	
Al-Megrahi	on	compassionate	grounds,	as	opposed	to	under	a	prisoner	transfer	agreement	
(the	preferred	approach	of	the	UK	Government).	He	goes	on	to	 isolate	the	paradiplomatic	
performances	of	both	Scottish	justice	secretary	Kenny	MacAskill	(placing	“a	heavy	emphasis	
on	Scottish	values	and	identity”)	and	Alex	Salmond,	who	“advanced	a	second	distinction.	The	
British	government	had	blended	judicial	and	commercial	issues	in	their	dealings	with	Libya;	
Scotland	had	acted	properly	and	in	accordance	with	due	process”	(2012a:	569-570).	Kenealy	
concludes	that:	
The	narratives	were	tightly	constructed	and	endlessly	repeated	after	august	
2009.	The	opportunities	for	MacAskill	and	Salmond	to	exploit	the	al-Megrahi	
saga	would	have	been	unavailable	had	Al-Megrahi	been	transferred.	The	PTA	
[prisoner	transfer	agreement]	narrative	would	have	had	to	include	Britain,	so	
the	decision	would	have	lacked	a	distinctly	“Scottish”	tone.	In	the	margin	left	
by	the	British	government’s	pursuit	of	its	national	interest,	Scotland	found	a	
way	to	advance	the	idea	that	is	central	to	its	own	national	interest	as	defined	
by	the	SNP.	Whether	Scotland’s	compassion	was	consciously	calculated	or	a	
genuine	sense	of	compassion	that	simply	created	a	positive	by-product	might	
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always	be	unknown.	However,	it	was	certainly	a	well-orchestrated	and	well-
executed	political	move	(Kenealy,	2012a:	570).	
In	 this	 case,	 the	 Scottish	Government’s	 ‘right’	 to	make	 a	 legal	 decision	 on	 the	 release	 or	
otherwise	of	Al-Megrahi	on	compassionate	grounds	was	unquestionable,	indeed	Scotland’s	
autonomous	 legal	 system	 is	 much	 older	 than	 its	 devolved	 parliament.	 Arguably,	 it	
demonstrates	the	‘unintended’	international	implications	of	sub-state	competences;	proof	-	
if	any	was	required	-	of	the	effects	of	globalization	and	intermestic	politics.	That	the	Scottish	
Government	initially	resisted	ownership	of	the	issue	-	knowing	the	entrenched	interests	on	
either	side	of	the	debate	-	further	speaks	to	these	unintended	consequences	on	the	part	of	
the	sub-state	government	itself;	‘drawing	them	in’,	less	than	willingly,	to	an	issue	where	the	
national	 interests	 of	 the	USA,	 the	UK	 and	 Libya	were	 all	 at	 stake.	However,	 the	 eventual	
course	struck	by	the	Scottish	Government	is	equally	illustrative;	seizing	an	opportunity	to	put	
‘clear	red	water’,	to	borrow	from	Welsh	political	discourse,	between	the	policies	of	Scotland	
and	the	UK,	 for	the	benefit	of	both	domestic	and	 international	audiences.	This	strategy	of	
“calculated	compassion”	was	outwith	the	control	-	and	presumably	to	the	dislike	-	of	the	UK	
Foreign	 Office.	 It	 was	 a	 situation	 both	 born	 from	 and	 reflective	 of	 a	 process	 of	 inter-
governmental	negotiations,	leading	up	to	Scotland’s	decision,	that	demonstrated	a	“lack	of	
willingness	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	UK	 government	 to	work	 to	 the	 letter	 and	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	
concordats	 [on	 international	 relations]”	 (Kenealy,	2012b:	61).	As	 such,	 the	 case	evidences	
both	the	fragility	of	the	UK’s	system	of	intergovernmental	relations,	‘binding	in	honour’	only	
(Kenealy,	2012b:	68)	and	the	value	 to	sub-state	governments	of	an	 international	 stage	on	
which	to	perform	its	own	distinctiveness.	
	
V. The	paradiplomacy	of	recognition	
	
Sub-state	governments	are	drawn	into	recognition	debates	from	various	angles.	On	the	one	
hand,	many	sub-state	governments	possess	similar	‘de	facto’	qualities	of	statehood	to	those	
seeking	 formal	 recognition	 as	 a	 sovereign	 state,	 despite	 not	 claiming	 such	 a	 mantle	 for	
themselves.	As	such	they	are	both	a	point	of	comparison	and	reference	for	a	variety	of	actors	
when	 determining	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 grant	 recognition	 for	 breakaway	 governments	 or	
seceded	 states	 -	 particularly	 for	 those	 governments	 whose	 own	 states	 possess	 strong	
independence	or	nationalist	movements.	On	the	other	hand,	some	sub-state	governments	do	
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indeed	 seek	 sovereignty,	 and	 are	 therefore	 actively	 involved	 in	 the	 task	 of	 securing	
international	 support	 for	 their	 secession	 from	 a	 host	 state,	 an	 activity	 termed	
‘protodiplomacy’	in	the	paradiplomatic	literature	(Duchacek,	1988a;	1990).		Additionally,	as	
hybrid	 entities	 whose	 own	 diplomacy	 spans	 a	 spectrum	 of	 ‘official-ness’,	 sub-state	
governments	are	often	a	target	for	unrecognised	states	themselves,	where	recognition	may	
not	carry	the	full	weight	of	international	law	but	instead	enhance	claims	of	moral	authority	
or	political	appropriateness	and	tie	into	broader	narratives	of	the	international	acceptance	of	
the	aspirant	state	or	regime.	Lastly,	in	their	international	modes,	all	sub-state	governments	
seek	a	form	of	recognition:	not	generally	as	sovereigns,	but	as	legitimate	interlocutors	of	their	
constituents	and	as	effective	 international	agents	 in	their	own	right;	staking	their	claim	to	
their	status	as	a	‘player’	in	their	unique	sovereignty	game	(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2012;	Adler-
Nissen	and	Gad,	2014;	Adler-Nissen	and	Gammeltoft-Hansen,	2008).	For	example,	Europe’s	
‘stateless	 nations’	 often	 seek	 a	 form	 of	 recognition	 from	 the	 European	 Union,	 yet	 not	
necessarily	as	a	fully	fledged	state,	rather	as	something	‘more’	than	a	region	(Nagel,	2004:	
74).	 The	 ‘line’	 between	 seeking	 this	 sort	 of	 recognition,	 and	 recognition	 that	might	 be	 a	
precursor	to	statehood	is	not	one	that	is	always	clear-cut,	and	as	such	can	represent	an	area	
of	concern	for	national	governments.		
	
Unlike	the	field	of	international	law	-	which	has	long	debated	these	issues	-	“recognition,	as	a	
general	topic,	has	received	relatively	little	attention	in	IR”	(Ker-Lindsay,	2012:	3).	And	yet,	the	
author	continues:	
Recognition,	 and	 non-recognition,	 is	 very	 important.	 Quite	 apart	 from	 its	
important	policy	implications,	it	is	of	central	significance	for	a	subject	that	tries	
to	 understand	 how	 various	 actors	 interact	 with	 one	 another	 on	 the	
international	 stage.	 Recognition	 is	 not	 just	 about	 how	 states	 accept	 one	
another.	It	is	about	how	they	define	the	entire	international	system	(2012:	3).	
According	to	Ker-Lindsay,	whilst	we	know	relatively	little	about	the	sorts	of	strategies	used	by	
states	 attempting	 to	 prevent	 recognition,	 this	 belies	 its	 significance.	 Such	 significance	
transcends	the	small	number	of	cases	we	are	familiar	with	and	bears	potential	relevance	to	
the	 “20-25	 significant	 separatist	 movements”	 within	 Europe	 alone;	 “the	 coming	 decades	
could	 see	 the	emergence	of	an	 independent	Scotland,	Flanders,	Greenland,	Catalonia	and	
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Basque	 Republic…	 indeed,	 the	 prospect	 of	 secessionist	 claims,	 albeit	 to	 wildly	 differing	
degrees…looms	over	most	countries”	(2012:	5).	
	
Though	“strictly	speaking,	recognition	refers	only	to	the	practice	of	states”	(Ker-Lindsay,	2012:	
6),	it	is	clear	that	that	other	actors	-	in	their	interactions	with	and	pronouncements	on	aspirant	
or	secessionist	states	-	have	a	role	to	play.	Indeed,	Ker-Lindsay	goes	on	to	argue	that:	
There	 is	 also	 a	 far	 looser	 usage	 of	 the	 term	 ‘recognition’	 that	 not	 only	
incorporates	the	formal	legal	acceptance	of	a	state	by	other	states,	but	also	
includes	 degrees	 of	 acknowledgement	 by	 states	 short	 of	 actual	 legal	
recognition.	 It	also	extends	to	the	 legitimacy	conferred	by	membership	of	a	
range	or	organizations	and	participation	in	international	activities	and	events.	
Again,	these	types	of	activities	-	especially	those	carried	out	by	international	
organizations	and	various	 sporting	and	cultural	associations	 -	do	not	 in	 fact	
amount	 to	 recognition	 in	 its	 correct	 sense.	 Nevertheless,	 these	 acts	 are	
extremely	important	in	their	own	right.	They	all	serve	to	strengthen	the	status	
of	the	contested	state	and	contribute	to	securing	or	stabilizing	its	place	in	the	
international	system	(2012:	6-7).	
These	wider	acts,	according	to	the	same	author,	“signal	that	a	territory	 is,	 in	some	way	or	
another,	understood	to	be	a	distinct	political	unit	in	international	politics”	(Ker-Lindsay,	2012:	
7).	Indeed,	for	Casperson	(2009:	47-48),	de-facto	states	can	create	effective	statehood	in	the	
absence	of	formal	recognition,	“internal	sovereignty	is,	in	other	words,	not	ruled	out	by	lack	
of	 external	 sovereignty”.	 	 Returning	 to	 the	multiple	 forms	 that	 recognition	 can	 take,	 Ker	
Lindsay	(2012:	8)	argues	that	the	most	useful	distinction	to	be	made	is	with	regard	to	express	
or	 implied	 recognition.	 	 Express	 recognition	 refers	 to	 situations	 whereby	 “a	 state	 openly	
announces	 its	decision	to	recognize	the	state	 in	question”.	Meanwhile,	 in	cases	of	 implicit	
recognition,	 “no	 formal	 announcement”	 is	 made,	 “but	 the	 situation	 is	 such	 that	 it	 can	
reasonably	be	deduced	that	recognition	exists”.	In	order	to	signal	such	implicit	recognition,	a	
state	might	carry	out	a	range	of	activities:	sending	an	official	delegation	to	an	independence	
ceremony,	 dispatching	 an	 “official	 reply”	 to	 communications	 from	 the	 territory	 seeking	
recognition,	“that	implicitly	it	explicitly	acknowledges	its	acceptance	as	a	state”,	concluding	a	
political	or	diplomatic	bilateral	treaty	or	exchanging	diplomatic	representatives	(Ker-Lindsay,	
2012:	9).	
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In	 the	 activities	 of	 Wales	 and	 Scotland,	 we	 can	 find	 evidence	 of	 sub-state	 governments	
engaging	in	activities	that	could	amount	to	both	implied	and	express	recognition.	In	large	part	
due	to	the	size	of	the	Somali	Diaspora	within	Wales,	the	National	Assembly	and	the	Welsh	
Government	have	been	key	targets	for	activities	designed	to	secure	international	recognition	
for	Somaliland.	In	perhaps	the	most	contentious	‘diplomatic’	move	-	albeit	not	one	made	by	
the	executive	branch	of	Wales’	Government	-	the	National	Assembly	for	Wales	extended	an	
invitation	to	the	Somaliland	government	to	attend	the	opening	of	the	Senedd	on	the	3rd	of	
March	2006,	an	 initiative	 interpreted	by	the	Somaliland	press	as	official	recognition	of	the	
break-away	government’s	legitimacy	(The	Somaliland	Times,	2006).		The	difference	between	
the	activities	of	sub-state	governments,	on	the	one	hand,	and	small	state	governments	on	the	
other	may	be	one	that	is	increasingly	difficult	to	discern	on	a	day-to-day	level.	However,	under	
international	 law,	 this	 distinction	 remains	 a	 pertinent	 one.	 The	 difference	 also	 has	 some	
relevance	 in	 a	 more	 pragmatic	 sense:	 the	 Welsh	 Assembly’s	 reported	 ‘recognition’	 of	
Somaliland	does	not	carry	the	same	diplomatic	or	legal	force	as	similar	actions	by	a	sovereign	
state.	However,	at	a	political	 level,	 this	 ‘unofficial’	 recognition	may	 indeed	have	an	effect,	
albeit	a	more	muted	one.	The	ambiguity	surrounding	the	status	of	sub-state	governments	is	
compounded	by	widespread	 confusion	 regarding	 the	 architecture	of	 devolved	or	 regional	
government	(such	as	between	the	National	Assembly	for	Wales	as	a	legislature,	and	the	Welsh	
Government	 as	 an	 executive)	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 designated	 ‘foreign	 office’	 from	 which	
diplomatic	messages	are	directed.		
	
Less	ambiguously,	in	October	2014	the	Scottish	External	Affairs	Minister	Humza	Yousaf	wrote	
to	the	Foreign	Secretary	Phillip	Hammond	to	argue	that	the	UK	should	recognise	Palestine	as	
an	independent	state.	Ahead	of	a	vote	in	the	UK	House	of	Commons	on	the	topic	-	in	which	a	
motion	 supporting	 recognition	was	 carried,	 albeit	with	 the	 abstention	 of	UK	Government	
Ministers	 -	 the	 Scottish	Minister	 also	 spoke	of	 the	 Scottish	Government’s	 support	 for	 the	
upgrading	 of	 the	 Palestinian	 representation	 in	 the	 UK	 to	 embassy	 level	 “with	 immediate	
effect”,	and	of	their	support	for	a	separate	Palestinian	consulate	to	be	opened	in	Scotland.	In	
a	 press	 release	 from	 the	 Scottish	 Government,	 Humza	 Yousaf	 comments:	 “we	 firmly	
encourage	 both	 Israel	 and	 Palestine	 to	 reach	 a	 sustainable,	 negotiated	 settlement	 under	
international	law,	which	has	at	its	foundation	mutual	recognition	and	the	determination	to	
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co-exist	peacefully”	 (Scottish	Government,	2014a).	For	 its	part,	 the	UK	Government	states	
that	-	while	its	goal	is	indeed	a	negotiated	two-state	solution	-	it	reserves	the	right	to	grant	
recognition	at	a	time	of	its	own	choosing,	where	it	would	be	of	greatest	benefit	to	the	peace	
process.	According	to	Middle	East	Minister	Tobias	Ellwood,	the	timing	of	any	recognition	was	
critical;	 “you	 can	 after	 all	 only	 play	 this	 card	 once”	 (BBC	 News,	 2014).	 Given	 the	 UK	
government’s	perception	of	time-sensitivity	 in	this	particular	case,	as	well	as	the	reactions	
that	the	Scottish	position	generated	in	global	presses,	it	would	indeed	appear	that	this	act	of	
-	 or	 ‘mimicking’	 of	 -	 an	 express	 form	 of	 recognition	 had	 real	 foreign	 policy	 implications.		
Though,	like	the	House	of	Commons	vote,	the	effects	of	such	activities	are	‘symbolic’,	such	
symbolism	 can	 be	 impactful,	 particularly	 where	 it	 builds	 towards	 a	 ‘critical	 mass’	 of	
international	support.		
	
The	activities	of	both	Wales	and	Scotland	in	the	two	instances	above	arguably	amount	to	what	
Ker	 Lindsay	 described	 as	 helping	 to	 “strengthen	 the	 status	 of	 the	 contested	 state	 and	
contribute	to	securing	or	stabilizing	its	place	in	the	international	system”	(Ker-Lindsay,	2012:	
7).	 	 From	 a	 post-structuralist	 perspective,	 diplomacy	 can	 be	 “productive	 of	 geopolitical	
space”,	 and	 as	 such	 the	 activities	 of	 sub-state	 governments	 in	 the	 high-stakes	 game	 of	
recognition	can	be	interpreted	as	something	of	real	significance.	Together	with	the	activities	
of	other	 ‘outliers’	of	 the	 international	 system,	 sub-state	paradiplomacy	can	 illuminate	 the	
“tension	between	formal	diplomatic	practices	and	non-state	actors”(McConnell	et	al.,	2012:	
806).		
	
Conclusion:	the	‘fair	weather’	diplomats?	
	
For	Adler-Nissen	and	Gad	 (2012:	3),	by	“focussing	on	what	appear	 to	be	marginal	 sites	of	
international	relations,	we	are	able	to	see	much	more	heterogeneity	than	IR	theory	usually	
allows	a	glimpse	of”.		In	the	case	of	paradiplomacy,	whether	one	recognises	greater	truth	in	
the	free-riding	or	free-wheeling	metaphors	outlined	above,	it	is	clear	that	the	large	degree	of	
flexibility	that	sub-state	governments	possess	in	their	diplomatic	actorness	puts	them	at	odds	
with	their	state	contemporaries.	In	many	ways,	this	flexibility	can	represent	an	advantage	in	
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diplomatic	terms:	sub-state	governments	are	able	to	direct	their	(generally	limited)	resources	
towards	only	‘win-win’	endeavours.	When	crises	occur	or	hostility	arises,	when	situations	are	
intractable	 or	 relationships	 become	 difficult	 or	 embarrassing,	 or	 even	 simply	 where	 it	
wouldn’t	be	politically	expedient	to	intervene,	the	sub-state	government	is	able	to	defer	to	
state-wide	competence.	Ultimate	responsibility	does	not	rest	with	the	region.	When	state-
diplomacy	 is	 unattractive	 for	 any	 reason,	 sub-state	 governments	 can	 seek	 to	 distance	
themselves	from	it	-	as	the	case	of	Scotland’s	pronouncements	on	overseas	aid	expenditure	
demonstrates.		This	is	not	to	say	that	all	sub-state	governments	operate	in	this	narrowly	self-
interested	way,	rather	that	their	ambiguous	status	would	allow	them	to	do	so	in	a	way	not	
easily	replicated	by	other	actors.	
	
In	as	much	as	there	 is	nothing	 inherently	 ‘bad’	about	sub-state	diplomacy,	nor	does	there	
seem	to	be	anything	particularly	‘good’	about	it	from	an	ethical	or	deontological	point	of	view.	
‘Smaller’	 is	not	always	better,	 and	a	 recent	 study	of	 South	African	 regions	presents	a	 key	
challenge	 to	 the	 argument	 that	 paradiplomacy	 is	 necessarily	 either	 a	 democratizing	 or	
developmental	force	(Nganje,	2014).	In	democratic	terms,	the	lack	of	scrutiny	-	from	regional	
parliaments,	 local	media,	 inter-party	competition	-	of	paradiplomatic	activity,	aided	by	the	
fact	 that	 it	 tends	 to	 be	 relatively	 uncontroversial	 and	 often	 ‘unspectacular’	 (Aldecoa	 and	
Keating,	 1999b:	 :19)	 in	 nature,	 is	 surely	 a	 concern	 for	 anyone	 concerned	 with	 ‘good	
governance’.	Indeed,	could	much	paradiplomatic	activity	be	reduced	to	a	vanity	exercise	on	
the	part	 of	 regional	 politicians?	 Less	pejoratively,	 could	paradiplomacy	 really	 be	 all	 about	
symbolism	-	with	state-level	actors	allowing	sub-state	governments	to	‘play’	at	foreign	policy	
as	 an	 appeasement	mechanism?	 The	 case	 of	 Tatarstan	 arguably	 demonstrates	 that	 using	
paradiplomacy	as	a	way	to	make	credible	the	internal	discourse	of	sovereignty,	which	in	this	
case	may	actually	be	centred	around	rationalist	economic	claims,	 is	a	credible	strategy	for	
some	 sub-state	 governments	 (Albina,	 2010:	 :123).	 The	meaning	 of	 such	 paradiplomacy	 is	
therefore	one	premised	almost	entirely	around	domestic	concerns	-	do	such	activities	really	
represent	a	challenge	to	the	state-centric	diplomatic	system?	
	
In	fact,	it	would	seem	to	be	in	its	‘uglier’	manifestations	that	paradiplomacy	raises	the	more	
pertinent	 questions	 for	 diplomatic	 studies.	 This	 dynamic	 is	 one	 addressed	 in	 detail	 by	
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Marciacq	in	the	context	of	the	Republika	Srpska	and	Bosnia	Herzegovina	(Marciacq,	2015).	
Here,	the	author	argues,	the	contesting	of	state-level	authority	by	a	sub-state	government	
has	 different	 implications	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 ‘malfunctioning	 state”	 such	 as	 Bosnia	 and	
Herzegovina,	where	‘lengthy	state-building	efforts	have	not	alleviated	the	risk	of	instability’.	
The	 author	 continues	 that	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Republika	 Srpska’s	 paradiplomacy	 is	
“driven	 by	 ethno-political	 competition,	 facilitated	 by	 state	 and	 sub-state	 actors’	 mutual	
disregard,	and	that	it	both	echoes	and	amplifies	the	systemic	malfunctioning	of	Bosnia	and	
Herzegovina”	(Marciacq,	2015:	329).	It	is	not	automatically	the	case	that	sub-state	diplomacy	
in	fragile	states	accentuates	such	fragility	(via	hollowing	out	the	functions	of	the	emergent	or	
malfunctioning	state),	rather	the	variable	seems	to	be	the	way	in	which	sub-state	diplomacy	
develops,	specifically	whether	it	is	“driven	by	cooperation	or	competition”	(Marciacq,	2015:	
343).	 	 The	 role	of	 sub-state	diplomacy	 in	 fragile	 states	 is	 certainly	 an	underexplored	one,	
something	that	Marciacq	argues	is	particularly	unfortunate	‘given	the	relevance	of	sub-state	
diplomatic	studies	to	state-building	theories”	(2015:	332).	
	
The	ambiguity	of	sub-state	government’s	diplomatic	status	-	combined	with	their	willingness	
to	share	opinions	on	controversial	issues	-	has	a	potentially	erosive	effect	on	central	concepts	
and	practices	in	international	relations,	such	as	recognition.	At	the	same	time,	a	similar	effect	
could	 arguably	 be	 seen	 on	 the	 unquestioned	 legitimacy	 of	 states	 as	 principal	 diplomatic	
agents.	Where	the	sub-state	government	can	be	seen	to	more	accurately	represent	a	‘foreign	
policy’	position	on	the	part	of	 its	constituents,	this	becomes	a	clear	challenge	for	those	at	
central-state	 level.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 increasingly	 salient	 regional	 and	 sub-state	 national	
identity,	this	challenge	would	appear	to	be	a	particularly	important	one.		
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Conclusion	
This	thesis	used	paradiplomacy	as	a	 lens	through	which	to	examine	the	confluence	of	two	
separate	 forces:	 the	 efflorescence	 of	 regionalism	 and	 sub-state	 nationalism	 and	 the	
diversification	and	stratification	of	diplomatic	practice.	Current	political	events	within	the	UK	
and	 the	wider	European	neighbourhood	demonstrate	how	relevant	 this	potential	 collision	
remains.	 In	 Scotland,	 a	 resounding	 ‘no’	 vote	 to	 the	UK	 leaving	 the	 EU	 stood	 in	 clear	 and	
uncomfortable	 contrast	 with	 the	 popular	 vote	 throughout	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 UK.	What	 has	
followed	 is	 a	 set	 of	 interrelated	 debates	 and	 political	 disagreements	which,	 according	 to	
McEwan,	 fundamentally	 expose	 “the	 difficulties	 in	 reconciling	 rival	 self-determination	
claims”:	
‘The	Brexit	vote	has	also	raised	again	the	issue	of	Scotland’s	place	within	the	
UK,	 and	 for	 some	 justifies	 reconsideration	 of	 the	 decision	 the	 Scottish	
electorate	 made	 to	 remain	 within	 the	 UK	 by	 rejecting	 independence	 in	
2014……	 the	 ‘one	 nation’	 nationalist	 rhetoric	 of	 the	UK	Government	 in	 the	
aftermath	of	the	vote	is	at	odds	with	the	plurinational	character	of	the	United	
Kingdom’	(McEwan,	2017).	
Scotland’s	many	disagreements	with	the	UK	Government	over	the	way	in	which	the	Brexit	
result	is	translated	into	policy,	its	thwarted	attempts	to	secure	a	second	referendum	and	its	
formulation	of	alternative	scenarios	for	Scotland’s	 future	relationship	with	the	EU	have	all	
been	carried	out	or	transposed	onto	a	paradiplomatic	plane.	Here,	their	desire	to	represent	
what	 they	 see	 as	 the	 legitimate	 interests	 of	 their	 nation,	 a	 distinct	 ‘people’	 or	 political	
community	that	has	expressed	a	firm	desire	to	remain	part	of	the	EU,	has	come	up	against	
some	hard	and	–	for	now,	at	the	least	–	immovable	boundaries.	The	UK	Government’s	view	
has	been	that	it	is	“the	decision	of	the	whole	of	the	UK	which	must	be	respected”,	and	it	is	
their	job	alone	to	negotiate	the	UK’s	departure	from	the	EU	(McEwan,	2017:	66).	Even	when	
European	 leaders	 such	 as	 Jean-Claude	 Junker	 rushed	 to	 meet	 with	 Nicola	 Sturgeon	
immediately	following	the	vote,	admitting	that	Scotland	had	“won	the	right	to	be	heard	in	
Brussels”,	this	was	quickly	followed	by	a	reminder:	Junker	would	not	“interfere	in	an	inner	
British	process”	(BBC	News,	14th	December	2016).	These	hard	borders	are	that	of	sovereignty,	
of	the	views	of	other	EU	Member	States	unwilling	to	set	a	precedent	with	consequences	in	
their	 own	 neighbourhoods	 –	 such	 as	 Spain	 and	 France,	 both	 of	 whom	 opposed	 the	 EU	
negating	potential	membership	for	Scotland	(BBC	News,	29th	June	2016).	However,	there	is	a	
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broader	function	that	paradiplomacy	perhaps	achieves	in	this	context.	By	articulating	the	very	
separateness	of	Scotland	to	the	UK,	and	in	framing	the	issue	as	one	of	Scotland’s	right	to	a	
different	kind	of	self-determination	than	the	one	sought	by	the	UK	Government	in	extricating	
itself	from	the	EU,	the	Scottish	Government	reinforces	its	sense	of	nationhood,	and	makes	a	
case	 for	 requiring	 additional	 political	 resources	 to	 adequately	 represent	 and	 govern	 ‘its	
people’.	 In	 this	 context,	 paradiplomacy	 allows	 the	 imagining	 of	 the	 Scottish	 political	
community	to	be	defined	in	contrast	to	the	international	objectives	and	priorities	of	other	
actors,	 in	 this	 case	 the	UK	Government.	 For	 the	UK	Government,	 this	must	 represent	 an	
unwelcome	 aspect	 of	 the	 ongoing	 debate.	 As	 Segura	 argues,	 sub-state	 governments	 can	
present	a	very	specific	challenge	to	state-authority:	
‘Sub-state	international	actions	form	part	of	the	growing	body	of	transnational	
relations	which	are	characteristic	of	the	contemporary	international	system,	
but	 states	 are	 especially	 wary	 of	 these	 due	 to	 their	 formal,	 symbolic	 and	
material	 proximity	 to	 state-level	 foreign	 policy,	which	 remains	 an	 exclusive	
realm	 of	 state	 power.	 It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 sub-state	 governments,	
especially	 in	their	 initial	phases	of	projection,	have	had	to	exert	pressure	to	
find	their	place	on	the	international	scene,	and	this	explains,	at	least	in	part,	
the	controversial	dimension	of	their	international	action’	(Garcia	Segura,	2017:	
345-346)	
	
The	 Brexit	 debate	 inevitably	 raises	 questions	 about	 both	 the	 nature	 and	 the	 location	 of	
sovereignty	 in	 ways	 that	 perhaps	 blur	 and	 befuddle	 the	 objective	 lines	 of	 demarcation	
between	the	UK	as	a	state	and	Scotland	as	a	sub-state	government.	As	McEwan	argues:	
‘The	concept	of	‘a	people’	is	often	synonymous	with	‘a	nation’	as	the	basis	of	
solidarity	and	locus	of	sovereignty	…	but	determining	who	or	what	constitutes	
a	nation,	 and	who	doesn’t,	 is	 no	 less	 ambiguous.	Contrary	 to	 some	beliefs,	
nations	are	not	primordial	communities	but	are	socially	constructed	over	time	
and,	while	many	share	some	cultural	or	linguistic	characteristic,	migration	and	
cultural	 plurality	 make	 these	 insufficient	 criteria	 of	 nationhood.	 A	 shared	
national	 identity	 and	 mutual	 sense	 of	 belonging	 –	 captured	 in	 Benedict	
Anderson’s	 (1991)	 celebrated	 definition	 of	 nations	 as	 ‘imagined	 political	
communities’	 –	 overcomes	 the	 limitations	 of	 objective	 criteria’	 (McEwan,	
2017:	70).	
Whilst	Scottish	interventions	–	diplomatic	and	inter-governmental	–	may	not	have	secured	a	
‘special	deal’	for	Scotland	in	the	Brexit	fallout,	they	may	signal	something	more	significant.	
Indeed,	the	contrasting	self-determination	narratives	in	Scotland	the	wider	UK	perhaps	reflect	
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what	Awan-Scully	argues	is	the	increasing	lack	of	shared	debates	and	shared	political	choices	
across	the	UK	that	might	work	to	tie	a	political	community	together,	giving	 it	the	sense	of	
being	a	‘coherent	and	united	nation’.	The	nature	of	the	‘electoral	menu’	across	the	UK	has	
changed	 in	 fundamental	 ways:	 “voters	 in	 the	 UK’s	 four	 nations	 are	 increasingly	 being	
presented	with	fundamentally	different,	and	largely	disconnected,	sets	of	political	opinions”.	
This	electoral	disunity	has	potentially	profound	implications	and	is	“deeply	problematic	for	
the	long-term	unity	and	integrity	of	the	UK”:	
	‘In	the	absence	of	a	genuinely	British	party	politics,	the	British	state	may	have	
a	limited	life	expectancy	as	a	continuing	and	united	entity’	(Awan-Scully,	2018:	
5).		
Where	paradiplomacy	fits	into	this	bigger,	contemporary	picture,	is	in	the	ability	it	gives	those	
sub-state	governments	who	represent	a	stateless	nation	to	‘speak	the	nation’	internationally	
and	enhance	their	legitimacy	as	a	representative	of	their	distinct	people,	whilst	also	further	
refining	and	highlighting	the	distinctiveness	of	their	nation	as	a	separate	political	community,	
by	either	aligning	or	distancing	itself	in	relation	to	other	actors.	Paradiplomacy	functions	as	
both	the	cause	and	the	consequence	of	this	bigger	shift	in	the	character	of	some	plurinational	
states	–	such	as	the	UK.	Sub-state	actors	are	empowered	by	an	international	voice	to	seek	
and	effect	change,	and	they	are	required	to	develop	an	international	voice	as	a	response	to	
change.		In	other	words,	paradiplomacy	both	provides	the	toolkit	for	political	mobilisation	–	
the	 ability	 to	 look	 and	 sound	 ‘state-like’,	 to	 seek	 inward	 investment,	 develop	 normative	
programmes	of	assistance	or	kinships	–	and	reflects	and	strengthens	an	underlying	force	that	
advances	 steadily	 in	 the	direction	of	 a	 greater	 role	 for	non-state	actors,	 specifically	 those	
representing	a	distinct	political	community.	
		
The	 intention	of	 this	 thesis	was	 to	 examine	paradiplomatic	 activity	 in	 a	way	 that	 resisted	
treating	its	more	ambitious,	developed	elements	as	mere	aberrations.	Instead,	those	types	of	
activities,	and	the	unique	political	contexts	that	inform,	drive	and	mediate	them	were	at	the	
centre	of	the	analysis.	An	attempt	was	made	to	look	at	paradiplomacy	itself	in	a	systematic	
and	wholesale	way,	asking	a	series	of	quite	simple	questions	related	to	the	colloquial	‘what’,	
‘how’,	‘why’	and	‘so,	what?’.	One	aim	was	to	define	some	commonalities	to	the	activities	that	
sub-state	governments	were	engaged	in	internationally.	Another	was	to	give	a	more	overtly	
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political	account	of	the	motivations	that	sub-state	governments	had	for	venturing	out	onto	
the	 world	 stage	 and	 to	 explain	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	 went	 on	 to	 construct	 a	 form	 of	
international	agency	and	legitimacy.	Sequentially,	the	thesis	then	sought	to	probe	the	range	
of	possible	ways	in	which	different	types	of	paradiplomatic	behaviours	might	be	interpreted	
and	 perceived	 by	 other	 actors	 in	 the	 international	 system,	 and	 to	 begin	 the	 process	 of	
categorising	this	variety	of	activities.		
	
There	were	also	exploratory	steps	taken	towards	signposting	a	new	theoretical	approach	to	
paradiplomacy	 that	 might	 allow	 a	 move	 away	 from	 the	 descriptive	 accounts	 that	 have	
dominated	the	literature	(McConnell	et	al.,	2012:	806).	Part	One	of	the	thesis,	Chapters	One	
and	Two,	set	out	this	stall;	arguing	that	paradiplomacy	had	become	too	closely	associated	
with	the	related	concept	of	multi-level	governance,	disguising	some	of	the	more	novel	and	
perhaps	challenging	features	of	paradiplomacy	itself.	It	called	for	a	more	thorough	grounding	
of	 paradiplomacy	 within	 the	 field	 of	 international	 relations,	 allowing	 an	 actor-focussed	
exploration	of	 the	 practices	 and	 characteristics	 of	 sub-state	 governments	 as	 international	
agents.	This	part	of	the	thesis	 introduced	the	reader	to	an	alternative	set	of	concepts	that	
were	used	in	the	substantive	analysis	to	follow,	principally:	sovereignty	games,	mimicry	and	
performativity.	The	principal	contributions	made	to	the	literature	of	paradiplomacy	in	these	
sections	related	to	a	fairly	radically	reorientation	of	the	theoretical	framework	towards	the	
discipline	of	International	Relations	and	specifically	to	a	largely	constructivist	approach	with	
some	important	elements	of	practice	theory	(Neumann,	2002;	Bueger	and	Gadinger,	2018).		
	
Part	Two	of	the	thesis	addressed	a	set	of	broadly	sequential	research	questions,	attempting	
to	tease	out	the	paradoxes	seemingly	inherent	in	paradiplomatic	activity.	In	Chapter	Three	
we	examined	the	legal	and	constitutional	basis	of	paradiplomacy	in	each	of	our	case	studies	
and	saw	that	this	was	substantially	varied,	something	borne	out	in	other	studies:	“researching	
regional	sub-state	diplomacy	is	sometimes	like	comparing	apples	with	pears:	they	look	and	
taste	 different”	 (Criekemans,	 2010b:	 39)	 .	 A	 key	 distinction	 between	 our	 cases	 was	 the	
provision	made	in	the	UK’s	Memorandum	of	Understanding	for	both	Scotland	and	Wales	to	
‘opt	in’	to	the	Vienna	Convention	on	Diplomatic	Relations,	and	to	receive	official	diplomatic	
status,	 through	 operating	 out	 of	 the	 UK	 Government’s	 own	 diplomatic	 missions.	 Under	
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Germany’s	Basic	Law	there	was	no	similar	provision	and	all	of	Bavaria’s	diplomatic	relations	
were	‘unofficial’	and	not	party	to	the	convention.	Bavaria,	for	its	part,	has	other	capabilities	
lacking	in	both	Scotland	and	Wales,	notably	the	ability	to	make	international	treaties,	though	
there	is	still	some	debate	about	the	extent	and	interpretation	of	these	powers.	Evident	across	
all	three	cases	was	a	degree	of	compromise	and	pragmatism	which	often	shaped	the	nature	
of	 overseas	 representation.	 From	 Scotland’s	 willingness	 to	 co-locate	with	 UK	missions	 to	
Bavaria’s	incremental	‘stretching’	of	its	representational	and	diplomatic	functions,	through	to	
the	conscious	expansion	of	Scotland	and	Wales’	remit	for	sustainable	development	to	allow	
for	 their	 respective	 African	 international	 aid	 programmes.	 This	 investigation	 also	
demonstrated	the	extent	to	which	individual	circumstances	and	varied	political	and	historic	
contexts	informed	the	paradiplomatic	strategies	used	by	each	of	our	three	case	studies,	and	
indeed	the	partners	targeted:	Wales	and	Patagonia,	Bavaria	and	the	Czech	Republic,	Scotland	
and	the	Nordic	region.	Wales	was	seen	to	focus	more	or	less	exclusively	on	targeting	other	
regions	and	 indeed	 regional	networks	whereas	both	Scotland	and	Bavaria	expanded	 their	
activities	to	include	third	states,	aided	by	factors	such	as	the	economic	weight	of	Bavaria	and	
the	successful	nation	branding	efforts	of	Scotland.	
	
In	Chapter	Four	we	explored	the	conundrum	that	economic	motivations,	though	undoubtedly	
crucial	to	much	paradiplomatic	activity,	could	not	alone	explain	the	varied	ways	in	which	it	
was	manifest	-	or	narrated	-	in	each	of	our	case	studies.	While	the	‘economic	argument’	may	
help	 to	 ground	 paradiplomacy	 in	 a	 perceived	 legitimacy	 and	 overcome	 its	 “aura	 of	
inappropriateness”	(Hocking,	1999:	36),	the	nature	of	sub-state	activities	demonstrated	that	
there	were	further	pieces	of	this	puzzle	to	be	uncovered.	Reflecting	on	the	political	contexts	
of	each	of	our	case	studies,	 it	became	apparent	that	the	currency	of	much	paradiplomatic	
activity	was,	in	fact,	sovereignty.	What	was	taking	place,	therefore,	could	be	interpreted	as	
part	of	what	Addler-Nissen	and	Gad	term	a	‘sovereignty	game’:	the	back-and-forth	of	a	sub-	
and	central	state	government	as	it	relates	to	their	‘relational	subjectivity’	(Adler-Nissen	and	
Gad,	 2014;	 Adler-Nissen	 and	 Gad,	 2012).	 Given	 that	 paradiplomacy	 entails	 a	 sub-state	
government	 touching	 on	 a	 key	 area	 of	 activity	 typically	 reserved	 for	 states,	 there	 is	 a	
reference	being	made	to	sovereignty	-	even	if	it	remains	implicit	-	and	to	the	legitimacy	of	a	
sub-state	government’s	participation	in	such	a	field.		
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Various	accounts	of	paradiplomacy	have	honed-in	on	the	conceptual	categories	of	stateless	
nations	and	nation-building,	often	making	 the	distinction	between	paradiplomacy	and	 the	
more	contentious	‘protodiplomacy’,	or	the	external	activities	of	a	‘state	in	waiting’	(Duchacek,	
1990;	 Duchacek,	 1988b).	 Though	 there	 is	 indeed	 an	 important	 interplay	 between	 these	
forces,	the	analysis	presented	here	saw	this	manifesting	in	perhaps	less	linear	or	directional	
terms.	When	viewed	through	the	lens	of	a	sovereignty	game	we	can	see	the	value	that	simply	
being	accepted	as	a	player	in	the	game	itself,	regardless	of	any	fixed	constitutional	or	political	
end-point,	has	 for	 sub-state	governments.	 Indeed,	 the	analysis	presented	 in	Chapter	Four	
argues	 that	 this	 conception	 of	 a	 game,	 playing	 on	 the	 associations	 and	 meanings	 of	
sovereignty,	might	help	to	explain	the	broadly	similar	ways	in	which	paradiplomacy	was	being	
conducted	 across	 cases	 whose	 governing	 parties	 held	 markedly	 different	 views	 on	 their	
constitutional	teleology.	Though	the	configurations	of	each	of	the	sovereignty	games	in	our	
case	 studies	 did	 differ,	 at	 heart	 they	 were	 all	 about	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	 sub-state	
government	 as	 a	player	 in	 its	 own	game.	 There	 appears	 to	be	 a	 common	attempt	 to	use	
paradiplomacy	to	make	a	statement	about	relative	power	and	authority.	
	
In	 Chapter	 Five	we	 questioned	 the	 process	 of	 international	 agency	 creation,	 employing	 a	
performativity	 framework	 to	 understand	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 sub-state	 governments	 have	
sought	 legitimacy	 and	 credibility	 as	 international	 actors.	 These	 processes	 are	 not	
unchallenged,	 indeed	contestation	and	negotiation	were	highly	visible	 in	 relation	 to	 these	
attempts	at	agency	creation:	from	the	UK	and	Scottish	Governments’	tussle	over	the	Panda	
diplomacy,	 to	 the	 slow	 acceptance	 of	 Bavaria’s	 European	 office	 and	 its	 ‘representation’	
function.	The	chapter	explored	the	ways	in	which	legitimacy	has	been	sought:	through	sub-
state	governments	drawing	heavily	on	their	representational	qualities,	through	mimicking	the	
discourse	 and	 symbols	 of	 states	 and	 through	 appealing	 to	 dominant	 liberal	 international	
norms.		
	
In	Chapter	Six,	we	considered	the	characteristics	that	sub-state	governments	seem	to	share	
when	operating	as	international	agents.	They	occupy	an	international	operational	space	that	
is	 largely	non-statutory	 and	 is	 very	 loosely	 institutionalised,	 nor	 is	 it	 subject	 to	 significant	
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levels	 of	 scrutiny.	 In	 possessing	 an	 ability,	 yet	 no	 corresponding	 obligation,	 to	 act	
internationally,	 sub-state	 governments	might	 be	 seen	 to	 ‘free-ride’	 on	 the	 foreign	 policy	
competences	of	their	states.	Examples	of	this	type	of	behaviour,	or	at	least	strong	precedents	
for	it,	emerged	from	some	of	the	interviews	conducted	as	part	of	this	research.	The	ability	of	
devolved	 governments	 in	 the	 UK	 to	 ‘pass	 under	 the	 radar’	 and	 refuse	 to	 be	 drawn	 on	
contentious	foreign	policy	issues	has	meant	that	relationships	with	related	or	relevant	parties	
were	left	unscathed.		However,	such	instances	remain	isolated.	Instead,	a	more	accurate	way	
to	conceive	of	this	selectivity	when	it	comes	to	international	relations	is	that	of	a	sub-state	
government	 ‘free-wheeling’	 in	 the	space	behind	 the	high-politics	of	 inter-state	diplomacy.	
This	potentially	allows	them	to	develop	niche	diplomatic	strategies	or	novel	instruments,	such	
as	the	reciprocal	approach	to	international	aid	showcased	by	Scotland	and	Wales	(Anyimadu,	
2011)	or	 the	 focus	on	 technical	development	assistance	 in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	by	
Bavaria.	 It	 also	 allows	 sub-state	 governments	 to	 focus	 on	 those	 areas	 or	 relationships	 of	
greatest	benefit	to	them,	whether	that	is	in	economic,	political,	cultural	or	other	terms.	The	
chapter	identified	a	range	of	scenarios	or	categories	of	activity	that	aimed	to	demonstrate	
the	variety	of	ways	in	which	paradiplomacy	may	impact	upon	or	be	perceived	by	other	actors:	
the	 paradiplomacy	 of	 good	 intentions,	 value-added	 or	 competitive	 paradiplomacy,	
paradiplomacy	on	the	fringes	of	high	politics	and	the	paradiplomacy	of	recognition.	Each	of	
these	categories	is	tentative	and	would	benefit	from	refinement	in	the	context	of	additional	
data	from	a	broader	range	of	case-studies.	However,	they	are	intended	for	our	purposes	as	a	
blunt	 tool	 to	 enumerate	 and	 identify	 the	 potential	 complexity	 of	 paradiplomacy	 as	 a	
‘normalised’	feature	of	global	politics.	
	
In	pulling	together	the	various	threads	outlined	above,	we	return	to	Adler-Nissen	and	Gad’s		
argument	that	the	unassuming	borderlands	of	International	Relations	is	precisely	the	area	in	
which	to	see	the	heterogeneity	of	the	field,	and	‘enquiry	at	the	margins’	is	an	important	way	
to	 develop	 International	 Relations	 theory(Adler-Nissen	 and	 Gad,	 2012:	 3).	 Expanding	 the	
‘analytical	gaze’	of	diplomacy	allows	us	to	incorporate	these	lessons	from	the	margins	into	
our	understandings	of	some	of	the	most	fundamental	questions	of	 international	relations:	
“legitimacy,	 recognition,	 statecraft	 and	 sovereignty”	 (McConnell	 et	 al.,	 2012:	 804).	 Rather	
than	 assuming	 a	 set	 of	 capabilities	 that	 sub-state	 governments	 have	 internationally,	 this	
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thesis	instead	probed	the	actual	practices	of	these	actors,	and	in	doing	so	illuminated	a	range	
of	ways	in	which	paradiplomacy	interacts	with	and	challenges	the	traditionally	hierarchical	
roles	of	state	and	sub-state	government.		
	
Among	several	things	that	this	thesis	did	not	do,	however,	two	are	particularly	important	to	
note.	The	first	of	these	relates	to	the	time	period	during	which	data	was	collected,	which	has	
meant	that	the	changes	and	challenges	resulting	from	the	UK’s	referendum	on	leaving	the	
European	Union	in	2016	have	fallen	outside	of	the	scope	of	this	research.	The	period	following	
this	referendum,	and	the	ways	in	which	the	‘Brexit	question’	has	unfolded	in	both	Scotland	
and	Wales	 has	 brought	many	 of	 the	 latent	 tensions	 noted	 in	 this	 thesis	 to	 the	 fore,	 and	
undoubtedly	 in	 other	 ways	 would	 have	 added	 important	 data	 and	 insight	 to	 the	 study.	
Nonetheless,	these	developments	have	arguably	shone	a	brighter	light	on	the	paradiplomatic	
practices	of	the	UK’s	devolved	regions	and	may	help	to	catalyse	further	research	in	this	area.	
Indeed,	 the	 themes	 explored	 in	 the	 course	 of	 this	 study,	 and	 the	 tentative	 framework	
introduced	 for	 a	more	actor-centred	 theory	of	paradiplomacy	may	provide	a	platform	 for	
understanding	the	‘Brexit’	fallout.		
	
Secondly,	in	its	focus	on	the	more	developed	aspects	of	paradiplomacy,	those	conversely	less	
developed	activities	have	not	featured	heavily	in	this	account.	Though	attempts	have	been	
made	to	draw	comparisons	on	the	tone,	content	and	relative	levels	of	resource	directed	at	
different	aspects	of	paradiplomacy	from	our	three	case	studies,	there	is	no	detailed	analyses	
of,	for	example,	the	economic	or	commercial	paradiplomacy	that	Bavaria,	Wales	and	Scotland	
all	conduct,	or	of	the	routine	interactions	of	these	governments	with	the	structures	of	the	
European	Union.	This	 is	 for	 two	reasons.	On	the	one	hand,	such	 interactions	are	precisely	
where	previous	research	has	been	directed,	and	using	much	bigger	pools	of	data	than	this	
project	had	access	 to.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	 fact	 that	 this	was	a	comparative	study	that	
looked	to	understand	the	‘bigger	picture’	of	paradiplomacy	and	attempted	to	discern	some	
common	features	to	paradiplomatic	interactions	in	the	cases	of	sub-state	nations	meant	that	
time	and	resources	were	strictly	limited.	Priority	was	therefore	given	to	those	areas	where	
the	clarity	of	an	overwhelming	economic	or	functional	business	case	was	lacking	and,	as	such,	
other	motivations	were	more	evidently	on	display.		
	 229	
	
Further	areas	were	simply	beyond	the	scope	of	the	research	project	underpinning	this	thesis.	
The	reactions	to	and	perceptions	of	paradiplomacy	on	the	part	of	central-state	officials	and	
politicians	would	have	been	 fascinating	 to	 investigate	 through	a	 series	of	elite-interviews;	
telling	 the	 other	 side	 of	 our	 ‘sovereignty	 games’	 story.	 The	 broader	 question	 of	 how	
paradiplomacy	 is	 understood	by	 actors	 other	 than	 the	 sub-state	 government	 itself	 seems	
enduringly	relevant	and	was	only	addressed	partially	 in	 this	study.	One	 immediate	area	 in	
which	this	might	be	probed	is	through	an	analysis	of	consular	representation	within	regions,	
reflecting	on	the	value	that	external	parties	see	in	their	relationships	with	sub-state	actors.	
The	attractiveness	of	Munich	and	Edinburgh	(though	not	Cardiff,	a	further	sharp	contrast	in	
the	perceptions	of	each	of	our	cases)	as	locations	for	consular	representation	was	remarked	
upon	 at	 several	 points	 during	 this	 study	 and	 indicates,	 once	 again,	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
international	 agency	 helps	 to	 constitute	 the	 self-perception	 of	 the	 region	 or	 sub-state	
government	 itself.	More	broadly,	 future	 research	 in	 this	 area	may	usefully	 probe	 the	 link	
between	 stateless	 nationalism	 and	 the	 sorts	 of	 advanced	 paradiplomatic	 interactions	
uncovered	 in	 this	 thesis,	 using	 the	 categories	 of	 activity	 identified	 here	 to	 highlight	 any	
differences	or	 similarities	 in	 the	 sorts	of	paradiplomacy	 that	other	 sub-state	governments	
carry	out,	particularly	that	–	comparatively	very	large	grouping	–	of	sub-state	locales	with	a	
regional	identity	stopping	short	of	sub-state	nationalism.	In	other	words,	do	the	findings	in	
this	thesis	–	related	to	a	small	sub-set	of	regions	–	also	have	implications	for	a	much	larger	
group,	and	thus	represent	a	more	significant	and	persuasive	phenomenon?	
	
In	 concluding	 this	 thesis,	we	 return	 briefly	 to	 two	 common	 themes	which	 have	 emerged	
strongly	throughout	the	analysis	presented	above.	The	first	of	these	themes	relates	to	the	
fact	that,	as	ever,	context	is	king.	Paradiplomatic	activities	are	by	their	nature	multi-locational.	
Sub-state	governments	are	nested	within	a	broader	state	structure	and	must	 in	some	way	
transcend	or	bypass	that	structure	and	forge	direct	relationships	with	other	actors:	regions,	
organisations	 or	 third	 states.	 The	 political	 context,	 therefore,	 does	 not	 only	 include	 that	
within	the	region,	but	also	that	of	the	state	and	the	relationship	between	different	tiers	of	
government.	 The	 diplomacy	 of	 sub-state	 governments	 does	 not	 occur	 in	 a	 vacuum:	 the	
spectre	of	the	state	looms	large.	Similarly,	the	unique	political	context	facing	each	of	the	sub-
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state	governments	featured	in	this	analysis	has	been	key	not	only	in	terms	of	the	motivations	
behind	paradiplomacy,	but	also	to	the	ways	in	which	this	paradiplomacy	has	been	received	
by	other	actors.	
	
It	is	perhaps	surprising,	given	the	political	differences	seen	in	Bavaria,	Scotland	and	Wales,	
that	 the	 nature	 of	 their	 paradiplomatic	 activities,	 the	 images	 that	 they	 cultivate	
internationally	and	the	institutional	arrangements	underpinning	their	external	presence	are	
all	rather	similar.		Certainly,	there	are	areas	where	Scotland	and	Bavaria	go	beyond	the	sorts	
of	activities	conducted	by	Wales,	in	particular	when	it	comes	to	targeting	nation	states	rather	
than	third	regions.	There	are	undoubtedly	thematic	differences,	too.	But	the	more	interesting	
marker	is	instead	the	differing	ways	that	these	often	broadly	similar	behaviours	are	perceived.	
In	Scotland,	for	example,	reactions	from	both	the	UK	Government	and	other	Scottish	and	UK-
wide	political	parties	to	diplomacy	on	Iran,	India,	the	release	of	Abdelbaset	al-Megrahi,	the	
Palestinian	question	and	numerous	other	issues	are	always	refracted	through	the	prism	of	
Scottish	independence,	and	are	subject	to	the	political	fault	lines	and	suspicions	that	exist	in	
this	context.	Contrasted	with	Bavaria,	whose	economic	clout	has	afforded	it	high-level	nation-
state	access	(including	with	those	of	a	vastly	different	size	and	standing	to	itself,	such	as	India),	
there	is	a	marked	difference	in	the	way	that	such	activities	are	perceived.	Aided	by	a	degree	
of	party-political	congruence	in	the	Federal	and	Bavarian	governments	and	a	recent	history,	
and	strong	political	narrative,	of	co-operational	federalism,	Bavaria	has	been	able	to	pursue	
its	paradiplomacy	in	a	very	different	climate	than	that	facing	Scotland.		
	
The	importance	of	territorial	cleavages,	the	mechanisms	of	intergovernmental	relations	and	
the	more	general	tenor	of	relations	between	different	levels	of	government	was	reaffirmed	
time	and	again	in	the	course	of	this	research	project.	In	the	UK,	for	example,	the	perceived	
challenge	to	the	devolved	governments’	scope	to	conduct	paradiplomacy	was	not	a	case	of	
party-political	 incongruence	 across	 a	 left-right	 axis,	 but	 rather	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 territorial	
cleavages	at	play;	“whoever	is	in	power	at	Westminster	and	Whitehall,	it	is	still	Westminster	
and	Whitehall…	 in	 the	 international	 context,	 that’s	 the	 more	 important	 division,	 it’s	 the	
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division	between	different	tiers	of	government”.97The	degree	to	which	the	unique	political	
context	in	each	of	our	case	studies	has	impacted	the	ways	in	which	their	paradiplomacy	is	
understood	 is	perhaps	to	be	expected.	 In	many	ways,	and	contrary	to	the	 impression	that	
paradiplomatic	actors	often	give,	paradiplomacy	is	a	politically	charged	activity.	Tensions	are	
almost	bound	to	arise	in	this	field	because	the	area	itself	-	diplomatic	representation,	foreign	
affairs,	 international	 relations,	 however	 one	 frames	 it	 -	 touches	 so	 closely	 on	 a	 key	 state	
prerogative.		
	
This	brings	us	to	the	second	overarching	theme	that	we	will	conclude	with:	the	paradoxical	
nature	 of	 paradiplomacy.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 we	 can	 understand	 paradiplomacy	 as	 a	
sovereignty	game	that	draws	on	fundamental	tenets	of	power	and	authority	and	is	about	the	
relative	position	of	the	sub-state	government	vis-a-vis	its	‘host’	state.	Even	in	the	absence	of	
any	desire	 to	 fundamentally	 recast	 the	state-	 sub-state	 relationship,	 the	game	can	still	be	
played:	with	 the	 ‘end	point’	being	 the	very	constitution	of	 the	sub-state	government	as	a	
legitimate	 player	 in	 the	 game	 itself	 (Adler-Nissen	 and	 Gammeltoft-Hansen,	 2008;	 Adler-
Nissen	 and	Gad,	 2014;	 Adler-Nissen	 and	Gad,	 2012).	 In	 this	 understanding,	 the	 sub-state	
government	performs	its	international	agency	to	both	domestic	and	international	audiences,	
in	doing	so	extending	their	‘territorial	reach’	(Ferguson	and	Mansbach,	1996)	and	making	an,	
often	implicit,	reference	to	sovereignty	-	drawing	on	the	meanings,	associations	and	symbols	
of	both	diplomacy	and	statehood	(McConnell	et	al.,	2012;	McConnell,	2016).		
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 however,	 the	 day-to-day	 realities	 of	 paradiplomacy	 are	 often	
‘unspectacular’	in	nature	(Aldecoa	and	Keating,	1999a:	19),	and	only	in	isolated	incidents	do	
we	 see	 tensions	 flare	 in	 a	way	 that	 reflects	 the	 underlying	 dynamics	 of	 contestation	 and	
appropriation	that	have	been	identified.	Similarly,	while	the	mimicry	of	state-like	diplomacy	
by	sub-state	governments	punctuates	the	monopoly	that	states	hold	in	this	domain,	the	fact	
that	paradiplomacy	looks	and	sounds	so	remarkably	similar	to	the	diplomacy	of	states	also	
acts	to	reinforce	this	same	dominance.	Sub-state	governments	become	both	“resemblance	
																																																						
97	Interview	data,	Senior	Welsh	Government	official,	2013.	
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and	menace”;	 they	 (non-state	actors)	both	 “elevate	 ‘official’	 state	diplomacy	as	 ideal	 and	
dilute	its	distinction	from	other,	‘unofficial’	diplomacies”	(McConnell	et	al.,	2012:	811):	
These	spaces	of	diplomatic	mimicry	can	be	imagined	as	remainders	left	over	
and	 left	 behind	 as	 the	 ‘legitimate’	 international	 space	 is	 continually	
constituted.	 It	 is	 their	 excess	 that	 provides	 the	 constitutive	 outside	 to	 the	
diplomatic	realm.	Even	as	their	existence	threatens	that	system,	the	system	
relies	on	them	for	representational	force	to	reify	systemic	norms	(McConnell	
et	al.,	2012:	811).		
	
Is	 paradiplomacy,	 therefore,	 just	 something	 and	 nothing?	 One	 factor	 pointing	 towards	 a	
different	explanation	is	the	political	‘doublespeak’	that	abounds	in	this	territory.	While	many	
of	 the	accounts	given	by	governmental	officials,	as	part	of	 the	 research	underpinning	 this	
thesis,	 pointed	 to	 the	 generally	 benign	 and	 workmanlike	 context	 surrounding	 their	
paradiplomatic	endeavours,	we	must	remember	to	question	the	source	of	such	accounts.	As	
was	highlighted	by	the	unwillingness	of	Scottish	officials	to	discuss	paradiplomacy	as	part	of	
this	 project,	 both	 civil	 servants	 and	 politicians	may	well	 be	mindful	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
impressions	that	they	give,	precisely	because	of	the	potential	for	this	to	be	such	a	politically	
sensitive	area,	one	“so	closely	articulated	to	sovereignty	that	it	is	considered	the	prerogative	
of	the	sovereign”	(Adler-Nissen	and	Gad,	2014:	16).	The	subject	matter	we	touch	upon	when	
discussing	 paradiplomacy	 is	 one	 that	 inherently	 chafes	 at	 the	 boundaries	 of	 sub-state	
authority,	and	therefore	we	must	triangulate	the	stories	we	are	told	in	different	contexts.	
	
The	conceptual	dissonance	of	paradiplomacy:	the	difficulty	we	have	in	reconciling	acts	which	
look	and	sound	like	they	are	conducted	by	states,	but	yet	are	not	being	conducted	by	states	
at	all,	points	to	the	fact	that	something	interesting	is	indeed	happening	in	this	domain.	It	is	
happening	at	the	margins	of	international	relations,	yet	it	lends	insight,	provides	parameters	
and	gives	indications	of	the	direction	of	travel	in	terms	of	much	‘bigger’	questions.	We	are	
perhaps	best	led	back	to	Krasner’s	classifications	of	sovereignty’s	many	variants:	international	
legal	 sovereignty,	 Westphalian	 sovereignty,	 domestic	 sovereignty	 and	 interdependence	
sovereignty,	each	with	their	own	rules	and	logics	of	appropriateness		(Krasner,	1999).	In	the	
varied	activities	of	sub-state	governments,	we	arguably	find	some	of	these	elements,	or	at	
least	precedents	for	them.	Certainly,	the	unique	characteristics	of	sub-state	governments	as	
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diplomatic	actors	-	‘sovereignty	bound	yet	sovereignty	free’	(Hocking,	1999)	-	present	a	new,	
incremental,	set	of	challenges	for	IR	theory.	 In	a	broader	sense	they	also	point	to	the	vast	
heterogeneity	of	international	relations,	and	of	the	multitude	of	relationships	that	exist	and	
persist	outside	of	the	‘Westphalian	straightjacket’	(Buzan	and	Little,	2001:	-25;	Adler-Nissen	
and	Gad,	2014:	14).	
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